Jamie_Harris

• Jamie_HarrisMar 16, 2025, 10:02 AM

  2 points

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  in reply to: Jamie_Harris’s comment on: Hy­pothe­ses on how we can mo­bil­ise peo­ple for an­i­mal welfare

  Social Movement Mobilization: Literature Review

  Collective Identity and Community Building

  Core concepts: Shared identity formation, in-group solidarity, boundary maintenance

  Key findings:

  • Strong collective identities significantly predict sustained participation

  • Communities that balance inclusivity with distinctive identity markers show higher retention

  • Regular face-to-face interaction strengthens commitment beyond digital-only engagement

  Evidence strength: Strong. Multiple longitudinal studies across diverse movements consistently show correlation between identity strength and participation persistence.

  Notable research:

  • Polletta and Jasper’s (2001) review found identity processes central to all stages of activism

  • Snow and McAdam (2000) documented how “identity alignment” precedes sustained activism

  • Blee’s (2012) ethnographic studies showed how white supremacist groups use identity work to maintain commitment despite social stigma

  Resource Mobilization

  Core concepts: Organizational infrastructure, resource acquisition, professional vs. grassroots structures

  Key findings:

  • Professionalized organizations excel at policy advocacy but often struggle with deep engagement

  • Hybrid structures combining professional leadership with grassroots participation demonstrate better long-term mobilization

  • Material and non-material resources both matter, but emotional resources become increasingly important for sustained involvement

  Evidence strength: Moderate to strong. Comparative organizational studies show clear patterns, though causal mechanisms remain debated.

  Notable research:

  • McCarthy and Zald’s (1977) foundational work showed how resource availability shapes movement trajectories

  • Staggenborg’s (1988) comparative study found professionalized organizations survived longer but mobilized fewer committed activists

  • Ganz’s (2000) research on the United Farm Workers demonstrated how strategic capacity depends on leadership structures and insider/​outsider combinations

  Framing and Messaging

  Core concepts: Diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing; frame resonance; frame alignment

  Key findings:

  • Single-issue framing simplifies messaging but limits identity commitment

  • Holistic frames connecting multiple issues create stronger commitment but reach narrower audiences

  • Progressive frame alignment over time builds deeper engagement than immediate ideological purity tests

  Evidence strength: Moderate. Experimental and observational studies show consistent effects, though context-specific factors introduce variability.

  Notable research:

  • Benford and Snow’s (2000) synthesis showed how framing shapes mobilization potential

  • Bail’s (2012) computational analysis demonstrated how emotional resonance predicts frame adoption

  • Jasper’s (2011) work on moral emotions highlighted how different framing strategies activate different types of commitment

  Biographical Availability and Networks

  Core concepts: Social ties, movement socialization, biographical constraints

  Key findings:

  • Pre-existing network ties remain the strongest predictor of initial movement participation

  • Sustained engagement correlates with integration into movement-related social networks

  • The “biographical availability” (free time, minimal competing commitments) affects participation levels

  Evidence strength: Very strong. Consistent findings across movements, methodologies, and time periods.

  Notable research:

  • McAdam’s (1986) study of Freedom Summer showed network ties predicted high-risk activism

  • Passy and Giugni’s (2001) work demonstrated how networks both recruit and socialize members

  • Corrigall-Brown’s (2012) longitudinal research identified how life transitions affect continued participation

  Emotional Dimensions

  Core concepts: Moral shock, collective emotions, emotional energy, affective commitment

  Key findings:

  • “Moral shocks” drive initial mobilization but rarely sustain long-term commitment

  • Positive emotions from collective action (solidarity, hope, pride) better predict sustained engagement

  • Groups that provide emotional rewards alongside instrumental goals show higher retention

  Evidence strength: Strong and growing. Initially understudied, emotional factors now recognized as crucial through both qualitative and quantitative research.

