Hi hi! I think I will respond with the Glo-centric points here and keep my own post more of a personal âmy relationship with cryptoâ story. Thanks for giving the Glo post a close read!
regarding market capâas we observe in a previous post, we face a tradeoff in talking about Glo: the entrepreneur class, who we need to keep the lights on, responds well to more maximalist claims (e.g. 11T market cap) and regular folks resonate with more intermediate goals. Were I meeting you at an EA meetup and trying to pitch you on Glo, Iâd probably focus on the first of the listed milestones: if Glo became the 4th largest stablecoin at $12B, we can effectively double GiveDirectlyâs annual revenue. That feels achievable to me. The top stablecoins out there right now all basically started in the past few years. This is just a matter of competing with the current leaders, and though they have first-mover advantage, at least some of them have glaringdrawbacks.
Regarding use cases -- Iâll touch on this in the post, but Iâm more optimistic about future use cases than you are, and less concerned by the lack of anything planetary-scale to date. And, per my first point, if Glo only becomes a very successful stablecoin for current stablecoin uses (re: DeFi), it would still do a lot of good. So I donât currently worry about this. âSufficient for the day is its own trouble.â
I personally struggle with how/âif/âwhen we should talk about volatility in the crypto industry. Stablecoinsâso long as they are actually fully-backed! -- are hedges against that volatility. Plausibly Glo helps ameliorate the overall problem by introducing a stable, fully- and transparently-backed asset into the mix? Though of course the overall volatility, at the tail end, is also a risk to Gloâsomething that takes the entire industry out would also take us out. And for sure anyone should go in with eyes open about the quantity and scale of hacks, rug pulls, etc. We talk about this in places but perhaps we can talk about it more.
Regarding reputational risksâI agree this is a problem. I think itâs more fruitful to think about this on a variety of different margins. A non-diversified portfolio is always risky; when EA as a whole suddenly found itself cash-rich because of a small handful of investors, that particular portfolio of reputational associations was extremely risky. With a properly diversified set of investment and reputational associations, associating with a crypto project thatâs trying to do things right doesnât strike me as especially risky. Your perceptions may vary. But I hope the main pointâitâs about the underlying distributionâmakes sense. Weâve also tried to think through as many of the risks as we can, which we describe in the âGlo smart contracts security and governanceâ .
Hope this was interesting! Iâll follow up when I have my thoughts together about the âwhy crypto ainât so badâ thread
I understand the use case for a stablecoin that needs to link with the crypto worldâwhatever one may think of crypto, if stablecoins exist, thereâs a good argument that the organizer should lack a profit motive and the profits should go to something socially useful.
I am struggling to understand the other use cases (e.g., âsaversâ on the Glo website). For such users, this seems akin to a money market fund owned by a charity that pays 0% interest and instead donates the interest to charity. I am not sure what the added advantage having a crypto element adds to that basic idea (which is probably a good one, by the way). Right now, I suspect the answer is lower operating costsâbut I think there is a high probability that much more extensive regulation is coming for crypto, and that operating costs of companies like Glo will begin to approach costs for banks and other financial institutions.
Indeed, this seems for non-crypto use cases potentially inferior to opening the âGiveDirectly Bankââi.e., a US bank owned by a non-profit that donates its profits to GiveDirectly. Because Glo isnât backstopped by the US FDIC (or equivalent), it has to purchase ultrasafe, highly liquid (thus: low-yield) assets to imperfectly simulate that backstop. In contrast, the GD Bank would have a freer hand in investing user capital for higher yield because (up to FDIC insurance limits, which can be creatively stretched to several million dollars per depositor) the risk of loss is ultimately borne by the US Government.
Four separate points here: 1) the stablecoin use case makes sense to you; 2) operating expenses for Glo are low today but likely to be higher in the future after regulation; 3) why crypto versus any other way of implementing the core idea, which is turning some portion of a personâs âcash on handâ into an automatically-donating vehicle; and 4) in particular why not an EA-aligned bank (re: credit union) that just donates to GiveDirectly?
