Thanks. (Pleased to see most of this stuff postdates my DPhil and therefore itâs less embarrassing I havenât read it!). I guess I feel I donât really have enough gasp on what phenomenal consciousness is, beyond definition by examples to feel like I entirely understand what is meant by âthereâs consciousness, but not phenomenal consciousnessâ.
I think people generally or often have Nagelâs what-it-is-likeness in mind as the definition of phenomenal consciousness (or at least without classic qualia or nonphysical properties).
If I recall correctly, Frankish (paper, video) called this âdiet qualiaâ and argued that attempts to define phenomenality in more specific terms generally reduce to either classic qualia or âzero qualiaâ (I think purely functionalist terms, compatible with strong illusionism).
Sure, but even the Nagel thing is kind of a metaphor. I find it easy to class which mental states it does or doesnât apply to, but itâs not something I can really characterize in other terms? I donât know, Iâve become less certain I know what all this terminology means the longer Iâve thought about it over the years.
On some definitions of âqualiaâ yes. I.e. not if you talk in the Tye/âByrne way where âqualiaâ turn out just to be perceived external properties that show up in the phenomenology, for example. And not, necessarily if qualia just means âproperty of a conscious experience that shows up in the phenomenologyâ. But some people do think that about qualia in the second sense, and probably some people do endorse the stronger claim that this is part of the definition of âqualiaâ.
Still having glanced at the Frankish paper I think I get whatâs going on now. Frankish is (I think, didnât read just glanced!) doing something like claiming standard dualist thought experiments show that ordinary people think there is more to consciousness than what goes on physically and functionally, then arguing that this makes that part of the meaning of âphenomenally consciousâ, so if thereâs nothing beyond the physical and the functional, there is no phenomenal consciousness by definition.
Thanks. (Pleased to see most of this stuff postdates my DPhil and therefore itâs less embarrassing I havenât read it!). I guess I feel I donât really have enough gasp on what phenomenal consciousness is, beyond definition by examples to feel like I entirely understand what is meant by âthereâs consciousness, but not phenomenal consciousnessâ.
I think people generally or often have Nagelâs what-it-is-likeness in mind as the definition of phenomenal consciousness (or at least without classic qualia or nonphysical properties).
If I recall correctly, Frankish (paper, video) called this âdiet qualiaâ and argued that attempts to define phenomenality in more specific terms generally reduce to either classic qualia or âzero qualiaâ (I think purely functionalist terms, compatible with strong illusionism).
Sure, but even the Nagel thing is kind of a metaphor. I find it easy to class which mental states it does or doesnât apply to, but itâs not something I can really characterize in other terms? I donât know, Iâve become less certain I know what all this terminology means the longer Iâve thought about it over the years.
Well, thatâs the whole issue, isnât it? Qualia are the things that canât be fully characterized by their relations.
On some definitions of âqualiaâ yes. I.e. not if you talk in the Tye/âByrne way where âqualiaâ turn out just to be perceived external properties that show up in the phenomenology, for example. And not, necessarily if qualia just means âproperty of a conscious experience that shows up in the phenomenologyâ. But some people do think that about qualia in the second sense, and probably some people do endorse the stronger claim that this is part of the definition of âqualiaâ.
Still having glanced at the Frankish paper I think I get whatâs going on now. Frankish is (I think, didnât read just glanced!) doing something like claiming standard dualist thought experiments show that ordinary people think there is more to consciousness than what goes on physically and functionally, then arguing that this makes that part of the meaning of âphenomenally consciousâ, so if thereâs nothing beyond the physical and the functional, there is no phenomenal consciousness by definition.