Almost certainly, all sentient agents have moral standing.[45] Itās likely that sentience is sufficient on its own for moral standing, though that view is just slightly more controversial.
I found that first sentence slightly surprising. Thatād be my preferred stance, but Iād guess that a great many people would disagree. Though I donāt know how many people whoāve thought about it a lot disagree. Iād be interested to know whether this sentence like your own considered judgement, or a reflection of the consensus view among philosophers.
Or was that sentence actually meant to indicate that āAlmost certainly, all beings with moral standing are sentientā (i.e., that sentience is almost certainly necessary, rather than sufficient, for moral standing)?
The theological-minded might prefer a view on which moral standing is grounded in the possession of a Cartesian soul. But on most such accounts, the possession of a Cartesian soul grants sentience or agency or both. So even most theologians will agree that all sentient agents have moral standing because they will thank that the class of moral agents is coextensive with the class of beings with Cartesian souls.
1. Was that last sentence meant to say they will think āthat the class of moral patients is coextensive with the class of beings with Cartesian soulsā?
2. It seems that one could believe that āthe possession of a Cartesian soul grants sentience or agency or bothā, but that there are also other ways of gaining sentience or agency or both, and thus that there may be sentient beings who arenāt moral patients (if possession of a Cartesian soul is required for moral patienthood). Was the second sentence meant to imply something like āthe possession of a Cartesian soul is necessary for sentience or agency or bothā?
The sentence you quote is meant to express a sufficiency claim, not a necessity claim. But note that the sentence is about both sentience and agency. I donāt know of any serious contemporary philosopher who has denied that the conjunction of sentience and agency is sufficient for moral standing, though there are philosophers who deny that agency is sufficient and a small number who deny that sentience is sufficient.
Itās true that one could hold a view that moral standing is wholly grounded in the possession of a Cartesian soul, that the possession of a Cartesian soul grants agency and sentience, and that there are other ways to be a sentient agent that donāt require a Cartesian soul. If that were true, then agency and sentience would not be sufficient for moral standing. But I donāt know anybody who holds that view. Do you?
I donāt know of any serious contemporary philosopher who has denied that the conjunction of sentience and agency is sufficient for moral standing, though there are philosophers who deny that agency is sufficient and a small number who deny that sentience is sufficient.
Interesting, thanks!
But I donāt know anybody who holds that view. Do you?
I donāt (but I know very little about the area as a whole, so Iād wouldnāt update on that in particular).
I can see why, if practically no one holds that view, āeven most theologians will agree that all sentient agents have moral standingā. I guess I asked my question because I interpreted the passage as saying that that followed logically from the prior statements alone, whereas it sounds like instead it follows given the prior statements plus a background empirical fact about theologiansā view.
(Minor points)
I found that first sentence slightly surprising. Thatād be my preferred stance, but Iād guess that a great many people would disagree. Though I donāt know how many people whoāve thought about it a lot disagree. Iād be interested to know whether this sentence like your own considered judgement, or a reflection of the consensus view among philosophers.
Or was that sentence actually meant to indicate that āAlmost certainly, all beings with moral standing are sentientā (i.e., that sentience is almost certainly necessary, rather than sufficient, for moral standing)?
1. Was that last sentence meant to say they will think āthat the class of moral patients is coextensive with the class of beings with Cartesian soulsā?
2. It seems that one could believe that āthe possession of a Cartesian soul grants sentience or agency or bothā, but that there are also other ways of gaining sentience or agency or both, and thus that there may be sentient beings who arenāt moral patients (if possession of a Cartesian soul is required for moral patienthood). Was the second sentence meant to imply something like āthe possession of a Cartesian soul is necessary for sentience or agency or bothā?
Hi Michael,
The sentence you quote is meant to express a sufficiency claim, not a necessity claim. But note that the sentence is about both sentience and agency. I donāt know of any serious contemporary philosopher who has denied that the conjunction of sentience and agency is sufficient for moral standing, though there are philosophers who deny that agency is sufficient and a small number who deny that sentience is sufficient.
Itās true that one could hold a view that moral standing is wholly grounded in the possession of a Cartesian soul, that the possession of a Cartesian soul grants agency and sentience, and that there are other ways to be a sentient agent that donāt require a Cartesian soul. If that were true, then agency and sentience would not be sufficient for moral standing. But I donāt know anybody who holds that view. Do you?
Interesting, thanks!
I donāt (but I know very little about the area as a whole, so Iād wouldnāt update on that in particular).
I can see why, if practically no one holds that view, āeven most theologians will agree that all sentient agents have moral standingā. I guess I asked my question because I interpreted the passage as saying that that followed logically from the prior statements alone, whereas it sounds like instead it follows given the prior statements plus a background empirical fact about theologiansā view.