Ceding Ukraine’s separatist regions (Donetsk, Luhansk) to Russian control
Committing to Ukraine not joining Nato (aka “Finlandisation”)
Committing to Ukraine not joining the EU
I’m pretty skeptical this is practical.
Inside Ukraine, leadership and the people wouldn’t accept this, even before the invasion. Also, there’s many people in those regions who don’t want to live in Russia. Outside the country, there is no mechanism or appetite to compel the country to do this. This would be seen as another Munich.
If you mean if the outside world was a singular hive mind and this would be the optimum play, I’m also skeptical.
While there are very real security concerns for Russia from a NATO aligned Ukraine, Putin’s tactics and rhetoric are extremely hostile and manipulative. This has a particularly treacherous character, where noxious narratives become part of the mixed warfare. This has been honed for decades.
After deleting the truth, I don’t think this behavior should be rewarded by reconstructing a narrative in his favor, and I see these concessions as doing this.
There’s more—Ukraine’s resistance is probably constructively helping to create an independent state, even if this involved Russian occupation in the near term. This could have overwhelming value, in the same way that an independent India, Poland or United States is seen as valuable by those people or the world.
This is partially informed by ‘inside’ views of the culture of Ukraine and the success and vibrance, at least of its wealthier regions. It’s not merely a breakaway region of Russia.
I would find it interesting and rewarding if you could explain how you formed these beliefs or provided links or articles supporting it:
I suspect lots of analysts and even politicians agree broadly with what I have written above, but find it difficult to say publicly because it might look like capitulation to Putin. He is obviously a bad guy, and sadly we lack language and nuance in our politics to recognise that a politician/regime is genuinely evil while also acknowledging the need to engage with them.
If the above is true, why haven’t more Ukrainians called for it? Probably a combination of things, including patriotism and (not unjustified) hatred/distrust of Russia. I suspect many were expecting a stronger military/sanction response from the West (e.g. no fly zone), but I don’t think they’ll get it because the West doesn’t want to risk war with Russia. Also, political incentives: Ukraine’s leaders don’t want to be seen to compromise with Moscow.
Yes, I agree that those options aren’t super practical (if they were, they probably would have happened last week), but my main point is that they would be preferable to the current situation. I also don’t want to reward Putin, obviously. However he’s currently on course to take the whole country. Surely this is worse for the West/Ukraine, and better for him?
On the last two bullet points: the first is informed by talking to analysts and parliamentary researchers in the UK. I think most people would agree there is political pressure (both domestic and international) not to be seen to concede to Putin. The question is how much of a factor this is and whether it leads to worse.
I think this broadly applies to the second bullet point too. It seems fairly clear to me that Ukraine’s leadership was not in a position to concede to Putin’s demands. To use a slightly facetious example, if China threatened nuclear war on the US in exchange for taking Hawaii, any US President would find it hard to agree to the demands, even if it could be better for the world in an EV/x-risk sense.
There are two points that are huge and aren’t mentioned at all in your posts or replies.
Ukraine’s military performance has been wildly successful, more so than is reported. It even seems like Russia’s offensive with its current deployed forces could fail.
The international response seems overwhelming and seems likely to gravely harm Russia’s capability to conduct future adverse activity of any kind.
My comment you are reading could age poorly (in the worst case, if Ukraine’s organized defenses collapses and the conflict turns into a terribly violent insurgency, and sanctions prove short lived).
But there’s something really off here.
Your post and perspective seem to come from a “realist” perspective. But it’s not addressing these points above (and others as well). This seems really weird to me, sort of walking in an uncanny valley. I can’t really place this and I don’t know what’s going on.
This feels similar to Feb 2020. I know someone who spoke with a staff member at the CDC, and this staff member had a post-graduate STEM degree. They vehemently said that the value of masks for civilians was zero (this was a conversation over several days, and semi-private)[1].
The UK’s intelligence on Russia is excellent, and has been huge aid in the conflict. Presumably the analysts you are speaking to are excellent, especially if you’re speaking to mainstream researchers who are advising policy.
But I don’t know who you are talking to. In this situation I want to learn more about who you are speaking to. I guess the main explanation is that I’m very wrong, but it’s hard for me to see how.
