We should take into account the possibility of having more influence in the future (e.g., from investment or learning more) and the possibility of having less influence in the future (e.g., from uncertainty about the future or the best opportunities becoming unavailable). This doesn’t mean that we should morally value future good differently from present good. (At 2% discounting, a single life 2000 years ago was far more important than everyone living today, which is an unappealing conclusion to me.)
There’s some literature on why we should basically just use the most pessimistic case for discounting, since it dominates over expected future impact. And that likely means we should do no discounting.
It’s not that a life 2000 years ago was more important than everyone living today, but rather that someone 2000 years ago trying to do good would be more effective trying to save one life that year than trying to save humanity 2000 years in their future (i.e. today).
someone 2000 years ago trying to do good would be more effective trying to save one life that year than trying to save humanity 2000 years in their future (i.e. today).
That seems true. But I think my comment is a true response to
The logical conclusion is that I should discount future good I might do by at least the real rate of investment return. I should value saving a life today twice as much as saving a life in 35 years, assuming my 2% figure.
We should take into account the possibility of having more influence in the future (e.g., from investment or learning more) and the possibility of having less influence in the future (e.g., from uncertainty about the future or the best opportunities becoming unavailable). This doesn’t mean that we should morally value future good differently from present good. (At 2% discounting, a single life 2000 years ago was far more important than everyone living today, which is an unappealing conclusion to me.)
There’s some literature on why we should basically just use the most pessimistic case for discounting, since it dominates over expected future impact. And that likely means we should do no discounting.
Could you please point me to some? Thanks!
There’s some arguments in favor and against time discounting linked from here (and more scholarly sources linked from those links): https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/topics/temporal-discounting
I’ve never personally looked into discount rates in any depth, and see the entire topic as rather beside the point; Scott Alexander best explains why: https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/KDjEogAqWNTdddF9g/long-termism-vs-existential-risk
It’s not that a life 2000 years ago was more important than everyone living today, but rather that someone 2000 years ago trying to do good would be more effective trying to save one life that year than trying to save humanity 2000 years in their future (i.e. today).
That seems true. But I think my comment is a true response to