I think you meant 44 ÂșC instead of 43 ÂșC. Level 2 starts at 44 ÂșC.
1-) As I stated earlier, duration is not just a multiplier; it is a catalyst for a qualitative shift. ( In the context of my Five-Phase Model, after a certain threshold, a prolonged Level 3 experience does not simply âadd upâ to a large Level 3 sum, it undergoes a functional priority shift, effectively transforming into a Level 4 state for example.)
It makes sense the maximum level of pain increases with duration, but I do not think this solves the core issue. There will still be very small changes in temperature or duration leading to a change in the level of pain. Consider the function f(T = âtemperature of the waterâ, t = âtime with a hand under waterâ) which outputs the highest level of pain (1 to 5). Below is an illustration from Gemini. It assumes the temperature ranges you provided apply to a duration of 1 min, and the level of pain increases with duration as you mentioned. The specific shape of the boundaries between pain level is not important. What matters is that boundaries exist. Imagine 45 ÂșC for 3 min separates the levels of pain 2 and 3, as it is roughly the case below. Would you prever averting i) 45 ÂșC for 3 min 0.1 s (maximum pain level of 3) for 1 person with probability 10^-100 over ii) 45 ÂșC for 2 min 59.9 s (maximum pain level of 2) for the 8 billion people on Earth with certainty? i) corresponds to 1.80*10^-98 s (= (3*60 + 0.1)*1*10^-100) of level 3 pain in expectation, and ii) to 1.44*10^12 s (= (2*60 + 59.9)*8*10^9*1) of level 2 pain in expectation. I understand you would prefer averting i) because you prioritise averting level 3 pain infinitely (lexically) more than averting level 2 pain. I do not understand this. People would not distinguish between 45 ÂșC for 3 min 0.1 s (maximum pain level of 3), and 45 ÂșC for 2 min 59.9 s (maximum pain level of 2).
I think you meant 44 ÂșC instead of 43 ÂșC. Level 2 starts at 44 ÂșC.
Yes, thank you!
People would not distinguish between 45 ÂșC for 3 min 0.1 s (maximum pain level of 3), and 45 ÂșC for 2 min 59.9 s (maximum pain level of 2).
Actually, this comes down to how we define the boundaries. If the difference is truly imperceptible, it remains within the same region where numerical comparisons are perfectly valid. However, my claim is based on a discontinuous graph. Just as water undergoes a qualitative jump at 100 °C and turns into steam, I believe consciousness undergoes a phase transition at specific thresholds which creates a qualitative leap in the nature of pain.
I am not entirely certain, but maybe we might also consider the following hypothesis: This qualitative shift in experience morally corresponds to the tradability status of the experience itself. At lower levels of intensity, the exchange value remains high; however, as we ascend the levels, this value drops logarithmically (an approach that would also align closely with my model). This means that averting even a minute amount of a higher-level pain requires sacrificing an exponentially larger quantity of a lower-level one. But at a certain critical threshold (the point of systemic collapse where the subject entirely loses its rationality) this tradability factor effectively hits zero. In such a model, while Level 3 and Level 4 pain might possess vastly different coefficients due to the hidden tradability factor, they remain theoretically comparable. However, once we reach Level 5, we encounter a state of incomparability.
Actually, this comes down to how we define the boundaries. If the difference is truly imperceptible, it remains within the same region where numerical comparisons are perfectly valid.
Do you think there is a temperature T, and duration t for which the pain of T for t + 0.1 s is infinitely (lexically) worse than pain of T for t â 0.1 s?
However, my claim is based on a discontinuous graph. Just as water undergoes a qualitative jump at 100 °C and turns into steam, I believe consciousness undergoes a phase transition at specific thresholds which creates a qualitative leap in the nature of pain.
What do you mean by âqualitative leapâ? A large, but finite increase in pain intensity for a small increase in temperature or duration? If so, it would still be the case that a sufficiently long time in pain of level i would be worse than any given time in pain of level i + 1, as argued in Benthamâs Bulldogâs post.
I am not entirely certain, but maybe we might also consider the following hypothesis: This qualitative shift in experience morally corresponds to the tradability status of the experience itself.
