I’ve spent my career deploying capital and building systems in some of the world’s most difficult environments: scaling a $116M program from the ground up, managing $186M across 700+ grants, and applying rigorous evaluation frameworks to reach some of the world’s most neglected populations.
What drives me is a simple question: is what we’re doing actually working? That instinct has shaped everything from how I designed grantmaking systems in active conflict to how I think about counterfactual impact, evidence-based adaptation, and where philanthropic giving has the most leverage. What gets me out of bed is the people—the ones working against long odds in places most funders never look—and the belief that thoughtful support can make a real difference to whether they succeed.
I’m transitioning into effective philanthropy, drawn to roles in multi-cause fund management, portfolio strategy, and evidence-based grantmaking. I’m particularly interested in cause areas where the stakes are highest and the funding most neglected: global development, improving institutions, and catastrophic risk.
My background spans strategic grantmaking, program evaluation, policy engagement, and operational scale-up across Africa, Europe, and Asia. I bring the judgment to make hard funding decisions and the systems-thinking to build infrastructure that makes those decisions better over time.
Jamie, thank you so much for this thoughtful and constructive feedback! I really appreciate you taking the time to engage with this so carefully.
You’re absolutely right that these claims need more substantiation. I made a deliberate choice to keep the initial post relatively brief to give people baseline knowledge and invite engagement rather than overwhelming readers with data upfront. But I’m glad you’re pushing me to go deeper.
Let me provide more detail on each dimension, while being honest about where the evidence is strong and where it’s limited:
On Scale: According to UN OCHA’s December 2024 report, an estimated 30.4 million people need assistance in 2025, nearly two thirds of the country’s population and marking an increase of 5.6 million people from 2024. The ACAPS October 2024 report notes that conflict-induced displacement has affected more than ten million people, while livelihoods, markets, and services across the country have collapsed.
According to UN OCHA’s report from August 2024, famine conditions are now prevalent in Zamzam internally displaced persons camp in North Darfur State, marking the first such report globally since 2017, with the IPC Famine Review Committee concluding that thousands more people are likely experiencing similar conditions in 13 other areas at risk of famine.
The IRC’s 2025 Emergency Watchlist ranks Sudan at the top for the second year running, describing it as “the largest humanitarian crisis ever recorded,” accounting for 10% of people in humanitarian need globally despite being home to just 1% of the global population.
On Neglectedness: This is what I think has the strongest case. The SSHAP October 2024 case study notes that in April 2024, donors came together in Paris in an effort to raise the USD 2.7 billion that the UN estimated is required. I helped prepare US government officials for that meeting, and remember how unbelievably difficult it was for donors to agree on coordinated action. But current estimation suggests funding is just 41% of what is needed. Media coverage, political will and funding all remain low when compared to the magnitude of the crisis.
According to UN OCHA’s July 2024 dashboard, by the end of July, the 2024 Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan was still less than 40 per cent funded of the $2.7 billion required.
The Norwegian Refugee Council’s 2023 report found that Sudan was among the nine most underfunded crises globally, with funding coverage between 2019 and 2023 averaging 15 percent lower than other humanitarian response plans.
And critically: the SSHAP report notes that in December 2023, research indicated that only 16% of aid was able to reach those in need, with access most restricted in the besieged Khartoum, Darfur and Kordofan states.
On Tractability and Cost-Effectiveness: This is where I need to be most honest about evidence limitations. I cannot provide you with a GiveWell-style cost-per-life-saved calculation. Here’s what I can tell you from the independent research reports:
Efficiency indicators:
The ACAPS report documents that ERR volunteers have worked unpaid for over two years, meaning overhead costs are near-zero
Some ERRs in Khartoum voiced that intermediary NGOs would take a significant percentage (often 10%) of grants for administrative fees while not doing much in terms of operational work, with ERRs carrying out implementation including running kitchens and clinics
ERRs implement informal yet effective accountability measures, such as public complaint handling and transparent procurement rules, including the formation of procurement committees
Access advantage:
ERRs’ adaptability, presence in conflict areas, and proximity to communities have enabled them to respond where other national and international responders could not
This means the counterfactual impact is potentially very high—these aren’t services duplicating what others could provide, they’re often the only services reaching certain populations
Demonstrated scale:
By October 2024, an estimated 360 ERRs were operating across seven states
Between 2023-2024, ERRs provided first aid, delivered medicines including for chronic diseases, mapped safe evacuation routes, supported IDPs in shelters, established communal kitchens, distributed food, and operated hospitals and local health facilities
The Honest Comparison to Top Cause Areas: You asked for explicit quantitative comparisons. I can’t provide them at the level of rigor EA typically expects, and I want to be clear about why:
Global health interventions (malaria nets, deworming, etc.) have decades of RCT evidence. I cannot compete with that level of certainty.
What I can argue: In a context where two-thirds of a country’s population needs humanitarian assistance including confirmed famine conditions, volunteer networks with ~0% overhead operating where no one else can reach might have cost-effectiveness in the same ballpark as top interventions. But I’m making an educated argument based on the available evidence, not proving it with RCTs.
The epistemic challenge: This raises a real question about EA’s framework. Should we only fund interventions we can measure with near-certainty? Or should we have some capacity for high-uncertainty, high-potential-impact interventions during acute emergencies?
What Would Stronger Evidence Look Like?
Honestly? It would probably require EA funding a proper evaluation. You could fund:
Retrospective analysis of ERR operations with health economists
Prospective monitoring of specific interventions
Comparative analysis of ERR vs. traditional NGO cost structures in Sudan
But there’s a chicken-and-egg problem: we can’t get that evidence without some initial funding, but we can’t get funding without that evidence.
My Ask: I’m not claiming Sudan definitively beats GiveWell top charities on cost-effectiveness. I’m arguing it’s plausible enough that it warrants serious evaluation, and that the combination of massive scale + extreme neglectedness + demonstrated local capacity should be enough to trigger that evaluation.
What would you need to see to consider this worth deeper investigation? I’d really value your thoughts on how EA might approach situations like this where the need is urgent but the evidence base doesn’t yet meet our typical standards. Thanks again for engaging with this so thoughtfully!