Interesting! One of the most salient aspects of Wolf’s article, to me, was her argument that a consequentialist who instrumentally valued other things (like family, personal well-being etc) as a means to their ultimate goal would:
a) not really value those things (because she ~argues that valuing is valuing non-instrumentally) b) be open to (or compelled to) take opportunities to lessen their instrumental values if that would lead to better ends. For example, a consequentialist who could go on a special meditation retreat which would make them care less about their own wellbeing (or their family or etc...) should take that option, and would take it if their only non-instrumental value was the impartial good.
Interesting! One of the most salient aspects of Wolf’s article, to me, was her argument that a consequentialist who instrumentally valued other things (like family, personal well-being etc) as a means to their ultimate goal would:
a) not really value those things (because she ~argues that valuing is valuing non-instrumentally)
b) be open to (or compelled to) take opportunities to lessen their instrumental values if that would lead to better ends. For example, a consequentialist who could go on a special meditation retreat which would make them care less about their own wellbeing (or their family or etc...) should take that option, and would take it if their only non-instrumental value was the impartial good.
Drafted! (directly because of upvotes + draft amnesty’s lower standards. Would never have finished it otherwise)