Aside, you would be more compelling if you talked about autocrats other than Hitler, Stalin and Mao.
Do you mean talking about other autocrats as well, or instead of, talking about Hitler, Stalin, and Mao?
If you mean āas wellā, Iād agree. Iāve already started looking at some others (as did David and Tobias, the authors of this post), and will hopefully do more of that. The reason for focusing mostly on those three so far is just that it takes time to learn about more, and those three were (Iād argue) huge factors in a large portion of all harms from political atrocities in the 20th century.
If you mean āinstead ofā, could you explain further why you say that?
Hmmm, that is a good question. Let me dig in more. Here are reasons to talk about others than Hitler Stalin and Mao
Coup Proofing is a common practice of dictators for political survival
Some behaviors of Hitler, Stalin and Mao have compelling institutional explanations that have become repeated behavior of long-ruling dictators. Iām thinking of coup proofing in particular. Coup proofing is a set of policies dictators enact to prevent a single small group from seizing power; rotatring or purging officers (Tukachevsky/āRommel) splitting the army into multiple factions/āmilitias (NKVD/āSS/āRevolutionary Guard). Weāve since observed that lots of dictators (and coup-threatened democracies) practice coup-proofing. So I would be careful about attributing the *intra-elite* violence by particular regimes to the personalities of the leaders. Coup-proofing cannot explain violence against non-elites by those regimes.
Change in ideological motivation between early dictators and modern dictators
Secondly, Hitler, Stalin and Mao were much more ideological than most modern dictators. The Mussolini model of a āmoderateā or āsynarchicā authoritarianism spread more after WWII. By moderate I mean without a narrow, extreme vision of state-society interaction, not that dissent or economic freedom were allowed. Particularly today ideology structures the behavior of dictators much less. So one could argue that both Hitler and Stalin faithfully followed the visions laid out in their (terrible and warped) ideologies. If you buy that argument you would update downward on future dictators committing similar violence against non-elites.
For example, Mohammad Bin Salman has killed and tortured elite rivals, dissenters and starved many thousands of Yemenis to death. But he does not seem interested in any state project that would involve violence on the scale of Hitler/āStalin/āPol Pot.
All that said, I personally do not put much weight on my ideology argument. Firstly, the ideological explanation of Hitler and Stalinās behavior is not that strong. Secondly just because most dictators, like MBS and the Ethiopians, have āmoderateā visions of state-society relations does not prevent future radical dictators from taking power (tail risk). Note that ISIS is a deathcult that took over half of two middle income countries, and that even in the 20ā²s and 30ā²s Mein Kampf was such ridiculous nonsense that Hitler should not have risen to power.
But on a first read this is a real hole in your argument. Almost all modern dictators do not look like Hitler, Stalin and Mao due to their weak ideoligical commitments. If you include a few more modern examples you can evade this argument. Off the top of my head I would suggest:
Khomeini and Ahmedinajadāthey did not murder lots of people but their stubborn refusal to compromise with the world order has impoverished Iran without causing a regime change (they changed a bit recently but 30 years of bad decisions before).
Pol Pot ā 1980ā²s, only stopped by Vietnamese intervention
Your comments about coup-proofing seem interesting and useful.
Weāve since observed that lots of dictators (and coup-threatened democracies) practice coup-proofing. So I would be careful about attributing the *intra-elite* violence by particular regimes to the personalities of the leaders.
I think the fact that more leaders engaged in violent coup-proofing (rather than it just being Hitler, Stalin, and Mao) should indeed provide weak evidence against the theory that the unusual (compared to the population as a whole) personalities of leaders plays a key role in whether violent coop-proofing occurs. This is because that theory would now need to claim that a larger number of leaders have personalities that are unusual in the relevant way, or that a lack of such unusual personalities was āmade up forā by other factors in some cases.
But I think that this fact would only serve as weak evidence, because it doesnāt seem very implausible to claim that a fairly large number of dictators, or leaders of coup-threatened democracies, have personalities that are unusual in the relevant way. These are people in unusual positions which are arguably easier to get into if one is ruthlessly self-interested, so it wouldnāt seem surprising (prima facie) if their average levels of ruthlessness-relevant traits was notably above population averages.
