One aspect of the framing here that annoyed me, both in the OP and in some of the comments: the problem is not controversial beliefs, it is exclusionary beliefs. Here are some controversial beliefs that I think would pose absolutely no problem at this event or any other:
The many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Virus gain-of-function research creates more risk than it prevents.
Nuclear energy is a necessary part of the transition away from fossil fuels.
The problem with racism and transphobia is not that people disagree about them! The problem is that these beliefs, in their content on the object level, hurt people and exclude people from the discussion.
Letâs avoid using âcontroversialâ as a euphemism for âtoxic and exclusionaryâ. Letâs celebrate the debate and discussion of all controversies that threaten no-one and exclude no-one. Suggesting any of that is at stake is totally unnecessary.
I think this concept of an âexclusionary beliefâ is incoherent. If Alice is a speaker at an event, and holds belief X, and Bob is very put off by belief X and is therefor less interested in attending, that is never just about X. That is always an interaction between Bob and X, it is a function of both. And for any X, there will exist a Bob. There are many anti-nuclear and green energy activists who would not attend a conference with a speaker who has advocated nuclear energy as a necessary part of the transition away from fossil fuels. There are surely researchers who do gain of function research, or who view it as essential to protecting against future pandemics, who would not attend a conference with a speaker advocating against gain of function research. I can certainly think of people in the world, on both sides of the political spectrum, who, had they been invited to Manifest, that would have given me pause. The question is how should we respond when we find ourselves in Bobâs shoes? And I think we should definitely not demand that Alice be deplatformed. Asking for someone else to be deplatformed, because of our own feelings about them or their beliefs, is controlling behavior. It is a hecklerâs veto, and therefor contrary to ideals of free expression and intellectual inquiry. Ultimately each of us is responsible for our own feelings. Each of us can weigh the features of an event that we like against the features we dislike and decide for ourselves whether it is worth our time and energy and money to attend. Either choice is fine. But nobody owes us an event with any particular speakers or ideas included or excluded, and to act as though they do is just poor, controlling behavior.
To be honest, I didnât intend to focus primarily on what an exclusionary belief is, as much as highlight that many controversial beliefs are not exclusionary. If we want to get more precise about it, Iâm saying something like: all the objectionable beliefs here are beliefs about people who are also (perhaps prospectively) participating in the discussion, and this is a key thing that distinguishes them from like 95% of controversial (in the sense of heated disagreement) beliefs, and thatâs a whole lot of baby that we risk throwing out with the bathwater if we keep saying âcontroversialâ like the controversy itself is the problem.
There are many anti-nuclear and green energy activists who would not attend a conference with a speaker who has advocated nuclear energy as a necessary part of the transition away from fossil fuels. There are surely researchers who do gain of function research, or who view it as essential to protecting against future pandemics, who would not attend a conference with a speaker advocating against gain of function research.
I think this is mostly just arguing over hypotheticals, so itâs pretty impossible to adjudicate, but I want to highlight a difference between âIâm not going to this conference because itâs a waste of time, because they are discussing ideas that are obviously (to me) wrongâ, and âIâm not going to this conference because itâs supporting and strengthening people who are actively hostile towards me, on the basis of characteristics that I canât change, and is thereby either hostile to me itself or at least indifferent to hostility towards meâ.
As a light thought experiment, what if Aliceâs belief X was âPeople called Bob are secret evil aliens who I should always try to physically attack and maim if I get the opportunityâ ? Bob would understandably be put off by this belief, and have a pretty valid reason to not attend an event if he knew someone who believed it were present. Does it seem reasonable that Bob would ask that Alice (or people who hold the attack-secret-alien-Bobs belief) not be invited as speakers? Is that a hecklerâs veto, and contrary to free expression and intellectual enquiry? Is Bobâs decision not to attend just a matter of his own feelings? If answers to the above questions are ânoâ, it suggests itâs possible for a belief to be an âexclusionary beliefâ, on your terms.
In this case, I think the âphysically attack and maimâ part makes it much more than just a belief. So far as I am aware, nobody thinks anyone under discussion in relation to Manifest was ever likely to physically attack anybody.