RE: 2: Weâre gonna have to wait and see what specifics shake out. Our overall hope is that by registering as a non-profit, and establishing formal oversight and governance within the established category of 501(c)3, weâll be compliant with whatever comes by default. But this is speculative.
RE: 3-4 Weâve had this idea and I even wrote up a version of it in a doc called âThe case for an effective altruist credit unionâ (which I would be happy to share with you if youâd like to DM me an email address). The basic consensus is: stablecoin makes a lot of sense as a first product, because the DeFi market is already huge and, frankly, in need of some better infrastructure (ultimately, stablecoins are infrastructure), so that is a fine beachhead for the overall idea. Second, launching a bank that is broadly available across the world is going to be very, very challenging. Glo the stablecoin is available just about everywhere the moment itâs on exchanges.
But yes, the overall idea of âpassive philanthropyââgenerating positive externalities automaticallyâhas broad implications. We dream of âphilanthriopizingâ other sectors of the economy as well (though Iâm not sure weâll stick wth the term philanthropizeâ.)
I should add that a good bit of my unease with non-DeFi use cases comes from the additional risk to which users âbringingâ funds into crypto will be exposed. Even assuming Glo is 100% risk-free itself, there is still either exchange risk (FTX was not the only one to go under) or self-custody risk (e.g., losing oneâs keys) plus risk from compromise of the userâs security environment (e.g., a trojan). For people who needed a stablecoin anyway, these risks are no different than for any other stablecoin; they have made the choice to take the risk for their own purposes. But these risks donât really have any counterpart for someone whose counterfactual was keeping the money in a high-yield savings account at an insured bank. The FDIC will cover you if your bank goes under, and your bank will cover you in most instances of fraud.
So I am not convinced that putting your money in something like Glo is essentially as safe as putting it in the bank. I donât think those risks are trivial, and I think there are concerns with exposing altruistic users to themâeven if they are very clearly disclosed as meaningful risks. We do not, for instance, allow altruistic blood donors to expose themselves to anything but the mildest or most unlikely of risks. As the folks at 1DaySooner could likely attest, we do allow altruists to take somewhat greater risks when the social goal is important enough and there is very strong informed consent. In those situations, we usually also require a plan to provide care for the altruist if something goes south.
One of the pleasures of liaising with EAs on Gloâs behalf is how quickly the conversations advance to the âfrontierâ of issues that we are currently debating or have debated extensively. This is a good example.
Section 3 of the previously linked-to Glo EA post outlines the intended stages of Gloâs growth, starting with stablecoin use cases and then moving to savings accounts. I wrote that section and I meant it as a chronological roadmap, meaning the DeFi use case would come first in a sequence. As you observed, that nuance has been lost on the Glo homepage. Weâre in the middle of redesigning the website to be more CTA (call to action)-focused in light of Gloâs impending release. If I had my druthers we would focus more on established stablecoin use cases and less on getting new people into crypto for the reasons you outlined. I didnât feel that way three months agoâin fact I wrote a Twitter thread on getting started with crypto that we published like two weeks before FTX collapsed. Shows what I know.
I currently own about $30 of crypto. I am lucky to live in a country with trusted (trustworthy?) third parties, which, as you point out in another comment, is not something everyone can say. But it does mean that stablecoins solve no obvious problem for me. So once Glo is released, my plan is to buy up to $100 a month. Iâll try to spend on groceries and such, with the intent to not hold more than $100 at a time until I think the risk profile is totally negligible and the utility approaches that of regular dollars. If something like that level of commitment makes sense to you, great. If not, no worries.
As you point out, Gloâs risk profile is partly a function of things Glo (the company) does, but also of how/âwhere Glo is available and how people interact with it. So a different way to approach your question is to ask what safety/ârisk benchmarks youâd have to see both from Glo and the crypto ecosystem as a whole to feel that the risk profiles of Glo and a âhigh-yield savings account at an insured bankâ were broadly similar?