  Notable research:

  • Jasper’s (2018) work on “the emotions of protest” showed how different emotional processes operate at different stages

  • Collins’ (2001) interaction ritual theory demonstrated how emotional energy from successful collective actions fuels continued participation

  • Goodwin et al.’s (2009) edited volume synthesized evidence on how emotional processes function in movements

  Application to Your Colleague’s Concerns

  Your colleague’s observations align with several empirical findings:

  1. On professional boundaries: The research strongly supports the importance of social bonds and informal connections. Corrigall-Brown found that when activism becomes integrated into participants’ broader social lives, persistence increases significantly. Their suggestion of physical community spaces aligns with findings from Haunss and Leach (2007) on the importance of “free spaces” for movement culture.

  2. On single-issue communication: The framing literature confirms the trade-off they identify. Snow and Benford’s work on “frame bridging” suggests organizations might develop ways to connect animal issues to other concerns without requiring complete ideological alignment. Their idea of different “flavors” of thought leadership is supported by research on “multi-organizational fields” (Curtis and Zurcher, 1973).

  Recommendations Based on Evidence

  1. Hybrid engagement models: The strongest evidence supports creating tiered engagement opportunities with different commitment levels—from single-petition signers to core organizers—with pathways between levels.

  2. Community-building infrastructure: Physical spaces, regular gatherings, and shared rituals consistently show high impact on commitment. Putnam’s (2000) work on social capital confirms the value of their community space idea.

  3. Frame diversification: Research supports developing multiple frames for different audiences while maintaining coalition coherence, similar to their suggestion about diverse thought leaders.

  4. Emotional cultivation: Strong evidence indicates that organizations should intentionally cultivate positive emotional experiences alongside instrumental campaigns.

  5. Life-course integration: Help supporters integrate their animal advocacy with other life domains rather than treating it as a separate activity.

• Jamie_HarrisMar 16, 2025, 9:58 AM

  2 points

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  on: Hy­pothe­ses on how we can mo­bil­ise peo­ple for an­i­mal welfare

  Seems important, thanks for raising! Your first suggestion seems very plausible to me, your second seems somewhat plausible but less likely/​important.

  My first reaction is that animal advocacy orgs should consider optimising for community building and mobilisation (as an interim goal). My impression (which may be wrong) from my involvement with the movement was roughly that orgs were usually optimising for mobilisation around specific objectives rather than actually trying to set up a long-term community and strong activist base. I expect a simple mindset shift from “my job is to generate progress on our campaigns” to “my job is to grow a community of sustained and dedicated activists” would unlock a bunch of options. E.g. it probably means more things like meetups, reading groups, etc.

  Second reaction: I believe there’s a rich academic literature on mobilising supporters and sustaining engagement in social movements. So I asked Claude for a summary which I’ll post as a reply to this comment. There’s some empirical support for your suggestions!

• Jamie_HarrisMar 10, 2025, 8:18 AM

  9 points

  1 ∶ 0

  in reply to: Gideon Futerman’s comment on: How con­fi­dent are you that it’s prefer­able for Amer­ica to de­velop AGI be­fore China does?

  Great point! I need to think about that framing more, I think.

• Jamie_HarrisMar 9, 2025, 4:14 PM

  9 points

  1 ∶ 0

  in reply to: Davidmanheim’s comment on: How con­fi­dent are you that it’s prefer­able for Amer­ica to de­velop AGI be­fore China does?

  Since you requested responses: I agree with something like: ‘conditional upon AI killing us all and then going on to do things that have zero moral (dis)value, it then matters little who was most responsible for that having happened’. But this seems like an odd framing to me:

  • Even if focusing solely on AI alignment, different actors have varying levels of responsibility for worsening various risk factors or contributing to various safety/​security/​mitigation between now and the arrival of transformative AI /​ ASI.

  • The post asked about AGI. Reaching AGI is not the same as reaching ASI, which is not the same as extinction.

  • It seems very possible that humanity could survive but the world could end up as severely net negative. See “The Future Might Not Be So Great”, “s-risks”, and the upcoming EA Forum debate week

  • In particular, I believe AI alignment is not enough to ensure positive futures. See for example risks of stable totalitarianism, risks from malevolent actors, risks from ideological fanaticism. We can think of ‘human misalignment’ or misuse of AI.