Additionally, it seems worth distinguishing violent coup-proofing from coup-proofing as a whole. In terms of how well they might evidence malevolent traits, ārotating [...] officersā and āsplitting the army into multiple factions/āmilitiasā seem quite different from the sorts of violent purges engaged in by e.g. Stalin. (It may well be that violent coup-proofing is very common as well; Iām just flagging that the distinction seems relevant for my purposes.)
You also seem to imply that (a) these coup-proofing behaviours may have been rational things for a self-interested leader to do in those situations, and (b) this is reason to be careful in assuming that this is about personality. I think (a) is a good point. And I think thereās some merit to (b), in the sense that this pushes against thinking something like āThese leaders are just crazy and evil.ā
But overall, I donāt think this is a question of personality vs incentive structures. I think neither determines a personās behaviour by itself. And I think whether or not one would do even horrific things if itās in oneās self-interest is partly a matter of personality. E.g., Iād be willing to bet that a very large portion of people wouldnāt engage in violent coup-proofing, even if they were in a situation where doing so would help them keep power. (Another framing of this is that a personās personality and values helps determine their incentives, in the sense that it influences what we like and dislike, including how much we dislike harming people.)
Coup-proofing cannot explain violence against non-elites by those regimes.
I think this is key; I think the massive-scale violence against non-elites is probably a larger part of why Hitler, Stalin, and Mao seem like interesting case studies of potential harm from malevolence than is the potentially ārationalā coup-proofing.
That said, itās good to independently consider the merits of a even non-central arguments/āpoints, and to update incrementally, so your arguments against making naive inferences from coup-proofing behaviours are still useful.
I have one criticism of the argument that coup-proofing prevalence is evidence for personality factors. Suppose that if people observe a game being played multiple times they are more likely to set aside their personal preferences and āplay to winā. So if I were the first dictator of Iraq I might say āno Iām not going to kill generals who come from different towns, that would be evilā. And then get killed for it. And maybe the second dictator says the same thing. But by the time the third or fourth dictator rises to power heāll either be selected for willingness to use violence or he will decide his preference for living is stronger than his preference for not killing. While I agree that many people would not commit inter-elite violence as the first leader, I suspect a much larger number would as the 5th leader. So an argument for point B.
Saddam Hussein was the 5th Iraqi leader to take power by coup within 21 years.
But on the other hand, there are lots of leaders that just stepped down when they lost the support of their ruling coalitions. And those heroes do not become famous. This is strong evidence of the importance of personality.
I have one criticism of the argument that coup-proofing prevalence is evidence for personality factors.
To be clear, my argument was more like ācoup-proofing prevalence doesnāt seem like strong evidence against personality playing an important roleā. I.e., I donāt think that it should reduce our belief that personality plays an important role.
It is true that I think Iād see these behaviours as evidence for personality playing an important role. But Iām not sure, and Iām not seeing it as key evidence.
While I agree that many people would not commit inter-elite violence as the first leader, I suspect a much larger number would as the 5th leader. So an argument for point B.
Iād agree that a much larger number would as the 5th leader than as the 1st leader, in the scenario you describe. And I think this is a valuable point.
But, in line with your final paragraph, Iād still bet that many people wouldnāt; I think many people would simply step down, flee, or accept radical changes to the nature of their regime.
And perhaps more importantly, I think personality influences whether someone tries to become a leader in the first place, and whether they succeed in that. So I expect a lot of people to not want to ādo horrible thingsā, recognise that pursuing this leadership position may require them to ādo horrible thingsā along the way or to stay in power, and thus just not pursue those positions.
(That said, I did say āIād be willing to bet that a very large portion of people wouldnāt engage in violent coup-proofing, even if they were in a situation where doing so would help them keep power.ā So thereās a valid reason why you focused on how people would behave if they somehow landed in the leadership position, rather than how likely they are to enter those positions to begin with.)
Your points (and counterpoints!) about changes in ideological motivation are very interesting. And I think itād probably be good for me to spend some time engaging with evidence/āarguments about how much ideology influenced Hitler, Stalin, and Maoās most āextremeā behaviours and whether/āhow much the influence of ideology has waned.
