JanB

• JanB 13 Jul 2017 18:20 UTC

  6 points

  0 ∶ 0

  on: How can we best co­or­di­nate as a com­mu­nity?

  With regards to “following your comparative advantage”:

  Key statement : While “following your comparative advantage” is beneficial as a community norm, it might be less relevant as individual advice.

  Imagine 2 people Ann and Ben. Ann has very good career capital to work on cause X. She studied a relevant subject, has relevant skill, maybe some promising work experience and a network. Ben has very good career capital to contribute to cause Y. Both have aptitude to become good at the other cause as well, but it would take some time, involve some cost, maybe not be as save.

  Now Ann thinks that cause Y is 1000 times as urgent as cause X, and for Ben it is the other way around. Both consider retraining for the cause they think is more urgent.

  From a community perspective, it is reasonable to promote the norm that everyone should follow their comparative advantage. This avoids prisoner’s dilemma situations and increases total impact of the community. After all, the solution that would best satisfy both Ann’s and Ben’s goals was if each continued in their respective areas of expertise. (Let’s assume they could be motivated to do so)

  However, from a personal perspective, let’s look at Ann’s situation: In reality of course, there will rarely be a Ben to mirror Ann, who would also be considering retraining at exactly the same time as Ann. And if there was, they would likely not know each other. So Ann is not in the position to offer anyone the specific trade that she could offer Ben, namely: “I keep contributing to cause X, if you continue contributing to cause Y”

  So these might be Ann’s thoughts: “I really think that cause Y is much more urgent than anything I could contribute to cause X. And yes, I have already considered moral uncertainty. If I went on to work on cause X, this would not directly cause someone else to work on cause Y. I realize that it is beneficial for EA to have a norm that people should follow their comparative advantage, and the creation of such a norm would be very valuable. However, I do not see how my decision could possibly have any effect on the establishment of such a norm”

  So for Ann it seems to be a prisoner’s dilemma without iteration, and she ought to defect.

  I see one consideration why Ann should continue working towards cause X: If Ann believed that EA is going to grow a lot, EA would reach many people with better comparative advantage for cause Y. And if EA successfully promoted said norm, those people would all work on cause Y, until Y would not be neglected enough any more to be much more urgent than cause X. Whether Ann believes this is likely to happen depends strongly on her predictions of the future of EA and on the specific characteristics of causes X and Y. If she believed this would happen (soon), she might think it was best for her to continue contributing to X. However, I think this consideration is fairly uncertain and I would not give it high weight in my decision process.

  So it seems that

  • it clearly makes sense (for CEA/​ 80000 hours/​ …) to promote such a norm

  • it makes much less sense for an individual to follow the norm, especially if said indiviual is not cause agnostic or does not think that all causes are within the same 1-2 orders of magnitude of urgency.

  All in all, the situation seems pretty weird. And there does not seem to be a consensus amongst EAs on how to deal with this. A real world example: I have met several trained physicians who thought that AI safety was the most urgent cause. Some retrained to do AI safety research, others continued working in health-related fields. (Of course, for each individual there were probably many other factors that played a role in their decision apart from impact, e.g. risk aversion, personal fit for AI safety work, fit with the rest of their lives, …)

  Ps: I would be really glad if you could point me to errors in my reasoning or aspects I missed, as I, too, am a physician currently considering retraining for AI safety research :D

  Pps: I am new to this forum and need 5 karma to be able to post threads. So feel free to upvote.

• JanB 21 Jul 2017 16:54 UTC

  3 points

  0 ∶ 0

  on: An Ar­gu­ment for Why the Fu­ture May Be Good

  Here is another argument why the future with humanity is likely better than the future without it. Possibly, there are many things of moral weight that are independent of humanity’s survival. And if you think that humanity would care about moral outcomes more than zero, then it might be better to have humanity around.

  For example in many szenarios of human extinction, wild animals would continue existing. In your post you assigned farmed animals enough moral weight to determine the moral value of the future, and wild animals should probably have even more moral weight. There are 10 x more wild birds than farmed birds, 100-1000x more wild mammals than farmed animals (and of course many, many more fish or even invertebrates). I am not convinced that wild animals’ lives are on average not worth living (= that they contain more suffering than happiness), but even without that, there surely is a huge amount of suffering. If you believe that humanity will have the potential to prevent/​alleviate that suffering some time in the future, that seems pretty important.

  The same goes for unknown unknowns. I think we know extremely little about what is morally good or bad, and maybe our views will fundamentally change in the (far) future. Maybe there are suffering non-intelligent extraterrestrials, maybe bacteria suffer, maybe there is moral weight in places were we would not have expected it (http://​​reducing-suffering.org/​​is-there-suffering-in-fundamental-physics/​​), maybe something completely different.

