Thanks for writing this up Richard. There was a plan a few months ago on the forum to divide and conquer the book, and maybe post up a joint review, but it fell by the wayside. Thatâs partly due to real-life being higher priority, but I also got ground down by the hostile nature of the bookâand slogging through it to reproduce the arguments just wasnât going to happen. I welcome attempts to steelman parts of this book[1], or associated works, as I do think it is important for EA to understand and to engage with our critics.
I think there are some good bits in there that are worth understand where critical/âleftist challenges to Effective Altruism come from. Srinivasanâs foreword is a good outline of a âlow decouplingâ challenge to the analytic philosophy approach thatâs core to a lot of EA thinking, and I found Simone de Limaâs Chapter 2 the highlight of what I readâI think that the Chapter title does it an injustice. Iâd encourage people to read David Thorstadâs review of that chapter for a charitable/âsteelman reading of it. In many places, especially the end of Chapter 17, the contributors are clear that they view Capitalism as the primary source of evilâand that this is a self-evident moral fact, and itâs a pretty clear crux to understand their point-of-view.
But yeah, a lot of it is just⌠really, really bad. Iâm going to single out Craryâs Chapter 16 âAgainst Effective Altruismâ here. I believe itâs mostly a reproduction of a previous essay (perhaps with small changes) that are already in the public domain.[2] Some points that are especially egregious to me:
Crary presents the âInstitutionalâ and âPhilosophicalâ critiques, before combining them into her âCompositeâ critique that is meant to carry the weight of both. But thereâs very little evidence cited for it at allâfor the Composite Critique the main argument is that it âfinds extensive support in philosophical reflection about the social sciencesâ, such as the Frankfurt school, which⌠will do very little to persuade many EAs. If the choice is between EA or the Frankfurt school, then thatâs a very easy choice.
Much like the rest of the book, thereâs an assumption that Capitalism is wrong, and that any deviations from removing it are of very little moral value. Instead of working with animal industries, we should be working for complete abolition. Instead of donating to Give Directly, we should be undoing the Bretton Woods organisations. This is, as you say, just a testimonial of their anti-capitalist perspective, and reads more as a rallying cry for fellow critics of EA to join the fight against it, rather than a consideration of whether EA is right at all.
In particular, Crary keeps calling EA morally corrupt throughout her piece. Perhaps I have too naĂŻve a view of the academyâbut this seems beyond the pale. Any academics who are reading this, how often have mentors/âreviewers/âinterlocutors called your work âa textbook case of moral corruptionâ? What do you think would happen if they did? In her reference to this, she quotes the original source of the idea as saying that this isnât villifying any individuals andâwell, my response is âyeah rightâ. You should know youâre playing with fire when you use that kind of language, and cowardly hiding a get-out-of-jail free card in your citations about how your terminology doesnât mean what it usually means doesnât cut it. Calling what someone believes as âmoral corruptionâ is a serious and harmful attack.
Her quip at the end, that accepting her philosophical critiques and changing the way EA works would allow it âfinally a step toward doing a bit of goodâ is I think both historically wrong and frankly insulting to the good work that EA individuals and organisations have done.
I honestly think that Craryâs article might be one of worst anti-EA articles Iâve read and boy is that saying something, because there are a lot. As I said in the intro maybe someone can make a stronger case for it, it definitely riled me up, but it may honestly just be as bad an article as it seems.
There is one final point worth considering though. Thereâs a meme in some rationalist-spaces that EAs are âquokkasââwhich I donât like[3], but it may have a kernel of truth if weâre so âturn the other cheek, donât fight noise with noiseâ etc. I want to suggest that EA should take a stronger response to this kind of critique in the future. I think the current line is to just not respond to this kind of thing? But I think weâre big enough as a movement where our criticism is also noticeable, and will on its own persuade critics. I think it was completely avoidable for someone as prominent as Timnit Gebru to call us all fascists. Instead, we should be pushing back on prominent criticisms that are clearly wrong and beyond the paleâand do so clearly but forcefully. In short, in cases like this, we may have too many Darwins and not enough Huxleys.
In particular, Crary keeps calling EA morally corrupt throughout her piece. Perhaps I have too naĂŻve a view of the academyâbut this seems beyond the pale.
Small disagreement: if someone genuinuely believes some work to be morally corrupt, Iâd prefer they go out and say it rather than hide behind more euphemisms. I donât think itâs structurally any different from e.g. calling factory farming âevilâ or AI capabilities research âterrible for the world.â
Part of this might just be a norms difference: in most fields regular uses of morally laden language is uncommon, often counterproductive, and comes across as aggressive. But Crary is a moral philosopher, and at their best, the job of a good moral philosopher[1]is to regularly interrogate the nature of good and evil.
I welcome attempts to steelman parts of this book[1], or associated works, as I do think it is important for EA to understand and to engage with our critics.