Maybe these people are of extreme talent, and have decades of experience focused on this issue, and it takes a lot of time for me to even see their worldview and judgement.
It got pretty weird: when presented with papers, the staff member got increasingly hostile. This seemed bizarre, especially since they spoke under “color of authority” and seemed to actively resort to it at several stages.
Agreed—I wasn’t expecting Ukraine’s military to hold out so well. In the longer run I suspect Putin still has the upper hand, but this isn’t what he wanted. That said I still think the most likely outcome for Ukraine is still very bad, and note that my option would have (hopefully) avoided the loss/suffering/economic collapse that has already happened. Lastly, I could be ex ante right even if this week’s events change our ex post calculations.
I wouldn’t say overwhelming, but I have been impressed with European unity and surprised by Sweden, Switzerland and Germany reversing longstanding policies. I agree that this will make future action for Russia technically harder, though it also backs Putin into a corner which is a bit of a dangerous place for him to be.
I also agree that ‘realist’ perspectives often risk losing track with reality—realism as an approach/philosophy in IR is often based more on pessimism about human behaviour than about how things turn out. But it’s too early to judge.
I’m talking to a range of people. Not everyone agrees. But there are a good number of ‘realists’ including in the EA community who are focused on reducing the chances of nuclear war, and believe that these would have been lower if Russia had been offered some concessions last week, but all of us recognise why this was politically unattainable.
I think that there’s good evidence, including US intelligence claims, that Russia decided on the invasion many weeks ago. This is another point, to the others above, that are contra to the premise of your post.
I’m also skeptical that Putin is backed into a corner or that it’s worth any time reacting to related posturing, as others seem to have.
I think your post is more virtuous and thoughtful than it appears.
The truth is that the Ukraine resistance and efforts on the back of the Ukrainian people, provide enormous value for western and US interests. It’s not clear the Ukrainians are really being “compensated” for this.
(I’m not sure where this fits in with a “realist” worldview but) I see your post as pushing through this to look at the human toll. The truth is probably that human suffering will be a lot higher with the effective Ukraine resistance we are seeing than the collapse that Russia expected.
It’s risky to point this out, in front of many Ukrainians and others close to the events, including those in Poland who have suffered a terrible history of de facto betrayal and perfidy.
Another reason why I’m interested in asking questions is that deep models are rare and it’s good to poke and try to learn more about them.
I think you’re right and I’m wrong about what will happen in the military situation, and this seems important for suffering.
I said:
It even seems like Russia’s offensive with its current deployed forces could fail.
You said:
I suspect Putin still has the upper hand, but this isn’t what he wanted. That said I still think the most likely outcome for Ukraine is still very bad, and note that my option would have (hopefully) avoided the loss/suffering/economic collapse that has already happened.
Unfortunately, I think you are right that the Russians will win. Also your perspective and post is right and much more virtuous than it seemed.
A perspective of the military situation is given here in this thread:
Basically, the Russian military looks bad right now. But this is because they relied on a light quick attack. However, the Russians are really good at brutal artillery attacks, which they will probably resort to. This may take time but they will use these and other heavy weapons in the following weeks or months.
If this happens, the Russians might level the cities of Ukraine, which are still filled with hundreds of thousands of people and the historical and cultural value of Ukraine.
I’m not really sure but it seems like there is an intervention here that is sort of weird in an EA way.
The idea of this intervention is not that we focus on stopping the war immediately. The “negotiations” that are going on seem ineffective.
Instead, we acknowledge the outcome, the surrender of Ukraine, and we focus on doing things that might result in a ceasefire earlier than it would otherwise occur, and at lower levels of destruction from heavy weapons.
For example, maybe US and NATO concessions can be dangled, or acts of antagonism are discouraged so that it doesn’t entrench the conflict, but I don’t really know what to do.
Another subthread is that the US policy establishment might have a mindset focused on Ukraine’s instrumental value in undermining Russia. Maybe this means that peace and concessions to Russia could be relatively neglected. It seems possible that someone could convince the US that enough has been done by the Ukrainian people.
Again, this intervention is weird because it says that the west will be horrified at some point and move for peace, especially if deaths rise to the horror of tens of thousands. The idea of this intervention is to try to move this point earlier, saving the thousands of lives because of the earlier cease fire.
