Yeah, I’m aware that is the emotional response (I feel it too), and I agree the game theoretic reason for not giving in to threats is important. However, it’s certainly not a theorem of game theory that you always do better if you don’t give in to threats, and sometimes giving in will be the right decision.
we will find you and we will make sure it was not worth it for you, at the cost of our own resources
This is often not an option. (It seems pretty hard to retaliate against an online mob, though I suppose you could randomly select particular members to retaliate against.)
Another good example is bullying. A child has ~no resources to speak of, and bullies will threaten to hurt them unless they do X. Would you really advise this child not to give in to the bully?
(Assume for the sake of the hypothetical the child has already tried to get adults involved and it has done ~nothing, as I am told is in fact often the case. No, the child can’t coordinate with other children to fight the bully, because children are not that good at coordinating.)
Another case where ‘precommitment to refute all threats’ is an unwise strategy (and a case more relevant to the discussion, as I don’t think all opponents to hosting a speaker like Hanson either see themselves or should be seen as bullies attempting coercion) is where your opponent is trying to warn you rather than trying to blackmail you. (cf. 1, 2)
Suppose Alice sincerely believes some of Bob’s writing is unapologetically misogynistic. She believes it is important one does not give misogynists a platform and implicit approbation. Thus she finds hosting Bob abhorrent, and is dismayed that a group at her university is planning to do just this. She approaches this group, making clear her objections and stating her intention to, if this goes ahead, to (e.g.) protest this event, stridently criticise the group in the student paper for hosting him, petition the university to withdraw affiliation, and so on.
This could be an attempt to bully (where usual game theory provides a good reason to refuse to concede anything on principle). But it also could not be: Alice may be explaining what responses she would make to protect her interests which the groups planned action would harm, and hoping to find a better negotiated agreement for her and the EA group besides “They do X and I do Y”.
It can be hard to tell the difference, but some elements in this example speak against Alice being a bully wanting to blackmail the group to get her way: First is the plausibility of her interests recommending these actions to her even if they had no deterrent effect whatsoever (i.e. she’d do the same if the event had already happened). Second the actions she intends falls roughly falls in ‘fair game’ of how one can retaliate against those doing something they’re allowed to do which you deem to be wrong.
Alice is still not a bully even if her motivating beliefs re. Bob are both completely mistaken and unreasonable. She’s also still not a bully even if Alice’s implied second-order norms are wrong (e.g. maybe the public square would be better off if people didn’t stridently object to hosting speakers based on their supposed views on topics they are not speaking upon, etc.) Conflict is typically easy to navigate when you can dictate to your opponent what their interests should be and what they can license themselves to do. Alas such cases are rare.
It is extremely important not to respond to Alice as if she was a bully if in fact she is not, for two reasons. First, if she is acting in good faith, pre-committing to refuse any compromise for ‘do not give in to bullying’ reasons means one always ends up at ones respective BATNAs even if there was mutually beneficial compromises to be struck. Maybe there is no good compromise with Alice this time, but there may be the next time one finds oneself at cross-purposes.
Second, wrongly presuming bad faith for Alice seems apt to induce her to make a symmetrical mistake presuming bad faith for you. To Alice, malice explains well why you were unwilling to even contemplate compromise, why you considered yourself obliged out of principle to persist with actions that harm her interests, and why you call her desire to combat misogyny bullying and blackmail. If Alice also thinks about these things through the lens of game theory (although perhaps not in the most sophisticated way), she may reason she is rationally obliged to retaliate against you (even spitefully) to deter you from doing harm again.
The stage is set for continued escalation. Presumptive bad faith is pernicious, and can easily lead to martyring oneself needlessly on the wrong hill. I also note that ‘leaning into righteous anger’ or ‘take oneself as justified in thinking the worst of those opposed to you’ are not widely recognised as promising approaches in conflict resolution, bargaining, or negotiation.
I agree with parts of this and disagree with other parts.
