Does anyone know why Singer hasn’t changed his views on infanticide and killing animals after he had become a hedonist utilitarian? As far as I know, his former views were based on the following:
a. Creation and fulfilment of new preferences is morally neutral.
b. Thwarting existing preferences is morally bad.
c. Persons have preferences about their future.
d. Non-persons don’t have a sense of the future, they don’t have preferences about their future either. They live in the moment.
e. Killing persons thwarts their preferences about the future.
f. Killing non-persons doesn’t thwart such preferences.
g. Therefore killing a person can’t be compensated by creating a new person. Whereas when you kill a non-person, you don’t thwart many preferences anyway so killing non-persons can be compensated.
I think after he had become a hedonist this person/non-person asymmetry should mostly disappear. But I haven’t seen him updating Animal Liberation or other books. Why is that?
Thanks Emre—simple question what are his current views, I’m assuming from what you are saying he is still pro infanticide in rare circumstances soon after birth?
I think he’s not commenting on it much anymore since this issue isn’t really a major priority. But I think he used to advocate for infanticide in a larger set of circumstances(eg. when it’s possible to have another child who will have a happier life). The part about infanticide isn’t that relevant to any kind of work EA is doing. But his views are still debated in animal advocacy circles and I am not sure what exactly his position is.
I think he writes a bit about it here: https://petersinger.info/faq in the section: “You have been quoted as saying: “Killing a defective infant is not morally equivalent to killing a person. Sometimes it is not wrong at all.” Is that quote accurate?”
Does anyone know why Singer hasn’t changed his views on infanticide and killing animals after he had become a hedonist utilitarian? As far as I know, his former views were based on the following:
a. Creation and fulfilment of new preferences is morally neutral.
b. Thwarting existing preferences is morally bad.
c. Persons have preferences about their future.
d. Non-persons don’t have a sense of the future, they don’t have preferences about their future either. They live in the moment.
e. Killing persons thwarts their preferences about the future.
f. Killing non-persons doesn’t thwart such preferences.
g. Therefore killing a person can’t be compensated by creating a new person. Whereas when you kill a non-person, you don’t thwart many preferences anyway so killing non-persons can be compensated.
I think after he had become a hedonist this person/non-person asymmetry should mostly disappear. But I haven’t seen him updating Animal Liberation or other books. Why is that?
Thanks Emre—simple question what are his current views, I’m assuming from what you are saying he is still pro infanticide in rare circumstances soon after birth?
I think he’s not commenting on it much anymore since this issue isn’t really a major priority. But I think he used to advocate for infanticide in a larger set of circumstances(eg. when it’s possible to have another child who will have a happier life). The part about infanticide isn’t that relevant to any kind of work EA is doing. But his views are still debated in animal advocacy circles and I am not sure what exactly his position is.
Gotcha. It’s true it’s not immediately obvious from google or chatGPTx.
I think he writes a bit about it here: https://petersinger.info/faq in the section: “You have been quoted as saying: “Killing a defective infant is not morally equivalent to killing a person. Sometimes it is not wrong at all.” Is that quote accurate?”