JBentham

Karma: 414

JBentham Sep 23, 2023, 8:56 PM
1 point
0 ∶ 0
in reply to: Alexander Herwix 🔸’s comment on: Should Effective Altruists be Valuists instead of utilitarians?
Being “agnostic” in all situations is itself a dogmatic position. It’s like claiming to be “agnostic” on every epistemic claim or belief. Sure, you can be, but some beliefs might be much more likely than others. I continue to consider the possibility that pleasure is not the only good; I just find it extremely unlikely. That could change.

I do not think biological and psychological “reasons” are actually reasons, but you’re right that this gets us into a separate meta-ethical discussion. Thank you for the discussion!

JBentham Sep 23, 2023, 6:50 PM
1 point
0 ∶ 0
in reply to: Alexander Herwix 🔸’s comment on: Should Effective Altruists be Valuists instead of utilitarians?
It wasn’t clear which aspect of Catholic dogma you were referring to. Catholic claims about ethics seem to crucially depend on a bunch of empirical claims that they make. Even so, I view such claims as just a subset of claims about ethics that depend on our intuitions.

As above, these conflicting intuitions can only be resolved through a process of reflection. I am glad that you support such a process. You seem disappointed that the result of this process has, for me, led to utilitarianism. This is not a “premature closing of this process” any more than your pluralist stance is a premature closing of this process. What we are both doing is going back and forth saying “please reflect harder”. I have sprinkled some reading recommendations throughout to facilitate this.

The post does not mention whether we have reasons to hold certain things dear. It actually rejects such a framing altogether, claiming that the idea that we “should” (in a reason-implying sense) hold certain things dear doesn’t make sense. This is tantamount to nihilism, in my view. The first two points, meanwhile, are psychological rather than normative claims. As Sidgwick stated, the point of philosophy is not to tell people what they do think, but what they ought to think.

I am always very happy to examine the plural goods that some say they value, but which I do not, and see whether convergence is possible.

JBentham Sep 23, 2023, 5:40 PM
1 point
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in reply to: Alexander Herwix 🔸’s comment on: Should Effective Altruists be Valuists instead of utilitarians?
Catholics make empirical claims about the natural world. Logical and moral truths do not fit into that category, so I disagree with the comparison.

The parent post makes no case whatsoever for caring about the things we value! All it does is assert that we ought to value everything that we already care emotionally about. Why should we act on everything we care emotionally about? How do we know that everything we care about is worth acting on? More humility may be required in all quarters!

Don’t worry, I still aim to maximise the well-being of all sentient beings because I think the very nature of pleasure gives me strong reason to want to increase it and that there are no other facts about the universe which give me similar reasons for action. The table in front of me certainly doesn’t. “Virtues” and “rights” are man-made fictions, not facts. Conscious experiences in general seem like a better bet, but the ‘redness’ of an object also doesn’t give me reason to act. It is only valenced experiences which do. Hypothetically, though, were I to reject utilitarianism, I would by default become a nihilist precisely because I am humble about our ability to know things! I might still care about the suffering of sentient beings, but my caring about something is not a reason to act on it. Parfit is very good on this.

JBentham Sep 23, 2023, 2:56 PM
1 point
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in reply to: Alexander Herwix 🔸’s comment on: Should Effective Altruists be Valuists instead of utilitarians?
I don’t consider the intuitions of adherents to competing moral theories to be strong evidence against the detailed, painstaking process of reflection that I and other utilitarians have been through. I also think that utilitarianism best accommodates and explains our common-sense moral intuitions, as Sidgwick argued in detail. Therefore, there is not as much disagreement between the broad mass of people and utilitarians as there might seem to be at first glance. Those who have invented ‘rights’ and ‘virtues’ out of thin air have much more serious disagreements with common-sense morality, which is a problem for them.

If most people thought that an object can simultaneously be red and green all over, their intuitions here wouldn’t be strong evidence against the fact that this is self-evidently absurd. For many centuries, Europeans rejected the idea that you could work with negative numbers. In cultures where negative numbers were being used, I don’t think this disagreement would have been good evidence against the self-evidence of negative numbers being useful in mathematics.