This is how I would think about it. I do not know if there are large increases in pain intensity for small increases in temperature or duration. However, I agree pain intensity increases superlinearly with temperature for some ranges of temperature. Note the above goes very much against prioritising higher levels of pain infinitely (lexically) more.
But at a certain critical threshold (the point of systemic collapse where the subject entirely loses its rationality) this tradability factor effectively hits zero. In such a model, while Level 3 and Level 4 pain might possess vastly different coefficients due to the hidden tradability factor, they remain theoretically comparable. However, once we reach Level 5, we encounter a state of incomparability.
Imagine 53 ÂșC for 1 min separates the levels of pain 4 and 5, as it is roughly the case in the graph above (which assumes the temperature ranges you mentioned apply to a duration of 1 min). Would you prever averting i) 53 ÂșC for 60.1 s (maximum pain level of 5) for 1 person with probability 10^-100 over ii) 53 ÂșC for 59.9 s (maximum pain level of 4) for the 8 billion people on Earth with certainty? i) corresponds to 6.01*10^-99 s (= 60.1*1*10^-100) of level 4 pain in expectation, and ii) to 4.79*10^11 s (= 59.9*8*10^9*1) of level 5 pain in expectation. I understand you would prefer averting i) because you prioritise averting level 5 pain infinitely (lexically) more than averting level 4 pain. I do not understand this. People would not distinguish between 53 ÂșC for 60.1 s (maximum pain level of 5), and 53 ÂșC for 59.9 s (maximum pain level of 4).
People would not distinguish between 53 ÂșC for 60.1 s (maximum pain level of 5), and 53 ÂșC for 59.9 s (maximum pain level of 4).
If the pain is imperceptible, how can we call it âMOREâ pain? Pain is a subjective experience; if the subject cannot feel the difference, then in what sense is it more?
What do you mean by âqualitative leapâ? A large, but finite increase in pain intensity for a small increase in temperature or duration?
If there is a qualitative leap, it means there is a fundamental difference in the experience. Different brain circuits are fired; the brain classifies the situation with a different prioritization.
With a little annoyance, you might be so tired that you donât even bother to scratch your nose to get rid of it. With manageable pain, you can still enjoy other things, like enjoying music even with a headache. If the pain is dominant, you are truly occupied by it, but you wouldnât want to kill yourself. But with invasive pain, you would give everything, even your life, just to make it stop.
This isnât just a higher magnitude of the âIâm too tired to scratch my noseâ response. It is completely something else. In none of these examples is it a case of the same neurons simply firing more; completely different circuits are fired in entirely different ways.
If so, it would still be the case that a sufficiently long time in pain of level i would be worse than any given time in pain of level i + 1, as argued in Benthamâs Bulldogâs post.
In that case, it becomes a qualitatively different experience.
Would you prever averting i) 53 ÂșC for 60.1 s (maximum pain level of 5) for 1 person with probability 10^-100 over ii) 53 ÂșC for 59.9 s (maximum pain level of 4) for the 8 billion people on Earth with certainty?
Pain perception doesnât work like a slider. We are not thermometers :)) Think about your experiences, do you experience pain like, âYeah it became 2 iotas higher, yeah now it became 6 iotas higherâ? No⊠It is distinct different codes to inform different responses.
You feel it like: âHmm itâs a bit annoying, but anyway.â âHmm itâs bad, it would be good to get rid of this.â âOh it is serious, I REALLY WANT TO stop this.â âOh itâs absolute hell, I canât think of anything else than stopping this exactly this moment.â
I would prefer infinite people to experience the âHmm itâs a bit annoyingâ response rather than one person to feel âOh itâs absolute hell.â There are different considerations when making real-world decisions, but in a vacuum, I would even prefer the âOh itâs seriousâ response infinite times than the âOh itâs absolute hell, I canât think of anything elseâ response. (As I would choose infinite reincarnations with a broken leg for 3 months rather than one reincarnation of 30 min of being eaten alive).
Between 10x absolute hell and 11x absolute hell, I would choose the second because itâs comparing apples to apples, but otherwise, itâs comparing oranges to apples. If the difference is imperceptible, it is still an apple or an orange. Actually, in my model, level 5 is unnecessary as it is evolutionarily the same response as level 4, so Iâll probably remove it from my updated model.
