This passage sounds to me like it’s implying that the anti-realist position is: “Some moral claims may be objectively true, but many are neither objectively true nor objectively false.” In this case, it sounds like the anti-realist is saying that there is a speaker-independent fact of the matter about whether everyone getting tortured is morally worse than a world full of flourishing, and just denying that that means there will always be independent facts of the matter about moral claims.
I should have chosen a more nuanced framing in my comment. Instead of saying, “Sure, we can agree about that,” the anti-realist should have said “Sure, that seems like a reasonable way to use words. I’m happy to go along with using moral terms like ‘worse’ or ‘better’ in ways where this is universally considered self-evident. But it seems to me that you think you are also saying that for every moral question, there’s a single correct answer [...]”
So the anti-realist isn’t necessarily conceding that “surely a world where everyone gets tortured is worse than a world where everyone flourishes” is a successful argument in favor of moral realism. At least, it’s not yet an argument for ambitious versions of moral realism (ones “worthy of the name” according to my semantic intuitions).
I think I’d want to classify such a view as moral realist in an important sense, as it seems to involve realism about at least some moral claims.
It’s possible that you just have different semantic intuitions from me. It might be helpful to take a step back and ignore whether or not to classify a view as “moral realism,” and think about what it means for notions like moral uncertainty, the value of information for doing more work in philosophy, the prospect of convergence among people’s normative-ethical views if they did more reflecting, etc. Because the view we are discussing here has relatively weak implications for all these things, I personally didn’t feel like calling it “moral realism.”
Ok, I think from this reply, your other reply to me, and the four posts you’ve made thus far, I’m realising that (1) there are three views which I would’ve felt were separate, and only the first of which I’d typically be inclined to call “definitely moral anti-realism”. These views are something like the following:
A position in which there may not even be a single correct moral theory
A position in which no strong claims are (yet?) made about what the single correct moral theory would be
A position in which most moral questions—out of all those that could possibly be asked—may lack definitively or singularly correct answers (even if some other moral questions have such answers)
But (2) it seems like you see these views as “in effect” very similar, and perhaps interchangeable. And it seems like you’d consider them all “anti-realist” in the sort of sense you care about, whether or not we use that label for them.
Does (2) sound like a roughly accurate depiction of your views?
(I tentatively suspect there are substantial differences in the implications of these views, which map onto what I’d typically think of as differences between the implications of moral realism and moral anti-realism. But my thoughts on that still seem hazy at the moment.)
Does (2) sound like a roughly accurate depiction of your views?
Yes, but with an important caveat. The way you described the three views, it doesn’t make it clear that 2. and 3. have the same practical implications as 1. Whereas I intended to describe them in a way that leaves no possible doubt about that.
Here’s how I would change your descriptions to make them compatible with my views:
A position in which there may not even be a single correct moral theory ((no change))
A position in which no strong claims can ever be made about what the single correct moral theory would be.
A position in which the only moral questions that have a correct (and/or knowable) answer are questions on which virtually everyone already agrees.
As you can see, my 2. and 3. are quite different from what you wrote.
I should have chosen a more nuanced framing in my comment. Instead of saying, “Sure, we can agree about that,” the anti-realist should have said “Sure, that seems like a reasonable way to use words. I’m happy to go along with using moral terms like ‘worse’ or ‘better’ in ways where this is universally considered self-evident. But it seems to me that you think you are also saying that for every moral question, there’s a single correct answer [...]”
So the anti-realist isn’t necessarily conceding that “surely a world where everyone gets tortured is worse than a world where everyone flourishes” is a successful argument in favor of moral realism. At least, it’s not yet an argument for ambitious versions of moral realism (ones “worthy of the name” according to my semantic intuitions).
It’s possible that you just have different semantic intuitions from me. It might be helpful to take a step back and ignore whether or not to classify a view as “moral realism,” and think about what it means for notions like moral uncertainty, the value of information for doing more work in philosophy, the prospect of convergence among people’s normative-ethical views if they did more reflecting, etc. Because the view we are discussing here has relatively weak implications for all these things, I personally didn’t feel like calling it “moral realism.”
Ok, I think from this reply, your other reply to me, and the four posts you’ve made thus far, I’m realising that (1) there are three views which I would’ve felt were separate, and only the first of which I’d typically be inclined to call “definitely moral anti-realism”. These views are something like the following:
A position in which there may not even be a single correct moral theory
A position in which no strong claims are (yet?) made about what the single correct moral theory would be
A position in which most moral questions—out of all those that could possibly be asked—may lack definitively or singularly correct answers (even if some other moral questions have such answers)
But (2) it seems like you see these views as “in effect” very similar, and perhaps interchangeable. And it seems like you’d consider them all “anti-realist” in the sort of sense you care about, whether or not we use that label for them.
Does (2) sound like a roughly accurate depiction of your views?
(I tentatively suspect there are substantial differences in the implications of these views, which map onto what I’d typically think of as differences between the implications of moral realism and moral anti-realism. But my thoughts on that still seem hazy at the moment.)
Yes, but with an important caveat. The way you described the three views, it doesn’t make it clear that 2. and 3. have the same practical implications as 1. Whereas I intended to describe them in a way that leaves no possible doubt about that.
Here’s how I would change your descriptions to make them compatible with my views:
A position in which there may not even be a single correct moral theory ((no change))
A position in which no strong claims can ever be made about what the single correct moral theory would be.
A position in which the only moral questions that have a correct (and/or knowable) answer are questions on which virtually everyone already agrees.
As you can see, my 2. and 3. are quite different from what you wrote.
Thanks, this helps me understand your views a bit more.