Here is a very quick and incomplete list. Some papers are less directly related, e.g., “Contests for status” is not about innovation contests per se, but if we know that a large appeal from inducement prizes comes from status (as the report also points out), we might still learn something from the paper.
Edit: added *s to indicate papers more directly related.
*Taylor, C. R. (1995). Digging for golden carrots: An analysis of research tournaments. The American Economic Review, 872-890.
Moldovanu, B., & Sela, A. (2001). The optimal allocation of prizes in contests. American Economic Review, 91(3), 542-558.
*Che, Y. K., & Gale, I. (2003). Optimal design of research contests. American Economic Review, 93(3), 646-671.
Yildirim, H. (2005). Contests with multiple rounds. Games and Economic Behavior, 51(1), 213-227.
Moldovanu, B., & Sela, A. (2006). Contest architecture. Journal of Economic Theory, 126(1), 70-96.
Moldovanu, B., Sela, A., & Shi, X. (2007). Contests for status. Journal of political Economy, 115(2), 338-363.
*Ding, W., & Wolfstetter, E. G. (2011). Prizes and lemons: procurement of innovation under imperfect commitment. The RAND Journal of Economics, 42(4), 664-680.
*Fu, Q., Lu, J., & Lu, Y. (2012). Incentivizing R&D: Prize or subsidies?. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 30(1), 67-79.
Halac, M., Kartik, N., & Liu, Q. (2017). Contests for experimentation. Journal of Political Economy, 125(5), 1523-1569.
*Letina, I., & Schmutzler, A. (2019). Inducing variety: A theory of innovation contests. International economic review, 60(4), 1757-1780.
*Gross, D. P. (2020). Creativity under fire: The effects of competition on creative production. Review of Economics and Statistics, 102(3), 583-599.
*Benkert, J. M., & Letina, I. (2020). Designing dynamic research contests. American economic journal: Microeconomics, 12(4), 270-89.
*Che, Y. K., Iossa, E., & Rey, P. (2021). Prizes versus contracts as incentives for innovation. The Review of Economic Studies, 88(5), 2149-2178.
*Lemus, J., & Marshall, G. (2021). Dynamic tournament design: Evidence from prediction contests. Journal of Political Economy, 129(2), 383-420.
*Erkal, N., & Xiao, J. (2021). Scarcity of ideas and optimal prizes in innovation contests. Available at SSRN.
*Chen, B., Chen, B., & Knyazev, D. (2022). Information disclosure in dynamic research contests. The RAND Journal of Economics, 53(1), 113-137.
Thank you so much for sharing additional literature! I really appreciate the effort.
As far as I can tell from a skimming these articles, they seem to be mostly theoretical or modeling studies.
In our report, we mainly focused on the empirical (and especially the (quasi-)experimental) literature in our report because (1) we wanted to understand how well prizes work in practice, and (2) our impression was that the theoretical literature on prizes seemed somewhat too removed from the way that typical large prizes are implemented in real life.
It could also be that the way innovation contests are implemented in real life is severely suboptimal :)
After all, the FCC only started using spectrum auctions in the mid 90s, while academic work on auction theory/mech design is significantly older. We have also only recently started using insights from game theory in school choice, even though Gale and Shapley published their paper on the deferred acceptance algorithm in 1962.
Yes, you’re right, that could definitely be the case. We have not looked into that.
Good examples with auction theory and the deferred acceptance algorithm! I’ve been frustrated for a while that my municipality doesn’t want to try out the deferred acceptance mechanism for school/kindergarten choice :)
This is moderately relevant to my work, but due to time constraints it’s unlikely I’d actually read more than 1-2 of these papers. If other people are willing to read and summarize these papers or a subset of them, I and presumably others would find this pretty useful.
I like summaries that are pretty detailed and critical (see here, here, and here), but if this is unreasonable due to time constraints, even shorter summaries (like Zoe’s) would be helpful.