I/âwe have some speculative answers to this but so long as Iâve got you on the line, Iâm curious to hear your thoughts.
For Glo: I donât fully know what means are available to show how much one has in the bank and in Treasuries. I guess the ideal would be some sort of continuous real-time verification, possibly by a network of the worldâs largest banks in a custodial role? I am assuming you could prove how much Glo had been issued and how much you held (e.g., from redemptions); from that, it should be possible to show near-full capitalization (perhaps with some lag during heavy redemptions).
I also donât know enough about running a cryptocurrency to express what Iâd need to know Glo was secure (e.g., that someone could not steal the metaphorical printing press and start printing new Glo without asset backing, or hack into a wallet holding redeemed or not-yet-issued Glo). I think some of that would involve proving that there was a technological solution whereby several independent authorities (e.g., your auditors, a partner at a mega law firm, whoever) would need to provide authorization to generate more Glo or to move significant quantities out of cold storage.
For exchange risk: Ideally, there would be something like the SIPC (which insurers customers of broker/âdealers from losses in the custody functionânot from losses in the value of the underlying securities). I do not think that is particularly realisticâSIPC is actually funded by a levy on broker/âdealers, but the exchange market is too concentrated for that to be a viable model to cover losses. It has a credit line with Treasury, but not full faith and credit.
I donât see a universe with the FDIC/âNCUA model for a whileâwe would need long proof that crypto exchange regulation was working well before I think putting the USGâs full faith and credit behind an exchange insurer would be viable.And to be frank, at least in the mid-term future, crypto exchanges just arenât socially necessary in the way banks and securities dealers are, and so justifying taxpayer backing would be a tough sell.
So the question is whether something like Japanese regulations would be sufficient. Iâm not yet convinced that would be sufficient for the standard you set, although they seem to have protected Japanese users at FTX Japan. Maybe I would change my mind after a few more years and more failures that affect other countries but not Japan.
For consumer-equipment risk: I donât think you can get to essentially-insured-bank safety for consumer users without either Glo or the exchange eating fraud losses that a bank would have to eat. Consumers on average are just not savvy enough to keep that risk at a minimal levelâand although you and I could probably do so, it would come at a steep cost for useability.
Thatâs a tough issue to figure out, because an entity like Glo isnât really in a position to verify or cover those sorts of losses. And for me to be convinced of their safety, exchanges need to play it safe and largely stick to providing safe custody and exchange services . . . nothing that exposes the exchange to meaningful risk. Unfortunately, that approach also limits how much money exchanges can make and thus how much they could be expected to spend on fraud reimbursements.
Note that at least US law gives much less protection to business usersâif your business computer gets a trojan and makes unauthorized transactions on your account, youâre often screwed. So if you could fix the exchange-risk problem, this might be an acceptable problem for business users.
Also, current US law does not generally protect customers who are fraudulently induced into lossesâe.g., you get a fake text from the IRS saying to Zelle $5000 to this account or youâre going to jail, and you comply. Since these are risks borne by users in the banking system, they can be borne by Glo users as well.
All that is to say that I think truly safe crypto is a ways off. Of course, I am willing to accept a somewhat higher level of risk for people holding crypto to accrue benefits to themselves than for those who hold Glo for altruistic purposes.
For the most part. For (2), I primarily meant stuff like KYC and anti-money laundering measures.
If you havenât already, itâs worth thinking about the tax implications as well. My gut feeling under US law is that all of this interest might be taxable as unrelated business income (UBIT) because running a stablecoin might not be substantially related to the charitable, educational, or other purpose that would be the basis of the organizationâs exemption. It would be a means of generating profit for the organizationâs charitable mission, which is the point of the UBI tax. The point of the UBI tax is to prevent non-profits from having an unfair advantage over for-profit businesses in commercial activity, which seems to fit here.
