Concerning the definition of suffering, I do actually provide a definition: an overall bad feeling, or state of consciousness (as I note, I here follow Mayerfeld, 1999, pp. 14-15). One may argue that this is not a particularly reductive definition, and I say the same in a footnote:
One cannot, I submit, define suffering in more precise or reductive terms than this. For just as one cannot ultimately define the experience of, say, phenomenal redness in any other way than by pointing to it, one cannot define a bad overall feeling, i.e. suffering, in any other way than by pointing to the aspect of consciousness it refers to.
I think that he made a deliberate choice to focus on capturing a wide range of views and defenses instead of going deep into defending one view.
Partly. I would say I both tried to make a broad case and defend a specific view, namely the view(s) I defend in Chapters 4 and 5 (they aren’t quite identical, but I’d say they are roughly equivalent at the level of normative ethics).
In Chapter 5 Magnus explains his position regarding suffering, but throughout the first part he does not rely on that in order to make a case for suffering focused ethics. Instead, he loads philosophical ammunition from all over the suffering-focused ethics coalition and shoots them at every obstacle in sight.
That’s not quite how I see it (though it’s true that I don’t rely strongly on the meta-ethical view defended in Chapter 5). My own view, including Chapter 5 in particular, is not really isolated from the arguments I make in the preceding chapters. I see most of the arguments outlined in previous chapters as lending support to the arguments made in Chapter 5, and I indeed explicitly cite many of them there.
Many of the arguments are of the form “philosopher X thinks that Y is true”, but without appropriate arguments for Y. Also, whenever there was a problem with an argument, Magnus can retreat to a less demanding version of Suffering-Focused Ethics, which makes it more difficult for the reader to follow the arguments.
I’d appreciate some examples (or just one) of this. :-)
I don’t think I at any point retreat from the view I defend in Chapters 4 and 5. But I do explain how one can hold other suffering-focused views (e.g. pluralist ones, such as those defended by Wolf and Mayerfeld).
My major issue with this book is that it feels heavily biased. I felt that I was being persuaded, not explained to.
I did seek to explain the arguments and considerations that have led me to hold a suffering-focused view, and I do happen to find these arguments persuasive.
I wonder what you think I should have done differently, and whether you can refer me to a book defending a moral view in a way that was more “explaining”.
It feels that Magnus offers no major concessions, related to the point above that there is always a line of retreat.
What major concessions do you feel I should make? My view is that it cannot be justified to create purported positive goods at the price of extreme suffering, and it would be dishonest for me to claim that I’ve found a persuasive argument against this view. But I’m keen to hear any counterargument you find persuasive.
In chapter 7, there are a long list of possible biases that prevent us from accepting Suffering-Focused Ethics.
This is not quite accurate, and I should have made this clearer. :-)
As I say at the beginning of this chapter, I here “present various biases against giving suffering its due moral weight and consideration.” This is not the same as (only) presenting biases against suffering-focused moral views in particular. One can be a classical utilitarian and still think that most, perhaps even all, of the biases mentioned in this chapter plausibly bias us against giving sufficient priority to suffering.
For example, a classical utilitarian can agree that we tend to shy away from contemplating suffering (7.2); that we underestimate how bad suffering often is (7.4); that we underestimate and ignore our ability to reduce suffering, in part because of omission bias (7.5); that we have a novelty bias and scope insensitivity (7.6); that we have a perpetrator bias that leads us to dismiss suffering not caused by moral agents (7.7); that the Just World Fallacy leads us to dismiss others’ suffering (7.8); that we have a positivity and an optimism bias (7.9); that a craving for certain sources of pleasure, e.g. sex and status, can distort our judgments (7.10); that we have an existence bias — widespread resistance against euthanasia is an example (7.11); that suffering is a very general phenomenon, which makes it difficult for us to make systematic and effective efforts to prevent it (7.13); etc.
I’d actually say that most of the biases reviewed are not biases against accepting suffering-focused moral views, but rather biases against giving the priority to reducing suffering that the values most people already hold would require. I should probably have made this more clear (I say a bit more on this in the second half of section 12.3).
and really the biggest flaw for me was that there was no analogous comparison with possible biases [favoring] Suffering-Based Ethics.
But there was in fact a section on this: 7.15. If you feel I’ve missed some important considerations, I’m keen to hear about them.
Also, in Chapter 8 Magnus presents many arguments against his views, each a couple of sentences, and spends the majority of the time making counterarguments and half-hearted concessions.