This is important, since deaths during use of heavy weapons might be extreme.
This seems neglected, since it assumes the dominance of Russian heavy weapons and promotes the surrender of Ukraine.
The US and EU are very sophisticated and active in diplomacy, so this might be (extremely) intractable, or this whole thread superseded in some way.
I’m pretty skeptical this is practical.
Inside Ukraine, leadership and the people wouldn’t accept this, even before the invasion. Also, there’s many people in those regions who don’t want to live in Russia. Outside the country, there is no mechanism or appetite to compel the country to do this. This would be seen as another Munich.
If you mean if the outside world was a singular hive mind and this would be the optimum play, I’m also skeptical.
While there are very real security concerns for Russia from a NATO aligned Ukraine, Putin’s tactics and rhetoric are extremely hostile and manipulative. This has a particularly treacherous character, where noxious narratives become part of the mixed warfare. This has been honed for decades.
After deleting the truth, I don’t think this behavior should be rewarded by reconstructing a narrative in his favor, and I see these concessions as doing this.
There’s more—Ukraine’s resistance is probably constructively helping to create an independent state, even if this involved Russian occupation in the near term. This could have overwhelming value, in the same way that an independent India, Poland or United States is seen as valuable by those people or the world.
This is partially informed by ‘inside’ views of the culture of Ukraine and the success and vibrance, at least of its wealthier regions. It’s not merely a breakaway region of Russia.
I would find it interesting and rewarding if you could explain how you formed these beliefs or provided links or articles supporting it:
Yes, I agree that those options aren’t super practical (if they were, they probably would have happened last week), but my main point is that they would be preferable to the current situation. I also don’t want to reward Putin, obviously. However he’s currently on course to take the whole country. Surely this is worse for the West/Ukraine, and better for him?
On the last two bullet points: the first is informed by talking to analysts and parliamentary researchers in the UK. I think most people would agree there is political pressure (both domestic and international) not to be seen to concede to Putin. The question is how much of a factor this is and whether it leads to worse.
I think this broadly applies to the second bullet point too. It seems fairly clear to me that Ukraine’s leadership was not in a position to concede to Putin’s demands. To use a slightly facetious example, if China threatened nuclear war on the US in exchange for taking Hawaii, any US President would find it hard to agree to the demands, even if it could be better for the world in an EV/x-risk sense.
Thanks David,
There are two points that are huge and aren’t mentioned at all in your posts or replies.
Ukraine’s military performance has been wildly successful, more so than is reported. It even seems like Russia’s offensive with its current deployed forces could fail.
The international response seems overwhelming and seems likely to gravely harm Russia’s capability to conduct future adverse activity of any kind.
My comment you are reading could age poorly (in the worst case, if Ukraine’s organized defenses collapses and the conflict turns into a terribly violent insurgency, and sanctions prove short lived).
But there’s something really off here.
Your post and perspective seem to come from a “realist” perspective. But it’s not addressing these points above (and others as well). This seems really weird to me, sort of walking in an uncanny valley. I can’t really place this and I don’t know what’s going on.
This feels similar to Feb 2020. I know someone who spoke with a staff member at the CDC, and this staff member had a post-graduate STEM degree. They vehemently said that the value of masks for civilians was zero (this was a conversation over several days, and semi-private)[1].
The UK’s intelligence on Russia is excellent, and has been huge aid in the conflict. Presumably the analysts you are speaking to are excellent, especially if you’re speaking to mainstream researchers who are advising policy.
But I don’t know who you are talking to. In this situation I want to learn more about who you are speaking to. I guess the main explanation is that I’m very wrong, but it’s hard for me to see how.
Maybe these people are of extreme talent, and have decades of experience focused on this issue, and it takes a lot of time for me to even see their worldview and judgement.
It got pretty weird: when presented with papers, the staff member got increasingly hostile. This seemed bizarre, especially since they spoke under “color of authority” and seemed to actively resort to it at several stages.