I fully accept that others can say similar things to me. That is fine. To use the example from your other post, you can say that it’s self-evident that Alice should take the morphine; I will say that it would be self-evidently wrong of Alice to deprive Bob of such a special experience. All utilitarians can do is trust that, in time, reason will prevail. Pinker and Singer have both written about this. This is why we have been ahead of our time, while Kant’s views, for example, on various object-level issues are recognised as having been horribly wrong.

It is certainly conceivable that I am “under the pernicious influence of utilitarianism”, in which case I would by default become a nihilist and abandon any attempt to reduce the suffering of sentient beings.

JBentham Sep 23, 2023, 11:49 AM
7 points
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in reply to: Alexander Herwix 🔸’s comment on: Should Effective Altruists be Valuists instead of utilitarians?
Thank you for the reply. As in mathematics and logic, rational intuition is ultimately my yardstick for determining the truth of a proposition. I think it self-evident that the good of any one individual is of no more importance than the good of any other and that a greater good should be preferred to a lesser good. As for what that good is, everything comes down to pleasure on reflection. The objections to this view fall prey to numerous biases (scope insensitivity, status quo bias), depend on knee-jerk emotional reactions, or rest on misunderstandings of the theory (for example, attacking naive as opposed to sophisticated utilitarianism). Some are even concerned with the practicality of the theory, which has no bearing on its truth.

There is no consensus in part because philosophers are under great pressure to publish. If Henry Sidgwick had figured most things out in his great 19th Century treatise The Methods of Ethics (the best book on ethics ever written, even according to many non-utilitarians), then that would rather spoil the fun. If you are interested in a painstaking attempt by a utilitarian to consider the alternatives, then have a read. It is extremely dense, but that is what’s required. A good companion is the volume published nine years ago by Singer and Lazari-Radek.
Hurting other sentient beings is the antithesis of utilitarianism, as you know. Mr Bankman-Fried’s alleged actions should serve as a warning against naive utilitarianism and are a reminder that commonly accepted negative duties should almost always be followed (on utilitarian grounds). We don’t know whether these alleged actions were the product of his philosophical beliefs, or whether it had more to do with the pernicious influence of money and power. Regardless, that he went down such a career path in the first place was the result of his philosophical beliefs and we should therefore take some responsibility as a community.

But I’m far more concerned about avoiding the (in)actions of virtually everyone in recent history, who fail to do anything about the plight of hundreds of billions of sentient beings (human and non-human) or who actively exacerbate their suffering. Most of these people are under the pernicious influence of “common-sense morality”, which tells them that they have few positive duties toward others. Others think that being or feeling “virtuous” is sufficient. A few are recognised as evildoers for violating the admirable negative duties of common-sense morality that most at least accept. Such evildoers have almost always subscribed to profoundly anti-utilitarian ideologies, whether it be fascism, Stalinism, racism or nationalism.

JBentham Sep 22, 2023, 10:12 PM
3 points
0 ∶ 1
on: Should Effective Altruists be Valuists instead of utilitarians?
As you anticipate, I don’t find this very compelling because I’m a moral realist. It’s true that people can have preferences that run counter to hedonism, but I think those preferences are irrational. For example, someone might have a preference to sit and count blades of grass even though it doesn’t make her happy. I think her friends should do everything they can (within reason) to persuade her to see a movie she’d enjoy.

I also already feel “comfortable investing in [my] own happiness and the happiness of [my] loved ones at the same time” because I know that it reduces burnout and that I wasn’t born a perfect utilitarian and that needs to be taken into consideration.

JBentham Sep 22, 2023, 10:06 PM
2 points
0 ∶ 0
on: What do we care about at the end of time?
I don’t think I find this a particularly difficult dilemma or a compelling objection to value monism. If everything is as you stipulate, then Bob should definitely take the morphine. If I were in Alice’s position, I would hope that I wouldn’t try to deprive Bob of such a special experience in order to experience a bit less pain.

JBentham Sep 22, 2023, 10:03 PM
1 point
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in reply to: Alexander Herwix 🔸’s comment on: What do we care about at the end of time?
I do not think it has any compelling limitations.