  Let’s see what the future brings, but it might be better to have an intelligent and at least slightly utility-concerned species around, as compared to no intelligent species.

• JanB 2 Aug 2017 9:02 UTC

  1 point

  0 ∶ 0

  on: Read­ing recom­men­da­tions for the prob­lem of con­se­quen­tial­ist scope?

  http://​​blog.givewell.org/​​2014/​​06/​​10/​​sequence-thinking-vs-cluster-thinking/​​

  This could be constructed as arguing for an approach that takes all perspectives that one can think of into account, and then discount them by uncertainty.

• JanB 9 Aug 2017 9:09 UTC

  1 point

  0 ∶ 0

  on: [Er­ror com­mu­ni­cat­ing with LW2 server]

  Seems interesting, how can one stay updated?

• JanB 13 Oct 2017 9:34 UTC

  7 points

  0 ∶ 0

  on: Us­ing a Spread­sheet to Make Good De­ci­sions: Five Examples

  Just wanted to say that I found this article really helpful and already sent it to many people who asked me for how they should make a decision. Please never take it down :D

• JanB 3 Nov 2017 11:51 UTC

  7 points

  0 ∶ 0

  on: Mul­ti­verse-wide co­op­er­a­tion in a nutshell

  This was really interesting and probably as clear as such a topic can possibly be displayed.

  Disclaimer: I dont know how to deal with infinities mathematically. What I am about to say is probably very wrong.

  For every conceivable value system, there is an exactly opposing value system, so that there is no room for gains from trade between the systems (e.g. suffering maximizers vs suffering minimizers).

  In an infinite multiverse, there are infinite agents with decision algorithms sufficiently similar to mine to allow for MSR. Among them, there are infinite agents that hold any value system. So whenever I cooperate with one value system, I defect on infinite agents that hold the exactly opposing values. So infinity seems to make cooperation impossble??

  Sidenote: If you assume decision algorithm and values to be orthogonal, why do you suggest to “adjust [the values to cooperate with] by the degree their proponents are receptive to MSR ideas”?

  Best, Jan

An al­gorithm/​flowchart for pri­ori­tiz­ing which con­tent to read

• JanB 14 Nov 2017 16:34 UTC

  1 point

  0 ∶ 0

  in reply to: Jonas V’s comment on: An al­gorithm/​flowchart for pri­ori­tiz­ing which con­tent to read

  Sorry, I use plain old google docs as well :|

• JanB 3 Jan 2018 16:50 UTC

  5 points

  0 ∶ 0

  on: The ex­pected value of the long-term future

  You write: “In this discussion, there are two considerations that might at first have ap- peared to be crucial, but turn out to look less important. The first such consid- eration is whether existence is in general good or bad, `a la Benatar (2008). If existence really should turn out to be a harm, sufficiently unbiased descendants would plausibly be able to end it. This is the option value argument. In turn, option value itself might appear to be a decisive argument against doing some- thing so irreversible as ending humanity: we should temporise, and delegate this decision to our descendants. But not everyone enjoys option value, and those who suffer are relatively less likely to do so. If our descendants are selfish, and find it advantageous to allow the suffering of powerless beings, we may not wish to give them option value. If our descendants are altruistic, we do want civilisation to continue, but for reasons that are more general than option value.”

  Since the option value argument is not very strong, it seems to be a very important consideration “whether existence in general is good or bad”—or, less dichotomous, where the threshold for a life worth living lies. Space colonization means more (sentient) beings. If our descendants are altruistic (or have values that we, upon reflection, would endorse), everything is fine anyway. If our descendants are selfish, and the threshold for a life worth living is fairly low, then not much harm will be done (as long as they don’t actively value causing harm, which seems unlikely). If they are selfish and the threshold is fairly high—i.e. a lot of things in a life have to go right in order to make the life worth living—then most powerless beings will probably have bad lives, possibly rendering overall utility negative.

• JanB 13 Mar 2018 9:02 UTC

  5 points

  0 ∶ 0

  on: Is Effec­tive Altru­ism fun­da­men­tally flawed?

  You think aggregating welfare between individuals is a flawed approach, such that you are indifferent between alleviating an equal amount of suffering for 1 or each of a million people.

  You conclude that these values recommend giving to charities that directly address the sources of most intense individual suffering, and that between them, one should not choose by cost-effectiveness, but randomly. One should not give to say GiveDirectly, which does not directly tackle the most intense suffering.