Yes Iâm not saying anyone wasâthis is a thought experiment to see if exclusionary beliefs can be a coherent concept. We can stipulate that Alice has this sincere belief, but no history of such attacks (sheâs never met a Bob), and hasnât made any specific threats against Bob. Itâs just a belief - a subjective attitude about the world. If Bob does not attend due to knowing about Aliceâs belief, is that reasonable in your view?
Bob can attend or not attend for whatever reasons he wishes. Iâm not trying to judge that at all. The question seems to be whether Bob can reasonably ask the organizers to deplatform or uninvite or ban Alice. In your scenario, I think the answer is âyesâ, though I would frame that as being about Aliceâs likely future criminal behavior, not directly about the belief that precipitates that behavior.
Thanks. Given Alice has committed no crime, and everything else about her is ânormalâ, I think organizers would need to point to her belief to justify uninviting or banning her. That would suggest that an individualâs beliefs can (in at least one case) justify restricting their participation, on the basis of how that belief concerns other (prospective) attendees.
I think youâd be a lot more successful with a hypothetical that wasnât about whether someone would follow the law and/âor conference rules.
I would also expect, for example, a conference under Chatham House Rules to reject participants who believed this kind of rule did not bind them. Even if the organizers otherwise were quite committed to free expression. Organizers can and should be willing to consider expressed beliefs even without a history of acting on them.
I also think it being about âpeople named Bobâ messes with our intuitions, since itâs so silly, but ok.
Perhaps better hypothetical would be if Alice believed people named Bob were not moral patients (that had a bunch of nasty views downstream from this on what law and social norms should be) but still confirmed (and organizers trusted) that she would follow the law and treat him respectfully at the conference?
The point wasnât to motivate intuitions on the broader issue, but demonstrate that exclusionary beliefs could be a coherent concept. I agree your version is better for motivating broader intuitions
Does advocating the anti-Bob position in any way constitute not âtreat[ing] him respectfully,â even if he is not in earshot? As a practical reality, very few people would feel psychologically safe attending a conference at which people were having anti-Bob conversations after checking the participantsâ comfort level with euphemisms and/âor slurs, or inviting people to an off-site anti-Bob party.
Also: While I think the Alice hypo is too related to non-speech actions, I think the anti-Bob hypo is too divorced from them in the abstract. Weâd need to consider a context in which anti-Bobism and adjacent thoughtsâat a minimumâhad been used to deny fundamental human rights to Bobs over an extended period of time. And where (at least) a number of people preaching anti-Bobism would favor rights denial against Bob and other Bobs (e.g., prohibition/ârestriction on procreation, deportation) should they come into power.
Does advocating the anti-Bob position in any way constitute not âtreat[ing] him respectfully,â even if he is not in earshot?
Letâs say that Alice is going to advocate for her anti-Bob position even when Bob is in the discussion. And that this is a carve out from âtreat Bob respectfullyâ.
Bonus questions: Is the answer the same in this related hypoâCharlie thinks Delana Dixon, and only her among all human beings, is not a moral patient. In other words, does it matter if the belief and advocacy are targeted at an individual person vs. a group based on an immutable characteristic?
Also, does the organizerâs assessment of Alice and Charlieâs reasons for holding their beliefs matter here? Should they give less tolerance to the extent they conclude a belief is based on bigotry, delusion, a bad breakup with a Bob or with Delana Dixon, etc?
I think the problem with making the hypo more concrete in the ways you suggest is that then whether the hypo represents reality becomes highly contestable, and we devolve into object level debates. To take one example, despite being very pro-immigration myself, I find your suggestion that deportation of non-citizens somehow violates fundamental human rights to be absolutely ridiculous. If you set up a hypothetical about Alice wanting to deport non-citizen Bobs, you wonât convince me of anything. Iâm guessing a lot of the disagreement here is less about event norms and more about people in the EA community being intolerant of those they disagree with politically. One reason for choosing such an abstract hypothetical was to try to separate out the two.
Note that I didnât actually say âdeportation of non-citizens somehow violates fundamental human rightsâ as you assert. The reference to fundamental rights was in the past tense: âhad been used to deny fundamental human rights.â Certainly slavery involves the denial of a fundamental human right. The e.g. that references deportation follows the broader term ârights denial.â
That being said, I would characterize at least severe discriminatory treatment by the government on the basis of race as denial of a fundamental human right.
