Hereās a half-formed idea of a somewhat different wager for moral realism, which may not make sense:
I feel a strong intuition similar to the idea that āoneās actions are meaningless without irreducible normativityā. I might phrase it as something like āāReasonsā based on moral beliefs that are ājust arbitraryā would matter far less, or perhaps infinitely less, than āreasonsā that are āobjectivelyā true.ā
It seems quite plausible to me that this intuition might be quite hard to really ājustifyā, and that the intuition might involve question-begging. (I also think moral anti-realism is far more likely than moral realism.) But I do have this intuition. And given that I have this intuition, if (a certain version of) moral anti-realism is correct, perhaps I should still act as though moral realism is correct anyway, because thatās what āfeels morally rightā to me? And if moral realism is correct, that would also suggest I should act as though moral realism is correct.
So perhaps for some of the people youāre responding to, thereās a wager that does work to favour acting as though moral realism is correct, simply because their intuitions favour doing that? And perhaps, in that case, thereās no real reason why such people should want to listen to your arguments or have their intuitions shifted towards acting as though anti-realism was true, even if they begin getting an inkling that that would be more ārationalā in some sense?
Are there reasons why that wager doesnāt work (for some people)? I wouldnāt be surprised if the answer was a strong āyesā, as this is just something Iām spit-balling now, and Iām confused about the whole topic.
One type of counterargument I can imagine is that this wager could be overridden by intuitions/āpreferences favouring thinking things through fully, avoiding intuitions that look like question-begging, etc. But I think that, for me, those intuitions/āpreferences might be weaker than my intuitions favouring acting as though moral realism is true (even if I think it probably isnāt).
Youāre describing what I tried to address in my last paragraph, the stance I called āmetaethical fanaticism.ā I think youāre right that this type of wager works. Importantly, itās dependent on having this strongly felt intuition you describe, and giving it (near-)total weight on what you care about.
Hmm, I think Iām talking about something different. (Though it may lead to the same problems, or be subject to the same counterarguments, or whatever, and maybe further discussion on this should be saved until after your next post.)
That section sounded like it was talking about people who are already committed to believing āirreducible normativity trumps everythingā. Personally, I think itās like I donāt believe thatāI assign it very low credenceābut I feel that intuition. So in a sense, I think I want to mostly think and act as though that were true.
So if you say āHey, that seems to be based on a shaky philosophical assumption which may not even be meaningfulā, perhaps I could be inclined to say āIf that were so, I donāt think Iād feel a strong pull towards caring that that were so. So Iām just going to proceed as I am.ā
Obviously, Iām not yet convinced enough about this wager to actually do that, given that Iām writing these comments. But it feels to me like maybe thatās the position Iād end up in, if I became more convinced of your arguments against my current moral realism wager (which is roughly the one you argue against in most of this post).
I meant it the way you describe, but I didnāt convey it well. Maybe a good way to explain it as follows:
My initial objection to the wager is that the anti-realist way of assigning what matters is altogether very different from the realist way, and this makes the moral realism wager question begging. This is evidenced by issues like āinfectiousness.ā I maybe shouldnāt even have called that a counter-argumentāIād just think of it as supporting evidence for the view that the two perspectives are altogether too different for there to be a straightfoward wager.
However, one way to still get something that behaves like a wager is if one perspective āvoluntarilyā favors acting as though the other perspective is true. Anti-realism is about acting on the moral intuitions that most deeply resonate with you. If your caring capacity under anti-realism says āI want to act as though irreducible normativity applies,ā and the perspective from irreducible normativity says āyou ought to act as though irreducible normativity applies,ā then the wager goes through in practice.
(In my text, I wrote āAdmittedly, it seems possible to believe that oneās actions are meaningless without irreducible normativity.ā This is confusing because it sounds like itās a philosophical belief rather than a statement of value. Edit: I now edited the text to reflect that I was thinking of ābelieving that oneās actions are meaningless without irreducible normativityā as a value statement.)
Ok, that makes sense, then. In that case, Iāll continue clinging to my strange wager as I await your next post :)
Do you think itās fair to say that this is somewhat reminiscent of the argument you countered elsewhere in the series, that (belief in) normative anti-realism would be self-defeating? Perhaps there as well, your counterargument was valid in that thereās some question-begging going on when comparing between frameworks like that, but anti-realism could still be self-defeating in practice, for people with particular intuitions?
In that case, Iāll continue clinging to my strange wager as I await your next post :)
Haha. The intuition probably wonāt get any weaker, but my next post will spell out the costs it would have to endorse this intuition as your value, as opposed to treating it as a misguiding intuition. Perhaps by reflecting on the costs and the practical inconveniences it could bring about to treat this intuition as oneās terminal value, we might come to rethink it.
