I think people generally or often have Nagel’s what-it-is-likeness in mind as the definition of phenomenal consciousness (or at least without classic qualia or nonphysical properties).
If I recall correctly, Frankish (paper, video) called this ‘diet qualia’ and argued that attempts to define phenomenality in more specific terms generally reduce to either classic qualia or ‘zero qualia’ (I think purely functionalist terms, compatible with strong illusionism).
Sure, but even the Nagel thing is kind of a metaphor. I find it easy to class which mental states it does or doesn’t apply to, but it’s not something I can really characterize in other terms? I don’t know, I’ve become less certain I know what all this terminology means the longer I’ve thought about it over the years.
On some definitions of “qualia” yes. I.e. not if you talk in the Tye/Byrne way where “qualia” turn out just to be perceived external properties that show up in the phenomenology, for example. And not, necessarily if qualia just means “property of a conscious experience that shows up in the phenomenology”. But some people do think that about qualia in the second sense, and probably some people do endorse the stronger claim that this is part of the definition of “qualia”.
Still having glanced at the Frankish paper I think I get what’s going on now. Frankish is (I think, didn’t read just glanced!) doing something like claiming standard dualist thought experiments show that ordinary people think there is more to consciousness than what goes on physically and functionally, then arguing that this makes that part of the meaning of “phenomenally conscious”, so if there’s nothing beyond the physical and the functional, there is no phenomenal consciousness by definition.
I think people generally or often have Nagel’s what-it-is-likeness in mind as the definition of phenomenal consciousness (or at least without classic qualia or nonphysical properties).
If I recall correctly, Frankish (paper, video) called this ‘diet qualia’ and argued that attempts to define phenomenality in more specific terms generally reduce to either classic qualia or ‘zero qualia’ (I think purely functionalist terms, compatible with strong illusionism).
Sure, but even the Nagel thing is kind of a metaphor. I find it easy to class which mental states it does or doesn’t apply to, but it’s not something I can really characterize in other terms? I don’t know, I’ve become less certain I know what all this terminology means the longer I’ve thought about it over the years.
Well, that’s the whole issue, isn’t it? Qualia are the things that can’t be fully characterized by their relations.
On some definitions of “qualia” yes. I.e. not if you talk in the Tye/Byrne way where “qualia” turn out just to be perceived external properties that show up in the phenomenology, for example. And not, necessarily if qualia just means “property of a conscious experience that shows up in the phenomenology”. But some people do think that about qualia in the second sense, and probably some people do endorse the stronger claim that this is part of the definition of “qualia”.
Still having glanced at the Frankish paper I think I get what’s going on now. Frankish is (I think, didn’t read just glanced!) doing something like claiming standard dualist thought experiments show that ordinary people think there is more to consciousness than what goes on physically and functionally, then arguing that this makes that part of the meaning of “phenomenally conscious”, so if there’s nothing beyond the physical and the functional, there is no phenomenal consciousness by definition.