Daniela R. Waldhorn

In­ver­te­brate Sen­tience Table

In­ver­te­brate Sen­tience: Sum­mary of find­ings, Part 1

In­ver­te­brate Sen­tience: Sum­mary of find­ings, Part 2

What Do Un­con­scious Pro­cesses in Hu­mans Tell Us About Sen­tience?

• Daniela R. Waldhorn 17 Jun 2019 10:52 UTC

  11 points

  0 ∶ 0

  in reply to: MichaelStJules’s comment on: In­ver­te­brate Sen­tience Table

  We were aware of that study, thanks for sharing it!

  However, that paper is published by a potentially predatory journal, and no further evidence on this matter was found. Hence, we maintain our current response (‘unknown’), but will introduce a clarificatory commentary mentioning this study and its reliability limitations.

• Daniela R. Waldhorn 17 Jun 2019 11:26 UTC

  9 points

  0 ∶ 0

  in reply to: MichaelStJules’s comment on: In­ver­te­brate Sen­tience Table

  Hi MichaelStJules!

  For now, (1) the table is not downloadable. Regarding (3), in various cases, we use the taxon or the species name to highlight that existing evidence only applies to that specific species. Thus, generalizing from a single species to the rest of the taxon or higher taxonomic ranks is potentially problematic –primarily when an invertebrate category comprises a large group of species, as is the case with ants.

  Thank you for your suggestions. We will take them into account to improve our work.

• Daniela R. Waldhorn 17 Jun 2019 11:30 UTC

  13 points

  0 ∶ 0

  in reply to: JoshYou’s comment on: What Do Un­con­scious Pro­cesses in Hu­mans Tell Us About Sen­tience?

  Hi JoshYou. Thanks for your very pertinent comment.
  
  We are aware of the possibility of hidden qualia. It is a valuable hypothesis. Nevertheless, we found no empirical evidence to support it, at least in the literature on invertebrate sentience. If you will, you can view our project as a compilation and analysis of the existing evidence about the sentience of individual invertebrate organisms, as opposed to subroutines within those systems. Under this reading, what we call ‘unconscious processes’ would be understood as processes which are inaccessible to the organisms’s first-person perspective.
  
  We are also aware that, on some accounts, one really does not need empirical evidence to determine whether a process (or subroutine or algorithm) is conscious. All of them are. On such an account, the relevant distinction is between processes that matter morally and those who don’t. Someone who endorsed this view should interpret our position as agnostic about (but compatible with) the thesis that there are hidden qualia.

• Daniela R. Waldhorn 17 Jun 2019 13:12 UTC

  11 points

  0 ∶ 0

  in reply to: gavintaylor’s comment on: What Do Un­con­scious Pro­cesses in Hu­mans Tell Us About Sen­tience?

  Hi, gavintaylor. Thanks for your comment. Research in patients with vegetative or minimally consciousness states –different from dementia or delirium, which should be better described as acute disturbances in consciousness– would probably shed some light on this matter. However, this area of research might be challenging by itself.

  Disorders of consciousness are heterogeneous, and judging the level of actual awareness has proved a complicated process. Traditional tests and observations have been criticized since they require some level of subjective interpretation –such as deciding whether a patient’s movements are purposeful or not. In fact, recent research has revealed that about 40% of vegetative state diagnoses is incorrect.

  We know, for instance, that some vegetative patients and other individuals in a minimally conscious state are capable of simple learning (i.e., classical conditioning). In a study, it was observed that the amount of learning correlated with the degree of cortical damage and was a good indicator of future recovery. But none of these effects were found in control subjects under the effect of anesthesia.

  Furthermore, integrative brain processing, a proposed prerequisite of awareness, has been observed in minimally conscious state patients as well. Previous neuroimaging work has shown that some vegetative patients, when asked to imagine performing physical tasks such as playing tennis, still had activity in premotor areas. In other patients, verbal cues sparked language sectors.

  Hence, these results have two interpretations. First, individuals with disorders of consciousness may have partially preserved conscious processing, which cannot be exhibited clearly via voluntary movement or verbal responses. Or, a second interpretation is that conditioning, for example, can indeed be acquired in the absence of consciousness.

  Given that (i) individuals in a pharmacologically controlled unconscious state were incapable of displaying signs of learning, and (ii) learning was a good predictor of recovery, researchers consider that the first interpretation is more likely. However, this comparison must be made cautiously and complementary evidence about these processes–including neuroimaging studies–should also be taken into account.

  As you suggest, more research in this field may pave the way for more definitive and accurate assessments of consciousness in humans, and probably, in non-human individuals as well.

• Daniela R. Waldhorn 17 Jun 2019 13:19 UTC

  6 points

  0 ∶ 0

  in reply to: MichaelStJules’s comment on: In­ver­te­brate Sen­tience Table

  Hi MichaelStJules. Thanks again for your valuable suggestions! We will publicly share our plans to update /​expand this database. Additionally, in upcoming posts we aim to outline the current state of improving invertebrate welfare as a cause area and suggest possible next steps in this regard.

