Fitting the name of the book, the first 8 chapter compose of an impressively long list of arguments and counter-arguments that support suffering-focused ethics. By Suffering-Focused Ethics, the author refers to the family of ethical theories that call for the reduction of suffering for sentient beingsāthey can differ in their approach to, e.g, the scale in which extreme suffering matters, how much weight should we put on other factors (such as well-being), whether we rely on moral realism, etc..
Deliberately, Magnus does not present a specific definition or characterisation of suffering but instead appeals to the readerās intuition and most examples of extreme suffering are those of extreme despair and pain. I didnāt find that to be an issue when contemplating most aspects written in the first part of the book, but as I wrote below the book aims at breadth rather than depth.
In Chapter 5 Magnus explains his position regarding suffering, but throughout the first part he does not rely on that in order to make a case for suffering focused ethics. Instead, he loads philosophical ammunition from all over the suffering-focused ethics coalition and shoots them at every obstacle in sight. There are many different bullets and many different obstacles, which makes this task difficult. I think that he made a deliberate choice to focus on capturing a wide range of views and defenses instead of going deep into defending one view.
That has some problems. Many of the arguments are of the form āphilosopher X thinks that Y is trueā, but without appropriate arguments for Y. Also, whenever there was a problem with an argument, Magnus can retreat to a less demanding version of Suffering-Focused Ethics, which makes it more difficult for the reader to follow the arguments.
My major issue with this book is that it feels heavily biased. I felt that I was being persuaded, not explained to. It feels that Magnus offers no major concessions, related to the point above that there is always a line of retreat. In chapter 7, there are a long list of possible biases that prevent us from accepting Suffering-Focused Ethics. Many of those were not persuasive, and some could have been symmetrically applied against Suffering-Focused Ethics, and really the biggest flaw for me was that there was mostly no analogous comparison with possible biases against Suffering-Based Ethics. Also, in Chapter 8 Magnus presents many arguments against his views, each about a couple of sentences, and spends the majority of the time on counterarguments and very little concessions. Instead of acknowledging reasonable ethical views that may oppose Suffering-Focused Ethics, there is an attempt at convincing the readers that there is still some way of reducing suffering that they should prefer.
Overall I am glad to have read this and look forward to reading the next part. After reading this book, it is clearer to me that I find extreme suffering very bad (so that it would still be very hard to outweigh it) but that in general I tend to think suffering can be outweighed. Also, I was worried before reading the book that there is an inherent difficulty in cooperation between suffering-focused ethical systems and aspirations for more (happy) people to exist. I still think thatās somewhat the case but it is clearer that these differences can be overcome and that one can value both.
DisclaimerāIām not an expert, and except for reading blog posts by Brian Tomasik and CLR I am not that familiar with the field
Concerning the definition of suffering, I do actually provide a definition: an overall bad feeling, or state of consciousness (as I note, I here follow Mayerfeld, 1999, pp. 14-15). One may argue that this is not a particularly reductive definition, and I say the same in a footnote:
One cannot, I submit, define suffering in more precise or reductive terms than this. For just as one cannot ultimately define the experience of, say, phenomenal redness in any other way than by pointing to it, one cannot define a bad overall feeling, i.e. suffering, in any other way than by pointing to the aspect of consciousness it refers to.
I think that he made a deliberate choice to focus on capturing a wide range of views and defenses instead of going deep into defending one view.
Partly. I would say I both tried to make a broad case and defend a specific view, namely the view(s) I defend in Chapters 4 and 5 (they arenāt quite identical, but Iād say they are roughly equivalent at the level of normative ethics).
In Chapter 5 Magnus explains his position regarding suffering, but throughout the first part he does not rely on that in order to make a case for suffering focused ethics. Instead, he loads philosophical ammunition from all over the suffering-focused ethics coalition and shoots them at every obstacle in sight.
