I feel like there are a lot of articles about “value pluralism” and such, another one being Tyler Alterman’s Effective Altruism in the Garden of Ends. This position appears to be more popular and in vogue than a more traditional utilitarian view that an agent’s subjective experiences should not be valued more highly terminally than that of other moral patients.
I would like to see an article (and maybe would write it someday) that we should primarily treat any naive favoritism for our own well-being as agents as instrumental to maximizing well-being, rather than having multiple terminal values.
Interesting! One of the most salient aspects of Wolf’s article, to me, was her argument that a consequentialist who instrumentally valued other things (like family, personal well-being etc) as a means to their ultimate goal would:
a) not really value those things (because she ~argues that valuing is valuing non-instrumentally) b) be open to (or compelled to) take opportunities to lessen their instrumental values if that would lead to better ends. For example, a consequentialist who could go on a special meditation retreat which would make them care less about their own wellbeing (or their family or etc...) should take that option, and would take it if their only non-instrumental value was the impartial good.
I feel like there are a lot of articles about “value pluralism” and such, another one being Tyler Alterman’s Effective Altruism in the Garden of Ends. This position appears to be more popular and in vogue than a more traditional utilitarian view that an agent’s subjective experiences should not be valued more highly terminally than that of other moral patients.
I would like to see an article (and maybe would write it someday) that we should primarily treat any naive favoritism for our own well-being as agents as instrumental to maximizing well-being, rather than having multiple terminal values.
Interesting! One of the most salient aspects of Wolf’s article, to me, was her argument that a consequentialist who instrumentally valued other things (like family, personal well-being etc) as a means to their ultimate goal would:
a) not really value those things (because she ~argues that valuing is valuing non-instrumentally)
b) be open to (or compelled to) take opportunities to lessen their instrumental values if that would lead to better ends. For example, a consequentialist who could go on a special meditation retreat which would make them care less about their own wellbeing (or their family or etc...) should take that option, and would take it if their only non-instrumental value was the impartial good.
Drafted! (directly because of upvotes + draft amnesty’s lower standards. Would never have finished it otherwise)