  This conclusion seems correct only for clear-cut textbook examples. In the real world, I think, your values fail to recommend anything. You can never know for certain how many people you are going help. Everything is probabilities and expected value:

  Say, for the sake of the argument, you think that severe depression is the cause of most intense individual suffering. You could give your $10.000 to a mental health charity, and they will in expectation prevent 100 people (made up number) from getting severe depression.

  However, if you give $10.000 to GiveDirectly, certainly that will affect they recipients strongly, and maybe in expectation prevent 0.1 cases of severe depression.

  Actually, if you take your $10.000, and buy that sweet, sweet Rolex with it, there is a tiny chance that this will prevent the jewelry store owner from going bankrupt, being dumped by their partner and, well, developing severe depression. $10.000 to the jeweller prevent an expected 0.0001 cases of severe depression.

  So, given your values, you should be indifferent between those.

  Even worse, all three actions also harbour tiny chances of causing severe depression. Even the mental health charity, for every 100 patients they prevent from developing depression, will maybe cause depression in 1 patient (because interventions sometimse have adverse effects, …). So if you decide between burning the money or giving it to the mental health charity, you decide between preventing 100 or 1 episodes of depression. An decision that you are, given your stated values, indifferent between.

  Further arguments why approaches that try to avoid interpersonal welfare aggregation fail in the real world can be found here: https://​​papers.ssrn.com/​​sol3/​​papers.cfm?abstract_id=1781092

• JanB 26 Mar 2018 17:07 UTC

  2 points

  0 ∶ 0

  on: Hi, I’m Holden Karnofsky. AMA about jobs at Open Philanthropy

  Hey Holden, thanks for doing this. Suppose I applied for the research analyst position and didn’t get it. Which of the following would then be more likely to eventually land me a job at OPP, and how much more likely (assuming I would perform well in both)?

  a) becoming research analyst at GiveWell

  b) doing research in one of OPP’s focus areas (biosecurity/​AI safety).

• JanB 14 Apr 2018 12:19 UTC

  0 points

  0 ∶ 0

  in reply to: Sebastian_Oehm’s comment on: Com­par­a­tive ad­van­tage in the tal­ent mar­ket

  I really like that idea. It might also be useful to check whether this model would have predicted past changes of career recommendations.

• JanB 22 Nov 2018 11:23 UTC

  8 points

  0 ∶ 0

  in reply to: Michelle_Hutchinson’s comment on: Take­aways from EAF’s Hiring Round

  I think that also depends on the country. In my experience, references don’t play such an important role in Germany as they do in UK/​US. Especially the practice that referees have to submit their reference directly to the university is uncommon in Germany. Usually, referees would write a letter of reference for you, and then the applicant can hand it in. Also, having references tailored to the specific application (which seems to be expected in UK/​US) is not common in Germany.

  So, yes, I am also hesitant to ask my academic referees too often. If I knew that they would be contacted early in application processes, I would certainly apply for less positions. For example, I maybe wouldn’t apply for positions that I probably won’t get but would be great if they worked out.

The ex­pected value of ex­tinc­tion risk re­duc­tion is positive

• JanB 16 Dec 2018 22:21 UTC

  9 points

  0 ∶ 0

  in reply to: Davidmanheim’s comment on: The ex­pected value of ex­tinc­tion risk re­duc­tion is positive

  Hi David, thanks for your comments.

  1) This seems not to engage with the questions about short-term versus long-term prioritization and discount rates. I’d think that the implicit assumptions should be made clearer.

  Yes, the article does not deal with considerations for and against caring about the long-term. This is discussed elsewhere. Instead, the article assumes that we care about the long-term (e.g. that we don’t discount the value of future lives strongly), and analyses what implications follow from that view.

  We tried to make that explicit. E.g., the first point under “Moral assumptions” reads:

  Throughout this article, we base our considerations on two assumptions:

  1. That it morally matters what happens in the billions of years to come. From this very long-term view, making sure the future plays out well is a primary moral concern.

  2) It doesn’t seem obvious to me that, given the universalist assumptions about the value of animal or other non-human species, the long term future is affected nearly as much by the presence or absence of humans. Depending on uncertainties about the Fermi hypothesis and the viability of non-human animals developing sentience over long time frames, this might greatly matter.

  I think this point matters. Part 2.1 of the article deals with the implications of potential future non-human animal civilizations and extraterrestrials. I think the implications are somewhat complicated and depend quite a bit on your values, so I won’t try to summarize them here.

  4) S-risks are plausibly more likely if moral development is outstripped by growth in technological power over relatively short time frames, and existential catastrophe has a comparatively limited downside.