I think âsteelmanningâ a view is not something we should generally strive to do, and I wish people stopped treating the inclination to âsteelmanâ an opponent as a sign of epistemic virtue. âSteelmanningâ is a pretty poor hueristic for many reasons, including that (1) it lacks the resources to distinguish views that may deserve to be steelmanned from views that ought to be dismissed as nonsense; (2) it is an instance of countering a potential bias in one direction with a bias in the opposite direction, which will often result in excessive correction, insufficient correction, or unnecessary correction; and (3) it often impedes understanding and communication, since the âsteelmannedâ version of a view may bear little resemblance to what its proponent intended.
As superior alternatives to âsteelmanningâ, I would suggest trying to pass the ideological Turing test, writing a hypothetical apostasy, and being willing to turn disagreements into bets (a practice which, to paraphrase Dr Johnson, âconcentrates the mind wonderfullyâ).
I disagree with this take, and fortunately now have a post to link to. I think steelmanning is a fine response to this situation.
I think your (3) is the one I spend the most time digging into in the post, and I feel quite confident is not a good reason not to steelman.
Re: 1&2, I agree Iâm, like, not that bullish on getting a bunch of value from this book, but it looks like a bunch of people have already gotten value from the theme of excessive focus on measurability. And generally I want to see more constructive engagement with criticism, and donât think âeh, low prior on it workingâ is a good critique of a good mental move.
Thanks. I hadnât seen that post, nor most of the arguments against steelmanning that Rob Bensinger mentions. I thought I was expressing a less popular view than now seems to me to be the case. I found it particularly interesting to read that Holden Karnofsky finds it unsatisfying to engage with âsteelmannedâ versions of his views.
I agree with you that steelmanning in the context of a discussion with others or of interpreting the views of others is importantly different from steelmanning in your own inner monologue, and I think the latter may be justified in some cases. Specifically, I think steelmanning can indeed be useful as a heuristic device for uncovering relevant considerations for or against some view as part of a brainstorming session. This seems pretty different from how steelmanning is typically applied, though.
I think steelmanning is bad for understanding and engaging with your critics, but is still useful for engaging with criticism, and for challenging and refining your own ideas.
We ought to have a new word, besides âsteelmanningâ, for âI think this idea is bad, but it made me think of another, much stronger idea that sounds similar, and I want to look at that idea now and ignore the first idea and probably whoever was advocating itâ.
Yeah, like Linch, I donât think thereâs anything wrong in principle with making a charge of âmoral corruptionâ or other harsh criticism. But it needs to be supported; the problem with Craryâs piece is just that itâs abysmally argued and substantively deeply unreasonable.
I think youâre misreading âmorally corruptâ here. Morally corrupt in the left usually refers to purity politics and moral contamination rather than corrupt is bad. This is common in left wing parlance.
Thanks for writing this up Richard. There was a plan a few months ago on the forum to divide and conquer the book, and maybe post up a joint review, but it fell by the wayside. Thatâs partly due to real-life being higher priority, but I also got ground down by the hostile nature of the bookâand slogging through it to reproduce the arguments just wasnât going to happen. I welcome attempts to steelman parts of this book[1], or associated works, as I do think it is important for EA to understand and to engage with our critics.
I think there are some good bits in there that are worth understand where critical/âleftist challenges to Effective Altruism come from. Srinivasanâs foreword is a good outline of a âlow decouplingâ challenge to the analytic philosophy approach thatâs core to a lot of EA thinking, and I found Simone de Limaâs Chapter 2 the highlight of what I readâI think that the Chapter title does it an injustice. Iâd encourage people to read David Thorstadâs review of that chapter for a charitable/âsteelman reading of it. In many places, especially the end of Chapter 17, the contributors are clear that they view Capitalism as the primary source of evilâand that this is a self-evident moral fact, and itâs a pretty clear crux to understand their point-of-view.
But yeah, a lot of it is just⌠really, really bad. Iâm going to single out Craryâs Chapter 16 âAgainst Effective Altruismâ here. I believe itâs mostly a reproduction of a previous essay (perhaps with small changes) that are already in the public domain.[2] Some points that are especially egregious to me:
Crary presents the âInstitutionalâ and âPhilosophicalâ critiques, before combining them into her âCompositeâ critique that is meant to carry the weight of both. But thereâs very little evidence cited for it at allâfor the Composite Critique the main argument is that it âfinds extensive support in philosophical reflection about the social sciencesâ, such as the Frankfurt school, which⌠will do very little to persuade many EAs. If the choice is between EA or the Frankfurt school, then thatâs a very easy choice.
Much like the rest of the book, thereâs an assumption that Capitalism is wrong, and that any deviations from removing it are of very little moral value. Instead of working with animal industries, we should be working for complete abolition. Instead of donating to Give Directly, we should be undoing the Bretton Woods organisations. This is, as you say, just a testimonial of their anti-capitalist perspective, and reads more as a rallying cry for fellow critics of EA to join the fight against it, rather than a consideration of whether EA is right at all.
In particular, Crary keeps calling EA morally corrupt throughout her piece. Perhaps I have too naĂŻve a view of the academyâbut this seems beyond the pale. Any academics who are reading this, how often have mentors/âreviewers/âinterlocutors called your work âa textbook case of moral corruptionâ? What do you think would happen if they did? In her reference to this, she quotes the original source of the idea as saying that this isnât villifying any individuals andâwell, my response is âyeah rightâ. You should know youâre playing with fire when you use that kind of language, and cowardly hiding a get-out-of-jail free card in your citations about how your terminology doesnât mean what it usually means doesnât cut it. Calling what someone believes as âmoral corruptionâ is a serious and harmful attack.