• Jamie_HarrisMar 9, 2025, 4:03 PM

  2 points

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  on: How con­fi­dent are you that it’s prefer­able for Amer­ica to de­velop AGI be­fore China does?

  This is an important question. Thank you for raising it, and highlighting some interesting considerations in your original post!

  Rather than attempt to answer comprehensively, I want to highlight a particular aspect that I’ve been thinking about recently: risks from ideological fanaticism. My colleague David Althaus is leading on an extensive post/​report on this topic which we hope to post soon, but to summarise a few of the risks we’re worried about (which are not solely reducible to authoritarianism):

  • Fanatical ideologies increase the risk of (great power) wars and conflict.

  • Fanatical ideologies are highly punitive and retributivist.

  • Ideological fanatics threaten the long reflection: They seek to lock in their values and fundamentally oppose moral reflection.

  If you bear with me and take it as a given that fanaticism poses serious long-term risks (x-risks and s-risks), there’s a question of to what extent the Chinese regime is worse than the US or other countries.

  I fed ChatGPT’s deep research our draft definition of ideological fanaticism and asked it for “a report that investigates the extent to which China’s regime today (e.g. the CCP, Xi Jinping) is ideologically fanatical, according to our definition.”

  The full response is here, but I will copy the “conclusion” and “Comparative Perspectives… United States under Trump (2017–2021): Polarized but Not Fanatical” sections below. (Sources omitted because they don’t copy over well.) I’d be very interested in responses/​critiques etc!

  I think that considering this aspect should shift us towards increased confidence “that it’s preferable for America to develop AGI before China does”.

  As for my own confidence… I dunno, like 65% confident? (I can imagine drastically shifting this if I thought more systematically about the framing of the question, listed more crucial considerations out etc.)

  Conclusion

  Is Xi’s CCP a genuinely fanatical regime or a pragmatic autocracy cloaked in ideology? The analysis suggests it is a blend of both, with an increasing tilt toward genuine fanaticism in recent years. Xi Jinping has re-ideologized China’s politics to an extent not seen since Mao – reintroducing dogma, purging dissent, and encouraging a quasi-religious loyalty to Party and leader. The CCP under Xi demonstrates all four hallmarks of ideological fanaticism: it asserts near-infallible truths (Marxist-Leninist, nationalist doctrine) and suppresses contrary voices (epistemic dogmatism); it frames its mission (national rejuvenation under one-party socialism) as an absolute moral imperative, castigating liberal values as “evil” Western assaults (moral absolutism)​; it fosters intense loyalty through nationalism and party indoctrination, making support for Xi and CCP a core identity of being Chinese (tribalistic loyalty)​; and it mercilessly targets those it labels enemies – from Uyghur Muslims and Hong Kong democrats to online critics – with hate-inciting propaganda and draconian punishment (out-group punitiveness). These aspects are not just for show: they have been implemented in concrete policies and campaigns that have profoundly altered Chinese society and governance in the past decade.

  However, it would be an oversimplification to label Xi’s China as purely fanatical and irrational. The CCP’s ideological moves are often calculated to serve its survivability. The leadership is keenly aware of historical and global trends and adapts tactics when necessary (e.g., fine-tuning censorship technology, leveraging nationalism only when useful but reining it in when it might spur uncontrollable public anger, etc.). Unlike a revolutionary movement driven by dogma at all costs, the CCP is fundamentally a ruling establishment that enjoys power and wants to keep it. If rigid ideology seriously imperiled economic development or provoked widespread unrest, the Party has shown capacity to adjust course (for instance, post-Mao in 1978, the Party pivoted dramatically from fanatical communism to pragmatic reform; even under Xi we saw a pragmatic retreat from zero-COVID policies when faced with economic damage and protests). So, ideology in Xi’s China, while fervently promoted, is also in service to the regime’s stability and ambitions. Officials and state intellectuals will tweak the ideological narrative (e.g., emphasizing certain Confucian elements or nationalist pride) when it suits practical needs. Xi’s China thus lacks the blind zeal of, say, the Khmer Rouge or ISIS – it is not pursuing an ideological end that would destroy its own power base. In fact, one could argue the CCP’s true “ideology” is simply authoritarianism for its own perpetuation, using whatever mix of Marxism and nationalism works. In that sense, the regime is adaptive: it clings fanatically to power, if not to every tenet of Marxism per se.