Thatās not quite how I see it (though itās true that I donāt rely strongly on the meta-ethical view defended in Chapter 5). My own view, including Chapter 5 in particular, is not really isolated from the arguments I make in the preceding chapters. I see most of the arguments outlined in previous chapters as lending support to the arguments made in Chapter 5, and I indeed explicitly cite many of them there.
Many of the arguments are of the form āphilosopher X thinks that Y is trueā, but without appropriate arguments for Y. Also, whenever there was a problem with an argument, Magnus can retreat to a less demanding version of Suffering-Focused Ethics, which makes it more difficult for the reader to follow the arguments.
Iād appreciate some examples (or just one) of this. :-)
I donāt think I at any point retreat from the view I defend in Chapters 4 and 5. But I do explain how one can hold other suffering-focused views (e.g. pluralist ones, such as those defended by Wolf and Mayerfeld).
My major issue with this book is that it feels heavily biased. I felt that I was being persuaded, not explained to.
I did seek to explain the arguments and considerations that have led me to hold a suffering-focused view, and I do happen to find these arguments persuasive.
I wonder what you think I should have done differently, and whether you can refer me to a book defending a moral view in a way that was more āexplainingā.
It feels that Magnus offers no major concessions, related to the point above that there is always a line of retreat.
What major concessions do you feel I should make? My view is that it cannot be justified to create purported positive goods at the price of extreme suffering, and it would be dishonest for me to claim that Iāve found a persuasive argument against this view. But Iām keen to hear any counterargument you find persuasive.
In chapter 7, there are a long list of possible biases that prevent us from accepting Suffering-Focused Ethics.
This is not quite accurate, and I should have made this clearer. :-)
As I say at the beginning of this chapter, I here āpresent various biases against giving suffering its due moral weight and consideration.ā This is not the same as (only) presenting biases against suffering-focused moral views in particular. One can be a classical utilitarian and still think that most, perhaps even all, of the biases mentioned in this chapter plausibly bias us against giving sufficient priority to suffering.
For example, a classical utilitarian can agree that we tend to shy away from contemplating suffering (7.2); that we underestimate how bad suffering often is (7.4); that we underestimate and ignore our ability to reduce suffering, in part because of omission bias (7.5); that we have a novelty bias and scope insensitivity (7.6); that we have a perpetrator bias that leads us to dismiss suffering not caused by moral agents (7.7); that the Just World Fallacy leads us to dismiss othersā suffering (7.8); that we have a positivity and an optimism bias (7.9); that a craving for certain sources of pleasure, e.g. sex and status, can distort our judgments (7.10); that we have an existence bias ā widespread resistance against euthanasia is an example (7.11); that suffering is a very general phenomenon, which makes it difficult for us to make systematic and effective efforts to prevent it (7.13); etc.
Iād actually say that most of the biases reviewed are not biases against accepting suffering-focused moral views, but rather biases against giving the priority to reducing suffering that the values most people already hold would require. I should probably have made this more clear (I say a bit more on this in the second half of section 12.3).
and really the biggest flaw for me was that there was no analogous comparison with possible biases [favoring] Suffering-Based Ethics.
But there was in fact a section on this: 7.15. If you feel Iāve missed some important considerations, Iām keen to hear about them.
Also, in Chapter 8 Magnus presents many arguments against his views, each a couple of sentences, and spends the majority of the time making counterarguments and half-hearted concessions.
I wonder what you mean by āhalf-hearted concessionsā, and why you think they are half-hearted. Also, itās not true that āeach [counterargument is] a couple of sentencesā, even as most are stated very concisely.
Instead of acknowledging reasonable ethical views that may oppose Suffering-Focused Ethics, there is an attempt at convincing the readers that there is still some way of reducing suffering that they should prefer.
As mentioned above, my view is that it cannot be justified to create purported positive goods at the price of extreme suffering. I cannot honestly say that I find views that would have us increase extreme suffering in order to increase, say, pleasure to be reasonable. So again, all I can say is that Iād invite you to present and defend the views that you think I should acknowledge as reasonable.