I wonder what you mean by “half-hearted concessions”, and why you think they are half-hearted. Also, it’s not true that “each [counterargument is] a couple of sentences”, even as most are stated very concisely.
Instead of acknowledging reasonable ethical views that may oppose Suffering-Focused Ethics, there is an attempt at convincing the readers that there is still some way of reducing suffering that they should prefer.
As mentioned above, my view is that it cannot be justified to create purported positive goods at the price of extreme suffering. I cannot honestly say that I find views that would have us increase extreme suffering in order to increase, say, pleasure to be reasonable. So again, all I can say is that I’d invite you to present and defend the views that you think I should acknowledge as reasonable.
After reading this book, it is clearer to me that I find extreme suffering very bad
I’m glad to hear that. Helping people clarify their views of the significance of extreme suffering is among the main objectives of the book.
but that in general I tend to think suffering can be outweighted.
This is then where I, apropos the complaint about a lack of “appropriate arguments” for a stated premise, would ask for some arguments: how and why can extreme suffering be outweighed? What counterarguments would you give to the arguments presented in, say, Chapters 3 and 4?
Also, I was worried before reading the book that there is an inherent difficulty in cooperation between suffering-focused ethical systems and aspirations for more (happy) people to exist. I still think that’s somewhat the case but it is clearer that these differences can be overcome and that one can value both.
Pleased to hear this. The second part of the book should lend even more support to that view. I very much hope we can all cooperate closely rather than fall victim to tribal psychology, as difficult as that can be. As I note in Chapter 10, disagreeing on values is arguably a strong catalyst for outgroup perception. Let’s resist falling prey to that.
Thanks again for taking the time to read and review the first part of the book. :-)
Thanks for this lengthy reply! I want to emphasise that I enjoyed and learned a lot from reading this book, and that most of my criticism I think of mostly as resulting from a deliberate choice of keeping the book readable, and definitely not something that I have any suggestions for improvements.
I appreciate your clarifications on chapter 7, on the definition of suffering and of using the arguments from chapters 4,5.
Regarding “line of retreat”, I meant something similar to your comment to Michael-
It’s true that I do mention the views of many different philosophers, and note how their views support suffering-focused views, and in some cases I merely identify the moral axioms, if you will, underlying these views. I then leave it to the reader to decide whether these axioms are plausible (this is a way in which I in fact do explain/present views rather than try to “persuade”; chapter 2 is very similar, in that it also presents a lot of views in this way).
I think that I felt simply that there were many claims which were supported by various views where I felt that it was difficult for me to judge how to take these into account. I looked back to find a good example of an actual “retreat” and honestly I can’t find any. I think that it’s possible that I have read something wrongly in chapter 8 and that tainted my expression of some of the reasoning in the book. In any case, I have clearly overemphasised that and I’ll retract it.
Regarding that feeling of being persuaded, I’m not really sure what to say. It mostly felt that I could easily come up with many counter-intuitions throughout reading the book and that raised some mental alarm bells: these are only the ideas I can come up with, and I’m sure that there are plenty more. I didn’t feel that opposing views were clearly explored, even though they were listed. If that’s how books that defend moral positions are supposed to be written, then my inside view thinks that’s epistemically mistaken.
I’d be very interested in discussing the actual contents of my views on the ethics of suffering, on which I’d really appreciate feedback; I’ve scheduled myself time to write this up here in the weekend. :)
In relation to counterintuitions and counterarguments, I can honestly say that I’ve spent a lot of time searching for good ones, and tried to include as many as I could in a charitable way (especially in Chapter 8).
I’m still keen to find more opposing arguments and intuitions, and to see them explored in depth. As hinted in the post, I hope my book can provoke people to reflect on these issues and to present the strongest case for their views, which I’d really like to see. I believe such arguments can help advance the views of all of us toward greater levels of nuance and sophistication.
Many of the arguments are of the form “philosopher X thinks that Y is true”, but without appropriate arguments for Y.
I’d appreciate some examples (or just one) of this. :-)
I think 3.2 Intra- and Interpersonal Claims and the discussion of Parfit’s compensation principle, Mill’s harm principle and Shiffrin’s consent principle just before in 3.1 are examples. You don’t discuss how they defend these views/principles.
(I only started reading last night, and this is about where I am now.)