First off:
First, if she is acting in good faith, pre-committing to refuse any compromise for ‘do not give in to bullying’ reasons means one always ends up at ones respective BATNAs even if there was mutually beneficial compromises to be struck.
Definitely agree that pre-committing seems like a bad idea (as you could probably guess from my previous comment).
Second, wrongly presuming bad faith for Alice seems apt to induce her to make a symmetrical mistake presuming bad faith for you. To Alice, malice explains well why you were unwilling to even contemplate compromise, why you considered yourself obliged out of principle to persist with actions that harm her interests, and why you call her desire to combat misogyny bullying and blackmail.
I agree with this in the abstract, but for the specifics of this particular case, do you in fact think that online mobs / cancel culture / groups who show up to protest your event without warning should be engaged with on a good faith assumption? I struggle to imagine any of these groups accepting anything other than full concession to their demands, such that you’re stuck with the BATNA regardless.
(I definitely agree that if someone emails you saying “I think this speaker is bad and you shouldn’t invite him”, and after some discussion they say “I’m sorry but I can’t agree with you and if you go through with this event I will protest / criticize you / have the university withdraw affiliation”, you should not treat this as a bad faith attack. Afaik this was not the case with EA Munich, though I don’t know the details.)
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Re: the first five paragraphs: I feel like this is disagreeing on how to use the word “bully” or “threat”, rather than anything super important. I’ll just make one note:
Alice is still not a bully even if her motivating beliefs re. Bob are both completely mistaken and unreasonable. She’s also still not a bully even if Alice’s implied second-order norms are wrong (e.g. maybe the public square would be better off if people didn’t stridently object to hosting speakers based on their supposed views on topics they are not speaking upon, etc.)
I’d agree with this if you could reasonably expect to convince Alice that she’s wrong on these counts, such that she then stops doing things like
(e.g.) protest this event, stridently criticise the group in the student paper for hosting him, petition the university to withdraw affiliation
But otherwise, given that she’s taking actions that destroy value for Bob without generating value for Alice (except via their impact on Bob’s actions), I think it is fine to think of this as a threat. (I am less attached to the bully metaphor—I meant that as an example of a threat.)
I agree with this in the abstract, but for the specifics of this particular case, do you in fact think that online mobs / cancel culture / groups who show up to protest your event without warning should be engaged with on a good faith assumption? I struggle to imagine any of these groups accepting anything other than full concession to their demands, such that you’re stuck with the BATNA regardless.
I think so.
In the abstract, ‘negotiating via ultimatum’ (e.g. “you must cancel the talk, or I will do this”) does not mean one is acting in bad faith. Alice may foresee there is no bargaining frontier, but is informing you what your BATNA looks like and gives you the opportunity to consider whether ‘giving in’ is nonetheless better for you (this may not be very ‘nice’, but it isn’t ‘blackmail’). A lot turns on whether her ‘or else’ is plausibly recommended by the lights of her interests (e.g. she would do these things if we had already held the event/she believed our pre-commitment to do so) or she is threatening spiteful actions where their primary value is her hope they alter our behaviour (e.g. she would at least privately wish she didn’t have to ‘follow through’ if we defied her).
The reason these are important to distinguish is ‘folk game theory’ gives a pro tanto reason to not give in the latter case, even if doing so is better than suffering the consequences (as you deter future attempts to coerce you). But not in the former one, as Alice’s motivation to retaliate does not rely on the chance you may acquiesce to her threats, and so she will not ‘go away’ after you’ve credibly demonstrated to her you will never do this.
On the particular case I think some of it was plausibly bad faith (i.e. if a major driver was ‘fleet in being’ threat that people would antisocially disrupt the event) but a lot of it probably wasn’t: “People badmouthing/thinking less of us for doing this” or (as Habryka put it) the ‘very explicit threat’ of an organisation removing their affiliation from EA Munich are all credibly/probably good faith warnings even if the only way to avoid them would have been complete concession. (There are lots of potential reasons I would threaten to stop associating with someone or something where the only way for me to relent is their complete surrender)
(I would be cautious about labelling things as mobs or cancel culture.)