After reading this book, it is clearer to me that I find extreme suffering very bad
Iām glad to hear that. Helping people clarify their views of the significance of extreme suffering is among the main objectives of the book.
but that in general I tend to think suffering can be outweighted.
This is then where I, apropos the complaint about a lack of āappropriate argumentsā for a stated premise, would ask for some arguments: how and why can extreme suffering be outweighed? What counterarguments would you give to the arguments presented in, say, Chapters 3 and 4?
Also, I was worried before reading the book that there is an inherent difficulty in cooperation between suffering-focused ethical systems and aspirations for more (happy) people to exist. I still think thatās somewhat the case but it is clearer that these differences can be overcome and that one can value both.
Pleased to hear this. The second part of the book should lend even more support to that view. I very much hope we can all cooperate closely rather than fall victim to tribal psychology, as difficult as that can be. As I note in Chapter 10, disagreeing on values is arguably a strong catalyst for outgroup perception. Letās resist falling prey to that.
Thanks again for taking the time to read and review the first part of the book. :-)
Thanks for this lengthy reply! I want to emphasise that I enjoyed and learned a lot from reading this book, and that most of my criticism I think of mostly as resulting from a deliberate choice of keeping the book readable, and definitely not something that I have any suggestions for improvements.
I appreciate your clarifications on chapter 7, on the definition of suffering and of using the arguments from chapters 4,5.
Regarding āline of retreatā, I meant something similar to your comment to Michael-
Itās true that I do mention the views of many different philosophers, and note how their views support suffering-focused views, and in some cases I merely identify the moral axioms, if you will, underlying these views. I then leave it to the reader to decide whether these axioms are plausible (this is a way in which I in fact do explain/āpresent views rather than try to āpersuadeā; chapter 2 is very similar, in that it also presents a lot of views in this way).
I think that I felt simply that there were many claims which were supported by various views where I felt that it was difficult for me to judge how to take these into account. I looked back to find a good example of an actual āretreatā and honestly I canāt find any. I think that itās possible that I have read something wrongly in chapter 8 and that tainted my expression of some of the reasoning in the book. In any case, I have clearly overemphasised that and Iāll retract it.
Regarding that feeling of being persuaded, Iām not really sure what to say. It mostly felt that I could easily come up with many counter-intuitions throughout reading the book and that raised some mental alarm bells: these are only the ideas I can come up with, and Iām sure that there are plenty more. I didnāt feel that opposing views were clearly explored, even though they were listed. If thatās how books that defend moral positions are supposed to be written, then my inside view thinks thatās epistemically mistaken.
Iād be very interested in discussing the actual contents of my views on the ethics of suffering, on which Iād really appreciate feedback; Iāve scheduled myself time to write this up here in the weekend. :)
In relation to counterintuitions and counterarguments, I can honestly say that Iāve spent a lot of time searching for good ones, and tried to include as many as I could in a charitable way (especially in Chapter 8).
Iām still keen to find more opposing arguments and intuitions, and to see them explored in depth. As hinted in the post, I hope my book can provoke people to reflect on these issues and to present the strongest case for their views, which Iād really like to see. I believe such arguments can help advance the views of all of us toward greater levels of nuance and sophistication.
Many of the arguments are of the form āphilosopher X thinks that Y is trueā, but without appropriate arguments for Y.
Iād appreciate some examples (or just one) of this. :-)
I think 3.2 Intra- and Interpersonal Claims and the discussion of Parfitās compensation principle, Millās harm principle and Shiffrinās consent principle just before in 3.1 are examples. You donāt discuss how they defend these views/āprinciples.
(I only started reading last night, and this is about where I am now.)
What I was keen to get an example of was mainly this (omitted in the text you quoted above):
Also, whenever there was a problem with an argument, Magnus can retreat to a less demanding version of Suffering-Focused Ethics, which makes it more difficult for the reader to follow the arguments.