And it does seem wise to think about that, and about more modern examples, if one is planning to communicate with the public, policymakers, or academics about this topic in a way that leans substantially on historical examples of dictators. (Iām not sure if anyone will actually do such communications, or emphasise those cases when doing so. It may, for example, make more sense to just focus on the psychological studies, or on examples from business.)
Do you mean talking about other autocrats as well, or instead of, talking about Hitler, Stalin, and Mao?
If you mean āas wellā, Iād agree. Iāve already started looking at some others (as did David and Tobias, the authors of this post), and will hopefully do more of that. The reason for focusing mostly on those three so far is just that it takes time to learn about more, and those three were (Iād argue) huge factors in a large portion of all harms from political atrocities in the 20th century.
If you mean āinstead ofā, could you explain further why you say that?
Hmmm, that is a good question. Let me dig in more. Here are reasons to talk about others than Hitler Stalin and Mao
Coup Proofing is a common practice of dictators for political survival
Some behaviors of Hitler, Stalin and Mao have compelling institutional explanations that have become repeated behavior of long-ruling dictators. Iām thinking of coup proofing in particular. Coup proofing is a set of policies dictators enact to prevent a single small group from seizing power; rotatring or purging officers (Tukachevsky/āRommel) splitting the army into multiple factions/āmilitias (NKVD/āSS/āRevolutionary Guard). Weāve since observed that lots of dictators (and coup-threatened democracies) practice coup-proofing. So I would be careful about attributing the *intra-elite* violence by particular regimes to the personalities of the leaders. Coup-proofing cannot explain violence against non-elites by those regimes.
Change in ideological motivation between early dictators and modern dictators
Secondly, Hitler, Stalin and Mao were much more ideological than most modern dictators. The Mussolini model of a āmoderateā or āsynarchicā authoritarianism spread more after WWII. By moderate I mean without a narrow, extreme vision of state-society interaction, not that dissent or economic freedom were allowed. Particularly today ideology structures the behavior of dictators much less. So one could argue that both Hitler and Stalin faithfully followed the visions laid out in their (terrible and warped) ideologies. If you buy that argument you would update downward on future dictators committing similar violence against non-elites.
For example, Mohammad Bin Salman has killed and tortured elite rivals, dissenters and starved many thousands of Yemenis to death. But he does not seem interested in any state project that would involve violence on the scale of Hitler/āStalin/āPol Pot.
All that said, I personally do not put much weight on my ideology argument. Firstly, the ideological explanation of Hitler and Stalinās behavior is not that strong. Secondly just because most dictators, like MBS and the Ethiopians, have āmoderateā visions of state-society relations does not prevent future radical dictators from taking power (tail risk). Note that ISIS is a deathcult that took over half of two middle income countries, and that even in the 20ā²s and 30ā²s Mein Kampf was such ridiculous nonsense that Hitler should not have risen to power.
But on a first read this is a real hole in your argument. Almost all modern dictators do not look like Hitler, Stalin and Mao due to their weak ideoligical commitments. If you include a few more modern examples you can evade this argument. Off the top of my head I would suggest:
Khomeini and Ahmedinajadāthey did not murder lots of people but their stubborn refusal to compromise with the world order has impoverished Iran without causing a regime change (they changed a bit recently but 30 years of bad decisions before).
Pol Pot ā 1980ā²s, only stopped by Vietnamese intervention
Modern Burma
Your comments about coup-proofing seem interesting and useful.
I think the fact that more leaders engaged in violent coup-proofing (rather than it just being Hitler, Stalin, and Mao) should indeed provide weak evidence against the theory that the unusual (compared to the population as a whole) personalities of leaders plays a key role in whether violent coop-proofing occurs. This is because that theory would now need to claim that a larger number of leaders have personalities that are unusual in the relevant way, or that a lack of such unusual personalities was āmade up forā by other factors in some cases.
But I think that this fact would only serve as weak evidence, because it doesnāt seem very implausible to claim that a fairly large number of dictators, or leaders of coup-threatened democracies, have personalities that are unusual in the relevant way. These are people in unusual positions which are arguably easier to get into if one is ruthlessly self-interested, so it wouldnāt seem surprising (prima facie) if their average levels of ruthlessness-relevant traits was notably above population averages.
