I can see why my intuitions would point to the 2nd option being better, but this can be explained by them not internalising the conditions of the thought experiment.
If I am at the end of year 49, and can choose whether to realise the 2nd or 3rd outcome after the end of year 50, I would intuitively think that:
Years 51 to 100 would have the same utility (50 k) for both the 2nd and 3rd options.
Year 50 would have less utility for the 3rd option than for the 2nd. This is because everyone would die at the end of year 50 in the 3rd option, and dying sounds intuitively bad.
However, the 2nd point violates the condition of equal utility. To maintain the conditions of the thought experiment, we would have to assume year 50 to contain the same utility in both options. In other words, the annual utility per capita of 10 would have to be realised every year, instead of simply being the mean annual of the 1st 50 years. To better internalise these conditions, we can say everyone would instantaneously stop to be alive (instead of dying) at the end of year 50 in the 2nd option. In this case, both options seem morally identical to me.
Thinking about it, one life could be described as a sequence of moments where one instantaneously stops to be alive and then is created.
one life could be described as a sequence of moments where one instantaneously stops to be alive and then is created
I do think a key issue here is whether or not thatās the right way to think about it. As I wrote in the āPersonal Identityā chapter of Parfitās Ethics (2021):
If our future selves are better regarded as entirely new people, there would seem no basis for distinguishing killing from failing to bring into existence. You would have to reconceive of guns as contraceptive agents. Nobody survives the present moment anyway, on this view, so the only effect of lethally shooting someone would be to prevent a new, qualitatively similar person from getting to exist in the next moment. Not so bad!
Thatās an extremely revisionary claim, and not one I think we should accept unless itās unavoidable. But it is entirely avoidable (even on a Parfitian account of personal identity). We can instead think that psychological continuants of existing persons have an importantly different moral status, in prospect, from entirely new (psychologically disconnected) individuals. We may think we have special reasons, grounded in concern for existing individuals, to prefer that their lives continue rather than being replacedāeven if this makes no difference to the impersonal value of the world.
That said, if your intuitions differ from mine after considering all these cases, then thatās fine. We may have simply reached a bedrock clash of intuitions.
If our future selves are better regarded as entirely new people, there would seem no basis for distinguishing killing from failing to bring into existence. You would have to reconceive of guns as contraceptive agents. Nobody survives the present moment anyway, on this view, so the only effect of lethally shooting someone would be to prevent a new, qualitatively similar person from getting to exist in the next moment. Not so bad!
I get the point, but the analogy is not ideal. To ensure total utility is similar in both situation, I think we should compare:
Doing nothing.
Killing and reviving someone who is in dreamless sleep.
Killing one person while reviving another may lead to changes in total utility, so it does not work so well as a counterexample in my view.
Being killed and revived while awake would maybe feel strange, which can also change total utility, so an example with dreamless sleep helps.
Ideally, the moments of killing and reviving should be as close in time as possible. The further apart, the more total utility can differ. Dreamless sleep also helps here, because the background stream of thought is more constant. If I was instantly killed while sitting at the sofa at home with some people around me, and then instantly revived a few minutes later, I may find myself surrounded by worried people. This means the total utility may well have changed.
Saying the 2 situations above are similar does not sound revisionary to me (assuming we could ensure with 100 % certainty that the 2nd one would work).
That said, if your intuitions differ from mine after considering all these cases, then thatās fine. We may have simply reached a bedrock clash of intuitions.
One quick clarification: If someone is later alive, then they have not previously been ākilledā, as I use the term (i.e. to mean the permanent cessation of life; not just temporary loss of life or whatever). I agree that stopping someoneās heartbeat and then starting it again, if no harm is done, is harmless to that individual. What Iām interested in here is whether permanently ending someoneās life, and replacing them with an entirely new (psychologically disconnected) life, is something we should regard negatively or with indifference, all else equal.
Ah, sorry, that makes sense. I can also try to give one example where someone dies permanently. For all else to be equal, we can consider 2 situations where only one person is alive at any given time (such that there are no effects on other persons):
Word A contains 1 person who lives for 100 years with mean annual utility of 10.
