Well, the shortfall for oil in the 2000s was still big enough to be highly linked to the 2008 financial crisis. You can check it hereâif the link doesnât work, search for the title âThe 2008 financial crisis: the third oil shock?â. The graph I refered to that didnât work was this one:
Relationship between oil price and oil production. Jancovici, based on data from BP statistical review
Renewable energy is more distributed, yes, but when I talk about supply shocks, Iâm talking about the fossil fuels dependency that we have right nowâand that is likely to stay there well into the next 3 decades.
Renewables also rely on metals, some of which are poorly destributed (like lithium and copper in China and Australia, and platinum in South Africa) . China also directly controls approximately 80% of the raw materials value chain (mining, refining, smelting, manufacture and recycling). This does not account for Chinese-held corporate foreign investment in industrial assets worldwide. Specifically, the country has reduced its exports to attract more industry to the country. The Made in China 2025 plan is designed to secure the remaining 20% for Chinese interests in the name of long-term security (see here, page 61).
I looked at the reference and I donât see evidence for the 80% number. The majority of the mineral budget (total ~1% of GDP) is cement, iron, and aluminum. It looks like China mines little iron and aluminum, though it does refine a lot of them. Eyeballing it looks like China is ~half production and consumption minerals, which is a lot. But the idea that China would control 100% of the worldâs mining, refining, smelting, manufacture and recycling is hyperbole.
Ok, I looked again and the 80% figure is a bit a stretch compared to the initial formula, I can agree. I think itâs not just âChina is mining these mineralsâ but âChina is involved in the material chain at some point, through mining or refining or smelting or manufacturing or recyclingâ (with varying degrees of dependency). That could be where the 80% figure comes from. 100% is not realistic, but Chinaâs share is the value chain is increasing.
But even if we were to stick to 50% of control as you suggest, or 60%, this would not change much of the issue that there is a lot of dependency, indeed. A lot of potential vulnerability would arise if China were to cut down some of its exports (whether voluntarily, or by accident, or because of a pandemic).
Well, the shortfall for oil in the 2000s was still big enough to be highly linked to the 2008 financial crisis. You can check it hereâif the link doesnât work, search for the title âThe 2008 financial crisis: the third oil shock?â. The graph I refered to that didnât work was this one:
Relationship between oil price and oil production. Jancovici, based on data from BP statistical review
Renewable energy is more distributed, yes, but when I talk about supply shocks, Iâm talking about the fossil fuels dependency that we have right nowâand that is likely to stay there well into the next 3 decades.
Renewables also rely on metals, some of which are poorly destributed (like lithium and copper in China and Australia, and platinum in South Africa) . China also directly controls approximately 80% of the raw materials value chain (mining, refining, smelting, manufacture and recycling). This does not account for Chinese-held corporate foreign investment in industrial assets worldwide. Specifically, the country has reduced its exports to attract more industry to the country. The Made in China 2025 plan is designed to secure the remaining 20% for Chinese interests in the name of long-term security (see here, page 61).
I looked at the reference and I donât see evidence for the 80% number. The majority of the mineral budget (total ~1% of GDP) is cement, iron, and aluminum. It looks like China mines little iron and aluminum, though it does refine a lot of them. Eyeballing it looks like China is ~half production and consumption minerals, which is a lot. But the idea that China would control 100% of the worldâs mining, refining, smelting, manufacture and recycling is hyperbole.
Ok, I looked again and the 80% figure is a bit a stretch compared to the initial formula, I can agree. I think itâs not just âChina is mining these mineralsâ but âChina is involved in the material chain at some point, through mining or refining or smelting or manufacturing or recyclingâ (with varying degrees of dependency). That could be where the 80% figure comes from. 100% is not realistic, but Chinaâs share is the value chain is increasing.
But even if we were to stick to 50% of control as you suggest, or 60%, this would not change much of the issue that there is a lot of dependency, indeed. A lot of potential vulnerability would arise if China were to cut down some of its exports (whether voluntarily, or by accident, or because of a pandemic).