[G]iven that she’s taking actions that destroy value for Bob without generating value for Alice (except via their impact on Bob’s actions), I think it is fine to think of this as a threat. (I am less attached to the bully metaphor—I meant that as an example of a threat.)
Let me take a more in-group example readers will find sympathetic.
When the NYT suggested it will run an article using Scott’s legal name, may of his supporters responded by complaining to the editor, organising petitions, cancelling their subscriptions (and encouraging others to do likewise), trying to coordinate sources/public figures to refuse access to NYT journalists, and so on. These are straightforwardly actions which ‘destroy value’ for the NYT, are substantially motivated to try and influence its behaviour, and was an ultimatum to boot (i.e. the only way the NYT can placate this ‘online mob’ is to fully concede on not using Scott’s legal name).
Yet presumably this strategy was not predicated on ‘only we are allowed to (or smart enough to) use game theory, so we can expect the NYT to irrationally give in to our threats when they should be ostentatiously doing exactly what we don’t want them to do to demonstrate they won’t be bullied’. For although these actions are ‘threats’, they are warnings/ good faith/ non-spiteful, as these responses are not just out of hope to coerce: these people would be minded to retaliate similarly if they only found out NYT’s intention after the article had been published.
Naturally the hope is that one can resolve conflict by a meeting of the minds: we might hope we can convince Alice to see things our way; and the NYT probably hopes the same. But if the disagreement prompting conflict remains, we should be cautious about how we use the word threat, especially in equivocating between commonsense use of the term (e.g. “I threaten to castigate Charlie publicly if she holds a conference on holocaust denial”) and the subspecies where folk game theory—and our own self-righteousness—strongly urges us to refute (e.g. “Life would be easier for us at the NYT if we acquiesced to those threatening to harm our reputation and livelihoods if we report things they don’t want us to. But we will never surrender the integrity of our journalism to bullies and blackmailers.”)
Yeah, I think I agree with everything you’re saying. I think we were probably thinking of different aspects of the situation—I’m imagining the sorts of crusades that were given as examples in the OP (for which a good faith assumption seems straightforwardly wrong, and a bad faith assumption seems straightforwardly correct), whereas you’re imagining other situations like a university withdrawing affiliation (where it seems far more murky and hard to label as good or bad faith).
Also, I realize this wasn’t clear before, but I emphatically don’t think that making threats is necessarily immoral or even bad; it depends on the context (as you’ve been elucidating).
I think I agree with you except for your example. I’m not sure, but it seems plausible to me that in many cases the bullied kid doing X is a bad idea. It seems like it will encourage the bullies to ask for Y and Z later.
Yeah, I’m aware that is the emotional response (I feel it too), and I agree the game theoretic reason for not giving in to threats is important. However, it’s certainly not a theorem of game theory that you always do better if you don’t give in to threats, and sometimes giving in will be the right decision.
This is often not an option. (It seems pretty hard to retaliate against an online mob, though I suppose you could randomly select particular members to retaliate against.)
Another good example is bullying. A child has ~no resources to speak of, and bullies will threaten to hurt them unless they do X. Would you really advise this child not to give in to the bully?
(Assume for the sake of the hypothetical the child has already tried to get adults involved and it has done ~nothing, as I am told is in fact often the case. No, the child can’t coordinate with other children to fight the bully, because children are not that good at coordinating.)
Another case where ‘precommitment to refute all threats’ is an unwise strategy (and a case more relevant to the discussion, as I don’t think all opponents to hosting a speaker like Hanson either see themselves or should be seen as bullies attempting coercion) is where your opponent is trying to warn you rather than trying to blackmail you. (cf. 1, 2)
Suppose Alice sincerely believes some of Bob’s writing is unapologetically misogynistic. She believes it is important one does not give misogynists a platform and implicit approbation. Thus she finds hosting Bob abhorrent, and is dismayed that a group at her university is planning to do just this. She approaches this group, making clear her objections and stating her intention to, if this goes ahead, to (e.g.) protest this event, stridently criticise the group in the student paper for hosting him, petition the university to withdraw affiliation, and so on.