That is, an example of how I retreat from the main position I defend (in Chapters 4 and 5), such as by relying on the views of other philosophers whose premises I havenāt defended. I donāt believe I do that anywhere. Again, what I do in some places is simply to show that there are other kinds of suffering-focused views one may hold; I donāt retreat from the view I in fact hold.
Itās true that I do mention the views of many different philosophers, and note how their views support suffering-focused views, and in some cases I merely identify the moral axioms, if you will, underlying these views. I then leave it to the reader to decide whether these axioms are plausible (this is a way in which the book in fact does explain/āpresent views rather than try to āpersuadeā; Chapter 2 is very similar, in that it also presents a lot of views in this way).
It seems that Shiffrin and Parfit did, for example, consider their respective principles rather axiomatic, and provided little to no justification for them (indeed, Parfit considered his compensation principle āclearly trueā, https://āāweb.archive.org/āāweb/āā20190410204154/āāhttps://āājwcwolf.public.iastate.edu/āāPapers/āāJUPE.HTM ). Millās principle was merely mentioned as one that ācan be considered congruentā with a conclusion I argued for; I didnāt rely on it to defend the conclusion in question.
Short Review on Part I
Fitting the name of the book, the first 8 chapter compose of an impressively long list of arguments and counter-arguments that support suffering-focused ethics. By Suffering-Focused Ethics, the author refers to the family of ethical theories that call for the reduction of suffering for sentient beingsāthey can differ in their approach to, e.g, the scale in which extreme suffering matters, how much weight should we put on other factors (such as well-being), whether we rely on moral realism, etc..
Deliberately, Magnus does not present a specific definition or characterisation of suffering but instead appeals to the readerās intuition and most examples of extreme suffering are those of extreme despair and pain. I didnāt find that to be an issue when contemplating most aspects written in the first part of the book, but as I wrote below the book aims at breadth rather than depth.
In Chapter 5 Magnus explains his position regarding suffering, but throughout the first part he does not rely on that in order to make a case for suffering focused ethics. Instead, he loads philosophical ammunition from all over the suffering-focused ethics coalition and shoots them at every obstacle in sight. There are many different bullets and many different obstacles, which makes this task difficult. I think that he made a deliberate choice to focus on capturing a wide range of views and defenses instead of going deep into defending one view.
That has some problems. Many of the arguments are of the form āphilosopher X thinks that Y is trueā, but without appropriate arguments for Y.
Also, whenever there was a problem with an argument, Magnus can retreat to a less demanding version of Suffering-Focused Ethics, which makes it more difficult for the reader to follow the arguments.My major issue with this book is that it feels heavily biased. I felt that I was being persuaded, not explained to. It feels that Magnus offers no major concessions, related to the point above that there is always a line of retreat. In chapter 7, there are a long list of possible biases that prevent us from accepting Suffering-Focused Ethics. Many of those were not persuasive, and some could have been symmetrically applied against Suffering-Focused Ethics, and really the biggest flaw for me was that there was mostly no analogous comparison with possible biases against Suffering-Based Ethics. Also, in Chapter 8 Magnus presents many arguments against his views, each about a couple of sentences, and spends the majority of the time on counterarguments and very little concessions. Instead of acknowledging reasonable ethical views that may oppose Suffering-Focused Ethics, there is an attempt at convincing the readers that there is still some way of reducing suffering that they should prefer.
Overall I am glad to have read this and look forward to reading the next part. After reading this book, it is clearer to me that I find extreme suffering very bad (so that it would still be very hard to outweigh it) but that in general I tend to think suffering can be outweighed. Also, I was worried before reading the book that there is an inherent difficulty in cooperation between suffering-focused ethical systems and aspirations for more (happy) people to exist. I still think thatās somewhat the case but it is clearer that these differences can be overcome and that one can value both.