• Daniela R. Waldhorn 20 Jun 2019 16:01 UTC

  2 points

  0 ∶ 0

  in reply to: MichaelStJules’s comment on: In­ver­te­brate Sen­tience Table

  Hi MichaelStJules! We’ll consider that paper for a clarificatory commentary on this. Thanks again for your suggestions!

• Daniela R. Waldhorn 20 Jun 2019 18:38 UTC

  4 points

  0 ∶ 0

  in reply to: gavintaylor’s comment on: In­ver­te­brate Sen­tience: Sum­mary of find­ings, Part 2

  Thanks again for your valuable comments and suggestions, Gavin! I’ll definitely dig deeper into those aspects you point out.

• Daniela R. Waldhorn 27 Jun 2019 12:59 UTC

  6 points

  0 ∶ 0

  in reply to: Jason Schukraft’s comment on: In­ver­te­brate Sen­tience Table

  Thanks for your enriching comment, Gavin. Just wanted to add to Jason’s response that, unfortunately, there is no consensus on whether various features potentially indicative of consciousness would be adaptive for any conscious individual, regardless of a species’ evolutionary history and its adaptive needs.
  
  Complicating things even further, we do not even have such thing as a ‘universal’ intelligence measuring instrument for humans–cultural differences in intelligence determine results country by country. The above points out that we need more research that tells us both criteria for understanding which features might be more robust for detecting consciousness, and forms of measurement that are sensitive to relevant differences between different groups of individuals.

• Daniela R. Waldhorn 3 Jul 2019 14:55 UTC

  8 points

  0 ∶ 0

  in reply to: Max_Carpendale’s comment on: What Do Un­con­scious Pro­cesses in Hu­mans Tell Us About Sen­tience?

  Hey Max! Thanks for your feedback and for your vital contribution to this project. Sorry I couldn’t get back to you before –I had taken a few days off.
  
  The example you provide fits well in what I classified as “sophisticated information processing functions that can be performed unconsciously”. Of course we can come up with creative ideas after a period of conscious thought, but it doesn’t necessarily happen that way. As you describe, unconscious processes play an important role in achieving creative insights, during what is called “the incubation period”. Neuroimaging studies suggest that the association cortices are the primary areas that are active during this state and that the brain is spontaneously reorganizing itself. Recent research also supports the idea that it is not merely the absence of conscious thought that drives creativity incubation effects, but that during an incubation period unconscious processes contribute to creative thinking.
  
  It’s still not clear which are the functional advantages of conscious over non-conscious thinking. In general, which kind of stimuli or tasks are more efficiently processed using unconscious mechanisms is an issue that remains to be elucidated. We also need a more refined distinction between neural correlates of unconsciousness (the absence of any conscious contents) vs. neural correlates of disconnectedness (the absence of perception of the environment) in different altered levels of consciousness.
  
  How these findings can be applied to research on consciousness in invertebrates? I’m unsure. Perhaps we can assess if equivalent structures of their CNS are activated when performing tasks that challenge them to “make associations” –and this may shed some light on how likely they are to show flexible (“creative”) responses. Currently, in my opinion, it is clearer how these findings can contribute to improving our thinking: for instance, we are likely to benefit more from an incubation period when we get stuck, or when we are dealing with a problem where the conventional approach is wrong. For specific tasks, a break of 3 min can be enough to promote unconscious thought. Understanding and facilitating creativity can have a direct application in the EA community since creativity plays a vital role in research and designing innovative solutions.

• Daniela R. Waldhorn 7 Nov 2019 12:08 UTC

  2 points

  0 ∶ 0

  in reply to: Max_Daniel’s comment on: Opinion: Es­ti­mat­ing In­ver­te­brate Sentience

  You’re right! Thanks for your feedback, Max Daniel! We’ll correct that shortly.

Next Steps in In­ver­te­brate Welfare, Part 1: Fun­da­men­tal Research

• Daniela R. Waldhorn 13 Nov 2019 23:19 UTC

  4 points

  0 ∶ 0

  in reply to: Tobias_Baumann’s comment on: Next Steps in In­ver­te­brate Welfare, Part 1: Fun­da­men­tal Research

  Hi Tobias!

  Thanks for commenting. You’re right. All else equal, smaller organisms or those with less intense experiences may have relatively less positive and negative experiences. However, since smaller individuals are typically r-selected, while they can suffer in large numbers, they usually live relatively short lives. Thus, two shifts happen –one of which drives the net balance of suffering up, and the other which drives the net balance of suffering down:

  • First, as the more organisms in a species fail, the more cases of suffering there are relative to enjoyment.