Generally, interest is excluded from UBI, but that may only apply to interest from ordinary and routine investments. I canât give you legal advice as to an answer even if I were qualified; I can only say that it is a question that crossed my mind.
Unbacked stablecoins like algorithmic coins and (probably) Tether are not hedges, they are a huge source of potential danger for the industry. Although I guess thatâs an argument in favour of Glo (assuming youâre legit).
In general, I think the idea is good, and if it works as planned, well, you arenât gonna make 11 trillion of course, but you could displace some bad actors and generate some money for charities.
However, if I were an EA org, I would still hold off on getting involved with glo for now. The problem is that the FTX debacle involved SBF using EAâs reputation to help build his company up, which was then used to harm people. If we get unlucky and Glo ends up doing something similar (even if itâs, say, incompetence rather than fraud), then the credibility of EA in most eyes would be pretty much dead. Being fooled twice by the exact same trick is not a good look.
Again, I think youâre probably fine, and i think the situation is unfair to you. I think if Glo establishes itself as gold standard, beyond reproach company with full auditing and transparency, then it could be something great and worth endorsing, Iâd just advise EA orgs to wait before getting involved.
For what itâs worth I think that holding off until Glo is more established is sensible. Others might have a different risk appetite.
I hope that Glo doesnât come across as trying to ride EAâs reputational coattailsârather I would say that EA-aligned thinking inspired the project and we think that it will be of interest to at least some EAs.
And a note on nomenclature: I think the stablecoin label should only apply to coins that can maintain their peg in the event of a run. It was quite the marketing coup that so many not-so-stable coins got folks to call them stable. I think âalgocoinâ would have been more appropriate, but the folks in the âexchange coordinationâ signal group have so far failed to consult me on the matter đ
I added a caveat about âfully-backedâ stablecoins to the comment above in light of your remark, BTW
Hi hi! I think I will respond with the Glo-centric points here and keep my own post more of a personal âmy relationship with cryptoâ story. Thanks for giving the Glo post a close read!
regarding market capâas we observe in a previous post, we face a tradeoff in talking about Glo: the entrepreneur class, who we need to keep the lights on, responds well to more maximalist claims (e.g. 11T market cap) and regular folks resonate with more intermediate goals. Were I meeting you at an EA meetup and trying to pitch you on Glo, Iâd probably focus on the first of the listed milestones: if Glo became the 4th largest stablecoin at $12B, we can effectively double GiveDirectlyâs annual revenue. That feels achievable to me. The top stablecoins out there right now all basically started in the past few years. This is just a matter of competing with the current leaders, and though they have first-mover advantage, at least some of them have glaring drawbacks.
Regarding use cases -- Iâll touch on this in the post, but Iâm more optimistic about future use cases than you are, and less concerned by the lack of anything planetary-scale to date. And, per my first point, if Glo only becomes a very successful stablecoin for current stablecoin uses (re: DeFi), it would still do a lot of good. So I donât currently worry about this. âSufficient for the day is its own trouble.â
I personally struggle with how/âif/âwhen we should talk about volatility in the crypto industry. Stablecoinsâso long as they are actually fully-backed! -- are hedges against that volatility. Plausibly Glo helps ameliorate the overall problem by introducing a stable, fully- and transparently-backed asset into the mix? Though of course the overall volatility, at the tail end, is also a risk to Gloâsomething that takes the entire industry out would also take us out. And for sure anyone should go in with eyes open about the quantity and scale of hacks, rug pulls, etc. We talk about this in places but perhaps we can talk about it more.
Regarding reputational risksâI agree this is a problem. I think itâs more fruitful to think about this on a variety of different margins. A non-diversified portfolio is always risky; when EA as a whole suddenly found itself cash-rich because of a small handful of investors, that particular portfolio of reputational associations was extremely risky. With a properly diversified set of investment and reputational associations, associating with a crypto project thatâs trying to do things right doesnât strike me as especially risky. Your perceptions may vary. But I hope the main pointâitâs about the underlying distributionâmakes sense. Weâve also tried to think through as many of the risks as we can, which we describe in the âGlo smart contracts security and governanceâ .