  We don’t try to argue for increasing the speed of technological progress.

  Apart from that, it is not clear to me that extinction has “comparatively little downside” (compared to S-risks, you probably mean). It, of course, depends on your moral values. But even from a suffering-focused perspective, it may well be that we would—with more moral and empirical insight—come to realize that the universe is already filled with suffering. I personally would not be surprised if “S-risks by omission” (*) weighed pretty heavily in the overall calculus. This topic is discussed in part 2.2.

  I don’t have anything useful to say regarding your point 3).

  (*) term coined by Lukas Gloor, I think.

• JanB 22 Dec 2018 17:05 UTC

  2 points

  0 ∶ 0

  in reply to: Lukas Finnveden’s comment on: The ex­pected value of ex­tinc­tion risk re­duc­tion is positive

  Thanks for the comment. We added a navigable table of contents.

• JanB 22 Dec 2018 17:07 UTC

  3 points

  0 ∶ 0

  in reply to: Milan_Griffes’s comment on: The ex­pected value of ex­tinc­tion risk re­duc­tion is positive

  Curious how you’re thinking about efforts that are intended to reduce x-risk but instead end up increasing it.

  Uhm… Seems bad? :-)

• JanB 22 Dec 2018 17:28 UTC

  4 points

  0 ∶ 0

  in reply to: Jacy’s comment on: The ex­pected value of ex­tinc­tion risk re­duc­tion is positive

  Hey Jacy,

  I have seen and read your post. It was published after my internal “Oh my god, I really, really need to stop reading and integrating even more sources, the article is already way too long”-deadline, so I don’t refer to it in the article.

  In general, I am more confident about the expected value of extinction risk reduction being positive, than about extinction risk reduction actually being the best thing to work on. It might well be that e.g. moral circle expansion is more promising, even if we have good reasons to believe that extinction risk reduction is positive.

  I do think your “very unlikely that [human descendants] would see value exactly where we see disvalue” argument is a viable one, but I think it’s just one of many considerations, and my current impression of the evidence is that it’s outweighed.

  I personally don’t think that this argument is very strong on its own. But I think there are additional strong arguments (in descending order of relevance):

  • “The universe might already be filled with suffering and post-humans might do something against it.”

  • “Global catastrophes, that don’t lead to extinction, might have negative long-term effects”

  • “Other non-human animal civilizations might be worse”

  • ...

• JanB 22 Dec 2018 17:44 UTC

  2 points

  0 ∶ 0

  in reply to: MichaelStJules’s comment on: The ex­pected value of ex­tinc­tion risk re­duc­tion is positive

  Hi Michael,

  By “in expectation random”, do you mean 0 in expectation?

  Yes, that’s what we meant.
  

  I am not sure I understand your argument. You seem to say the following:

  • Post-humans will put “sentient tools” into harsher conditions than the ones the tools were optimized for.

  • If “sentient tools” are put into these conditions, their welfare decreases (compared with the situations they were optimized for).

  My answer: The complete “side-effects” (in the meaning of the article) on sentient tools comprises bringing them into existence and using them. The relevant question seems to be if this package is positive or negative, compared to the counterfactual (no sentient tools). Humanity might bring sentient tools into conditions that are worse for the tools than the conditions they were optimized for. Even these conditions might still be overall positive.

  Apart from that, I am not sure if the two assumptions listed as bullet points above will actually hold for the majority of “sentient tools”. I think that we know very little about the way tools will be created and used in the far future, which was one reason for assuming “zero in expectation” side-effects.

• JanB 22 Dec 2018 18:23 UTC

  2 points

  0 ∶ 0

  in reply to: Davidmanheim’s comment on: The ex­pected value of ex­tinc­tion risk re­duc­tion is positive

  Regarding your second point, just a few thoughts:
  First of all, an important point is how you think values and morality work. If two-thirds of humanity, after thorough reflection, disagree with your values, does this give you a reason to become less certain about your values as well? Maybe adopt their values to a degree? …
  
  Secondly, I am also uncertain how coherent/​convergent human values will be. There seem to be good arguments for both sides, see e.g. this blog post by Paul Christiano (and the discussion with Brian Tomasik in the comments of that post): https://​​rationalaltruist.com/​​2013/​​06/​​13/​​against-moral-advocacy/​​
  
  Third: In a situation like the one you described above, at least there would be huge room for compromise/​gains from trade/​… So if future humanity would be split into the three factions you suggested, they would not necessarily fight a war until only one faction remains that can then tile the universe with their preferred version. Indeed, they probably would not, as cooperation seems better for everyone in expectation.