Additionally, it seems worth distinguishing violent coup-proofing from coup-proofing as a whole. In terms of how well they might evidence malevolent traits, ārotating [...] officersā and āsplitting the army into multiple factions/āmilitiasā seem quite different from the sorts of violent purges engaged in by e.g. Stalin. (It may well be that violent coup-proofing is very common as well; Iām just flagging that the distinction seems relevant for my purposes.)
You also seem to imply that (a) these coup-proofing behaviours may have been rational things for a self-interested leader to do in those situations, and (b) this is reason to be careful in assuming that this is about personality. I think (a) is a good point. And I think thereās some merit to (b), in the sense that this pushes against thinking something like āThese leaders are just crazy and evil.ā
But overall, I donāt think this is a question of personality vs incentive structures. I think neither determines a personās behaviour by itself. And I think whether or not one would do even horrific things if itās in oneās self-interest is partly a matter of personality. E.g., Iād be willing to bet that a very large portion of people wouldnāt engage in violent coup-proofing, even if they were in a situation where doing so would help them keep power. (Another framing of this is that a personās personality and values helps determine their incentives, in the sense that it influences what we like and dislike, including how much we dislike harming people.)
I think this is key; I think the massive-scale violence against non-elites is probably a larger part of why Hitler, Stalin, and Mao seem like interesting case studies of potential harm from malevolence than is the potentially ārationalā coup-proofing.
That said, itās good to independently consider the merits of a even non-central arguments/āpoints, and to update incrementally, so your arguments against making naive inferences from coup-proofing behaviours are still useful.
I have one criticism of the argument that coup-proofing prevalence is evidence for personality factors. Suppose that if people observe a game being played multiple times they are more likely to set aside their personal preferences and āplay to winā. So if I were the first dictator of Iraq I might say āno Iām not going to kill generals who come from different towns, that would be evilā. And then get killed for it. And maybe the second dictator says the same thing. But by the time the third or fourth dictator rises to power heāll either be selected for willingness to use violence or he will decide his preference for living is stronger than his preference for not killing. While I agree that many people would not commit inter-elite violence as the first leader, I suspect a much larger number would as the 5th leader. So an argument for point B.
Saddam Hussein was the 5th Iraqi leader to take power by coup within 21 years.
But on the other hand, there are lots of leaders that just stepped down when they lost the support of their ruling coalitions. And those heroes do not become famous. This is strong evidence of the importance of personality.
To be clear, my argument was more like ācoup-proofing prevalence doesnāt seem like strong evidence against personality playing an important roleā. I.e., I donāt think that it should reduce our belief that personality plays an important role.
It is true that I think Iād see these behaviours as evidence for personality playing an important role. But Iām not sure, and Iām not seeing it as key evidence.
Iād agree that a much larger number would as the 5th leader than as the 1st leader, in the scenario you describe. And I think this is a valuable point.
But, in line with your final paragraph, Iād still bet that many people wouldnāt; I think many people would simply step down, flee, or accept radical changes to the nature of their regime.
And perhaps more importantly, I think personality influences whether someone tries to become a leader in the first place, and whether they succeed in that. So I expect a lot of people to not want to ādo horrible thingsā, recognise that pursuing this leadership position may require them to ādo horrible thingsā along the way or to stay in power, and thus just not pursue those positions.
(That said, I did say āIād be willing to bet that a very large portion of people wouldnāt engage in violent coup-proofing, even if they were in a situation where doing so would help them keep power.ā So thereās a valid reason why you focused on how people would behave if they somehow landed in the leadership position, rather than how likely they are to enter those positions to begin with.)
Thanks for this comment.
Your points (and counterpoints!) about changes in ideological motivation are very interesting. And I think itād probably be good for me to spend some time engaging with evidence/āarguments about how much ideology influenced Hitler, Stalin, and Maoās most āextremeā behaviours and whether/āhow much the influence of ideology has waned.
And it does seem wise to think about that, and about more modern examples, if one is planning to communicate with the public, policymakers, or academics about this topic in a way that leans substantially on historical examples of dictators. (Iām not sure if anyone will actually do such communications, or emphasise those cases when doing so. It may, for example, make more sense to just focus on the psychological studies, or on examples from business.)