Her quip at the end, that accepting her philosophical critiques and changing the way EA works would allow it âfinally a step toward doing a bit of goodâ is I think both historically wrong and frankly insulting to the good work that EA individuals and organisations have done.
I honestly think that Craryâs article might be one of worst anti-EA articles Iâve read and boy is that saying something, because there are a lot. As I said in the intro maybe someone can make a stronger case for it, it definitely riled me up, but it may honestly just be as bad an article as it seems.
There is one final point worth considering though. Thereâs a meme in some rationalist-spaces that EAs are âquokkasââwhich I donât like[3], but it may have a kernel of truth if weâre so âturn the other cheek, donât fight noise with noiseâ etc. I want to suggest that EA should take a stronger response to this kind of critique in the future. I think the current line is to just not respond to this kind of thing? But I think weâre big enough as a movement where our criticism is also noticeable, and will on its own persuade critics. I think it was completely avoidable for someone as prominent as Timnit Gebru to call us all fascists. Instead, we should be pushing back on prominent criticisms that are clearly wrong and beyond the paleâand do so clearly but forcefully. In short, in cases like this, we may have too many Darwins and not enough Huxleys.
Hopefully we can find someone in addition to Thorstad willing to give it a go?
The earliest source I could find was this talk, but the article also appeared in Radical Philosophy in 2021.
ClarificationâI donât like the use of this term pejoratively. Quokkas themselves are objectively adorable.
Small disagreement: if someone genuinuely believes some work to be morally corrupt, Iâd prefer they go out and say it rather than hide behind more euphemisms. I donât think itâs structurally any different from e.g. calling factory farming âevilâ or AI capabilities research âterrible for the world.â
Part of this might just be a norms difference: in most fields regular uses of morally laden language is uncommon, often counterproductive, and comes across as aggressive. But Crary is a moral philosopher, and at their best, the job of a good moral philosopher[1] is to regularly interrogate the nature of good and evil.
not saying that sheâs necessarily a good one
I liked your comment but disagree with this part:
I think âsteelmanningâ a view is not something we should generally strive to do, and I wish people stopped treating the inclination to âsteelmanâ an opponent as a sign of epistemic virtue. âSteelmanningâ is a pretty poor hueristic for many reasons, including that (1) it lacks the resources to distinguish views that may deserve to be steelmanned from views that ought to be dismissed as nonsense; (2) it is an instance of countering a potential bias in one direction with a bias in the opposite direction, which will often result in excessive correction, insufficient correction, or unnecessary correction; and (3) it often impedes understanding and communication, since the âsteelmannedâ version of a view may bear little resemblance to what its proponent intended.
As superior alternatives to âsteelmanningâ, I would suggest trying to pass the ideological Turing test, writing a hypothetical apostasy, and being willing to turn disagreements into bets (a practice which, to paraphrase Dr Johnson, âconcentrates the mind wonderfullyâ).
I disagree with this take, and fortunately now have a post to link to. I think steelmanning is a fine response to this situation.
I think your (3) is the one I spend the most time digging into in the post, and I feel quite confident is not a good reason not to steelman.
Re: 1&2, I agree Iâm, like, not that bullish on getting a bunch of value from this book, but it looks like a bunch of people have already gotten value from the theme of excessive focus on measurability. And generally I want to see more constructive engagement with criticism, and donât think âeh, low prior on it workingâ is a good critique of a good mental move.
Thanks. I hadnât seen that post, nor most of the arguments against steelmanning that Rob Bensinger mentions. I thought I was expressing a less popular view than now seems to me to be the case. I found it particularly interesting to read that Holden Karnofsky finds it unsatisfying to engage with âsteelmannedâ versions of his views.
I agree with you that steelmanning in the context of a discussion with others or of interpreting the views of others is importantly different from steelmanning in your own inner monologue, and I think the latter may be justified in some cases. Specifically, I think steelmanning can indeed be useful as a heuristic device for uncovering relevant considerations for or against some view as part of a brainstorming session. This seems pretty different from how steelmanning is typically applied, though.
I think steelmanning is bad for understanding and engaging with your critics, but is still useful for engaging with criticism, and for challenging and refining your own ideas.
We ought to have a new word, besides âsteelmanningâ, for âI think this idea is bad, but it made me think of another, much stronger idea that sounds similar, and I want to look at that idea now and ignore the first idea and probably whoever was advocating itâ.
Yeah, like Linch, I donât think thereâs anything wrong in principle with making a charge of âmoral corruptionâ or other harsh criticism. But it needs to be supported; the problem with Craryâs piece is just that itâs abysmally argued and substantively deeply unreasonable.
I think youâre misreading âmorally corruptâ here. Morally corrupt in the left usually refers to purity politics and moral contamination rather than corrupt is bad. This is common in left wing parlance.