Hereās a half-formed idea of a somewhat different wager for moral realism, which may not make sense:
I feel a strong intuition similar to the idea that āoneās actions are meaningless without irreducible normativityā. I might phrase it as something like āāReasonsā based on moral beliefs that are ājust arbitraryā would matter far less, or perhaps infinitely less, than āreasonsā that are āobjectivelyā true.ā
It seems quite plausible to me that this intuition might be quite hard to really ājustifyā, and that the intuition might involve question-begging. (I also think moral anti-realism is far more likely than moral realism.) But I do have this intuition. And given that I have this intuition, if (a certain version of) moral anti-realism is correct, perhaps I should still act as though moral realism is correct anyway, because thatās what āfeels morally rightā to me? And if moral realism is correct, that would also suggest I should act as though moral realism is correct.
So perhaps for some of the people youāre responding to, thereās a wager that does work to favour acting as though moral realism is correct, simply because their intuitions favour doing that? And perhaps, in that case, thereās no real reason why such people should want to listen to your arguments or have their intuitions shifted towards acting as though anti-realism was true, even if they begin getting an inkling that that would be more ārationalā in some sense?
Are there reasons why that wager doesnāt work (for some people)? I wouldnāt be surprised if the answer was a strong āyesā, as this is just something Iām spit-balling now, and Iām confused about the whole topic.
One type of counterargument I can imagine is that this wager could be overridden by intuitions/āpreferences favouring thinking things through fully, avoiding intuitions that look like question-begging, etc. But I think that, for me, those intuitions/āpreferences might be weaker than my intuitions favouring acting as though moral realism is true (even if I think it probably isnāt).
Youāre describing what I tried to address in my last paragraph, the stance I called āmetaethical fanaticism.ā I think youāre right that this type of wager works. Importantly, itās dependent on having this strongly felt intuition you describe, and giving it (near-)total weight on what you care about.
Hmm, I think Iām talking about something different. (Though it may lead to the same problems, or be subject to the same counterarguments, or whatever, and maybe further discussion on this should be saved until after your next post.)
That section sounded like it was talking about people who are already committed to believing āirreducible normativity trumps everythingā. Personally, I think itās like I donāt believe thatāI assign it very low credenceābut I feel that intuition. So in a sense, I think I want to mostly think and act as though that were true.
So if you say āHey, that seems to be based on a shaky philosophical assumption which may not even be meaningfulā, perhaps I could be inclined to say āIf that were so, I donāt think Iād feel a strong pull towards caring that that were so. So Iām just going to proceed as I am.ā
Obviously, Iām not yet convinced enough about this wager to actually do that, given that Iām writing these comments. But it feels to me like maybe thatās the position Iād end up in, if I became more convinced of your arguments against my current moral realism wager (which is roughly the one you argue against in most of this post).
I meant it the way you describe, but I didnāt convey it well. Maybe a good way to explain it as follows:
My initial objection to the wager is that the anti-realist way of assigning what matters is altogether very different from the realist way, and this makes the moral realism wager question begging. This is evidenced by issues like āinfectiousness.ā I maybe shouldnāt even have called that a counter-argumentāIād just think of it as supporting evidence for the view that the two perspectives are altogether too different for there to be a straightfoward wager.
However, one way to still get something that behaves like a wager is if one perspective āvoluntarilyā favors acting as though the other perspective is true. Anti-realism is about acting on the moral intuitions that most deeply resonate with you. If your caring capacity under anti-realism says āI want to act as though irreducible normativity applies,ā and the perspective from irreducible normativity says āyou ought to act as though irreducible normativity applies,ā then the wager goes through in practice.
(In my text, I wrote āAdmittedly, it seems possible to believe that oneās actions are meaningless without irreducible normativity.ā This is confusing because it sounds like itās a philosophical belief rather than a statement of value. Edit: I now edited the text to reflect that I was thinking of ābelieving that oneās actions are meaningless without irreducible normativityā as a value statement.)
Ok, that makes sense, then. In that case, Iāll continue clinging to my strange wager as I await your next post :)
Do you think itās fair to say that this is somewhat reminiscent of the argument you countered elsewhere in the series, that (belief in) normative anti-realism would be self-defeating? Perhaps there as well, your counterargument was valid in that thereās some question-begging going on when comparing between frameworks like that, but anti-realism could still be self-defeating in practice, for people with particular intuitions?
Yes, thatās the same intuition. :)
Haha. The intuition probably wonāt get any weaker, but my next post will spell out the costs it would have to endorse this intuition as your value, as opposed to treating it as a misguiding intuition. Perhaps by reflecting on the costs and the practical inconveniences it could bring about to treat this intuition as oneās terminal value, we might come to rethink it.