What I was keen to get an example of was mainly this (omitted in the text you quoted above):
Also, whenever there was a problem with an argument, Magnus can retreat to a less demanding version of Suffering-Focused Ethics, which makes it more difficult for the reader to follow the arguments.
That is, an example of how I retreat from the main position I defend (in Chapters 4 and 5), such as by relying on the views of other philosophers whose premises I haven’t defended. I don’t believe I do that anywhere. Again, what I do in some places is simply to show that there are other kinds of suffering-focused views one may hold; I don’t retreat from the view I in fact hold.
It’s true that I do mention the views of many different philosophers, and note how their views support suffering-focused views, and in some cases I merely identify the moral axioms, if you will, underlying these views. I then leave it to the reader to decide whether these axioms are plausible (this is a way in which the book in fact does explain/present views rather than try to “persuade”; Chapter 2 is very similar, in that it also presents a lot of views in this way).
It seems that Shiffrin and Parfit did, for example, consider their respective principles rather axiomatic, and provided little to no justification for them (indeed, Parfit considered his compensation principle “clearly true”, https://web.archive.org/web/20190410204154/https://jwcwolf.public.iastate.edu/Papers/JUPE.HTM ). Mill’s principle was merely mentioned as one that “can be considered congruent” with a conclusion I argued for; I didn’t rely on it to defend the conclusion in question.
Thanks for sharing your review. A few comments:
Concerning the definition of suffering, I do actually provide a definition: an overall bad feeling, or state of consciousness (as I note, I here follow Mayerfeld, 1999, pp. 14-15). One may argue that this is not a particularly reductive definition, and I say the same in a footnote:
Partly. I would say I both tried to make a broad case and defend a specific view, namely the view(s) I defend in Chapters 4 and 5 (they aren’t quite identical, but I’d say they are roughly equivalent at the level of normative ethics).
That’s not quite how I see it (though it’s true that I don’t rely strongly on the meta-ethical view defended in Chapter 5). My own view, including Chapter 5 in particular, is not really isolated from the arguments I make in the preceding chapters. I see most of the arguments outlined in previous chapters as lending support to the arguments made in Chapter 5, and I indeed explicitly cite many of them there.
I’d appreciate some examples (or just one) of this. :-)
I don’t think I at any point retreat from the view I defend in Chapters 4 and 5. But I do explain how one can hold other suffering-focused views (e.g. pluralist ones, such as those defended by Wolf and Mayerfeld).
I did seek to explain the arguments and considerations that have led me to hold a suffering-focused view, and I do happen to find these arguments persuasive.
I wonder what you think I should have done differently, and whether you can refer me to a book defending a moral view in a way that was more “explaining”.
What major concessions do you feel I should make? My view is that it cannot be justified to create purported positive goods at the price of extreme suffering, and it would be dishonest for me to claim that I’ve found a persuasive argument against this view. But I’m keen to hear any counterargument you find persuasive.
This is not quite accurate, and I should have made this clearer. :-)
As I say at the beginning of this chapter, I here “present various biases against giving suffering its due moral weight and consideration.” This is not the same as (only) presenting biases against suffering-focused moral views in particular. One can be a classical utilitarian and still think that most, perhaps even all, of the biases mentioned in this chapter plausibly bias us against giving sufficient priority to suffering.
For example, a classical utilitarian can agree that we tend to shy away from contemplating suffering (7.2); that we underestimate how bad suffering often is (7.4); that we underestimate and ignore our ability to reduce suffering, in part because of omission bias (7.5); that we have a novelty bias and scope insensitivity (7.6); that we have a perpetrator bias that leads us to dismiss suffering not caused by moral agents (7.7); that the Just World Fallacy leads us to dismiss others’ suffering (7.8); that we have a positivity and an optimism bias (7.9); that a craving for certain sources of pleasure, e.g. sex and status, can distort our judgments (7.10); that we have an existence bias — widespread resistance against euthanasia is an example (7.11); that suffering is a very general phenomenon, which makes it difficult for us to make systematic and effective efforts to prevent it (7.13); etc.
I’d actually say that most of the biases reviewed are not biases against accepting suffering-focused moral views, but rather biases against giving the priority to reducing suffering that the values most people already hold would require. I should probably have made this more clear (I say a bit more on this in the second half of section 12.3).
But there was in fact a section on this: 7.15. If you feel I’ve missed some important considerations, I’m keen to hear about them.
I wonder what you mean by “half-hearted concessions”, and why you think they are half-hearted. Also, it’s not true that “each [counterargument is] a couple of sentences”, even as most are stated very concisely.