If reincarnation were real, would you prefer infinite lifetimes with dust specks irritating you for 10 minutes, or just one lifetime of 10 min extreme unbearable hell? The former is infinity times larger than the second.
People would not distinguish between 53 ÂșC for 60.1 s (maximum pain level of 5), and 53 ÂșC for 59.9 s (maximum pain level of 4).
I should have been clearer. I meant âpeople would barely distinguishâ. In any case, my point is that you seem to believe pain of level 5 is infinitely worse than pain of level 4 despite people barely or not distinguishing between experiences with pain of level 4 and 5 if they are sufficiently close to the temperature-duration curve separating a highest level of pain of 4 and 5.
Would you prever averting i) 53 ÂșC for 60.1 s (maximum pain level of 5) for 1 person with probability 10^-100 over ii) 53 ÂșC for 59.9 s (maximum pain level of 4) for the 8 billion people on Earth with certainty?
You did not answer this? If it helps, you could imagine that it was a real situation, and that by default ii) all people on Earth would have one hand under water at 53 ÂșC with certainty for 59.9 s, but that you could prevent this, and instead have i) just one person have their hand under water at 53 ÂșC with probablity 10^-100 for 60.1 s. It seems obvious to me i) is way better. However, if you think level 5 pain is infinitely worse than level 4 pain, you would pick ii).
Actually, in my model, level 5 is unnecessary as it is evolutionarily the same response as level 4, so Iâll probably remove it from my updated model.
The number of levels of pain, and temperture is not important to the situation I described above. As long as you believe some pains are infinitely worse than others, it is possible to come up with a situation like the above where you would pick ii) all people on Earth having one hand under water at temperature T with certainty for 59.9 s (maximum level of pain of k) over i) just one person having their hand under water at temperature T with probablity 10^-100 for 60.1 s (maximum level of pain of k + 1).
I am only discussing temperature and duration, but my argument generalises to any number of dimensions affecting the maximum level of pain. If this depends on N variables, there will be a N-dimensional space with boundaries separating experiences with maximum level of pain k and k + 1. So, for a boundary which contains experiences with duration 60 s, people prioritising pains of level k + 1 infinitely more than pains of level k would pick ii) all people on Earth being subject to a painful stimulus with certainty for 59.9 s (maximum level of pain of k) over i) just one person being subject to the same painful stimulus with probablity 10^-100 for 60.1 s (maximum level of pain of k + 1).
If reincarnation were real, would you prefer infinite lifetimes with dust specks irritating you for 10 minutes, or just one lifetime of 10 min extreme unbearable hell? The former is infinity times larger than the second.
I do not know whether literal dust specks would be sufficiently bad to make my welfare negative. However, I would prefer 10 min of extreme unbearable hell over an infinite time with slighly negative welfare.
You did not answer this? If it helps, you could imagine that it was a real situation, and that by default ii) all people on Earth would have one hand under water at 53 ÂșC with certainty for 59.9 s, but that you could prevent this, and instead have i) just one person have their hand under water at 53 ÂșC with probablity 10^-100 for 60.1 s. It seems obvious to me i) is way better. However, if you think level 5 pain is infinitely worse than level 4 pain, you would pick ii).
Still thinking about it.
I do not know whether literal dust specks would be sufficiently bad to make my welfare negative. However, I would prefer 10 min of extreme unbearable hell over an infinite time with slighly negative welfare.
Okay, letâs change it then. What would be bad enough, a mild headache? Letâs go with that. Would you prefer infinite lifetimes with a mild headache for 10 minutes, or just one lifetime of 10 min extreme unbearable hell? The disutility of the former is infinitely greater than that of the latter. Actually, even if you replace those 10 minutes with 10^10000000000 years of uninterrupted extreme torture, the disutility of the former is still infinitely greater. Which one would you choose in that case?
Or letsâsay you have to choose between these two worlds:
World A: a Rayoâs number of people experience extreme suffering but also an infinite number of people live barely above neutral (defined as 1/âRayoâs number above neutral) World B: a world where a Rayoâs number of people experience extreme hedonia without any suffering whatsoever.
The utility of the former is infinitely greater than that of the latter. Which one would you go for?