In any event, I recognize the concern you identifyâbut using only abstract hypotheticals is going to systematically bias the hypo in favor of the scientific racists by stripping away important context. If adding certain context changes the results of the hypo, then weâre stuck with an object-level debate on which hypo better reflects reality.
I was a bit confused by this comment. I thought âcontroversialâ commonly meant something more than just âcausing disagreementâ, and indeed I think that seems to be true. Looking it up, the OED defines âcontroversialâ as âgiving rise or likely to give rise to controversy or public disagreementâ, and âcontroversyâ as âprolonged public disagreement or heated discussionâ. That is, a belief being âcontroversialâ implies not just that people disagree over it, but also that thereâs an element of heated, emotional conflict surrounding it.
So it seems to me like the problem might actually be controversial beliefs, and not exclusionary beliefs? For example, antinatalism, communism, anarcho-capitalism, vaccine skepticism, and flat earthism are all controversial, and could plausibly cause the sort of controversy being discussed here, while not being exclusionary per se. (There are perhaps also some exclusionary beliefs that are not that controversial and therefore accepted, e.g., some forms of credentialism, but Iâm less sure about that.)
Of course I agree that thereâs no good reason to exclude topics/âpeople just because thereâs disagreement around themâI just donât think âcontroversialâ is a good word to fence those off, since it has additional baggage. Maybe âcontentiousâ or âtendentiousâ are better?
Yeah I just donât think that what people are objecting to is that these beliefs are the subject of even heated disagreement. Iâm not saying âdisagreement is fine, as long as itâs not heatedâ, Iâm saying âeven heated disagreement is fine, but thereâs some other distinction that makes it potentially a problemâ, and while Iâm not quite precise about what that other distinction is, itâs something like, is this topic directly about some of the people in the conversation, and does it implicitly or explicitly threaten the legitimacy of their presence or their contribution?
I think vaccine skepticism is an interesting example, as I do tend to think conferences shouldnât invite vaccine skeptics. But thatâs more out of a sense that vaccine skeptics in practice are grifters /â dishonest (which is no coincidence, in that the genuinely curious have mostly had their curiosity satisfied). I would be very happy to see someone speak about how the new malaria vaccines arenât effective enough to be worth it, if they had good reasons for thinking that.
I donât think people object to these topics being heated either. I think there are probably (at least) two things going on:
Thereâs some underlying thing causing some disagreements to be heated/âemotional, and people want to avoid that underlying thing (that could be that it involves exclusionary beliefs, but it could also be that it is harmful in other ways)
Thereâs a reputational risk in being associated with controversial issues, and people want to distance themselves from those for that reason
Either way, I donât think the problem is centrally about exclusionary beliefs, and I also donât think itâs centrally about disagreement. But anyway, it sounds like we mostly agree on the important bits.
I like what this is getting at, and also I personally disprefer many of the specific âcontroversial/âexclusionaryâ speakers at manifest being discussed (and would expect things be better if some had not attended), but I think this proposal might need revision to really work more broadly.
First, Iâm pretty sure it is common lingo to have âcontroversialâ be used in the way it is in this article. If this were a news story in The New York Times, Iâd expect it would be much more likely to use the word âcontroversialâ than the word âexclusionaryâ.
If the New York Times and WSJ both had front-page stories about âConference draws attention for controversial speakersâ, Iâd expect this to be more about radical right-wing or left-wing beliefs than I would the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Second, Iâm nervous that in practice that âexclusionaryâ is not as clean a concept as weâd like it to be. Itâs arguably too low a bar in many cases, and too high in others. I understand this to be arguing that there are some beliefs are disliked by others, enough to convince others to attend the event.
But I could imagine many ideas in this category. If there were a speaker talking about how to secure Taiwan, arguably Chinese nationalists would feel uncomfortable attending and argue that that is exclusionary. Many people are uncomfortable with basic ideas in effective altruism and might not attend conferences with prominent EAsâthey might argue that that EA is exclusionary.
Iâm not sure if one could argue that many beliefs themselves lead to people being uncomfortableâthis seems more like a function of both the belief and the culture at some moment in time.
For example, say that we did live in some world where all discussion of âthe value of nuclear researchâ was highly coupled with hateful takes against some group or other. In that case, this might then become exclusionary, in a way that could, in many cases, subsequently make sense to draw less attention to.