JBentham Sep 11, 2023, 8:22 AM
26 points
12 ∶ 2
in reply to: freedomandutility’s comment on: Thoughts on EA, post-FTX
I disagreed with this because good, sophisticated consequentialists should follow those rules on consequentialist grounds.

JBentham Aug 24, 2023, 8:23 PM
2 points
1 ∶ 0
on: New encyclopedia entry on utilitarianism and Christian theology
Thank you! I hope utilitarians and Christians can cooperate more on our points of agreement. An evangelical Christian friend of mine who’s a Young Earth Creationist surprised me when he expressed sympathy for utilitarianism. The catch being that he doesn’t care about the welfare of non-human animals. (On that note, I’d argue that the first statement of utilitarianism, and one which referenced all sentient beings, was made by the Buddhist philosopher Santideva in the 8th Century).

JBentham Jul 29, 2023, 11:17 PM
3 points
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in reply to: Will Aldred’s comment on: The Ultimate Argument Against Deontology And For Utilitarianism
Thanks for your response. It seems we disagree on much less than I had initially assumed. My response was mostly intended for someone who has prematurely become a nihilist (as apparently happened to one of Carlsmith’s friends), whereas you remain committed to doing the most good. And I was mainly addressing the last flavour of objection you mention.

JBentham Jul 29, 2023, 8:45 PM
1 point
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in reply to: Will Aldred’s comment on: The Ultimate Argument Against Deontology And For Utilitarianism
I respectfully disagree. Firstly, that is by no means the last word on infinite ethics (see papers by Manheim and Sandberg, and a more recent paper out of the Global Priorities Institute). Prematurely abandoning utilitarianism because of infinites is a bit like (obviously the analogy is not perfect) abandoning the general theory of relativity because it can’t deal with infinities.

Secondly, we should act as if we are in a finite world: it would be seen as terribly callous of someone not to have relieved the suffering of others if it turned out we were in a finite universe all along. It is telling that virtually no one has substantively changed their actions as a result of infinite ethics. This is sensible and prudent.

Thirdly, in an infinite world, we should understand that utilitarianism is not about maximising some abstract utility function or number in the sky, but about improving the conscious experiences of sentient beings. Infinities don’t change the fact that I can reduce the suffering of the person in front of me, or the sentient being on the other side of the world, or the fact that this is good for them. And there are good practical, utilitarian reasons not to spend one’s time focusing on other potential worlds.

JBentham Jul 17, 2023, 10:53 PM
23 points
10 ∶ 2
on: Effective Altruism and the strategic ambiguity of ‘doing good’
That’s a pretty impressive and thorough piece of research, regardless of whether you agree with the conclusions. I think one of its central points — that x-risk/longtermism has always been a core part of the movement — is correct. Some recent critiques have overemphasised the degree to which EA has shifted toward these areas in the last few years. It was always, if not front and centre, ‘hiding in plain sight’. And there was criticism of EA for focusing on x-risk from very early on (though it was mostly drowned out by criticisms of EA’s global health work, which now seems less controversial along with some of the farmed animal welfare work being done).

If someone disagrees empirically with estimates of existential risk, or holds a person-affecting view of population ethics, the idea that it is a front for longtermism is a legitimate criticism to make of EA. Even more resources could be directed toward global health if it wasn’t for these other cause areas. A bit less reasonably, people who hold non-utilitarian beliefs might even suspect that EA was just a way of rebranding ‘total utilitarianism’ (with the ‘total’ part becoming slowly more prominent over time).

At the same time, EAs still do a lot in the global health space (where a majority of EA funding is still directed), so the movement is in a sense being condemned because it has actually noticed these problems (see the Copenhagen Interpretation of Ethics).

This isn’t to say that the paper itself is criticising EA (it seems to be more of a qualitative study of the movement).

JBentham Jul 13, 2023, 12:33 PM
12 points
9 ∶ 0
in reply to: MHR🔸’s comment on: Electric Shrimp Stunning: a Potential High-Impact Donation Opportunity
And that goes in both directions: some find it intuitively unreasonable to think that humans can realise far more welfare than some other animals. Additionally, the undiluted experience model seems pretty intuitive to many.