I would go with world A. I think world B is worse than, for example, a world with 1 M times as many people as B, and welfare per person just 0.0001 % lower. Repeating a similar comparison sufficiently many times, I conclude that world B is worse than a world C with way way more people than B, and welfare per person just above 0. I also believe world C is worse than a world D with 10 billion more people than C, all of whom experiencing super high welfare except for 1 person with welfare just below 0 (for example, â10^-100 times the welfare of a random human). So I conclude world B is worse than a world D with lots and lots of people with barely positive lives, 10^10 â 1 people with super high welfare w, and 1 person with welfare just below 0. I think 10^10 â 1 people with welfare w is worse than 10^11 people with welfare 0.0001 % lower than w. Repeating this, I determine that 10^10 â 1 people with welfare w is worse than lots and lots of people with barely positive welfare. So I conclude that world B is worse than a world E with lots and lots of people with barely positive lives, and 1 person with welfare just below 0. Based on a similar reasoning, world B is worse than a world F with lots and lots of people with welfare just above 0, and lots of people with welfare just below 0. For the reasons I have mentioned in the thread, I think sufficiently many people with welfare just below 0 is worse than a given number of people with very negative welfare. So I conclude world B is worse than world A with infinitely many people with welfare just above 0, and a large number of people with very negative welfare.
My conclusion that A is better than B may seem counterintuitive. However, I strongly endorse all the steps that lead me to conclude A is better than B. So I also endorse this conclusion. It is also counterintuitive that the mass of sufficiently many grains of sand could be larger than the mass of a mountain. However, I strongly endorse that grains of sand have mass, and therefore I am forced to endorse the conclusion that sufficiently many grains could have a greater mass than a mountain.
I think you meant 44 ÂșC instead of 43 ÂșC. Level 2 starts at 44 ÂșC.
It makes sense the maximum level of pain increases with duration, but I do not think this solves the core issue. There will still be very small changes in temperature or duration leading to a change in the level of pain. Consider the function f(T = âtemperature of the waterâ, t = âtime with a hand under waterâ) which outputs the highest level of pain (1 to 5). Below is an illustration from Gemini. It assumes the temperature ranges you provided apply to a duration of 1 min, and the level of pain increases with duration as you mentioned. The specific shape of the boundaries between pain level is not important. What matters is that boundaries exist. Imagine 45 ÂșC for 3 min separates the levels of pain 2 and 3, as it is roughly the case below. Would you prever averting i) 45 ÂșC for 3 min 0.1 s (maximum pain level of 3) for 1 person with probability 10^-100 over ii) 45 ÂșC for 2 min 59.9 s (maximum pain level of 2) for the 8 billion people on Earth with certainty? i) corresponds to 1.80*10^-98 s (= (3*60 + 0.1)*1*10^-100) of level 3 pain in expectation, and ii) to 1.44*10^12 s (= (2*60 + 59.9)*8*10^9*1) of level 2 pain in expectation. I understand you would prefer averting i) because you prioritise averting level 3 pain infinitely (lexically) more than averting level 2 pain. I do not understand this. People would not distinguish between 45 ÂșC for 3 min 0.1 s (maximum pain level of 3), and 45 ÂșC for 2 min 59.9 s (maximum pain level of 2).
Yes, thank you!
Actually, this comes down to how we define the boundaries. If the difference is truly imperceptible, it remains within the same region where numerical comparisons are perfectly valid. However, my claim is based on a discontinuous graph. Just as water undergoes a qualitative jump at 100 °C and turns into steam, I believe consciousness undergoes a phase transition at specific thresholds which creates a qualitative leap in the nature of pain.
I am not entirely certain, but maybe we might also consider the following hypothesis: This qualitative shift in experience morally corresponds to the tradability status of the experience itself. At lower levels of intensity, the exchange value remains high; however, as we ascend the levels, this value drops logarithmically (an approach that would also align closely with my model). This means that averting even a minute amount of a higher-level pain requires sacrificing an exponentially larger quantity of a lower-level one. But at a certain critical threshold (the point of systemic collapse where the subject entirely loses its rationality) this tradability factor effectively hits zero. In such a model, while Level 3 and Level 4 pain might possess vastly different coefficients due to the hidden tradability factor, they remain theoretically comparable. However, once we reach Level 5, we encounter a state of incomparability.