This could be an attempt to bully (where usual game theory provides a good reason to refuse to concede anything on principle). But it also could not be: Alice may be explaining what responses she would make to protect her interests which the groups planned action would harm, and hoping to find a better negotiated agreement for her and the EA group besides “They do X and I do Y”.
It can be hard to tell the difference, but some elements in this example speak against Alice being a bully wanting to blackmail the group to get her way: First is the plausibility of her interests recommending these actions to her even if they had no deterrent effect whatsoever (i.e. she’d do the same if the event had already happened). Second the actions she intends falls roughly falls in ‘fair game’ of how one can retaliate against those doing something they’re allowed to do which you deem to be wrong.
Alice is still not a bully even if her motivating beliefs re. Bob are both completely mistaken and unreasonable. She’s also still not a bully even if Alice’s implied second-order norms are wrong (e.g. maybe the public square would be better off if people didn’t stridently object to hosting speakers based on their supposed views on topics they are not speaking upon, etc.) Conflict is typically easy to navigate when you can dictate to your opponent what their interests should be and what they can license themselves to do. Alas such cases are rare.
It is extremely important not to respond to Alice as if she was a bully if in fact she is not, for two reasons. First, if she is acting in good faith, pre-committing to refuse any compromise for ‘do not give in to bullying’ reasons means one always ends up at ones respective BATNAs even if there was mutually beneficial compromises to be struck. Maybe there is no good compromise with Alice this time, but there may be the next time one finds oneself at cross-purposes.
Second, wrongly presuming bad faith for Alice seems apt to induce her to make a symmetrical mistake presuming bad faith for you. To Alice, malice explains well why you were unwilling to even contemplate compromise, why you considered yourself obliged out of principle to persist with actions that harm her interests, and why you call her desire to combat misogyny bullying and blackmail. If Alice also thinks about these things through the lens of game theory (although perhaps not in the most sophisticated way), she may reason she is rationally obliged to retaliate against you (even spitefully) to deter you from doing harm again.
The stage is set for continued escalation. Presumptive bad faith is pernicious, and can easily lead to martyring oneself needlessly on the wrong hill. I also note that ‘leaning into righteous anger’ or ‘take oneself as justified in thinking the worst of those opposed to you’ are not widely recognised as promising approaches in conflict resolution, bargaining, or negotiation.
I agree with parts of this and disagree with other parts.
First off:
Definitely agree that pre-committing seems like a bad idea (as you could probably guess from my previous comment).
I agree with this in the abstract, but for the specifics of this particular case, do you in fact think that online mobs / cancel culture / groups who show up to protest your event without warning should be engaged with on a good faith assumption? I struggle to imagine any of these groups accepting anything other than full concession to their demands, such that you’re stuck with the BATNA regardless.
(I definitely agree that if someone emails you saying “I think this speaker is bad and you shouldn’t invite him”, and after some discussion they say “I’m sorry but I can’t agree with you and if you go through with this event I will protest / criticize you / have the university withdraw affiliation”, you should not treat this as a bad faith attack. Afaik this was not the case with EA Munich, though I don’t know the details.)
----
Re: the first five paragraphs: I feel like this is disagreeing on how to use the word “bully” or “threat”, rather than anything super important. I’ll just make one note:
I’d agree with this if you could reasonably expect to convince Alice that she’s wrong on these counts, such that she then stops doing things like
But otherwise, given that she’s taking actions that destroy value for Bob without generating value for Alice (except via their impact on Bob’s actions), I think it is fine to think of this as a threat. (I am less attached to the bully metaphor—I meant that as an example of a threat.)
I think so.