All that said, personally, I agree with what the post is grappling with, Iâm just nervous about the idea of trying to change terminology without thinking it through.
First, Iâm pretty sure it is common lingo to have âcontroversialâ be used in the way it is in this article. If this were a news story in The New York Times, Iâd expect it would be much more likely to use the word âcontroversialâ than the word âexclusionaryâ.
If the New York Times and WSJ both had front-page stories about âConference draws attention for controversial speakersâ, Iâd expect this to be more about radical right-wing or left-wing beliefs than I would the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Yeah, and I mostly think this is a mixture of confusion and cowardice on their part, frankly. To the extent that they really believe the controversy is itself the problem, I think theyâre wrong. To the extent that theyâre saying âcontroversialâ because itâs unarguably literally true and allows them to imply âbadâ without having to actually say it, I think itâs an attempt to project a false neutrality, to take a side without appearing to take a side. Some react to that by saying âlet our neutrality not be falseâ, some by âlet us not project neutralityâ. Either way has more respect from me.
But I could imagine many ideas in this category. If there were a speaker talking about how to secure Taiwan, arguably Chinese nationalists would feel uncomfortable attending and argue that that is exclusionary. Many people are uncomfortable with basic ideas in effective altruism and might not attend conferences with prominent EAsâthey might argue that that EA is exclusionary.
Yeah, for sure I expect disagreement about whatâs exclusionary, and when we should stand by something even though itâs exclusionary. My main point was to point out that lots of disagreements arenât exclusionary, and choosing how we handle potentially-exclusionary discourse doesnât need to put any of that at stake. (Thereâs room to disagree with this distinction, but thatâs the distinction I was trying to draw.)
If I am in support of designer babies, and see this as an important issue, does that fall in under your âtoxic and exclusionaryâ label?
Or would you perhaps want to make that taboo, due to âguilt by associationâ? (If so, I ask rhetoricallyâat what degree of seperation does the guilt by association stop?)
I see that the post author explicitly chose to not put Steve Hsu under the eugenics/âHBD label, which I appreciate. But the author did throw shade at Steve Hsu.
If people didnât know the context, they might think that you only want to make opinions taboo if they are mean-spirited or inherently constitute some sort of personal attack. While in actuality, the scope of ideas you want to be taboo is wider than that. And that is for good and understandable reasons. Itâs wider than that for me too (even if it is less wide than yours).
From my perspective, there is significant truth/âwisdom in your comment here. But also some degree of not acknowledging genuine tradeoffs.
As an added comment: I feel unsure myself about what the right balance is for this sort of thing.
One aspect of the framing here that annoyed me, both in the OP and in some of the comments: the problem is not controversial beliefs, it is exclusionary beliefs. Here are some controversial beliefs that I think would pose absolutely no problem at this event or any other:
The many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Virus gain-of-function research creates more risk than it prevents.
Nuclear energy is a necessary part of the transition away from fossil fuels.
The problem with racism and transphobia is not that people disagree about them! The problem is that these beliefs, in their content on the object level, hurt people and exclude people from the discussion.
Letâs avoid using âcontroversialâ as a euphemism for âtoxic and exclusionaryâ. Letâs celebrate the debate and discussion of all controversies that threaten no-one and exclude no-one. Suggesting any of that is at stake is totally unnecessary.
I think this concept of an âexclusionary beliefâ is incoherent. If Alice is a speaker at an event, and holds belief X, and Bob is very put off by belief X and is therefor less interested in attending, that is never just about X. That is always an interaction between Bob and X, it is a function of both. And for any X, there will exist a Bob. There are many anti-nuclear and green energy activists who would not attend a conference with a speaker who has advocated nuclear energy as a necessary part of the transition away from fossil fuels. There are surely researchers who do gain of function research, or who view it as essential to protecting against future pandemics, who would not attend a conference with a speaker advocating against gain of function research. I can certainly think of people in the world, on both sides of the political spectrum, who, had they been invited to Manifest, that would have given me pause. The question is how should we respond when we find ourselves in Bobâs shoes? And I think we should definitely not demand that Alice be deplatformed. Asking for someone else to be deplatformed, because of our own feelings about them or their beliefs, is controlling behavior. It is a hecklerâs veto, and therefor contrary to ideals of free expression and intellectual inquiry. Ultimately each of us is responsible for our own feelings. Each of us can weigh the features of an event that we like against the features we dislike and decide for ourselves whether it is worth our time and energy and money to attend. Either choice is fine. But nobody owes us an event with any particular speakers or ideas included or excluded, and to act as though they do is just poor, controlling behavior.
