I think vagueness isnât that much of a problem. Many useful categories are vague. Even murder and rape are vague. People can say âwe donât know the exact point where harm to animals becomes unacceptable. But morality is very difficult. Thatâs to be expected. We know some actions(such as eating animal products) are definitely too bad, for that reason we can confidently claim they are non-vegan.â
I think bigger problems with the consistency of veganism are:
-Some obviously vegan actions harm more animals than some obviously non-vegan actions.
-Some vegans cause more animal killings than some non-vegans.
-Veganism itself optimises for minimising animal product consumption. It doesnât optimise for minimising killings caused or minimising harm caused or minimising the suffering in the world.
I think what happens is that human brain finds it much easier to attribute moral emotions like disgust and shame to physical objects. So our emotional reactions track âcan I sustainably disgust this physical objectâ rather than âis this action causing the least harm possibleâ. If something can be completely eliminated it gets tabooed. On the other hand itâs unstable to wear clothes but also feel disgusted when someone buys way too many clothes. So you canât create a taboo over clothing or vehicle use. I wrote more about this topic here.
I am NOT disputing the harm to animals from eating or consuming animal products in any-way nor do I believe that the harm itself in some sense vague or poorly defined (on the contrary, there are very few things that stand out as clearly as that).
The distinction I am trying to draw is between first-order or direct harm from a given action and the multiple indirectâsecond-order and beyondâways in which that action can lead to suffering. In the conventional definition of veganism, the focus is almost entirely on the first-order effects especially when it relates to personal identification with the term âveganâ. This asymmetric focus happens at the expense of consequentialist considerations of our actions.
I believe weâre in agreement that the official definition of veganism is vague as you also use words like âambiguityâ or âunclearâ while describing it. In my comment Iâm stating that vagueness of that definition isnât that much of a problem.
Iâm also curious why do you think animal tested ingredient consumption is first-order harm whereas crop deaths are a second-order harm. I can see how tractors crushing animals might be accidental instead of intentional. But when I compare pesticides to animal testing, both of them seem to be instances of intentionally exposing animals to harmful chemicals to improve product quality.
You may be slightly mistaken about what I am stating: the ambiguity is in the official definition even if it a sensible sounding one whereas the conventional definition is well-defined (âno first-order consumptionâ) but arbitrary. The problem arises not so much from arbitrariness in and of itself, but rather demanding strict adherence to (and unwarranted focus on) something that isnât well-justified to begin with. That leads to all sorts of contradictions.
On the second point, I agree that the distinctions between the two examples are somewhat arbitrary. One may argue that perhaps animal-testing in many instances is unnecessary (turns out several are based on methods and assumptions that have been around for a century and have persisted more out of inertia despite no clear evaluation of their effectiveness) but conventional agriculture depends on pesticides but I wouldnât find that argument very convincing.
I think vagueness isnât that much of a problem. Many useful categories are vague. Even murder and rape are vague. People can say âwe donât know the exact point where harm to animals becomes unacceptable. But morality is very difficult. Thatâs to be expected. We know some actions(such as eating animal products) are definitely too bad, for that reason we can confidently claim they are non-vegan.â
I think bigger problems with the consistency of veganism are:
-Some obviously vegan actions harm more animals than some obviously non-vegan actions.
-Some vegans cause more animal killings than some non-vegans.
-Veganism itself optimises for minimising animal product consumption. It doesnât optimise for minimising killings caused or minimising harm caused or minimising the suffering in the world.
I think what happens is that human brain finds it much easier to attribute moral emotions like disgust and shame to physical objects. So our emotional reactions track âcan I sustainably disgust this physical objectâ rather than âis this action causing the least harm possibleâ. If something can be completely eliminated it gets tabooed. On the other hand itâs unstable to wear clothes but also feel disgusted when someone buys way too many clothes. So you canât create a taboo over clothing or vehicle use. I wrote more about this topic here.
I am NOT disputing the harm to animals from eating or consuming animal products in any-way nor do I believe that the harm itself in some sense vague or poorly defined (on the contrary, there are very few things that stand out as clearly as that).
The distinction I am trying to draw is between first-order or direct harm from a given action and the multiple indirectâsecond-order and beyondâways in which that action can lead to suffering. In the conventional definition of veganism, the focus is almost entirely on the first-order effects especially when it relates to personal identification with the term âveganâ. This asymmetric focus happens at the expense of consequentialist considerations of our actions.
I believe weâre in agreement that the official definition of veganism is vague as you also use words like âambiguityâ or âunclearâ while describing it. In my comment Iâm stating that vagueness of that definition isnât that much of a problem.
Iâm also curious why do you think animal tested ingredient consumption is first-order harm whereas crop deaths are a second-order harm. I can see how tractors crushing animals might be accidental instead of intentional. But when I compare pesticides to animal testing, both of them seem to be instances of intentionally exposing animals to harmful chemicals to improve product quality.
You may be slightly mistaken about what I am stating: the ambiguity is in the official definition even if it a sensible sounding one whereas the conventional definition is well-defined (âno first-order consumptionâ) but arbitrary. The problem arises not so much from arbitrariness in and of itself, but rather demanding strict adherence to (and unwarranted focus on) something that isnât well-justified to begin with. That leads to all sorts of contradictions.
On the second point, I agree that the distinctions between the two examples are somewhat arbitrary. One may argue that perhaps animal-testing in many instances is unnecessary (turns out several are based on methods and assumptions that have been around for a century and have persisted more out of inertia despite no clear evaluation of their effectiveness) but conventional agriculture depends on pesticides but I wouldnât find that argument very convincing.