âUnlike effective altruists, longtermists donât really care about famines or floods because those wonât lead to extinctionâ
I think this is an accurate characterization of the popular EV-maximizing total utilitarian longtermist worldview within the community. Note the âreallyâ, indicating that itâs approximately true. I would be less comfortable attributing this view to longtermists as individuals, as a community or to weaker forms of longtermism, since longtermists arenât necessarily 100% bought into longtermism this strong.
Also, even shortermist EAs donât really care about famines or floods, as evidenced by our lack of work on these problems because there are still more cost-effective (less neglected) things to work on.
Rather than prioritization explaining that we do care, prioritization explains why we donât really care.
Letâs taboo the word âcareâ. I expect the average longtermist thinks that deaths from famines and floods are about as bad as the average non-longtermist EA. Problems do not become âless badâ simply because other problems exist.
Having different priorities, stemming from different beliefs about e.g. what things matter and how effectively we can address them, is orthogonal to relative evaluations of how bad any individual problem is.
They donât become less bad, but we pay less attention and devote fewer resources to them, which is a very plausible way of interpreting âcaring lessâ. On this interpretation, itâs psychologically implausible that we can care as much about these other problems as others can, even if our abstract utility functions donât say they matter any less just because other things matter more.
I donât think the right response is to argue some definitional point. We should just own that we care less on a commonsense interpretation of the word, and explain why thatâs right to do.
I agree that the definitional point would be uninteresting, except that I think the commensense interpretation bundles a bunch of connotations which are wrong (and negative). In context, people receiving this message will have systematically incorrect beliefs about longtermism and those who use it as a framework for prioritization. This is plainly obvious if you e.g. go read pretty much any Twitter thread where people who are hearing about it for the first time (or were otherwise introduced to it in an adversarial context) are debating the subject.
They donât become less bad, but we pay less attention and devote fewer resources to them, which is a very plausible way of interpreting âcaring lessâ.
One meaning of âcaringâ (letâs call it Caring-1) is the kind of care a parent provides for their child. This is precisely the type of care youâre talking about here. It implies a responsibility to nurture, protect, and feel for and individual person, place, or thing. Common sense is that we have a responsibility to care for a very limited number of others in this way, and to at least be cognizant enough to do no harm to a much wider circle of others.
âCaringâ can also refer to oneâs receptivity to âchance encounters with other peopleâs problems.â Letâs call this Caring-2.
If you had a golden opportunity to help out with a certain problem, would you (âDo you want a hand with thatâ)?
Do you approve of the fact that somebody out there is working on a certain problem (âX is doing amazing work on this problem!â)?
Do you feel and express sympathy for a certain problem when it is brought to your attention (âIâm so sorryâ)?
Do you acknowledge the reality of the suffering various problems cause, even if you donât personally work on that problem yourself (âthat is a really serious issueâ)?
Will you acknowledge that the problem seem like a plausible choice for extending Caring-1, even if you donât personally choose to do so (âsomebody should do somethign!â)?
Nobody can provide Caring-1 to every issue. The difference between short-termists and longtermists is to what sorts of issues they extend or reject Caring-2.
Longtermists may reject or downplay Caring-2 for major present-day issues (famines, floods, etc), in favor of extending either Caring-1 or Caring-2 for far-future issues (astronomical waste).
Short-termists may reject or downplay Caring-2 for far-future issues (astronomical waste) in order to focus more on present-day issues (famines and floods).
Hossenfelder expresses around 14:45 that she approves of extending Caring-2 to both the short-term and long-term future. What bothers her is the idea that we should extend no caring-2 or caring-1 to the present day, as well as some of the more far-out ideas longtermist thinkers have explored (i.e. simulation arguments).
Of course, Hossenfelder, a theoretical physicist, is smart enough to make this distinction herself. The fact that she chooses not to, and couches her argument in such heated language, says to me that this is just another crude political hit-job.
even if our abstract utility functions donât say they matter any less just because other things matter more
A utility function canât say anything else, in decision theory. Total caring is, roughly speaking, conserved.
The psuedo utility functions that a hedonic utilitarian projects onto others can introduce more caring for one thing without reducing their caring for other things, but theyâre irrelevant in this context. (and if you ask me, a preference utilitarian, theyâre not very relevant in the context of utilitarianism either, but never mind that.)
Hmm, although I think I get what you mean, Iâm not sure how it could actually be true given that (preference) utility functions are scale and offset invariant, so the extent of an agentâs caring can only be described relative to the other things they care about?