As mentioned above, my view is that it cannot be justified to create purported positive goods at the price of extreme suffering. I cannot honestly say that I find views that would have us increase extreme suffering in order to increase, say, pleasure to be reasonable. So again, all I can say is that I’d invite you to present and defend the views that you think I should acknowledge as reasonable.
I’m glad to hear that. Helping people clarify their views of the significance of extreme suffering is among the main objectives of the book.
This is then where I, apropos the complaint about a lack of “appropriate arguments” for a stated premise, would ask for some arguments: how and why can extreme suffering be outweighed? What counterarguments would you give to the arguments presented in, say, Chapters 3 and 4?
Pleased to hear this. The second part of the book should lend even more support to that view. I very much hope we can all cooperate closely rather than fall victim to tribal psychology, as difficult as that can be. As I note in Chapter 10, disagreeing on values is arguably a strong catalyst for outgroup perception. Let’s resist falling prey to that.
Thanks again for taking the time to read and review the first part of the book. :-)
Thanks for this lengthy reply! I want to emphasise that I enjoyed and learned a lot from reading this book, and that most of my criticism I think of mostly as resulting from a deliberate choice of keeping the book readable, and definitely not something that I have any suggestions for improvements.
I appreciate your clarifications on chapter 7, on the definition of suffering and of using the arguments from chapters 4,5.
Regarding “line of retreat”, I meant something similar to your comment to Michael-
I think that I felt simply that there were many claims which were supported by various views where I felt that it was difficult for me to judge how to take these into account. I looked back to find a good example of an actual “retreat” and honestly I can’t find any. I think that it’s possible that I have read something wrongly in chapter 8 and that tainted my expression of some of the reasoning in the book. In any case, I have clearly overemphasised that and I’ll retract it.
Regarding that feeling of being persuaded, I’m not really sure what to say. It mostly felt that I could easily come up with many counter-intuitions throughout reading the book and that raised some mental alarm bells: these are only the ideas I can come up with, and I’m sure that there are plenty more. I didn’t feel that opposing views were clearly explored, even though they were listed. If that’s how books that defend moral positions are supposed to be written, then my inside view thinks that’s epistemically mistaken.
I’d be very interested in discussing the actual contents of my views on the ethics of suffering, on which I’d really appreciate feedback; I’ve scheduled myself time to write this up here in the weekend. :)
Thanks for your comment. I appreciate it! :-)
In relation to counterintuitions and counterarguments, I can honestly say that I’ve spent a lot of time searching for good ones, and tried to include as many as I could in a charitable way (especially in Chapter 8).
I’m still keen to find more opposing arguments and intuitions, and to see them explored in depth. As hinted in the post, I hope my book can provoke people to reflect on these issues and to present the strongest case for their views, which I’d really like to see. I believe such arguments can help advance the views of all of us toward greater levels of nuance and sophistication.
I think 3.2 Intra- and Interpersonal Claims and the discussion of Parfit’s compensation principle, Mill’s harm principle and Shiffrin’s consent principle just before in 3.1 are examples. You don’t discuss how they defend these views/principles.
(I only started reading last night, and this is about where I am now.)
Thanks for your comment, Michael :-)
What I was keen to get an example of was mainly this (omitted in the text you quoted above):
That is, an example of how I retreat from the main position I defend (in Chapters 4 and 5), such as by relying on the views of other philosophers whose premises I haven’t defended. I don’t believe I do that anywhere. Again, what I do in some places is simply to show that there are other kinds of suffering-focused views one may hold; I don’t retreat from the view I in fact hold.
It’s true that I do mention the views of many different philosophers, and note how their views support suffering-focused views, and in some cases I merely identify the moral axioms, if you will, underlying these views. I then leave it to the reader to decide whether these axioms are plausible (this is a way in which the book in fact does explain/present views rather than try to “persuade”; Chapter 2 is very similar, in that it also presents a lot of views in this way).
It seems that Shiffrin and Parfit did, for example, consider their respective principles rather axiomatic, and provided little to no justification for them (indeed, Parfit considered his compensation principle “clearly true”, https://web.archive.org/web/20190410204154/https://jwcwolf.public.iastate.edu/Papers/JUPE.HTM ). Mill’s principle was merely mentioned as one that “can be considered congruent” with a conclusion I argued for; I didn’t rely on it to defend the conclusion in question.