The clearest such historical cases are ones where a disenfranchised group of people broke laws that directly enforced their own exclusion from political participation or basic legal personhood. These cases are self-limiting (and thus pass reasonable tests of universalizability) since the principles justifying such lawbreaking achieve their own obsolescence once participation is granted.
I worry this approach excludes the most vulnerable (those who cannot meaningfully participate in political life, like human babies and animals), and focuses on less fundamental rights: I think protection from torture is more urgent than legal personhood.
Why would women be justified in engaging in civil disobedience to get the vote for themselves, but not be justified in engaging in civil disobedience to rescue babies from Josef Mengele?
I agree that there’s a sense in which the constraints I’m talking about focus on less fundamental rights. But I think the more important sense is that they focus on preserving a viable process for living together in a society with people of greatly differing moral views. That doesn’t mean we have to leave behind other vulnerable groups, just that we have to try and bring about change for them through democratic means.
Regarding the Mengele example, I think it’s disanalogous because it took place in a dictatorship, where the rule utilitarian and contractualist constraints on action look very different.[1] I’m really probing at what constraints EAs should have when acting in the context of a democracy (including a flawed one), not what behavior would be correct in Nazi Germany.
Note that the act utilitarian calculus also changes in a dictatorship too. Following the law in a dictatorship is unlikely to be a successful decision procedure for maximizing utility under epistemic uncertainty.
What if “protecting innocent sentient beings from torture” is a higher moral priority than “living together in a society with people of greatly differing moral views”?
I’m sceptical that the distinction between flawed democracy and dictatorship is clean enough to justify civil disobedience on behalf of others only in the latter (if this is what you’re saying). Would you support rescuing American children from deliberate infection with hepatitis at Willowbrook in the 1960s?
On your first question, I think your framing isn’t addressing what happens if other people think the same way. The equilibrium where everyone with strong moral convictions feels licensed to break laws doesn’t seem to me like it’s better for vulnerable groups, just more chaotic. I think that to some extent you’re proposing smashing the “defect” button in a prisoner’s dilemma and hoping the other side doesn’t do the same.
On your second, I agree that it’s not a clear line between flawed democracy and dictatorship, but in the US today this isn’t really relevant.
On your third, I think the Willowbrook example is worth thinking about more carefully. As I understand the history, the binding constraint at Willowbrook wasn’t legal. Many parents and guardians retained custody and could have legally removed their children. The constraint was that families without resources didn’t have a better option. And in the end, legal activism was able to marshal those resources, albeit much more slowly than I would have wished.
I think that to some extent you’re proposing smashing the “defect” button in a prisoner’s dilemma and hoping the other side doesn’t do the same.
I’ve been pondering this. I think your button-smashing characterisation is basically accurate, and it is a leap of faith that those who engage in civil disobedience make: an appeal to the conscience of society, the jury etc..
You’re right to say that one way to think about universalisability is “if it’s okay for me to break the law to achieve what I consider to be a moral goal here, why can’t everyone break the law to achieve their own moral goals?”. But another way to think about universalisability is to go “if I were the one in Ridglan / Unit 731 / Willowbrook, what actions would I support to end my suffering?”
I don’t know whether it would be illegal for parents to break their children out of Willowbrook, but for the purposes of this question assume it was.
I worry this approach excludes the most vulnerable (those who cannot meaningfully participate in political life, like human babies and animals), and focuses on less fundamental rights: I think protection from torture is more urgent than legal personhood.
Why would women be justified in engaging in civil disobedience to get the vote for themselves, but not be justified in engaging in civil disobedience to rescue babies from Josef Mengele?
I agree that there’s a sense in which the constraints I’m talking about focus on less fundamental rights. But I think the more important sense is that they focus on preserving a viable process for living together in a society with people of greatly differing moral views. That doesn’t mean we have to leave behind other vulnerable groups, just that we have to try and bring about change for them through democratic means.
Regarding the Mengele example, I think it’s disanalogous because it took place in a dictatorship, where the rule utilitarian and contractualist constraints on action look very different.[1] I’m really probing at what constraints EAs should have when acting in the context of a democracy (including a flawed one), not what behavior would be correct in Nazi Germany.
Note that the act utilitarian calculus also changes in a dictatorship too. Following the law in a dictatorship is unlikely to be a successful decision procedure for maximizing utility under epistemic uncertainty.
What if “protecting innocent sentient beings from torture” is a higher moral priority than “living together in a society with people of greatly differing moral views”?
I’m sceptical that the distinction between flawed democracy and dictatorship is clean enough to justify civil disobedience on behalf of others only in the latter (if this is what you’re saying). Would you support rescuing American children from deliberate infection with hepatitis at Willowbrook in the 1960s?
Taking each of these points in turn:
On your first question, I think your framing isn’t addressing what happens if other people think the same way. The equilibrium where everyone with strong moral convictions feels licensed to break laws doesn’t seem to me like it’s better for vulnerable groups, just more chaotic. I think that to some extent you’re proposing smashing the “defect” button in a prisoner’s dilemma and hoping the other side doesn’t do the same.
On your second, I agree that it’s not a clear line between flawed democracy and dictatorship, but in the US today this isn’t really relevant.
On your third, I think the Willowbrook example is worth thinking about more carefully. As I understand the history, the binding constraint at Willowbrook wasn’t legal. Many parents and guardians retained custody and could have legally removed their children. The constraint was that families without resources didn’t have a better option. And in the end, legal activism was able to marshal those resources, albeit much more slowly than I would have wished.
I’ve been pondering this. I think your button-smashing characterisation is basically accurate, and it is a leap of faith that those who engage in civil disobedience make: an appeal to the conscience of society, the jury etc..
You’re right to say that one way to think about universalisability is “if it’s okay for me to break the law to achieve what I consider to be a moral goal here, why can’t everyone break the law to achieve their own moral goals?”. But another way to think about universalisability is to go “if I were the one in Ridglan / Unit 731 / Willowbrook, what actions would I support to end my suffering?”
I don’t know whether it would be illegal for parents to break their children out of Willowbrook, but for the purposes of this question assume it was.