Hope this was interesting! Iâll follow up when I have my thoughts together about the âwhy crypto ainât so badâ thread
I understand the use case for a stablecoin that needs to link with the crypto worldâwhatever one may think of crypto, if stablecoins exist, thereâs a good argument that the organizer should lack a profit motive and the profits should go to something socially useful.
I am struggling to understand the other use cases (e.g., âsaversâ on the Glo website). For such users, this seems akin to a money market fund owned by a charity that pays 0% interest and instead donates the interest to charity. I am not sure what the added advantage having a crypto element adds to that basic idea (which is probably a good one, by the way). Right now, I suspect the answer is lower operating costsâbut I think there is a high probability that much more extensive regulation is coming for crypto, and that operating costs of companies like Glo will begin to approach costs for banks and other financial institutions.
Indeed, this seems for non-crypto use cases potentially inferior to opening the âGiveDirectly Bankââi.e., a US bank owned by a non-profit that donates its profits to GiveDirectly. Because Glo isnât backstopped by the US FDIC (or equivalent), it has to purchase ultrasafe, highly liquid (thus: low-yield) assets to imperfectly simulate that backstop. In contrast, the GD Bank would have a freer hand in investing user capital for higher yield because (up to FDIC insurance limits, which can be creatively stretched to several million dollars per depositor) the risk of loss is ultimately borne by the US Government.
Hi Jason, thanks for the kind words!
Four separate points here: 1) the stablecoin use case makes sense to you; 2) operating expenses for Glo are low today but likely to be higher in the future after regulation; 3) why crypto versus any other way of implementing the core idea, which is turning some portion of a personâs âcash on handâ into an automatically-donating vehicle; and 4) in particular why not an EA-aligned bank (re: credit union) that just donates to GiveDirectly?
RE: 2: Weâre gonna have to wait and see what specifics shake out. Our overall hope is that by registering as a non-profit, and establishing formal oversight and governance within the established category of 501(c)3, weâll be compliant with whatever comes by default. But this is speculative.
RE: 3-4 Weâve had this idea and I even wrote up a version of it in a doc called âThe case for an effective altruist credit unionâ (which I would be happy to share with you if youâd like to DM me an email address). The basic consensus is: stablecoin makes a lot of sense as a first product, because the DeFi market is already huge and, frankly, in need of some better infrastructure (ultimately, stablecoins are infrastructure), so that is a fine beachhead for the overall idea. Second, launching a bank that is broadly available across the world is going to be very, very challenging. Glo the stablecoin is available just about everywhere the moment itâs on exchanges.
But yes, the overall idea of âpassive philanthropyââgenerating positive externalities automaticallyâhas broad implications. We dream of âphilanthriopizingâ other sectors of the economy as well (though Iâm not sure weâll stick wth the term philanthropizeâ.)
Does that make sense?
I should add that a good bit of my unease with non-DeFi use cases comes from the additional risk to which users âbringingâ funds into crypto will be exposed. Even assuming Glo is 100% risk-free itself, there is still either exchange risk (FTX was not the only one to go under) or self-custody risk (e.g., losing oneâs keys) plus risk from compromise of the userâs security environment (e.g., a trojan). For people who needed a stablecoin anyway, these risks are no different than for any other stablecoin; they have made the choice to take the risk for their own purposes. But these risks donât really have any counterpart for someone whose counterfactual was keeping the money in a high-yield savings account at an insured bank. The FDIC will cover you if your bank goes under, and your bank will cover you in most instances of fraud.