I would hope that in a community committed to impartiality, one need not have to make the case for why it’s worth caring about the welfare of beings that happen not to be members of our species, so it is totally fine not to include that in your post.

JBentham Jul 9, 2023, 10:17 PM
11 points
3 ∶ 0
in reply to: Joseph’s comment on: Effective Altruism and Eastern Ethics
I’ll have a look, thanks! I do tend to be quite sceptical of this research due to the replication crisis and I’m not sure how useful it is. The same was true with Heinrich’s questionable “WEIRD” book. The common factor linking people whose parents/families object to them becoming vegetarian isn’t being Eastern/Western or Asian/Western, but “having families who object to vegetarianism”. This post uses a personal anecdote and those of two other people raised in East Asian households to speak on behalf of every single Asian on the planet — “those of us brought up in Asian households” apparently find these issues “particularly challenging”.

On a population scale, there are of course behavioural and ideological differences on average. And this can inform population-level policies and strategies, to some extent. Farmed animal welfare charities might use this information to tailor their messages to audiences in different countries, for example. But applying population averages to individuals is not good practice.

JBentham Jul 9, 2023, 5:19 PM
4 points
2 ∶ 0
in reply to: Joseph’s comment on: Effective Altruism and Eastern Ethics
That display seems to illustrate my point — that the West/East distinction is a bit odd and rather outdated — well! People in cities in Brazil, Costa Rica, Malawi, India and China were more helpful than people in the United States, the Netherlands, Italy and Israel. But also, people in Vienna, Madrid and Copenhagen were more helpful than people in other parts of Europe, while people in Shanghai were more helpful than people in Taipei, Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur.

Why many EAs are so eager to make broad, hasty generalisations about entire continents and hemispheres is something I’ve never understood.

JBentham Jul 9, 2023, 2:16 PM
10 points
3 ∶ 0
in reply to: Fai’s comment on: Effective Altruism and Eastern Ethics
Yes, I probably should have mentioned Hinduism too, because that is after all what explains the prevalence of vegetarianism in India.

I do again agree that the East doesn’t take EA ideas well. But neither, unfortunately, does the West, despite being much wealthier and better educated on average. Even people within the existing community find it difficult to commit to impartiality.

JBentham Jul 9, 2023, 1:17 AM
19 points
6 ∶ 2
on: Effective Altruism and Eastern Ethics
Thank you for this post. I agree that EA’s moral roots are very weird to almost everyone, but it’s for that reason that I’m unclear why the “Western-Eastern” dichotomy needed to be invoked? I imagine vegetarianism has been poorly received by many Western parents/families too.

Many of the philosophical ideas that underpin EA are also very close to those found in some “Eastern/Asian” traditions, including Mohism, Buddhism and Jainism (edit: and Hinduism). Asia probably had the first recorded consequentialist (Mozi, in China), the first recorded utilitarian (Santideva, in India) and the first recorded vegan (al-Ma’arri, in Syria) in history. And estimates vary, but India probably has the highest prevalence of vegetarianism in the world?

JBentham Jun 21, 2023, 4:17 PM
6 points
2 ∶ 1
in reply to: MichaelStJules’s comment on: Linkpost—dawnwatch ‘Peter Singer is not Animal Liberation Now’
The distinction between philosophers and animal activists might be relevant. For instance, his name was also listed last on a 2007 book he co-edited with two woman philosophers (Lori Gruen and Laura Grabel). In contrast, he was listed first on a 2006 book he co-authored with animal activist Jim Mason (a man). But the claim that he “appropriates” people’s voices is unsubstantiated, never mind the stronger claim that he appropriates some people’s voices simply because they are women.

JBentham Jun 21, 2023, 12:24 AM
49 points
9 ∶ 3
on: Linkpost—dawnwatch ‘Peter Singer is not Animal Liberation Now’
The claim that Professor Singer appropriates women’s voices because his name appeared first on a couple of bylines seems belied by the fact that Helga Kuhse and Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek (both women co-authors of his, in the 20th and 21st Century respectively) are listed first on all of the books they’ve written with him as far as I can tell. In his recent interview with Tyler Cowen, he assiduously mentioned Lazari-Radek whenever his work with her was mentioned.