I think there’s some talking past each other happening.
I am claiming that there are real coordination problems that lead even actors who believe in a large amount of AI risk to think that they need to undertake risky AI development (or riskier) for private gain or dislike of what others would do. I think that dynamic will likely result in future governments (and companies absent government response) taking on more risk than they otherwise would, even if they think it’s quite a lot of risk.
I don’t think that most AI companies or governments would want to create an indefinite global ban on AI absent coordination problems, because they think benefits exceed costs, even those who put 10%+ on catastrophic outcomes, like Elon Musk or Dario Amodei (e.g. I put 10%+ on disastrous outcomes from AI development but wouldn’t want a permanent ban, even Eliezer Yudkowsky doesn’t want a permanent ban on AI).
I do think most of the AI company leadership that actually believes they may succeed in creating AGI or ASI would want to be able to take a year or two for safety testing and engineering if they were approaching powerful AGI and ASI absent issues of commercial and geopolitical competition (and I would want that too). And I think future US and Chinese governments, faced with powerful AGI/ASI and evidence of AI misbehavior and misalignment, would want to do so save for geopolitical rivalry.
Faced with that competition each actor taking a given level of risk to the world doesn’t internalize it, only the increment of risk over their competitor. And companies and states both get a big difference in value from being incrementally ahead vs behind competitors. For companies it can be huge profits vs bankruptcy. For states (and several AI CEOs who actually believe in AGI and worry about how others would develop and use it, I agree most of the hyperscaler CEOs and the like are looking at things from a pure business perspective and don’t even believe in AGI/ASI) there is the issue of power (among other non-financial motives) as a reason to care about being first.
Perhaps I overstated some of my claims or was unclear. So let me try to be more clear about my basic thesis. First of all, I agree that in the most basic model of the situation, being slightly ahead of a competitor can be the decisive factor between going bankrupt and making enormous profits. This creates a significant personal incentive to race ahead, even if doing so only marginally increases existential risk overall. As a result, AI labs may end up taking on more risk than they would in the absence of such pressure. More generally, I agree that without competition—whether between states or between AI companies—progress would likely be slower than it currently is.
My main point, however, is that these effects are likely not strong enough to justify the conclusion that the socially optimal pace of AI R&D is meaningfully slower than the current pace we in fact observe. In other words, I’m not convinced that what’s rational from an individual actor’s perspective diverges greatly from what would be rational from a collective or societal standpoint.
This is the central claim underlying my objection: if there is no meaningful difference between what is individually rational and what is collectively rational, then there is little reason to believe we are facing a tragedy-of-the-commons scenario as suggested in the post.
To sketch a more complete argument here, I would like to make two points:
First, while some forces incentivize speeding up AI development, others push in the opposite direction. Measures like export controls, tariffs, and (potentially) future AI regulations can slow down progress. In these cases, the described dynamic flips: the global costs of slowing down are shared, while the political rewards—such as public credit or influence—are concentrated among the policymakers or lobbyists who implement the slowdown.
Second, as I’ve mentioned, a large share of both the risks and benefits of AI accrue directly to those driving its development. This alignment of incentives gives them a reason to avoid reckless acceleration that would dramatically increase risk.
As a testable prediction of my view, we could ask whether AI labs are actively lobbying for slower progress internationally. If they truly preferred collective constraint but felt compelled to move forward individually, we would expect them to support measures that slow everyone down—while personally moving forward as fast as they can in the meantime. However, to my knowledge, such lobbying is not happening. This suggests that labs may not, in fact, collectively prefer significantly slower development.
I think there’s some talking past each other happening.
I am claiming that there are real coordination problems that lead even actors who believe in a large amount of AI risk to think that they need to undertake risky AI development (or riskier) for private gain or dislike of what others would do. I think that dynamic will likely result in future governments (and companies absent government response) taking on more risk than they otherwise would, even if they think it’s quite a lot of risk.
I don’t think that most AI companies or governments would want to create an indefinite global ban on AI absent coordination problems, because they think benefits exceed costs, even those who put 10%+ on catastrophic outcomes, like Elon Musk or Dario Amodei (e.g. I put 10%+ on disastrous outcomes from AI development but wouldn’t want a permanent ban, even Eliezer Yudkowsky doesn’t want a permanent ban on AI).
I do think most of the AI company leadership that actually believes they may succeed in creating AGI or ASI would want to be able to take a year or two for safety testing and engineering if they were approaching powerful AGI and ASI absent issues of commercial and geopolitical competition (and I would want that too). And I think future US and Chinese governments, faced with powerful AGI/ASI and evidence of AI misbehavior and misalignment, would want to do so save for geopolitical rivalry.
Faced with that competition each actor taking a given level of risk to the world doesn’t internalize it, only the increment of risk over their competitor. And companies and states both get a big difference in value from being incrementally ahead vs behind competitors. For companies it can be huge profits vs bankruptcy. For states (and several AI CEOs who actually believe in AGI and worry about how others would develop and use it, I agree most of the hyperscaler CEOs and the like are looking at things from a pure business perspective and don’t even believe in AGI/ASI) there is the issue of power (among other non-financial motives) as a reason to care about being first.
Perhaps I overstated some of my claims or was unclear. So let me try to be more clear about my basic thesis. First of all, I agree that in the most basic model of the situation, being slightly ahead of a competitor can be the decisive factor between going bankrupt and making enormous profits. This creates a significant personal incentive to race ahead, even if doing so only marginally increases existential risk overall. As a result, AI labs may end up taking on more risk than they would in the absence of such pressure. More generally, I agree that without competition—whether between states or between AI companies—progress would likely be slower than it currently is.
My main point, however, is that these effects are likely not strong enough to justify the conclusion that the socially optimal pace of AI R&D is meaningfully slower than the current pace we in fact observe. In other words, I’m not convinced that what’s rational from an individual actor’s perspective diverges greatly from what would be rational from a collective or societal standpoint.
This is the central claim underlying my objection: if there is no meaningful difference between what is individually rational and what is collectively rational, then there is little reason to believe we are facing a tragedy-of-the-commons scenario as suggested in the post.
To sketch a more complete argument here, I would like to make two points:
First, while some forces incentivize speeding up AI development, others push in the opposite direction. Measures like export controls, tariffs, and (potentially) future AI regulations can slow down progress. In these cases, the described dynamic flips: the global costs of slowing down are shared, while the political rewards—such as public credit or influence—are concentrated among the policymakers or lobbyists who implement the slowdown.
Second, as I’ve mentioned, a large share of both the risks and benefits of AI accrue directly to those driving its development. This alignment of incentives gives them a reason to avoid reckless acceleration that would dramatically increase risk.
As a testable prediction of my view, we could ask whether AI labs are actively lobbying for slower progress internationally. If they truly preferred collective constraint but felt compelled to move forward individually, we would expect them to support measures that slow everyone down—while personally moving forward as fast as they can in the meantime. However, to my knowledge, such lobbying is not happening. This suggests that labs may not, in fact, collectively prefer significantly slower development.