Do you think there is a temperature T, and duration t for which the pain of T for t + 0.1 s is infinitely (lexically) worse than pain of T for t â 0.1 s?
What do you mean by âqualitative leapâ? A large, but finite increase in pain intensity for a small increase in temperature or duration? If so, it would still be the case that a sufficiently long time in pain of level i would be worse than any given time in pain of level i + 1, as argued in Benthamâs Bulldogâs post.
This is how I would think about it. I do not know if there are large increases in pain intensity for small increases in temperature or duration. However, I agree pain intensity increases superlinearly with temperature for some ranges of temperature. Note the above goes very much against prioritising higher levels of pain infinitely (lexically) more.
Imagine 53 ÂșC for 1 min separates the levels of pain 4 and 5, as it is roughly the case in the graph above (which assumes the temperature ranges you mentioned apply to a duration of 1 min). Would you prever averting i) 53 ÂșC for 60.1 s (maximum pain level of 5) for 1 person with probability 10^-100 over ii) 53 ÂșC for 59.9 s (maximum pain level of 4) for the 8 billion people on Earth with certainty? i) corresponds to 6.01*10^-99 s (= 60.1*1*10^-100) of level 4 pain in expectation, and ii) to 4.79*10^11 s (= 59.9*8*10^9*1) of level 5 pain in expectation. I understand you would prefer averting i) because you prioritise averting level 5 pain infinitely (lexically) more than averting level 4 pain. I do not understand this. People would not distinguish between 53 ÂșC for 60.1 s (maximum pain level of 5), and 53 ÂșC for 59.9 s (maximum pain level of 4).
If the pain is imperceptible, how can we call it âMOREâ pain? Pain is a subjective experience; if the subject cannot feel the difference, then in what sense is it more?
If there is a qualitative leap, it means there is a fundamental difference in the experience. Different brain circuits are fired; the brain classifies the situation with a different prioritization.
With a little annoyance, you might be so tired that you donât even bother to scratch your nose to get rid of it. With manageable pain, you can still enjoy other things, like enjoying music even with a headache. If the pain is dominant, you are truly occupied by it, but you wouldnât want to kill yourself. But with invasive pain, you would give everything, even your life, just to make it stop.
This isnât just a higher magnitude of the âIâm too tired to scratch my noseâ response. It is completely something else. In none of these examples is it a case of the same neurons simply firing more; completely different circuits are fired in entirely different ways.
In that case, it becomes a qualitatively different experience.
Pain perception doesnât work like a slider. We are not thermometers :)) Think about your experiences, do you experience pain like, âYeah it became 2 iotas higher, yeah now it became 6 iotas higherâ? No⊠It is distinct different codes to inform different responses.
You feel it like: âHmm itâs a bit annoying, but anyway.â âHmm itâs bad, it would be good to get rid of this.â âOh it is serious, I REALLY WANT TO stop this.â âOh itâs absolute hell, I canât think of anything else than stopping this exactly this moment.â
I would prefer infinite people to experience the âHmm itâs a bit annoyingâ response rather than one person to feel âOh itâs absolute hell.â There are different considerations when making real-world decisions, but in a vacuum, I would even prefer the âOh itâs seriousâ response infinite times than the âOh itâs absolute hell, I canât think of anything elseâ response. (As I would choose infinite reincarnations with a broken leg for 3 months rather than one reincarnation of 30 min of being eaten alive).
Between 10x absolute hell and 11x absolute hell, I would choose the second because itâs comparing apples to apples, but otherwise, itâs comparing oranges to apples. If the difference is imperceptible, it is still an apple or an orange. Actually, in my model, level 5 is unnecessary as it is evolutionarily the same response as level 4, so Iâll probably remove it from my updated model.
If reincarnation were real, would you prefer infinite lifetimes with dust specks irritating you for 10 minutes, or just one lifetime of 10 min extreme unbearable hell? The former is infinity times larger than the second.
I should have been clearer. I meant âpeople would barely distinguishâ. In any case, my point is that you seem to believe pain of level 5 is infinitely worse than pain of level 4 despite people barely or not distinguishing between experiences with pain of level 4 and 5 if they are sufficiently close to the temperature-duration curve separating a highest level of pain of 4 and 5.
