Cameron Meyer Shorb 🔸

Karma: 657

Cameron Meyer Shorb 🔸Apr 9, 2020, 4:26 PM
3 points
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in reply to: GeorgeBridgwater’s comment on: Why I’m Not Vegan
Another argument against this position is its effect on your moral attitudes as Jeff Sebo argued in his talk at EA global in 2019. You could dismiss this if you are certain it will not effect the relative value you place on other being and by not advertising your position as to not effect others.
(FYI, this is the argument I was referring to as the “epistemic” argument in my other comment. Thanks for linking to that talk, George!)

Cameron Meyer Shorb 🔸Apr 9, 2020, 4:21 PM
19 points
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in reply to: abrahamrowe’s comment on: Why I’m Not Vegan
Hi Abraham! Thanks for pointing out that it would be helpful to clarify what is meant by the tradeoff values.
I differ on this point:
if you’re just saying, with little basis, that a pig has ¹⁄₁₀₀ human moral worth, I don’t know how to evaluate it. It isn’t an argument. It’s just an arbitrary discount to make your actions feel justified from a utilitarian standpoint.
I think we should give Jeff the benefit of the doubt here. I don’t think his estimates are arbitrary. I think they are honest reflections of the conclusions he has come to given his experience and his understanding of the evidence.
It would be nice to hear more about Jeff’s rationale. But in terms of community norms, I’d like to keep space open for people who want to present novel arguments without having to exhaustively justify every premise.

Cameron Meyer Shorb 🔸Apr 9, 2020, 2:59 PM
10 points
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in reply to: Cameron Meyer Shorb 🔸’s comment on: Why I’m Not Vegan
Another kind of reason to do both: There is epistemic value to going vegan.
It’s legitimately hard to understand the experiences and needs of individuals that are different from us. Most of the time, it’s even harder than it needs to be, because we approach them with unfounded prejudices.
Going vegan might be a psychologically necessary step to considering animals’ experiences and needs in at least a somewhat objective manner.
(I’m hoping to elaborate on this later, and apologies for the doc-dump, but the elegantly argued and eminently readable John & Sebo 2019 does a great job elaborating on this point: https://jeffsebodotnet.files.wordpress.com/2019/06/consequentialism-and-nonhuman-animals-penultimate.pdf .)

Cameron Meyer Shorb 🔸Apr 9, 2020, 2:55 PM
8 points
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in reply to: Cameron Meyer Shorb 🔸’s comment on: Why I’m Not Vegan
One kind of reason to do both: It’s not a true tradeoff.
It’s easy to spend a lot of money on top-of-the-line vegan cheeses and meats. But it’s also quite feasible to meet most people’s dietary requirements with vegan foods that cost just as much as, or even less than, animal-based foods. (Shout out to my boi rice-and-beans.)
In that case, we’re not trading off dollars for dollars. We’re trading off time, effort, and comfort for dollars.
At some point, if you spend enough time on something, it might cut into your earning potential. But many of us have jobs that only allow us to work a certain number of hours per week anyway, or minds that only allow us to be focused and productive for a certain number of hours per week. For these people, it’s possible to spend additional time and effort without cutting into earning potential.
So the question is not “Can I do more good than veganism with my money?” but rather “Can I do more good than veganism with my time?” Not a lot of other volunteer opportunities give you the chance to spare multiple individuals from torture every year, so I think it’s likely still a good use of time.
(Though this obviously intersects with the other question of “Just how morally valuable is it to spare animals from factory farming?”)

Cameron Meyer Shorb 🔸Apr 9, 2020, 2:49 PM
12 points
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on: Why I’m Not Vegan
I think veganism doesn’t represent a very good tradeoff, and I think we should put our altruistic efforts elsewhere.
For the sake of this comment thread, let’s assume that veganism is a substantially worse tradeoff than other altruistic efforts.
Personally, I think that’s likely to be true. For people (like me) who place a high likelihood on the sentience of farmed animals, it’s worth considering how the costs and benefits of going vegan compare to the costs and benefits of donating to a nonprofit that is attempting to end animal farming through systematic/institutional change (meat alternatives, corporate campaigns, legislative campaigns, etc.). Seems like those nonprofits are probably a lot more efficient at doing good for animals than I am.
However, it doesn’t necessarily follow that we shouldn’t both go vegan and donate to highly cost-effective charities. Let’s use this comment thread to discuss why that might be.