  Nevertheless, the methods and mindset employed under Xi – the massive propaganda, the personality cult hints, the social credit monitoring, the intolerance of minor heterodox opinions – have a fanatical character and could deepen. There is a feedback loop: the more the regime insists on ideological conformity, the more it may start to believe its own propaganda, and the smaller the space for corrective feedback becomes. This can lead to policy blunders (as seen with the rigid insistence on zero-COVID until things reached a breaking point). It is worth noting that Xi has eliminated virtually all internal party opposition and surrounded himself with loyalists, which means policy is made in an echo chamber affirming Xi’s ideological instincts. This is a classic hallmark of regimes that have slid into true fanaticism – losing the capacity for self-critique. The trajectory of China’s CCP seems to be moving away from Deng-era pragmatism toward a more stifling, dogma-driven approach. Whether this will harden into a full-blown cult of personality and a completely inflexible system (like North Korea), or whether practical needs will impose moderation, remains an open question.

  In conclusion, China under Xi Jinping can accurately be described as ideologically hardline and authoritarian, exhibiting many elements of fanaticism but stopping short of the most extreme fanatic regimes. It has a vigorous official ideology and enforces it coercively (far more than most regimes of its size and complexity), yet it also shows opportunism and careful management beneath the surface. The CCP is fanatical about maintaining its rule and the narrative that legitimizes that rule. Whether one views that as true belief or Machiavellian strategy, the effects on the ground are similar: a society that is more tightly controlled in thought and behavior than any time in recent memory. Compared to polarized democracies, Xi’s China is unmistakably unfree and ideologically repressive. Compared to Iran or North Korea, China’s fanaticism is somewhat more secular and techno‑bureaucratic in flavor, but it is trending in a similarly oppressive direction. For now, the CCP’s actions suggest it is doubling down on ideological governance, not loosening up. The risk is that this rigidity, if taken too far, could become a liability in a rapidly changing world – a fanaticism that undermines the very national strength it seeks to secure. The CCP’s challenge ahead will be whether it can sustain its tight ideological grip without stifling the creativity and openness needed for economic and social vitality. That balance (or imbalance) will determine if Xi’s China is remembered as a stable, adaptive authoritarianism or as a cautionary tale of ideological overreach.

  To put China’s ideological rigor in context, we compare it with other regimes on the spectrum from non-fanatical democracies to the world’s most fanatical authoritarian states.