To be honest, I didnât intend to focus primarily on what an exclusionary belief is, as much as highlight that many controversial beliefs are not exclusionary. If we want to get more precise about it, Iâm saying something like: all the objectionable beliefs here are beliefs about people who are also (perhaps prospectively) participating in the discussion, and this is a key thing that distinguishes them from like 95% of controversial (in the sense of heated disagreement) beliefs, and thatâs a whole lot of baby that we risk throwing out with the bathwater if we keep saying âcontroversialâ like the controversy itself is the problem.
I think this is mostly just arguing over hypotheticals, so itâs pretty impossible to adjudicate, but I want to highlight a difference between âIâm not going to this conference because itâs a waste of time, because they are discussing ideas that are obviously (to me) wrongâ, and âIâm not going to this conference because itâs supporting and strengthening people who are actively hostile towards me, on the basis of characteristics that I canât change, and is thereby either hostile to me itself or at least indifferent to hostility towards meâ.
As a light thought experiment, what if Aliceâs belief X was âPeople called Bob are secret evil aliens who I should always try to physically attack and maim if I get the opportunityâ ?
Bob would understandably be put off by this belief, and have a pretty valid reason to not attend an event if he knew someone who believed it were present. Does it seem reasonable that Bob would ask that Alice (or people who hold the attack-secret-alien-Bobs belief) not be invited as speakers? Is that a hecklerâs veto, and contrary to free expression and intellectual enquiry? Is Bobâs decision not to attend just a matter of his own feelings?
If answers to the above questions are ânoâ, it suggests itâs possible for a belief to be an âexclusionary beliefâ, on your terms.
In this case, I think the âphysically attack and maimâ part makes it much more than just a belief. So far as I am aware, nobody thinks anyone under discussion in relation to Manifest was ever likely to physically attack anybody.
Yes Iâm not saying anyone wasâthis is a thought experiment to see if exclusionary beliefs can be a coherent concept. We can stipulate that Alice has this sincere belief, but no history of such attacks (sheâs never met a Bob), and hasnât made any specific threats against Bob. Itâs just a belief - a subjective attitude about the world. If Bob does not attend due to knowing about Aliceâs belief, is that reasonable in your view?
Bob can attend or not attend for whatever reasons he wishes. Iâm not trying to judge that at all. The question seems to be whether Bob can reasonably ask the organizers to deplatform or uninvite or ban Alice. In your scenario, I think the answer is âyesâ, though I would frame that as being about Aliceâs likely future criminal behavior, not directly about the belief that precipitates that behavior.
Thanks. Given Alice has committed no crime, and everything else about her is ânormalâ, I think organizers would need to point to her belief to justify uninviting or banning her. That would suggest that an individualâs beliefs can (in at least one case) justify restricting their participation, on the basis of how that belief concerns other (prospective) attendees.
I think youâd be a lot more successful with a hypothetical that wasnât about whether someone would follow the law and/âor conference rules.
I would also expect, for example, a conference under Chatham House Rules to reject participants who believed this kind of rule did not bind them. Even if the organizers otherwise were quite committed to free expression. Organizers can and should be willing to consider expressed beliefs even without a history of acting on them.
I also think it being about âpeople named Bobâ messes with our intuitions, since itâs so silly, but ok.
Perhaps better hypothetical would be if Alice believed people named Bob were not moral patients (that had a bunch of nasty views downstream from this on what law and social norms should be) but still confirmed (and organizers trusted) that she would follow the law and treat him respectfully at the conference?
The point wasnât to motivate intuitions on the broader issue, but demonstrate that exclusionary beliefs could be a coherent concept. I agree your version is better for motivating broader intuitions
Does advocating the anti-Bob position in any way constitute not âtreat[ing] him respectfully,â even if he is not in earshot? As a practical reality, very few people would feel psychologically safe attending a conference at which people were having anti-Bob conversations after checking the participantsâ comfort level with euphemisms and/âor slurs, or inviting people to an off-site anti-Bob party.