âUnlike effective altruists, longtermists donât really care about famines or floods because those wonât lead to extinctionâ
I think this is an accurate characterization of the popular EV-maximizing total utilitarian longtermist worldview within the community. Note the âreallyâ, indicating that itâs approximately true. I would be less comfortable attributing this view to longtermists as individuals, as a community or to weaker forms of longtermism, since longtermists arenât necessarily 100% bought into longtermism this strong.
Also, even shortermist EAs donât really care about famines or floods, as evidenced by our lack of work on these problems because there are still more cost-effective (less neglected) things to work on.
Rather than prioritization explaining that we do care, prioritization explains why we donât really care.
Letâs taboo the word âcareâ. I expect the average longtermist thinks that deaths from famines and floods are about as bad as the average non-longtermist EA. Problems do not become âless badâ simply because other problems exist.
Having different priorities, stemming from different beliefs about e.g. what things matter and how effectively we can address them, is orthogonal to relative evaluations of how bad any individual problem is.
They donât become less bad, but we pay less attention and devote fewer resources to them, which is a very plausible way of interpreting âcaring lessâ. On this interpretation, itâs psychologically implausible that we can care as much about these other problems as others can, even if our abstract utility functions donât say they matter any less just because other things matter more.
I donât think the right response is to argue some definitional point. We should just own that we care less on a commonsense interpretation of the word, and explain why thatâs right to do.
I agree that the definitional point would be uninteresting, except that I think the commensense interpretation bundles a bunch of connotations which are wrong (and negative). In context, people receiving this message will have systematically incorrect beliefs about longtermism and those who use it as a framework for prioritization. This is plainly obvious if you e.g. go read pretty much any Twitter thread where people who are hearing about it for the first time (or were otherwise introduced to it in an adversarial context) are debating the subject.
One meaning of âcaringâ (letâs call it Caring-1) is the kind of care a parent provides for their child. This is precisely the type of care youâre talking about here. It implies a responsibility to nurture, protect, and feel for and individual person, place, or thing. Common sense is that we have a responsibility to care for a very limited number of others in this way, and to at least be cognizant enough to do no harm to a much wider circle of others.
âCaringâ can also refer to oneâs receptivity to âchance encounters with other peopleâs problems.â Letâs call this Caring-2.
If you had a golden opportunity to help out with a certain problem, would you (âDo you want a hand with thatâ)?
Do you approve of the fact that somebody out there is working on a certain problem (âX is doing amazing work on this problem!â)?
Do you feel and express sympathy for a certain problem when it is brought to your attention (âIâm so sorryâ)?
Do you acknowledge the reality of the suffering various problems cause, even if you donât personally work on that problem yourself (âthat is a really serious issueâ)?
Will you acknowledge that the problem seem like a plausible choice for extending Caring-1, even if you donât personally choose to do so (âsomebody should do somethign!â)?
Nobody can provide Caring-1 to every issue. The difference between short-termists and longtermists is to what sorts of issues they extend or reject Caring-2.
Longtermists may reject or downplay Caring-2 for major present-day issues (famines, floods, etc), in favor of extending either Caring-1 or Caring-2 for far-future issues (astronomical waste).
Short-termists may reject or downplay Caring-2 for far-future issues (astronomical waste) in order to focus more on present-day issues (famines and floods).
Hossenfelder expresses around 14:45 that she approves of extending Caring-2 to both the short-term and long-term future. What bothers her is the idea that we should extend no caring-2 or caring-1 to the present day, as well as some of the more far-out ideas longtermist thinkers have explored (i.e. simulation arguments).
Of course, Hossenfelder, a theoretical physicist, is smart enough to make this distinction herself. The fact that she chooses not to, and couches her argument in such heated language, says to me that this is just another crude political hit-job.
A utility function canât say anything else, in decision theory. Total caring is, roughly speaking, conserved.
The psuedo utility functions that a hedonic utilitarian projects onto others can introduce more caring for one thing without reducing their caring for other things, but theyâre irrelevant in this context. (and if you ask me, a preference utilitarian, theyâre not very relevant in the context of utilitarianism either, but never mind that.)
Hmm, although I think I get what you mean, Iâm not sure how it could actually be true given that (preference) utility functions are scale and offset invariant, so the extent of an agentâs caring can only be described relative to the other things they care about?
Just flagging that a group here in Israel, led by Sella Nevo, has been working on flood forecasting for years (among other cool projects).