  United States under Trump (2017–2021): Polarized but Not Fanatical

  The United States during President Donald Trump’s tenure provides a useful democratic contrast. The Trump era saw unprecedented polarization and some populist, tribalistic rhetoric from the top, but the U.S. remained far from an ideologically fanatical regime. Unlike Xi, Trump did not command a single-party apparatus enforcing an official ideology nationwide – the U.S. continued to have a competitive two-party system, a boisterous free press, and institutional checks and balances that limited Trump’s power. Epistemic dogmatism: The Trump administration certainly had issues with truth (e.g. spreading the notion of “alternative facts” and conspiracy theories like election fraud in 2020), and Trump himself was often dismissive of expert knowledge. However, these tendencies did not translate into a monolithic control of information. Media opposing Trump (CNN, New York Times, etc.) operated freely and in fact grew in influence; social media was not censored by the government (Trump’s critiques of platforms aside). Many Americans disbelieved Trump’s false claims – in short, there was vigorous debate rather than enforced dogma. Moral absolutism: Trump’s political style was combative and he often painted opponents in stark terms (calling mainstream press “the enemy of the people,” for example, a phrase with totalitarian echoes​). Yet in the broader system, there remained strong normative commitments to pluralism and the rule of law. Political opposition was not outlawed or inherently deemed treasonous; in fact, Trump faced pushback from courts, Congress (including impeachment proceedings), and state governments. The country did not embrace an absolutist moral narrative dictated by Trump – indeed, roughly half the country vehemently opposed him, and this was accepted as part of the democratic process. Tribalism and loyalty: There was certainly a cult of personality among segments of Trump’s base, with intense loyalty to him personally and a tendency to dismiss any criticism of him. The Republican Party largely rallied around Trump, showing high partisan loyalty. But this loyalty was voluntary and contested – several prominent Republicans and conservative media outlets did break with Trump on various issues (especially after the January 6, 2021 Capitol riot). Importantly, loyalty to the nation was not officially redefined as loyalty to Trump; civil servants, military officers, and others often acted independently. Out-group hostility: Trump’s rhetoric was notorious for targeting out-groups – e.g. harsh language about immigrants (Mexicans, Muslims) and political opponents (chanting “Lock her up!” about Hillary Clinton). His administration implemented hardline policies like the Muslim-country travel ban and family separations at the border, which reflected punitive attitudes toward those groups. However, these policies, while controversial and arguably cruel, were constrained by law and courts (parts of the travel ban were struck down, family separations were eventually halted under public pressure). There was no comprehensive state propaganda vilifying a group to the extent of, say, China’s portrayal of Uyghurs or Iran’s of dissidents. Dissent against Trump was robust – millions marched in protests (e.g. Women’s March, BLM protests) without being suppressed by a regime apparatus. The press openly criticized and satirized him daily. In sum, the U.S. under Trump saw heightened polarization and some authoritarian-style tendencies, but it did not approach the systematic ideological fanaticism of a one-party state. Freedom House continued to rate the U.S. as “Free,” albeit noting some democratic backsliding. The democracy index classed the U.S. as a “flawed democracy” (score ~7.9/​10)​ – a far cry from authoritarian. Trump’s presidency did not eliminate institutional pluralism; elections led to his removal in 2020, and the transition of power continued (despite his attempts to overturn the results). This illustrates the difference: in a democracy, even a polarizing leader cannot enforce a singular ideology or eliminate opposition. The U.S. remained fundamentally adaptive and open, as evidenced by how rapidly policies and narratives shifted with a new administration in 2021.

• Jamie_HarrisMar 1, 2025, 12:24 PM

  4 points

  0 ∶ 0

  on: Alter­na­tive press­ing prob­lems lists

  There are some related resources and discussion in my quick take here

  https://​​forum.effectivealtruism.org/​​posts/​​MNxFL6Lry7w5nQaaH/​​jamie_harris-s-shortform?commentId=HGqprJnfE3xBiHHeX

  (Apologies if this is too late!)

• Jamie_HarrisMar 1, 2025, 12:17 PM

  4 points

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  on: Ret­ro­spec­tive for Inau­gu­ral EA SA Sum­mit 2024: Its Im­pact and What We Learnt

  From a quick glance this seems like some really cool and promising outcomes! I’d have been interested to know more detail about the “Intended Actions of Respondents” (e.g.s of specific promising things people are doing as a result) and what the costs were after accounting for organiser remuneration as well.

  I was pretty surprised how many accepted attendees you had for such low online advertising costs. That suggests there’s some real low-hanging fruit of potentially interested people. I’d also be interested in whether (m)any of the people who applied and attended through this method ended up being strong participants in the event and/​or taking follow-up actions.

• Jamie_HarrisFeb 16, 2025, 5:51 PM

  6 points

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  in reply to: Jeroen Willems🔸’s comment on: Ideas EAIF is ex­cited to re­ceive ap­pli­ca­tions for

  Apologies, missed this comment!

  EA outreach is still in-scope, it just wasn’t an area we highlighted in this post. That’s partly because we tend to get quite a few applications of this sort anyway. (I’m not sure but my vague impression is that the average quality of such applications is lower, too.)

• Jamie_HarrisFeb 5, 2025, 3:16 PM

  2 points

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  on: In­tro­duc­ing Canopy Retreats

  Hey! Does Canopy Retreats still exist in any form? I see the website is down but not sure if that’s because it migrated, got absorbed into a larger org, or everyone just moved onto other things. Thanks!
  