Here is a very quick and incomplete list. Some papers are less directly related, e.g., “Contests for status” is not about innovation contests per se, but if we know that a large appeal from inducement prizes comes from status (as the report also points out), we might still learn something from the paper.
Edit: added *s to indicate papers more directly related.
*Taylor, C. R. (1995). Digging for golden carrots: An analysis of research tournaments. The American Economic Review, 872-890.
Moldovanu, B., & Sela, A. (2001). The optimal allocation of prizes in contests. American Economic Review, 91(3), 542-558.
*Che, Y. K., & Gale, I. (2003). Optimal design of research contests. American Economic Review, 93(3), 646-671.
Yildirim, H. (2005). Contests with multiple rounds. Games and Economic Behavior, 51(1), 213-227.
Moldovanu, B., & Sela, A. (2006). Contest architecture. Journal of Economic Theory, 126(1), 70-96.
Moldovanu, B., Sela, A., & Shi, X. (2007). Contests for status. Journal of political Economy, 115(2), 338-363.
*Ding, W., & Wolfstetter, E. G. (2011). Prizes and lemons: procurement of innovation under imperfect commitment. The RAND Journal of Economics, 42(4), 664-680.
*Fu, Q., Lu, J., & Lu, Y. (2012). Incentivizing R&D: Prize or subsidies?. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 30(1), 67-79.
Halac, M., Kartik, N., & Liu, Q. (2017). Contests for experimentation. Journal of Political Economy, 125(5), 1523-1569.
*Letina, I., & Schmutzler, A. (2019). Inducing variety: A theory of innovation contests. International economic review, 60(4), 1757-1780.
*Gross, D. P. (2020). Creativity under fire: The effects of competition on creative production. Review of Economics and Statistics, 102(3), 583-599.
*Benkert, J. M., & Letina, I. (2020). Designing dynamic research contests. American economic journal: Microeconomics, 12(4), 270-89.
*Che, Y. K., Iossa, E., & Rey, P. (2021). Prizes versus contracts as incentives for innovation. The Review of Economic Studies, 88(5), 2149-2178.
*Lemus, J., & Marshall, G. (2021). Dynamic tournament design: Evidence from prediction contests. Journal of Political Economy, 129(2), 383-420.
*Erkal, N., & Xiao, J. (2021). Scarcity of ideas and optimal prizes in innovation contests. Available at SSRN.
*Chen, B., Chen, B., & Knyazev, D. (2022). Information disclosure in dynamic research contests. The RAND Journal of Economics, 53(1), 113-137.
Thank you so much for sharing additional literature! I really appreciate the effort.
As far as I can tell from a skimming these articles, they seem to be mostly theoretical or modeling studies.
In our report, we mainly focused on the empirical (and especially the (quasi-)experimental) literature in our report because (1) we wanted to understand how well prizes work in practice, and (2) our impression was that the theoretical literature on prizes seemed somewhat too removed from the way that typical large prizes are implemented in real life.
It could also be that the way innovation contests are implemented in real life is severely suboptimal :)
After all, the FCC only started using spectrum auctions in the mid 90s, while academic work on auction theory/mech design is significantly older. We have also only recently started using insights from game theory in school choice, even though Gale and Shapley published their paper on the deferred acceptance algorithm in 1962.
Yes, you’re right, that could definitely be the case. We have not looked into that.
Good examples with auction theory and the deferred acceptance algorithm! I’ve been frustrated for a while that my municipality doesn’t want to try out the deferred acceptance mechanism for school/kindergarten choice :)
Thanks you’re a hero!
For onlookers:
This is moderately relevant to my work, but due to time constraints it’s unlikely I’d actually read more than 1-2 of these papers. If other people are willing to read and summarize these papers or a subset of them, I and presumably others would find this pretty useful.
I like summaries that are pretty detailed and critical (see here, here, and here), but if this is unreasonable due to time constraints, even shorter summaries (like Zoe’s) would be helpful.
agreed