So I am not convinced that putting your money in something like Glo is essentially as safe as putting it in the bank. I donât think those risks are trivial, and I think there are concerns with exposing altruistic users to themâeven if they are very clearly disclosed as meaningful risks. We do not, for instance, allow altruistic blood donors to expose themselves to anything but the mildest or most unlikely of risks. As the folks at 1DaySooner could likely attest, we do allow altruists to take somewhat greater risks when the social goal is important enough and there is very strong informed consent. In those situations, we usually also require a plan to provide care for the altruist if something goes south.
One of the pleasures of liaising with EAs on Gloâs behalf is how quickly the conversations advance to the âfrontierâ of issues that we are currently debating or have debated extensively. This is a good example.
Section 3 of the previously linked-to Glo EA post outlines the intended stages of Gloâs growth, starting with stablecoin use cases and then moving to savings accounts. I wrote that section and I meant it as a chronological roadmap, meaning the DeFi use case would come first in a sequence. As you observed, that nuance has been lost on the Glo homepage. Weâre in the middle of redesigning the website to be more CTA (call to action)-focused in light of Gloâs impending release. If I had my druthers we would focus more on established stablecoin use cases and less on getting new people into crypto for the reasons you outlined. I didnât feel that way three months agoâin fact I wrote a Twitter thread on getting started with crypto that we published like two weeks before FTX collapsed. Shows what I know.
I currently own about $30 of crypto. I am lucky to live in a country with trusted (trustworthy?) third parties, which, as you point out in another comment, is not something everyone can say. But it does mean that stablecoins solve no obvious problem for me. So once Glo is released, my plan is to buy up to $100 a month. Iâll try to spend on groceries and such, with the intent to not hold more than $100 at a time until I think the risk profile is totally negligible and the utility approaches that of regular dollars. If something like that level of commitment makes sense to you, great. If not, no worries.
As you point out, Gloâs risk profile is partly a function of things Glo (the company) does, but also of how/âwhere Glo is available and how people interact with it. So a different way to approach your question is to ask what safety/ârisk benchmarks youâd have to see both from Glo and the crypto ecosystem as a whole to feel that the risk profiles of Glo and a âhigh-yield savings account at an insured bankâ were broadly similar?
I/âwe have some speculative answers to this but so long as Iâve got you on the line, Iâm curious to hear your thoughts.
As always, thanks for engaging.
For Glo: I donât fully know what means are available to show how much one has in the bank and in Treasuries. I guess the ideal would be some sort of continuous real-time verification, possibly by a network of the worldâs largest banks in a custodial role? I am assuming you could prove how much Glo had been issued and how much you held (e.g., from redemptions); from that, it should be possible to show near-full capitalization (perhaps with some lag during heavy redemptions).
I also donât know enough about running a cryptocurrency to express what Iâd need to know Glo was secure (e.g., that someone could not steal the metaphorical printing press and start printing new Glo without asset backing, or hack into a wallet holding redeemed or not-yet-issued Glo). I think some of that would involve proving that there was a technological solution whereby several independent authorities (e.g., your auditors, a partner at a mega law firm, whoever) would need to provide authorization to generate more Glo or to move significant quantities out of cold storage.
For exchange risk: Ideally, there would be something like the SIPC (which insurers customers of broker/âdealers from losses in the custody functionânot from losses in the value of the underlying securities). I do not think that is particularly realisticâSIPC is actually funded by a levy on broker/âdealers, but the exchange market is too concentrated for that to be a viable model to cover losses. It has a credit line with Treasury, but not full faith and credit.
I donât see a universe with the FDIC/âNCUA model for a whileâwe would need long proof that crypto exchange regulation was working well before I think putting the USGâs full faith and credit behind an exchange insurer would be viable.And to be frank, at least in the mid-term future, crypto exchanges just arenât socially necessary in the way banks and securities dealers are, and so justifying taxpayer backing would be a tough sell.
So the question is whether something like Japanese regulations would be sufficient. Iâm not yet convinced that would be sufficient for the standard you set, although they seem to have protected Japanese users at FTX Japan. Maybe I would change my mind after a few more years and more failures that affect other countries but not Japan.