  (In the meantime, for anyone else coming back across this post, I stumbled across “Skylark”: “We plan and facilitate transformative events. We help you shape a bold vision for your community, manage every operational detail, and lead workshops”. Seemingly run by EAs with testimonials all by EAs.)

• Jamie_HarrisJan 24, 2025, 9:34 PM

  4 points

  0 ∶ 1

  on: How big of a prob­lem is abor­tion?

  I really appreciate you reasoning independently, working through to try to overcome scope insensitivity (and communicate clearly/​graphically to others!), and make important prioritisation decisions that affect how you can best help others. Interesting to see your thought process; thanks for sharing!

• Jamie_HarrisJan 19, 2025, 8:18 PM

  4 points

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  in reply to: Angelina Li’s comment on: An­gelina Li’s Shortform

  I agree and am guilty of not doing this myself; I mostly only leave comments when I want to question or critique something. So after reading this I went back and left two positive comments on two posts I read today. (Plus also this comment.) Thanks for the explanation and nudge!

• Jamie_HarrisJan 19, 2025, 8:13 PM

  2 points

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  in reply to: Rasool’s comment on: How Effec­tive Altru­ists In­fluenced Vi­talik Bu­terin to donate $1 Billion in Crypto Meme Coins

  I appreciate the original post and also appreciate you highlighting this useful extra info.

  Thanks to both!

• Jamie_HarrisJan 19, 2025, 8:12 PM

  2 points

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  on: An­nounc­ing a new CEA-sup­ported lo­cal event series

  Great idea! Seems good to try out and I imagine that a bunch of the infrastructure and expertise CEA has already built up will easily transfer over.

  I’m intrigued about the summary costs (total, per attendee average); $, CEA staff time, local organiser staff time etc. I think the linked posts at the top contained some but not all of this. Intrigued to hear how it goes going forward.

• Jamie_HarrisJan 19, 2025, 7:39 PM

  4 points

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  in reply to: Benny Smith’s comment on: How can we get the world to talk about an­i­mals’ in­vi­o­lable rights?

  In case you and @David Michelson haven’t seen them, I and some colleagues did a bunch of research into social movement case studies a few years ago.

  https://​​forum.effectivealtruism.org/​​posts/​​ATpxEPwCQWQAFf4XX/​​key-lessons-from-social-movement-history

  Not to suggest that more wouldn’t be useful, just an FYI in case you didn’t know and would find them helpful!

• Jamie_HarrisJan 17, 2025, 9:08 PM

  11 points

  1 ∶ 0

  on: How To In­crease The Im­pact Of The EA Com­mu­nity (II): Draw­ing In­spira­tion From The Past

  ank you for this post—it looks very interesting. I’ve given it a quick skim but wanted to check in on a concern/​critique I have before engaging more closely with the recommendations.

  Most of the post seems dedicated to explaining why the Fabians were so successful.

  However, I’m not yet convinced that they actually caused meaningful change. You begin by listing some of their goals and then highlight how many of those goals came to fruition, but that doesn’t establish their causal role in making those changes happen.

  It looks like you provide two main forms of evidence for their influence:

  1. Noting that they had influential members or supporters in many countries.

  
  2. Quoting a particular supporter of the Fabians.

  Unfortunately, both of these seem like weak evidence to me. The first point is fairly common—many people sign up for societies and pay lip service to their supposed importance without necessarily contributing to their impact. For example, PlayPumps (a classic Effective Altruist case of an ineffective and even counterproductive yet widely endorsed charity) had many influential supporters, but that didn’t make it effective or significant.

  As for the Margaret Cole quote, it doesn’t provide much evidence either—it’s essentially just an endorsement, asserting that the Fabians were important without substantiating that claim?

  To be clear, I’m not saying you’re wrong about the Fabians being influential. Rather, I think the post hasn’t yet provided strong evidence for that claim. If you were to include more comprehensive or compelling evidence, this could be a really valuable post.

  Thanks a lot for your work here!