Cameron Meyer Shorb 🔸Apr 9, 2020, 2:43 PM
21 points
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in reply to: Cameron Meyer Shorb 🔸’s comment on: Why I’m Not Vegan
Here are the main reasons I find it overwhelmingly likely that mammals and birds (and very likely that fish) have morally relevant subjective experiences:
- Behavior. They respond to potentially-painful things in almost all the same ways humans do (except for verbally articulating their experiences in a language I understand).
- Evolution. The best evolutionary rationale I can think of for why humans have subjective experiences is that that might be a good way of motivating us to avoid experiences that tend to be bad for our reproductive fitness. (Note that this evolutionary story doesn’t suggest a strong connection between sentience and intelligence. In fact, it might suggest that less intelligent species are more reliant on strong subjective experiences to learn and motivate their behavior.) That rationale would apply to almost all mobile creatures (but much less so for mostly immobile ones like mussels or plants).
Here are the main reasons I doubt that mammals, birds, or fish have morally relevant subjective experiences:
- Inaccessibility. Subjective experiences are, by their nature, personal. So I can’t directly observe these experiences in others. This applies to other humans’ sentience.
- Programmability. For any given behavior, I can imagine a computer program that responds to the same stimulus in the same way without having a morally relevant subjective experience. This applies to other adult humans’ sentience somewhat, but not quite as well, because we seem to have pretty similar machinery. It applies more so to babies, children, or other humans with brains that are more different than mine.
- Radical uncertainty. I really don’t have a good idea of what sentience consists of, what anatomy is needed to support it, or why it evolved. This applies to other humans’ sentience.
In the end, while there are good reasons to be uncertain about the sentience of other species, these reasons are at least somewhat applicable to other humans, too. So my uncertainty about the sentience of other vertebrate species isn’t much more than an order of magnitude higher than my uncertainty about the sentience of other humans.

Cameron Meyer Shorb 🔸Apr 9, 2020, 2:36 PM
8 points
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on: Why I’m Not Vegan
[T]his is the main place where I think I differ from most ethical vegans: I think humans matter much more than these animals.
I agree that this is the biggest difference between you and most ethical vegans!
Let’s use this comment thread to discuss differences in estimates of the likelihood that nonhuman animals (or non-me humans) are sentient (where “sentient” means “having morally relevant subjective experiences such as the ability to feel pain”).

Cameron Meyer Shorb 🔸Apr 9, 2020, 2:25 PM
10 points
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on: Why I’m Not Vegan
Thanks so much for writing this, Jeff! I think we talked about this the first night we met. Since then, I’ve always appreciated your thoughtful objections to veganism. The carelessness with which so many people approach the question really bothers me. It’s a real treat to talk with an objector who takes the idea seriously and has really thought through their positions.
Of course, on the facts of the matter, I strongly disagree! There are several different kinds of reasons why. I’ll post them in separate comments in the hopes of keeping the conversation focused on one idea at a time. (If that’s not kosher on the EA Forum, I hope someone will let me know, and I won’t do it in the future.)

Cameron Meyer Shorb 🔸Mar 25, 2020, 7:22 PM
10 points
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on: What are examples of EA work being reviewed by non-EA researchers?
Hopefully Wild Animal Initiative will have more answers for you soon! We recently assembled an Academic Advisory Panel in part to solicit feedback on our publications when they don’t go through a formal peer-review process.
We’re still growing the panel, so please let us know if you or anyone you know might be interested in joining. https://www.wildanimalinitiative.org/advisory-panel

Cameron Meyer Shorb 🔸Oct 1, 2019, 2:13 PM
4 points
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in reply to: gavintaylor’s comment on: Best EA use of $500,000AUD/$340,000 USD for basic science?
I recently learned that many universities require a certain percentage of all grants go to institutional overhead unless the grant maker has a policy against it. So grant-makers can save a lot of money by publicly posting a policy limiting the portion of a grant that can go to overhead.

Cameron Meyer Shorb 🔸Sep 10, 2019, 9:37 PM
7 points
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on: Best EA use of $500,000AUD/$340,000 USD for basic science?
I believe the most cost-effective use of basic science funds right now is in welfare biology.

I’m the deputy director of Wild Animal Initiative, an EA nonprofit dedicated to understanding and improving the lives of wild animals.

The number of animals in the wild is mind-boggling. Estimates put it at around ten trillion vertebrates (most or all of whom are probably sentient) and 10^18 arthropods (at least some of whom are probably sentient).

And there’s reason to believe many of those animals lead incredibly difficult lives. Survival can be a constant struggle. This is especially true for the most numerous species, which tend to give birth to dozens or hundreds of young that die early—and presumably very painful—deaths.