In response to your two points:
Agreed—I wasn’t expecting Ukraine’s military to hold out so well. In the longer run I suspect Putin still has the upper hand, but this isn’t what he wanted. That said I still think the most likely outcome for Ukraine is still very bad, and note that my option would have (hopefully) avoided the loss/suffering/economic collapse that has already happened. Lastly, I could be ex ante right even if this week’s events change our ex post calculations.
I wouldn’t say overwhelming, but I have been impressed with European unity and surprised by Sweden, Switzerland and Germany reversing longstanding policies. I agree that this will make future action for Russia technically harder, though it also backs Putin into a corner which is a bit of a dangerous place for him to be.
I also agree that ‘realist’ perspectives often risk losing track with reality—realism as an approach/philosophy in IR is often based more on pessimism about human behaviour than about how things turn out. But it’s too early to judge.
I’m talking to a range of people. Not everyone agrees. But there are a good number of ‘realists’ including in the EA community who are focused on reducing the chances of nuclear war, and believe that these would have been lower if Russia had been offered some concessions last week, but all of us recognise why this was politically unattainable.
I think that there’s good evidence, including US intelligence claims, that Russia decided on the invasion many weeks ago. This is another point, to the others above, that are contra to the premise of your post.
I’m also skeptical that Putin is backed into a corner or that it’s worth any time reacting to related posturing, as others seem to have.
Russian decisions, starting from weeks ago, through to today are easily rationalizable (if grossly incompetent and murderous). Putin can make his performative actions, but he spends a lot of effort/money on say, his $100M yacht which he carefully evacuated before the conflict or his (probable) billion dollar (!) palace in the Mediterranean climate on the Black Sea.
I think your post is more virtuous and thoughtful than it appears.
The truth is that the Ukraine resistance and efforts on the back of the Ukrainian people, provide enormous value for western and US interests. It’s not clear the Ukrainians are really being “compensated” for this.
(I’m not sure where this fits in with a “realist” worldview but) I see your post as pushing through this to look at the human toll. The truth is probably that human suffering will be a lot higher with the effective Ukraine resistance we are seeing than the collapse that Russia expected.
It’s risky to point this out, in front of many Ukrainians and others close to the events, including those in Poland who have suffered a terrible history of de facto betrayal and perfidy.
Another reason why I’m interested in asking questions is that deep models are rare and it’s good to poke and try to learn more about them.
I think you’re right and I’m wrong about what will happen in the military situation, and this seems important for suffering.
I said:
You said:
Unfortunately, I think you are right that the Russians will win. Also your perspective and post is right and much more virtuous than it seemed.
A perspective of the military situation is given here in this thread:
https://mobile.twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1498381975022940167
Basically, the Russian military looks bad right now. But this is because they relied on a light quick attack. However, the Russians are really good at brutal artillery attacks, which they will probably resort to. This may take time but they will use these and other heavy weapons in the following weeks or months.
If this happens, the Russians might level the cities of Ukraine, which are still filled with hundreds of thousands of people and the historical and cultural value of Ukraine.
I’m not really sure but it seems like there is an intervention here that is sort of weird in an EA way.
The idea of this intervention is not that we focus on stopping the war immediately. The “negotiations” that are going on seem ineffective.
Instead, we acknowledge the outcome, the surrender of Ukraine, and we focus on doing things that might result in a ceasefire earlier than it would otherwise occur, and at lower levels of destruction from heavy weapons.
For example, maybe US and NATO concessions can be dangled, or acts of antagonism are discouraged so that it doesn’t entrench the conflict, but I don’t really know what to do.
Another subthread is that the US policy establishment might have a mindset focused on Ukraine’s instrumental value in undermining Russia. Maybe this means that peace and concessions to Russia could be relatively neglected. It seems possible that someone could convince the US that enough has been done by the Ukrainian people.
Again, this intervention is weird because it says that the west will be horrified at some point and move for peace, especially if deaths rise to the horror of tens of thousands. The idea of this intervention is to try to move this point earlier, saving the thousands of lives because of the earlier cease fire.
This is important, since deaths during use of heavy weapons might be extreme.
This seems neglected, since it assumes the dominance of Russian heavy weapons and promotes the surrender of Ukraine.
The US and EU are very sophisticated and active in diplomacy, so this might be (extremely) intractable, or this whole thread superseded in some way.