Also: While I think the Alice hypo is too related to non-speech actions, I think the anti-Bob hypo is too divorced from them in the abstract. Weâd need to consider a context in which anti-Bobism and adjacent thoughtsâat a minimumâhad been used to deny fundamental human rights to Bobs over an extended period of time. And where (at least) a number of people preaching anti-Bobism would favor rights denial against Bob and other Bobs (e.g., prohibition/ârestriction on procreation, deportation) should they come into power.
Letâs say that Alice is going to advocate for her anti-Bob position even when Bob is in the discussion. And that this is a carve out from âtreat Bob respectfullyâ.
Bonus questions: Is the answer the same in this related hypoâCharlie thinks Delana Dixon, and only her among all human beings, is not a moral patient. In other words, does it matter if the belief and advocacy are targeted at an individual person vs. a group based on an immutable characteristic?
Also, does the organizerâs assessment of Alice and Charlieâs reasons for holding their beliefs matter here? Should they give less tolerance to the extent they conclude a belief is based on bigotry, delusion, a bad breakup with a Bob or with Delana Dixon, etc?
I think the problem with making the hypo more concrete in the ways you suggest is that then whether the hypo represents reality becomes highly contestable, and we devolve into object level debates. To take one example, despite being very pro-immigration myself, I find your suggestion that deportation of non-citizens somehow violates fundamental human rights to be absolutely ridiculous. If you set up a hypothetical about Alice wanting to deport non-citizen Bobs, you wonât convince me of anything. Iâm guessing a lot of the disagreement here is less about event norms and more about people in the EA community being intolerant of those they disagree with politically. One reason for choosing such an abstract hypothetical was to try to separate out the two.
Note that I didnât actually say âdeportation of non-citizens somehow violates fundamental human rightsâ as you assert. The reference to fundamental rights was in the past tense: âhad been used to deny fundamental human rights.â Certainly slavery involves the denial of a fundamental human right. The e.g. that references deportation follows the broader term ârights denial.â
That being said, I would characterize at least severe discriminatory treatment by the government on the basis of race as denial of a fundamental human right.
In any event, I recognize the concern you identifyâbut using only abstract hypotheticals is going to systematically bias the hypo in favor of the scientific racists by stripping away important context. If adding certain context changes the results of the hypo, then weâre stuck with an object-level debate on which hypo better reflects reality.
I was a bit confused by this comment. I thought âcontroversialâ commonly meant something more than just âcausing disagreementâ, and indeed I think that seems to be true. Looking it up, the OED defines âcontroversialâ as âgiving rise or likely to give rise to controversy or public disagreementâ, and âcontroversyâ as âprolonged public disagreement or heated discussionâ. That is, a belief being âcontroversialâ implies not just that people disagree over it, but also that thereâs an element of heated, emotional conflict surrounding it.
So it seems to me like the problem might actually be controversial beliefs, and not exclusionary beliefs? For example, antinatalism, communism, anarcho-capitalism, vaccine skepticism, and flat earthism are all controversial, and could plausibly cause the sort of controversy being discussed here, while not being exclusionary per se. (There are perhaps also some exclusionary beliefs that are not that controversial and therefore accepted, e.g., some forms of credentialism, but Iâm less sure about that.)
Of course I agree that thereâs no good reason to exclude topics/âpeople just because thereâs disagreement around themâI just donât think âcontroversialâ is a good word to fence those off, since it has additional baggage. Maybe âcontentiousâ or âtendentiousâ are better?
Yeah I just donât think that what people are objecting to is that these beliefs are the subject of even heated disagreement. Iâm not saying âdisagreement is fine, as long as itâs not heatedâ, Iâm saying âeven heated disagreement is fine, but thereâs some other distinction that makes it potentially a problemâ, and while Iâm not quite precise about what that other distinction is, itâs something like, is this topic directly about some of the people in the conversation, and does it implicitly or explicitly threaten the legitimacy of their presence or their contribution?