For consumer-equipment risk: I donât think you can get to essentially-insured-bank safety for consumer users without either Glo or the exchange eating fraud losses that a bank would have to eat. Consumers on average are just not savvy enough to keep that risk at a minimal levelâand although you and I could probably do so, it would come at a steep cost for useability.
Thatâs a tough issue to figure out, because an entity like Glo isnât really in a position to verify or cover those sorts of losses. And for me to be convinced of their safety, exchanges need to play it safe and largely stick to providing safe custody and exchange services . . . nothing that exposes the exchange to meaningful risk. Unfortunately, that approach also limits how much money exchanges can make and thus how much they could be expected to spend on fraud reimbursements.
Note that at least US law gives much less protection to business usersâif your business computer gets a trojan and makes unauthorized transactions on your account, youâre often screwed. So if you could fix the exchange-risk problem, this might be an acceptable problem for business users.
Also, current US law does not generally protect customers who are fraudulently induced into lossesâe.g., you get a fake text from the IRS saying to Zelle $5000 to this account or youâre going to jail, and you comply. Since these are risks borne by users in the banking system, they can be borne by Glo users as well.
All that is to say that I think truly safe crypto is a ways off. Of course, I am willing to accept a somewhat higher level of risk for people holding crypto to accrue benefits to themselves than for those who hold Glo for altruistic purposes.
For the most part. For (2), I primarily meant stuff like KYC and anti-money laundering measures.
If you havenât already, itâs worth thinking about the tax implications as well. My gut feeling under US law is that all of this interest might be taxable as unrelated business income (UBIT) because running a stablecoin might not be substantially related to the charitable, educational, or other purpose that would be the basis of the organizationâs exemption. It would be a means of generating profit for the organizationâs charitable mission, which is the point of the UBI tax. The point of the UBI tax is to prevent non-profits from having an unfair advantage over for-profit businesses in commercial activity, which seems to fit here.
Generally, interest is excluded from UBI, but that may only apply to interest from ordinary and routine investments. I canât give you legal advice as to an answer even if I were qualified; I can only say that it is a question that crossed my mind.
Iâll DM you an e-mail address.
Unbacked stablecoins like algorithmic coins and (probably) Tether are not hedges, they are a huge source of potential danger for the industry. Although I guess thatâs an argument in favour of Glo (assuming youâre legit).
In general, I think the idea is good, and if it works as planned, well, you arenât gonna make 11 trillion of course, but you could displace some bad actors and generate some money for charities.
However, if I were an EA org, I would still hold off on getting involved with glo for now. The problem is that the FTX debacle involved SBF using EAâs reputation to help build his company up, which was then used to harm people. If we get unlucky and Glo ends up doing something similar (even if itâs, say, incompetence rather than fraud), then the credibility of EA in most eyes would be pretty much dead. Being fooled twice by the exact same trick is not a good look.
Again, I think youâre probably fine, and i think the situation is unfair to you. I think if Glo establishes itself as gold standard, beyond reproach company with full auditing and transparency, then it could be something great and worth endorsing, Iâd just advise EA orgs to wait before getting involved.
For what itâs worth I think that holding off until Glo is more established is sensible. Others might have a different risk appetite.
I hope that Glo doesnât come across as trying to ride EAâs reputational coattailsârather I would say that EA-aligned thinking inspired the project and we think that it will be of interest to at least some EAs.
And a note on nomenclature: I think the stablecoin label should only apply to coins that can maintain their peg in the event of a run. It was quite the marketing coup that so many not-so-stable coins got folks to call them stable. I think âalgocoinâ would have been more appropriate, but the folks in the âexchange coordinationâ signal group have so far failed to consult me on the matter đ
I added a caveat about âfully-backedâ stablecoins to the comment above in light of your remark, BTW
Yeah, i think that satisfies me for now at least. I expect Iâll have more to say on your post about the rest of crypto. Thanks for the conversation!