I agree that thereâs a sense in which the constraints Iâm talking about focus on less fundamental rights. But I think the more important sense is that they focus on preserving a viable process for living together in a society with people of greatly differing moral views. That doesnât mean we have to leave behind other vulnerable groups, just that we have to try and bring about change for them through democratic means.
Regarding the Mengele example, I think itâs disanalogous because it took place in a dictatorship, where the rule utilitarian and contractualist constraints on action look very different.[1] Iâm really probing at what constraints EAs should have when acting in the context of a democracy (including a flawed one), not what behavior would be correct in Nazi Germany.
Note that the act utilitarian calculus also changes in a dictatorship too. Following the law in a dictatorship is unlikely to be a successful decision procedure for maximizing utility under epistemic uncertainty.
What if âprotecting innocent sentient beings from tortureâ is a higher moral priority than âliving together in a society with people of greatly differing moral viewsâ?
Iâm sceptical that the distinction between flawed democracy and dictatorship is clean enough to justify civil disobedience on behalf of others only in the latter (if this is what youâre saying). Would you support rescuing American children from deliberate infection with hepatitis at Willowbrook in the 1960s?
On your first question, I think your framing isnât addressing what happens if other people think the same way. The equilibrium where everyone with strong moral convictions feels licensed to break laws doesnât seem to me like itâs better for vulnerable groups, just more chaotic. I think that to some extent youâre proposing smashing the âdefectâ button in a prisonerâs dilemma and hoping the other side doesnât do the same.
On your second, I agree that itâs not a clear line between flawed democracy and dictatorship, but in the US today this isnât really relevant.
On your third, I think the Willowbrook example is worth thinking about more carefully. As I understand the history, the binding constraint at Willowbrook wasnât legal. Many parents and guardians retained custody and could have legally removed their children. The constraint was that families without resources didnât have a better option. And in the end, legal activism was able to marshal those resources, albeit much more slowly than I would have wished.
I think that to some extent youâre proposing smashing the âdefectâ button in a prisonerâs dilemma and hoping the other side doesnât do the same.
Iâve been pondering this. I think your button-smashing characterisation is basically accurate, and it is a leap of faith that those who engage in civil disobedience make: an appeal to the conscience of society, the jury etc..
Youâre right to say that one way to think about universalisability is âif itâs okay for me to break the law to achieve what I consider to be a moral goal here, why canât everyone break the law to achieve their own moral goals?â. But another way to think about universalisability is to go âif I were the one in Ridglan /â Unit 731 /â Willowbrook, what actions would I support to end my suffering?â
I donât know whether it would be illegal for parents to break their children out of Willowbrook, but for the purposes of this question assume it was.
I agree that thereâs a sense in which the constraints Iâm talking about focus on less fundamental rights. But I think the more important sense is that they focus on preserving a viable process for living together in a society with people of greatly differing moral views. That doesnât mean we have to leave behind other vulnerable groups, just that we have to try and bring about change for them through democratic means.
Regarding the Mengele example, I think itâs disanalogous because it took place in a dictatorship, where the rule utilitarian and contractualist constraints on action look very different.[1] Iâm really probing at what constraints EAs should have when acting in the context of a democracy (including a flawed one), not what behavior would be correct in Nazi Germany.
Note that the act utilitarian calculus also changes in a dictatorship too. Following the law in a dictatorship is unlikely to be a successful decision procedure for maximizing utility under epistemic uncertainty.
What if âprotecting innocent sentient beings from tortureâ is a higher moral priority than âliving together in a society with people of greatly differing moral viewsâ?
Iâm sceptical that the distinction between flawed democracy and dictatorship is clean enough to justify civil disobedience on behalf of others only in the latter (if this is what youâre saying). Would you support rescuing American children from deliberate infection with hepatitis at Willowbrook in the 1960s?
Taking each of these points in turn:
On your first question, I think your framing isnât addressing what happens if other people think the same way. The equilibrium where everyone with strong moral convictions feels licensed to break laws doesnât seem to me like itâs better for vulnerable groups, just more chaotic. I think that to some extent youâre proposing smashing the âdefectâ button in a prisonerâs dilemma and hoping the other side doesnât do the same.
On your second, I agree that itâs not a clear line between flawed democracy and dictatorship, but in the US today this isnât really relevant.
On your third, I think the Willowbrook example is worth thinking about more carefully. As I understand the history, the binding constraint at Willowbrook wasnât legal. Many parents and guardians retained custody and could have legally removed their children. The constraint was that families without resources didnât have a better option. And in the end, legal activism was able to marshal those resources, albeit much more slowly than I would have wished.
Iâve been pondering this. I think your button-smashing characterisation is basically accurate, and it is a leap of faith that those who engage in civil disobedience make: an appeal to the conscience of society, the jury etc..
Youâre right to say that one way to think about universalisability is âif itâs okay for me to break the law to achieve what I consider to be a moral goal here, why canât everyone break the law to achieve their own moral goals?â. But another way to think about universalisability is to go âif I were the one in Ridglan /â Unit 731 /â Willowbrook, what actions would I support to end my suffering?â
I donât know whether it would be illegal for parents to break their children out of Willowbrook, but for the purposes of this question assume it was.