I think vaccine skepticism is an interesting example, as I do tend to think conferences shouldnât invite vaccine skeptics. But thatâs more out of a sense that vaccine skeptics in practice are grifters /â dishonest (which is no coincidence, in that the genuinely curious have mostly had their curiosity satisfied). I would be very happy to see someone speak about how the new malaria vaccines arenât effective enough to be worth it, if they had good reasons for thinking that.
I donât think people object to these topics being heated either. I think there are probably (at least) two things going on:
Thereâs some underlying thing causing some disagreements to be heated/âemotional, and people want to avoid that underlying thing (that could be that it involves exclusionary beliefs, but it could also be that it is harmful in other ways)
Thereâs a reputational risk in being associated with controversial issues, and people want to distance themselves from those for that reason
Either way, I donât think the problem is centrally about exclusionary beliefs, and I also donât think itâs centrally about disagreement. But anyway, it sounds like we mostly agree on the important bits.
I like what this is getting at, and also I personally disprefer many of the specific âcontroversial/âexclusionaryâ speakers at manifest being discussed (and would expect things be better if some had not attended), but I think this proposal might need revision to really work more broadly.
First, Iâm pretty sure it is common lingo to have âcontroversialâ be used in the way it is in this article. If this were a news story in The New York Times, Iâd expect it would be much more likely to use the word âcontroversialâ than the word âexclusionaryâ.
If the New York Times and WSJ both had front-page stories about âConference draws attention for controversial speakersâ, Iâd expect this to be more about radical right-wing or left-wing beliefs than I would the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Second, Iâm nervous that in practice that âexclusionaryâ is not as clean a concept as weâd like it to be. Itâs arguably too low a bar in many cases, and too high in others. I understand this to be arguing that there are some beliefs are disliked by others, enough to convince others to attend the event.
But I could imagine many ideas in this category. If there were a speaker talking about how to secure Taiwan, arguably Chinese nationalists would feel uncomfortable attending and argue that that is exclusionary. Many people are uncomfortable with basic ideas in effective altruism and might not attend conferences with prominent EAsâthey might argue that that EA is exclusionary.
Iâm not sure if one could argue that many beliefs themselves lead to people being uncomfortableâthis seems more like a function of both the belief and the culture at some moment in time.
For example, say that we did live in some world where all discussion of âthe value of nuclear researchâ was highly coupled with hateful takes against some group or other. In that case, this might then become exclusionary, in a way that could, in many cases, subsequently make sense to draw less attention to.
All that said, personally, I agree with what the post is grappling with, Iâm just nervous about the idea of trying to change terminology without thinking it through.
Yeah, and I mostly think this is a mixture of confusion and cowardice on their part, frankly. To the extent that they really believe the controversy is itself the problem, I think theyâre wrong. To the extent that theyâre saying âcontroversialâ because itâs unarguably literally true and allows them to imply âbadâ without having to actually say it, I think itâs an attempt to project a false neutrality, to take a side without appearing to take a side. Some react to that by saying âlet our neutrality not be falseâ, some by âlet us not project neutralityâ. Either way has more respect from me.
Yeah, for sure I expect disagreement about whatâs exclusionary, and when we should stand by something even though itâs exclusionary. My main point was to point out that lots of disagreements arenât exclusionary, and choosing how we handle potentially-exclusionary discourse doesnât need to put any of that at stake. (Thereâs room to disagree with this distinction, but thatâs the distinction I was trying to draw.)
If I am in support of designer babies, and see this as an important issue, does that fall in under your âtoxic and exclusionaryâ label?
Or would you perhaps want to make that taboo, due to âguilt by associationâ? (If so, I ask rhetoricallyâat what degree of seperation does the guilt by association stop?)
I see that the post author explicitly chose to not put Steve Hsu under the eugenics/âHBD label, which I appreciate. But the author did throw shade at Steve Hsu.
If people didnât know the context, they might think that you only want to make opinions taboo if they are mean-spirited or inherently constitute some sort of personal attack. While in actuality, the scope of ideas you want to be taboo is wider than that. And that is for good and understandable reasons. Itâs wider than that for me too (even if it is less wide than yours).
From my perspective, there is significant truth/âwisdom in your comment here. But also some degree of not acknowledging genuine tradeoffs.
As an added comment: I feel unsure myself about what the right balance is for this sort of thing.