World B contains:
1 person X who lives for 50 years with mean annual utility of 10, and then instantly dies.
1 person Y who is instantly created when person X instantly dies, and then lives for 50 years with mean annual utility of 10.
Both worlds have utility of 1 k, and feel equally valuable to me.
Thanks for replying!
I can see why my intuitions would point to the 2nd option being better, but this can be explained by them not internalising the conditions of the thought experiment.
If I am at the end of year 49, and can choose whether to realise the 2nd or 3rd outcome after the end of year 50, I would intuitively think that:
Years 51 to 100 would have the same utility (50 k) for both the 2nd and 3rd options.
Year 50 would have less utility for the 3rd option than for the 2nd. This is because everyone would die at the end of year 50 in the 3rd option, and dying sounds intuitively bad.
However, the 2nd point violates the condition of equal utility. To maintain the conditions of the thought experiment, we would have to assume year 50 to contain the same utility in both options. In other words, the annual utility per capita of 10 would have to be realised every year, instead of simply being the mean annual of the 1st 50 years. To better internalise these conditions, we can say everyone would instantaneously stop to be alive (instead of dying) at the end of year 50 in the 2nd option. In this case, both options seem morally identical to me.
Thinking about it, one life could be described as a sequence of moments where one instantaneously stops to be alive and then is created.
I do think a key issue here is whether or not thatās the right way to think about it. As I wrote in the āPersonal Identityā chapter of Parfitās Ethics (2021):
Thatās an extremely revisionary claim, and not one I think we should accept unless itās unavoidable. But it is entirely avoidable (even on a Parfitian account of personal identity). We can instead think that psychological continuants of existing persons have an importantly different moral status, in prospect, from entirely new (psychologically disconnected) individuals. We may think we have special reasons, grounded in concern for existing individuals, to prefer that their lives continue rather than being replacedāeven if this makes no difference to the impersonal value of the world.
That said, if your intuitions differ from mine after considering all these cases, then thatās fine. We may have simply reached a bedrock clash of intuitions.
Thanks for sharing.
I get the point, but the analogy is not ideal. To ensure total utility is similar in both situation, I think we should compare:
Doing nothing.
Killing and reviving someone who is in dreamless sleep.
Killing one person while reviving another may lead to changes in total utility, so it does not work so well as a counterexample in my view.
Being killed and revived while awake would maybe feel strange, which can also change total utility, so an example with dreamless sleep helps.
Ideally, the moments of killing and reviving should be as close in time as possible. The further apart, the more total utility can differ. Dreamless sleep also helps here, because the background stream of thought is more constant. If I was instantly killed while sitting at the sofa at home with some people around me, and then instantly revived a few minutes later, I may find myself surrounded by worried people. This means the total utility may well have changed.
Saying the 2 situations above are similar does not sound revisionary to me (assuming we could ensure with 100 % certainty that the 2nd one would work).
Likewise, and thanks for engaging!
One quick clarification: If someone is later alive, then they have not previously been ākilledā, as I use the term (i.e. to mean the permanent cessation of life; not just temporary loss of life or whatever). I agree that stopping someoneās heartbeat and then starting it again, if no harm is done, is harmless to that individual. What Iām interested in here is whether permanently ending someoneās life, and replacing them with an entirely new (psychologically disconnected) life, is something we should regard negatively or with indifference, all else equal.
Ah, sorry, that makes sense. I can also try to give one example where someone dies permanently. For all else to be equal, we can consider 2 situations where only one person is alive at any given time (such that there are no effects on other persons):
Word A contains 1 person who lives for 100 years with mean annual utility of 10.
World B contains:
1 person X who lives for 50 years with mean annual utility of 10, and then instantly dies.
1 person Y who is instantly created when person X instantly dies, and then lives for 50 years with mean annual utility of 10.
Both worlds have utility of 1 k, and feel equally valuable to me.