You did not answer this? If it helps, you could imagine that it was a real situation, and that by default ii) all people on Earth would have one hand under water at 53 ÂșC with certainty for 59.9 s, but that you could prevent this, and instead have i) just one person have their hand under water at 53 ÂșC with probablity 10^-100 for 60.1 s. It seems obvious to me i) is way better. However, if you think level 5 pain is infinitely worse than level 4 pain, you would pick ii).
The number of levels of pain, and temperture is not important to the situation I described above. As long as you believe some pains are infinitely worse than others, it is possible to come up with a situation like the above where you would pick ii) all people on Earth having one hand under water at temperature T with certainty for 59.9 s (maximum level of pain of k) over i) just one person having their hand under water at temperature T with probablity 10^-100 for 60.1 s (maximum level of pain of k + 1).
I am only discussing temperature and duration, but my argument generalises to any number of dimensions affecting the maximum level of pain. If this depends on N variables, there will be a N-dimensional space with boundaries separating experiences with maximum level of pain k and k + 1. So, for a boundary which contains experiences with duration 60 s, people prioritising pains of level k + 1 infinitely more than pains of level k would pick ii) all people on Earth being subject to a painful stimulus with certainty for 59.9 s (maximum level of pain of k) over i) just one person being subject to the same painful stimulus with probablity 10^-100 for 60.1 s (maximum level of pain of k + 1).
I do not know whether literal dust specks would be sufficiently bad to make my welfare negative. However, I would prefer 10 min of extreme unbearable hell over an infinite time with slighly negative welfare.
Still thinking about it.
Okay, letâs change it then. What would be bad enough, a mild headache? Letâs go with that. Would you prefer infinite lifetimes with a mild headache for 10 minutes, or just one lifetime of 10 min extreme unbearable hell? The disutility of the former is infinitely greater than that of the latter. Actually, even if you replace those 10 minutes with 10^10000000000 years of uninterrupted extreme torture, the disutility of the former is still infinitely greater. Which one would you choose in that case?
Or letsâsay you have to choose between these two worlds:
World A: a Rayoâs number of people experience extreme suffering but also an infinite number of people live barely above neutral (defined as 1/âRayoâs number above neutral)
World B: a world where a Rayoâs number of people experience extreme hedonia without any suffering whatsoever.
The utility of the former is infinitely greater than that of the latter. Which one would you go for?
I would go with world A. I think world B is worse than, for example, a world with 1 M times as many people as B, and welfare per person just 0.0001 % lower. Repeating a similar comparison sufficiently many times, I conclude that world B is worse than a world C with way way more people than B, and welfare per person just above 0. I also believe world C is worse than a world D with 10 billion more people than C, all of whom experiencing super high welfare except for 1 person with welfare just below 0 (for example, â10^-100 times the welfare of a random human). So I conclude world B is worse than a world D with lots and lots of people with barely positive lives, 10^10 â 1 people with super high welfare w, and 1 person with welfare just below 0. I think 10^10 â 1 people with welfare w is worse than 10^11 people with welfare 0.0001 % lower than w. Repeating this, I determine that 10^10 â 1 people with welfare w is worse than lots and lots of people with barely positive welfare. So I conclude that world B is worse than a world E with lots and lots of people with barely positive lives, and 1 person with welfare just below 0. Based on a similar reasoning, world B is worse than a world F with lots and lots of people with welfare just above 0, and lots of people with welfare just below 0. For the reasons I have mentioned in the thread, I think sufficiently many people with welfare just below 0 is worse than a given number of people with very negative welfare. So I conclude world B is worse than world A with infinitely many people with welfare just above 0, and a large number of people with very negative welfare.
My conclusion that A is better than B may seem counterintuitive. However, I strongly endorse all the steps that lead me to conclude A is better than B. So I also endorse this conclusion. It is also counterintuitive that the mass of sufficiently many grains of sand could be larger than the mass of a mountain. However, I strongly endorse that grains of sand have mass, and therefore I am forced to endorse the conclusion that sufficiently many grains could have a greater mass than a mountain.