Hi Akash! Yep, I think Mind Ease’s ability to attract users is certainly an important factor! I think of it as Mind Ease’s counterfactual ability to get users relative to other apps (for example, since Mind Ease is impact-driven, they could offer the app for free to people living in low-income countries which profit-driven competitors are not incentivized to do) as well as Mind Ease’s counterfactual impact on users compared to a substitute anxiety reduction app (for example, data in the cost-effectiveness analysis section of Hauke’s report pointing Mind Ease potentially having a stronger effect on GAD-7 anxiety scores compared to Pacifica, a popular alternative, as well as the general rigor of their approach).
The active user estimates were modeled in TPP’s full report on Mind Ease. We provide a high-level overview of the data that was considered in the full report, which “included Mind Ease’s background and plans (including offering a free or discounted version of the app to low/middle income countries), historical downloads and active users, competitors, and financial details.” The report leveraged Lionheart’s business analysis, and based on my knowledge of information such as Mind Ease’s historical user figures and strategic options like offering the app for free to certain populations, I think the report’s user growth projections are reasonable (and those projections are only for the 25% “success” case).
As a reference point for the 25% chance of success, it’s possible that many people’s views on startup success are shaped by headlines like “90% of startups fail.” However, the criteria for the startups that are included in the numerator and denominator of such success calculations can greatly affect the final number. Funded startups have higher success rates than one might expect. In our footnote on startup base rates which you may find interesting, “Funded ventures had a 76% survival rate (to 2010) and 27% “success” rate (exit or >75 employees).” The 25% success rate aligns very closely with the 27% success rate of funded ventures gaining over 75 employees or getting acquired in the study we cited. The study findings align with other research/reports I am familiar with.
To add two additional points to Brendon’s comment.
The 1,000,000 active users is cumulative over the 8 years. So, just for example, it would be sufficient for Mind Ease to attract 125,000 users a year each year. Still very non-trivial, but not quite as high a bar as 1,000,000 MAU.
We were happy we the 25% chance of success primarily because of the base rates Brendon mentioned. In addition this can include the possibility that Mind Ease isn’t commercially viable for reasons unconnected to its efficacy, so the IP could be spun out into a non-profit. We didn’t put much weight on this, but it does seem like a possibility. I’m mentioning it mostly because it’s an interesting consideration with impact investing that could be even more important in some cases.
Hi Akash! Yep, I think Mind Ease’s ability to attract users is certainly an important factor! I think of it as Mind Ease’s counterfactual ability to get users relative to other apps (for example, since Mind Ease is impact-driven, they could offer the app for free to people living in low-income countries which profit-driven competitors are not incentivized to do) as well as Mind Ease’s counterfactual impact on users compared to a substitute anxiety reduction app (for example, data in the cost-effectiveness analysis section of Hauke’s report pointing Mind Ease potentially having a stronger effect on GAD-7 anxiety scores compared to Pacifica, a popular alternative, as well as the general rigor of their approach).
The active user estimates were modeled in TPP’s full report on Mind Ease. We provide a high-level overview of the data that was considered in the full report, which “included Mind Ease’s background and plans (including offering a free or discounted version of the app to low/middle income countries), historical downloads and active users, competitors, and financial details.” The report leveraged Lionheart’s business analysis, and based on my knowledge of information such as Mind Ease’s historical user figures and strategic options like offering the app for free to certain populations, I think the report’s user growth projections are reasonable (and those projections are only for the 25% “success” case).
As a reference point for the 25% chance of success, it’s possible that many people’s views on startup success are shaped by headlines like “90% of startups fail.” However, the criteria for the startups that are included in the numerator and denominator of such success calculations can greatly affect the final number. Funded startups have higher success rates than one might expect. In our footnote on startup base rates which you may find interesting, “Funded ventures had a 76% survival rate (to 2010) and 27% “success” rate (exit or >75 employees).” The 25% success rate aligns very closely with the 27% success rate of funded ventures gaining over 75 employees or getting acquired in the study we cited. The study findings align with other research/reports I am familiar with.
To add two additional points to Brendon’s comment.
The 1,000,000 active users is cumulative over the 8 years. So, just for example, it would be sufficient for Mind Ease to attract 125,000 users a year each year. Still very non-trivial, but not quite as high a bar as 1,000,000 MAU.
We were happy we the 25% chance of success primarily because of the base rates Brendon mentioned. In addition this can include the possibility that Mind Ease isn’t commercially viable for reasons unconnected to its efficacy, so the IP could be spun out into a non-profit. We didn’t put much weight on this, but it does seem like a possibility. I’m mentioning it mostly because it’s an interesting consideration with impact investing that could be even more important in some cases.