Ok, I think from this reply, your other reply to me, and the four posts you’ve made thus far, I’m realising that (1) there are three views which I would’ve felt were separate, and only the first of which I’d typically be inclined to call “definitely moral anti-realism”. These views are something like the following:
A position in which there may not even be a single correct moral theory
A position in which no strong claims are (yet?) made about what the single correct moral theory would be
A position in which most moral questions—out of all those that could possibly be asked—may lack definitively or singularly correct answers (even if some other moral questions have such answers)
But (2) it seems like you see these views as “in effect” very similar, and perhaps interchangeable. And it seems like you’d consider them all “anti-realist” in the sort of sense you care about, whether or not we use that label for them.
Does (2) sound like a roughly accurate depiction of your views?
(I tentatively suspect there are substantial differences in the implications of these views, which map onto what I’d typically think of as differences between the implications of moral realism and moral anti-realism. But my thoughts on that still seem hazy at the moment.)
Does (2) sound like a roughly accurate depiction of your views?
Yes, but with an important caveat. The way you described the three views, it doesn’t make it clear that 2. and 3. have the same practical implications as 1. Whereas I intended to describe them in a way that leaves no possible doubt about that.
Here’s how I would change your descriptions to make them compatible with my views:
A position in which there may not even be a single correct moral theory ((no change))
A position in which no strong claims can ever be made about what the single correct moral theory would be.
A position in which the only moral questions that have a correct (and/or knowable) answer are questions on which virtually everyone already agrees.
As you can see, my 2. and 3. are quite different from what you wrote.
Ok, I think from this reply, your other reply to me, and the four posts you’ve made thus far, I’m realising that (1) there are three views which I would’ve felt were separate, and only the first of which I’d typically be inclined to call “definitely moral anti-realism”. These views are something like the following:
A position in which there may not even be a single correct moral theory
A position in which no strong claims are (yet?) made about what the single correct moral theory would be
A position in which most moral questions—out of all those that could possibly be asked—may lack definitively or singularly correct answers (even if some other moral questions have such answers)
But (2) it seems like you see these views as “in effect” very similar, and perhaps interchangeable. And it seems like you’d consider them all “anti-realist” in the sort of sense you care about, whether or not we use that label for them.
Does (2) sound like a roughly accurate depiction of your views?
(I tentatively suspect there are substantial differences in the implications of these views, which map onto what I’d typically think of as differences between the implications of moral realism and moral anti-realism. But my thoughts on that still seem hazy at the moment.)
Yes, but with an important caveat. The way you described the three views, it doesn’t make it clear that 2. and 3. have the same practical implications as 1. Whereas I intended to describe them in a way that leaves no possible doubt about that.
Here’s how I would change your descriptions to make them compatible with my views:
A position in which there may not even be a single correct moral theory ((no change))
A position in which no strong claims can ever be made about what the single correct moral theory would be.
A position in which the only moral questions that have a correct (and/or knowable) answer are questions on which virtually everyone already agrees.
As you can see, my 2. and 3. are quite different from what you wrote.
Thanks, this helps me understand your views a bit more.