DisclaimerāIām not an expert, and except for reading blog posts by Brian Tomasik and CLR I am not that familiar with the field
Thanks for sharing your review. A few comments:
Concerning the definition of suffering, I do actually provide a definition: an overall bad feeling, or state of consciousness (as I note, I here follow Mayerfeld, 1999, pp. 14-15). One may argue that this is not a particularly reductive definition, and I say the same in a footnote:
Partly. I would say I both tried to make a broad case and defend a specific view, namely the view(s) I defend in Chapters 4 and 5 (they arenāt quite identical, but Iād say they are roughly equivalent at the level of normative ethics).
Thatās not quite how I see it (though itās true that I donāt rely strongly on the meta-ethical view defended in Chapter 5). My own view, including Chapter 5 in particular, is not really isolated from the arguments I make in the preceding chapters. I see most of the arguments outlined in previous chapters as lending support to the arguments made in Chapter 5, and I indeed explicitly cite many of them there.
Iād appreciate some examples (or just one) of this. :-)
I donāt think I at any point retreat from the view I defend in Chapters 4 and 5. But I do explain how one can hold other suffering-focused views (e.g. pluralist ones, such as those defended by Wolf and Mayerfeld).
I did seek to explain the arguments and considerations that have led me to hold a suffering-focused view, and I do happen to find these arguments persuasive.
I wonder what you think I should have done differently, and whether you can refer me to a book defending a moral view in a way that was more āexplainingā.
What major concessions do you feel I should make? My view is that it cannot be justified to create purported positive goods at the price of extreme suffering, and it would be dishonest for me to claim that Iāve found a persuasive argument against this view. But Iām keen to hear any counterargument you find persuasive.
This is not quite accurate, and I should have made this clearer. :-)
As I say at the beginning of this chapter, I here āpresent various biases against giving suffering its due moral weight and consideration.ā This is not the same as (only) presenting biases against suffering-focused moral views in particular. One can be a classical utilitarian and still think that most, perhaps even all, of the biases mentioned in this chapter plausibly bias us against giving sufficient priority to suffering.
For example, a classical utilitarian can agree that we tend to shy away from contemplating suffering (7.2); that we underestimate how bad suffering often is (7.4); that we underestimate and ignore our ability to reduce suffering, in part because of omission bias (7.5); that we have a novelty bias and scope insensitivity (7.6); that we have a perpetrator bias that leads us to dismiss suffering not caused by moral agents (7.7); that the Just World Fallacy leads us to dismiss othersā suffering (7.8); that we have a positivity and an optimism bias (7.9); that a craving for certain sources of pleasure, e.g. sex and status, can distort our judgments (7.10); that we have an existence bias ā widespread resistance against euthanasia is an example (7.11); that suffering is a very general phenomenon, which makes it difficult for us to make systematic and effective efforts to prevent it (7.13); etc.
Iād actually say that most of the biases reviewed are not biases against accepting suffering-focused moral views, but rather biases against giving the priority to reducing suffering that the values most people already hold would require. I should probably have made this more clear (I say a bit more on this in the second half of section 12.3).
But there was in fact a section on this: 7.15. If you feel Iāve missed some important considerations, Iām keen to hear about them.
I wonder what you mean by āhalf-hearted concessionsā, and why you think they are half-hearted. Also, itās not true that āeach [counterargument is] a couple of sentencesā, even as most are stated very concisely.
As mentioned above, my view is that it cannot be justified to create purported positive goods at the price of extreme suffering. I cannot honestly say that I find views that would have us increase extreme suffering in order to increase, say, pleasure to be reasonable. So again, all I can say is that Iād invite you to present and defend the views that you think I should acknowledge as reasonable.
Iām glad to hear that. Helping people clarify their views of the significance of extreme suffering is among the main objectives of the book.