Despite the tremendous scale of wild animal suffering, it remains exceptionally neglected. We don’t even know the answers to the most foundational questions: Which animals can experience suffering or happiness? What are their lives like in the wild? What, if anything, can we do to help them?

The good news for science supporters is there’s no shortage of low-hanging fruit. In the nascent field of welfare biology, every project breaks entirely new ground. And because we need so many types of expertise—neuroscience, physiology, genetics, behavioral ecology, population ecology, etc. - there’s lots of flexibility to find projects that fit each funder’s goals.

We are in the process of establishing a research fund to jumpstart the growth of this field, and your relative could play a critical role in making that happen. We could also connect you directly with promising researchers in Australia.

If there’s any chance this would be of interest, let’s schedule a quick chat to see if it’s a good fit: cameronms@wildanimalinitiative.org.

Cameron Meyer Shorb 🔸Dec 20, 2018, 12:28 AM
1 point
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in reply to: Aaron Gertler 🔸’s comment on: Lessons Learned from a Prospective Alternative Meat Startup Team
I’d also love to hear Scott’s perspective on this, but in the meantime, I wanted to point out that this is one of the ways The Good Food Institute aims to help potential founders. For starters, I’d recommend these essential resources.

Cameron Meyer Shorb 🔸Dec 20, 2018, 12:21 AM
3 points
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in reply to: Lukas Finnveden’s comment on: Lessons Learned from a Prospective Alternative Meat Startup Team
Most plant-based meats get their form and texture through high-moisture extrusion, in which textured vegetable protein is forced through a die like Play-Doh through a spaghetti maker (see Wikipedia for a more technical overview).
Extruders are big, expensive, and sensitive machines. Most startups can’t buy their own, so they normally contract with a manufacturer. However, there is a limited number of manufacturers that currently do high-moisture extrusion of textured vegetable protein.
I believe the authors’ concern is that because demand for extruders currently exceeds supply, their project wouldn’t necessarily add to the total amount of plant-based meat produced. Instead, it might take up space that another plant-based meat startup would otherwise use. (Scott et al., please correct me if I’m misrepresenting your view.)
I like this way of thinking. It’s important to consider whether our direct impact is actually different than the counterfactual.
But fortunately for prospective plant-based meat entrepreneurs, there are several reasons why my colleagues at The Good Food Institute think displacement may not be as big of an issue here (and I agree):
1. A new plant-based meat company creates new demand for extrusion capacity. Consistently increasing demand for extrusion capacity signals to manufacturers that they should invest in capital expenditure.
2. Alternative manufacturing processes are being developed that do not require high-moisture extrusion (e.g., sheer cell technology). A new plant-based meat company could either directly contribute to developing these technologies or indirectly contribute by demonstrating demand for the technology.
3. Extrusion capacity tends to go to the producer with the highest willingness to pay. In general, this will favor companies that are more mature, have higher sales, or have more investment. Although imperfect, these factors correlate with product quality, decreasing the likelihood that a worse product will displace a better one.

Cameron Meyer Shorb 🔸Dec 11, 2018, 3:25 AM
5 points
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on: Which World Gets Saved
Great points, Trammell! Thank you for this post.
Your example comparing the peaceful-psychology hypothesis and the violent-psychology hypothesis is effective, and it stands on its own. However, I don’t think it’s the best way to represent Steven Pinker’s argument, and I think representing that argument more accurately leads in some interesting new directions.
As I understand him, Pinker does not argue humans have a peaceful psychology. Rather, he acknowledges that there are many aspects of our psychology that predispose us to violence, and he attributes the historical decline in violence primarily to social developments, e.g., establishing trade networks, accumulating social norms, elevating women’s power in society, etc. These changes in society have built stronger and stronger defenses against our violent instincts, which have remained relatively unchanged over the course of human history.
Stating the hypothesis this way raises the question of how far we expect this trend to continue. We would be much more interested in saving a world (“World 1”) where society continues to grow increasingly less violent and more compassionate, and substantially less interested in saving a world (“World 2″) where that trend stops, or where it doesn’t go far enough fast enough to prevent huge new sources of suffering.
Moral circle expansion is a strategy to make our world more like the first one and less like the second one. Unlike the strategies discussed in this post, it doesn’t deal with affecting the likelihood of extinction scenarios. Rather, it tries to directly influence the speed and direction of the trends that determine the expected value of the long-term future (a.k.a. it tries to shift us to a world more worth saving). For what it’s worth, I think Sentience Institute is doing some really valuable research on this topic.