  (Apologies if this seems pedantic. I think these methodological considerations are important for the effort to learn useful lessons from history though. See these posts I wrote for some related thoughts)

  https://​​www.sentienceinstitute.org/​​blog/​​what-can-the-farmed-animal-movement-learn-from-history

  https://​​www.sentienceinstitute.org/​​blog/​​social-movement-case-studies-methodology )

• Jamie_HarrisJan 5, 2025, 9:49 PM

  3 points

  1 ∶ 0

  in reply to: akash 🔸’s comment on: Earn­ing to Give (EtG) Pledge Club

  Random idea on the random idea: such an event (or indeed similar social opportunities for ETGers) could charge for participation and aim to fully cover costs, or even make a profit that gets donated.

  EtGers have money they want to give away, and this is clearly a service that should be supporting them to address a need they have --> they should be willing to pay for it.

  Also, if the service just focused on providing EtGers with fun, social connections, and a great community rather than ‘overfitting’ to what seems directly relevant to impact, I think it might be easier to make it successful and grow it. But then a bunch of the money would be spent on things that are quite disconnected from impact, and arguably shouldn’t be funded by Open Philanthropy, EAIF etc and would be better coming from EtGers personal/​social/​fun budgets rather than out of their donations.

  Arguments against:

  separate fuzzies and utilons… This might be blurring the boundaries and making it hard to optimise for either, or making it confusing for EtGers whether they should see it as a donation or not.

  EtGers might underestimate the benefits of investing in themselves in this way (in the same way people often underinvest in their own mental health, productivity systems, etc) and offering it free or subsidised might better set incentives that accurately represent its value.

• Jamie_HarrisDec 31, 2024, 9:44 AM

  22 points

  0 ∶ 0

  on: Fund­ing Diver­sifi­ca­tion for Mid-Large EA Or­ga­ni­za­tions is Nearly Im­pos­si­ble in the Short-Medium Term

  Thanks for the useful post Marcus!

  If people reading might be a good fit for running a project helping to improve funding diversification, I encourage them to apply to the EA Infrastructure Fund. We are keen to receive applications that help with this (and aren’t currently very funding constrained ourselves).

  As for ideas for projects; Marcus lists some above, I list some on my post, and you might have ideas of your own.

• Jamie_HarrisDec 18, 2024, 7:20 PM

  4 points

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  in reply to: gergo’s comment on: Ideas EAIF is ex­cited to re­ceive ap­pli­ca­tions for

  I don’t know all the details since it’s a governance/​operational thing but I don’t think we expect this to be an issue, thankfully!

• Jamie_HarrisDec 16, 2024, 3:29 PM

  2 points

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  in reply to: Jacob Watts🔸’s comment on: Ideas EAIF is ex­cited to re­ceive ap­pli­ca­tions for

  I didn’t write that wording originally (I just copied it over from this post), so I can’t speak exactly to their original thinking.

  But I think the phrasing includes the EA community, it just uses the plural to avoid excluding others.

  Some examples that jump to mind:

  • EA

  • Rationality, x-risk, s-risk, AI Safety, wild animal welfare, etc to varying degrees

  • Org-specific communities, e.g. the fellows and follow-up opportunities on various fellowship programmes.

  I would like to more clearly understand what the canonical “stewards of the EA brand” in CEA and the EAIF have in mind for the future of EA groups and the movement as a whole?

  I think this suggests more of a sense of unity/​agreement than I expect is true in practice. These are complex things and individuals have different views and ideas!

  Thanks for thinking this stuff through and coming up with ideas!

• Jamie_HarrisDec 16, 2024, 3:24 PM

  2 points

  0 ∶ 0

  in reply to: Daniel Abiliba’s comment on: Ideas EAIF is ex­cited to re­ceive ap­pli­ca­tions for

  Hi Daniel! I don’t have a lot to elaborate on here; I haven’t really thought much about the practicalities, I was just flagging that proposals and ideas relating to regranting seem like a plausible way to help with funding diversification.

  Also, just FYI, on the specific intervention idea, which could be promising, that would fall in the remit of EA Funds’ Animal Welfare Fund (which I do not work at), not the Infrastructure Fund (which I work at). I didn’t check with fund managers there if they endorse things I’ve written here or not.