Great power wars could trigger or accelerate such a collapse, but they wouldnāt lead to decoupled sociotechnical systems, or any plausible scenarios that would allow a winner to replace the loser.
What do you mean by saying āthey wouldnāt lead to [...] any plausible scenarios that would allow a winner to replace the loserā? E.g., if there was a war between China and the US, couldnāt China replace the US as the dominant power?
FWIW, I agree with the following statement:
Because civilization is more tightly interconnected, many types of collapse would be universal, rather than local.
(Though I donāt feel highly confident about whether the net effect of increased interconnectednessāand the things that go along with itāon the chance of universal collapse is positive or negative, at least when one considers other things that tend to go along with increased interconnectedness.)
China could replace the US as a dominant power, but they wouldnāt actually take over the US the way nations used to conquer and replace the culture of other countries.
And I agree that itās not obvious that interconnection on net increases fragility, but I think that itās clear, as I argued in the paper, that technology which creates the connection is fragile, and getting more so.
they wouldnāt actually take over the US the way nations used to conquer and replace the culture of other countries.
I do think this is much less likely now than it was in the past.
Though at first glance, the āwouldnātā feels a bit strong. (Though I think I know much less about both geopolitics and forecasting than you do.)
Do you mean something like āConditional on a hot war between China and the US with military actions on at least one of those countriesā mainland territories (not just e.g. sea battles), and conditional on China clearly winning, the chance China would actually then administer the US as an annexed territory is <x%ā? Or were you thinking about not just annexation but also a massive shift in US ācultureā towards Chinese ācultureā?
And roughly what x did you have in mind? E.g., 50%? 1%?
Iād be comfortable with 1% - Iād take a bet at 100:1 conditional on land warfare in China or the US with a clear victor, they winner still would at the most extreme, restore a modified modern national government controlled by citizens that had heavy restrictions on what it was allowed to do, following the post-WWII model in Japan and Germany. (Iād take the bet, but in that case, I wouldnāt expect both parties to survive to collect on the bet, whichever way it ends.)
Thatās because the post-WWII international system is built with structures that almost entirely prevent wars of conquest, and while I donāt see that system as being strong, I also donāt think the weaknesses are ones leading to those norms breaking down.
But maybe, despite sticking to my earlier claim, the post-WWII replacement of Japanās emperor with a democracy is exactly the class of case we should be discussing as an example relevant to the more general question of whether civilizations are conquered rather than collapse. And the same logic would apply to Iraq, and other nations the US āhelpedā along the road to democracy, since they were at least occasionallyāthough by no means alwaysāfailing states. And Iraq was near collapse because of conflict with Iran and sanctions, not because of internal decay. (Iām less knowledgeable about the stability of Japanese culture pre-WWII.)
What do you mean by saying āthey wouldnāt lead to [...] any plausible scenarios that would allow a winner to replace the loserā? E.g., if there was a war between China and the US, couldnāt China replace the US as the dominant power?
FWIW, I agree with the following statement:
(Though I donāt feel highly confident about whether the net effect of increased interconnectednessāand the things that go along with itāon the chance of universal collapse is positive or negative, at least when one considers other things that tend to go along with increased interconnectedness.)
China could replace the US as a dominant power, but they wouldnāt actually take over the US the way nations used to conquer and replace the culture of other countries.
And I agree that itās not obvious that interconnection on net increases fragility, but I think that itās clear, as I argued in the paper, that technology which creates the connection is fragile, and getting more so.
I do think this is much less likely now than it was in the past.
Though at first glance, the āwouldnātā feels a bit strong. (Though I think I know much less about both geopolitics and forecasting than you do.)
Do you mean something like āConditional on a hot war between China and the US with military actions on at least one of those countriesā mainland territories (not just e.g. sea battles), and conditional on China clearly winning, the chance China would actually then administer the US as an annexed territory is <x%ā? Or were you thinking about not just annexation but also a massive shift in US ācultureā towards Chinese ācultureā?
And roughly what x did you have in mind? E.g., 50%? 1%?
Iād be comfortable with 1% - Iād take a bet at 100:1 conditional on land warfare in China or the US with a clear victor, they winner still would at the most extreme, restore a modified modern national government controlled by citizens that had heavy restrictions on what it was allowed to do, following the post-WWII model in Japan and Germany. (Iād take the bet, but in that case, I wouldnāt expect both parties to survive to collect on the bet, whichever way it ends.)
Thatās because the post-WWII international system is built with structures that almost entirely prevent wars of conquest, and while I donāt see that system as being strong, I also donāt think the weaknesses are ones leading to those norms breaking down.
But maybe, despite sticking to my earlier claim, the post-WWII replacement of Japanās emperor with a democracy is exactly the class of case we should be discussing as an example relevant to the more general question of whether civilizations are conquered rather than collapse. And the same logic would apply to Iraq, and other nations the US āhelpedā along the road to democracy, since they were at least occasionallyāthough by no means alwaysāfailing states. And Iraq was near collapse because of conflict with Iran and sanctions, not because of internal decay. (Iām less knowledgeable about the stability of Japanese culture pre-WWII.)
Interesting, thanks for the response :)