In the abstract, ‘negotiating via ultimatum’ (e.g. “you must cancel the talk, or I will do this”) does not mean one is acting in bad faith. Alice may foresee there is no bargaining frontier, but is informing you what your BATNA looks like and gives you the opportunity to consider whether ‘giving in’ is nonetheless better for you (this may not be very ‘nice’, but it isn’t ‘blackmail’). A lot turns on whether her ‘or else’ is plausibly recommended by the lights of her interests (e.g. she would do these things if we had already held the event/she believed our pre-commitment to do so) or she is threatening spiteful actions where their primary value is her hope they alter our behaviour (e.g. she would at least privately wish she didn’t have to ‘follow through’ if we defied her).
The reason these are important to distinguish is ‘folk game theory’ gives a pro tanto reason to not give in the latter case, even if doing so is better than suffering the consequences (as you deter future attempts to coerce you). But not in the former one, as Alice’s motivation to retaliate does not rely on the chance you may acquiesce to her threats, and so she will not ‘go away’ after you’ve credibly demonstrated to her you will never do this.
On the particular case I think some of it was plausibly bad faith (i.e. if a major driver was ‘fleet in being’ threat that people would antisocially disrupt the event) but a lot of it probably wasn’t: “People badmouthing/thinking less of us for doing this” or (as Habryka put it) the ‘very explicit threat’ of an organisation removing their affiliation from EA Munich are all credibly/probably good faith warnings even if the only way to avoid them would have been complete concession. (There are lots of potential reasons I would threaten to stop associating with someone or something where the only way for me to relent is their complete surrender)
(I would be cautious about labelling things as mobs or cancel culture.)
Let me take a more in-group example readers will find sympathetic.
When the NYT suggested it will run an article using Scott’s legal name, may of his supporters responded by complaining to the editor, organising petitions, cancelling their subscriptions (and encouraging others to do likewise), trying to coordinate sources/public figures to refuse access to NYT journalists, and so on. These are straightforwardly actions which ‘destroy value’ for the NYT, are substantially motivated to try and influence its behaviour, and was an ultimatum to boot (i.e. the only way the NYT can placate this ‘online mob’ is to fully concede on not using Scott’s legal name).
Yet presumably this strategy was not predicated on ‘only we are allowed to (or smart enough to) use game theory, so we can expect the NYT to irrationally give in to our threats when they should be ostentatiously doing exactly what we don’t want them to do to demonstrate they won’t be bullied’. For although these actions are ‘threats’, they are warnings/ good faith/ non-spiteful, as these responses are not just out of hope to coerce: these people would be minded to retaliate similarly if they only found out NYT’s intention after the article had been published.
Naturally the hope is that one can resolve conflict by a meeting of the minds: we might hope we can convince Alice to see things our way; and the NYT probably hopes the same. But if the disagreement prompting conflict remains, we should be cautious about how we use the word threat, especially in equivocating between commonsense use of the term (e.g. “I threaten to castigate Charlie publicly if she holds a conference on holocaust denial”) and the subspecies where folk game theory—and our own self-righteousness—strongly urges us to refute (e.g. “Life would be easier for us at the NYT if we acquiesced to those threatening to harm our reputation and livelihoods if we report things they don’t want us to. But we will never surrender the integrity of our journalism to bullies and blackmailers.”)
Yeah, I think I agree with everything you’re saying. I think we were probably thinking of different aspects of the situation—I’m imagining the sorts of crusades that were given as examples in the OP (for which a good faith assumption seems straightforwardly wrong, and a bad faith assumption seems straightforwardly correct), whereas you’re imagining other situations like a university withdrawing affiliation (where it seems far more murky and hard to label as good or bad faith).
Also, I realize this wasn’t clear before, but I emphatically don’t think that making threats is necessarily immoral or even bad; it depends on the context (as you’ve been elucidating).
I think I agree with you except for your example. I’m not sure, but it seems plausible to me that in many cases the bullied kid doing X is a bad idea. It seems like it will encourage the bullies to ask for Y and Z later.