  • Second, as the number of organisms which fail increases, based on an evolutionary constrained optimization, the degree each organism suffers may decrease. Evolution may put relatively less weight on suffering since suffering becomes more costly for genes in expectation the more organisms experience it. In the case of r-selected individuals (who are typically smaller), if indeed evolution is optimizing, then their shorter lifespan may serve to attenuate their suffering.

  Because these two effects go in opposite directions, as the number of failing organisms rises, total suffering may come to exceed overall enjoyment, or the opposite may occur instead. In other words, while greater intensity of experience would lead to more suffering relative to enjoyment, a higher rate of evolutionary failure relative to success may have a surprisingly ambiguous effect.

  For the time being, given this trade-off between number and degree of suffering, it is not possible to conclude whether suffering or enjoyment predominates in nature. Additionally, it should be noted that the question of how evolution produces positive and negative experiences is highly uncertain.

Next Steps in In­ver­te­brate Welfare, Part 2: Pos­si­ble Interventions

Next Steps in In­ver­te­brate Welfare, Part 3: Un­der­stand­ing At­ti­tudes and Pos­si­bil­ities

• Daniela R. Waldhorn 15 Nov 2019 3:46 UTC

  16 points

  0 ∶ 0

  in reply to: Tobias_Baumann’s comment on: Next Steps in In­ver­te­brate Welfare, Part 1: Fun­da­men­tal Research

  Hi Tobias!

  Thanks again for sharing your views. Regarding the role of further research, first, we should keep in mind that the scientific literature in invertebrate sentience is still scarce, and the extent to which invertebrates have been investigated varies. Thus, there are some particular species about which there is a comparatively great deal of knowledge (e.g., fruit flies). But for several other taxa, potentially consciousness-indicating features have not been investigated at all. It is unknown if many invertebrate taxa display particular anatomical, physiological, or behavioral functions that seem to be necessary for consciousness (e.g., nociceptors in honey bees). Especially in these cases, I think further research may significantly reduce current uncertainty.

  Additionally, we should consider that the scientific community does not agree that many invertebrate taxa are sentient. Probably, the only exception are cephalopods. In this case, we have seen how further research has led to relevant ethical discussions and specific welfare measures on the use of live cephalopods in science (at least, in Europe). Some researchers believe that in the future, other invertebrate taxa will face similar challenges, and additional research will promote further discussions on invertebrate welfare. Similarly, new research would also contribute to identify the most determining factors in invertebrates’ quality of life and prioritize forms of intervention.

  Nevertheless, lack of scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent potential suffering –especially in cases of potential threats of serious or irreversible harms. Do you have other ideas about this?

  Your question about society’s lack of moral concern for invertebrates is very interesting. In general, existing knowledge about our attitudes towards invertebrates mostly looks into occurrent, spontaneous, or superficial responses that people tend to experience in the course of their everyday life (e.g., disgust, as you say). But, importantly, those attitudes do not necessarily reflect people’s views on the moral consideration of invertebrates, or their actual behavior towards these animals. For example, even if someone feels disgust towards insects, that does not necessarily entail that she believes they are not sentient, that their pain does not matter or that using insecticide is morally innocuous. Apparently, most people have not even thought about these issues as moral problems and, in turn, may hold a collection of unreflected ideas. If you’re interested in this, I’ve just published a new post about our attitudes towards invertebrates and challenges.

• Daniela R. Waldhorn 20 Nov 2019 21:24 UTC

  6 points

  0 ∶ 0

  in reply to: Tobias_Baumann’s comment on: Next Steps in In­ver­te­brate Welfare, Part 3: Un­der­stand­ing At­ti­tudes and Pos­si­bil­ities

  Hi Tobias!
  

  Thanks for your interest and your stimulating feedback. In general, I think that people do not have an elaborated position about these issues. But we are typically resistant to ideas that conflict with our beliefs, and, as you say, if one rationalization does not work, in all probability, we will make up a new excuse in order to dismiss a “troubling” or “crazy” position.
  

  Unfortunately, there is no direct evidence about this specific effect in how we morally think about invertebrates. In fact, the psychological barriers here described are, in several cases, mere hypotheses based on existing knowledge. Thus, to what extent these psychological barriers operate, and the role of the radical flank effect and other mechanisms are issues that should be empirically addressed.
  

  I also share your impression that, in some contexts, we may have the chance to promote welfare measures for some invertebrates, like octopuses, crabs, or lobsters. Crustacean Compassion’s work in the UK is a good example in this regard. Surprisingly, some of their demands are shared by the Labour Party, and an animal welfare organization linked to the Conservative Party. I still wonder under what circumstances this is possible –(i) on behalf of which species and why (i.e., what factors make us more likely to consider some invertebrates rather than others), and (ii) what makes a society more suitable for such demands. Do you have any other suggestions in this regard?