I’m not a GWWC member, because I don’t want to lock myself in to a pledge. (I’ve been comfortably over 10% for a few years, and expect that to continue, but I could imagine, e.g., needing expensive medical care in the future and cutting out my donations to pay for that.) For that reason I wouldn’t take the pledge in either its current or its proposed form.
My take on this is that it’s okay to make a pledge in good faith if you intend to fulfil it and will make an effort to do so even if this becomes inconvenient.
That doesn’t mean committing yourself come what may. If we thought we had to carry through on our promises no matter what, nobody would make promises, and the world would be a sorrier place for that. Similarly people getting married usually intend in good faith to stay with the marriage for the rest of their life, and to make an effort to make that work, but I think the process works better by allowing the prospect of divorce.
For reference, here’s what the GWWC FAQ has to say on this:
If someone decides that they can no longer keep the pledge (for instance due to serious unforeseen circumstances), then they can simply cease to be a member. They can of course rejoin later if they renew their commitment. Obviously taking the pledge is something to be considered seriously, but we understand if a member can no longer keep it.
If we thought we had to carry through on our promises no matter what, nobody would make promises
I don’t think that’s true. Historically many people have been willing to die for their oaths of fealty—despite knowledge of this possible outcome, they still took the oath, and frequently failed to run away even when they had the chance. In our less honour-bound contemporary society, this behaviour sounds alien and implausible, but it still happened. Given that GWWC is trying to impress the moral seriousness of the issue upon people, I think it is important to consider how previous groups have dealt with similar moral weights.
I don’t think this need stop you from taking the pledge. We think of it like making a promise to do something. It is perfectly reasonable to promise to do something (say to pick up a friend’s children from school) even if there is a chance you will have to pull out (e.g. if you got sick). We don’t usually think of small foreseeable chances of having to pull out as a reason not to make promises, so I wouldn’t worry about that here. I think this is mentioned on our FAQ page—if not, it should be.
Another approach is to make sure you have enough health insurance (possibly supplementing your country’s public insurance, though I don’t think that is needed in the UK), and maybe getting income insurance too. It should be possible to have enough of both kind and still donate 10%.
The healthcare thing was just an example (though, despite the FAQ on this topic that Owen brought up below, I would still feel dishonest withdrawing from a pledge for this reason). It’s the lock-in thing that I just don’t feel comfortable with.
I ramped up my donations after discovering GiveWell, and at the time it looked like it cost ~$500 to save a life. Now they reckon it’s roughly ten times that amount. The overwhelming moral case for donating today feels around ten times weaker to me than it did in 2009. If the cost per life saved(-equivalent) rises even further in the coming decade, I might decide that I’m only going to chip in a few percent of my income to MSF, say.
Basically I feel more comfortable donating and being an example of someone who donates to cost-effective charities, rather than publicly pledging.
The overwhelming moral case for donating today feels around ten times weaker to me than it did in 2009.
Yes, it seems that EAs have not really addressed this issue. Especially as GiveWell have said their estimates are still likely to be overly-optimistic. At this point the ‘child in the pond’ example fails to accurately describe the trade-off involved.
Yes, it seems that EAs have not really addressed this issue. Especially as GiveWell have said their estimates are still likely to be overly-optimistic. At this point the ‘child in the pond’ example fails to accurately describe the trade-off involved.
How come? If someone’s given over 10% of their income for a few years, wouldn’t we still expect them to have (in expectation) saved at least one life, or achieved something of similar magnitude? GiveWell’s downgrades would only mean that they haven’t saved as many lives.
In practice all of these figures seriously underestimate the full impact because they don’t consider flow-through effects such as:
the people whose lives are saved will have more children themselves, perhaps resulting in hundreds of extra lives over the very long term (I know of people who have 100+ great grandchildren)
people for centuries or millennia into the future will be richer because the country developed economically sooner as a result of having healthier, better educated, and more productive people now (this is a version of ‘astronomical waste’).
If the direct impact is lower, the flow-through effects will also be lower, but ‘$3,000 per life saved’ is still very misleading as an indication of the absolute cost-effectiveness.
I’m not a GWWC member, because I don’t want to lock myself in to a pledge. (I’ve been comfortably over 10% for a few years, and expect that to continue, but I could imagine, e.g., needing expensive medical care in the future and cutting out my donations to pay for that.) For that reason I wouldn’t take the pledge in either its current or its proposed form.
My take on this is that it’s okay to make a pledge in good faith if you intend to fulfil it and will make an effort to do so even if this becomes inconvenient.
That doesn’t mean committing yourself come what may. If we thought we had to carry through on our promises no matter what, nobody would make promises, and the world would be a sorrier place for that. Similarly people getting married usually intend in good faith to stay with the marriage for the rest of their life, and to make an effort to make that work, but I think the process works better by allowing the prospect of divorce.
For reference, here’s what the GWWC FAQ has to say on this:
I don’t think that’s true. Historically many people have been willing to die for their oaths of fealty—despite knowledge of this possible outcome, they still took the oath, and frequently failed to run away even when they had the chance. In our less honour-bound contemporary society, this behaviour sounds alien and implausible, but it still happened. Given that GWWC is trying to impress the moral seriousness of the issue upon people, I think it is important to consider how previous groups have dealt with similar moral weights.
I don’t think this need stop you from taking the pledge. We think of it like making a promise to do something. It is perfectly reasonable to promise to do something (say to pick up a friend’s children from school) even if there is a chance you will have to pull out (e.g. if you got sick). We don’t usually think of small foreseeable chances of having to pull out as a reason not to make promises, so I wouldn’t worry about that here. I think this is mentioned on our FAQ page—if not, it should be.
Another approach is to make sure you have enough health insurance (possibly supplementing your country’s public insurance, though I don’t think that is needed in the UK), and maybe getting income insurance too. It should be possible to have enough of both kind and still donate 10%.
The healthcare thing was just an example (though, despite the FAQ on this topic that Owen brought up below, I would still feel dishonest withdrawing from a pledge for this reason). It’s the lock-in thing that I just don’t feel comfortable with.
I ramped up my donations after discovering GiveWell, and at the time it looked like it cost ~$500 to save a life. Now they reckon it’s roughly ten times that amount. The overwhelming moral case for donating today feels around ten times weaker to me than it did in 2009. If the cost per life saved(-equivalent) rises even further in the coming decade, I might decide that I’m only going to chip in a few percent of my income to MSF, say.
Basically I feel more comfortable donating and being an example of someone who donates to cost-effective charities, rather than publicly pledging.
Yes, it seems that EAs have not really addressed this issue. Especially as GiveWell have said their estimates are still likely to be overly-optimistic. At this point the ‘child in the pond’ example fails to accurately describe the trade-off involved.
How come? If someone’s given over 10% of their income for a few years, wouldn’t we still expect them to have (in expectation) saved at least one life, or achieved something of similar magnitude? GiveWell’s downgrades would only mean that they haven’t saved as many lives.
There’s a big difference between many lives and only one life!
In practice all of these figures seriously underestimate the full impact because they don’t consider flow-through effects such as:
the people whose lives are saved will have more children themselves, perhaps resulting in hundreds of extra lives over the very long term (I know of people who have 100+ great grandchildren)
people for centuries or millennia into the future will be richer because the country developed economically sooner as a result of having healthier, better educated, and more productive people now (this is a version of ‘astronomical waste’).
If the direct impact is lower, the flow-through effects will also be lower, but ‘$3,000 per life saved’ is still very misleading as an indication of the absolute cost-effectiveness.
True, but I meant that to me saving even one life seems clearly worth giving up 10% of my income for.