This is then where I, apropos the complaint about a lack of āappropriate argumentsā for a stated premise, would ask for some arguments: how and why can extreme suffering be outweighed? What counterarguments would you give to the arguments presented in, say, Chapters 3 and 4?
Pleased to hear this. The second part of the book should lend even more support to that view. I very much hope we can all cooperate closely rather than fall victim to tribal psychology, as difficult as that can be. As I note in Chapter 10, disagreeing on values is arguably a strong catalyst for outgroup perception. Letās resist falling prey to that.
Thanks again for taking the time to read and review the first part of the book. :-)
Thanks for this lengthy reply! I want to emphasise that I enjoyed and learned a lot from reading this book, and that most of my criticism I think of mostly as resulting from a deliberate choice of keeping the book readable, and definitely not something that I have any suggestions for improvements.
I appreciate your clarifications on chapter 7, on the definition of suffering and of using the arguments from chapters 4,5.
Regarding āline of retreatā, I meant something similar to your comment to Michael-
I think that I felt simply that there were many claims which were supported by various views where I felt that it was difficult for me to judge how to take these into account. I looked back to find a good example of an actual āretreatā and honestly I canāt find any. I think that itās possible that I have read something wrongly in chapter 8 and that tainted my expression of some of the reasoning in the book. In any case, I have clearly overemphasised that and Iāll retract it.
Regarding that feeling of being persuaded, Iām not really sure what to say. It mostly felt that I could easily come up with many counter-intuitions throughout reading the book and that raised some mental alarm bells: these are only the ideas I can come up with, and Iām sure that there are plenty more. I didnāt feel that opposing views were clearly explored, even though they were listed. If thatās how books that defend moral positions are supposed to be written, then my inside view thinks thatās epistemically mistaken.
Iād be very interested in discussing the actual contents of my views on the ethics of suffering, on which Iād really appreciate feedback; Iāve scheduled myself time to write this up here in the weekend. :)
Thanks for your comment. I appreciate it! :-)
In relation to counterintuitions and counterarguments, I can honestly say that Iāve spent a lot of time searching for good ones, and tried to include as many as I could in a charitable way (especially in Chapter 8).
Iām still keen to find more opposing arguments and intuitions, and to see them explored in depth. As hinted in the post, I hope my book can provoke people to reflect on these issues and to present the strongest case for their views, which Iād really like to see. I believe such arguments can help advance the views of all of us toward greater levels of nuance and sophistication.
I think 3.2 Intra- and Interpersonal Claims and the discussion of Parfitās compensation principle, Millās harm principle and Shiffrinās consent principle just before in 3.1 are examples. You donāt discuss how they defend these views/āprinciples.
(I only started reading last night, and this is about where I am now.)
Thanks for your comment, Michael :-)
What I was keen to get an example of was mainly this (omitted in the text you quoted above):
That is, an example of how I retreat from the main position I defend (in Chapters 4 and 5), such as by relying on the views of other philosophers whose premises I havenāt defended. I donāt believe I do that anywhere. Again, what I do in some places is simply to show that there are other kinds of suffering-focused views one may hold; I donāt retreat from the view I in fact hold.
Itās true that I do mention the views of many different philosophers, and note how their views support suffering-focused views, and in some cases I merely identify the moral axioms, if you will, underlying these views. I then leave it to the reader to decide whether these axioms are plausible (this is a way in which the book in fact does explain/āpresent views rather than try to āpersuadeā; Chapter 2 is very similar, in that it also presents a lot of views in this way).
It seems that Shiffrin and Parfit did, for example, consider their respective principles rather axiomatic, and provided little to no justification for them (indeed, Parfit considered his compensation principle āclearly trueā, https://āāweb.archive.org/āāweb/āā20190410204154/āāhttps://āājwcwolf.public.iastate.edu/āāPapers/āāJUPE.HTM ). Millās principle was merely mentioned as one that ācan be considered congruentā with a conclusion I argued for; I didnāt rely on it to defend the conclusion in question.