I like the puzzle. But I wonder if you can make your answer even simpler:
Actions taken in war have some benefit to the perpetrator, and some costs to the larger system of permitting them
When the ratio between these things gets too extreme, it’s regarded as a war crime
I think this explains the category that you outline (undermining trust in the kind of institutions that could stop the war is super destructive!), but also explains some other cases, e.g. abuse of prisoners, not impersonating medical staff, etc.
Yeah this is fair. I outlined something like that here.
I think there’s a few tricky things with this model. One is lack of precision, eg by whose lights are you interpreting “costs to the larger system of permitting them.” Relatedly, an advantage of advocating “war crimes are crimes against the end of war” is that it creates a clear core (even if it doesn’t describe everything) of norms that I think are a good description of commonly shared norms in history, and I think are good to uphold morally[1]. In contrast, many other norms of war tend to be more sporadic, like protecting civilians, chivalry, or diplomatic precedence.
Another tricky thing is Schelling’s point that almost all conflict is non-zero-sum, you can’t treat the zero-sum parts of war and the non-zero-sum parts as cleanly separable.
(I’d also note that torturing POWs makes surrender less appealing, so it’s consistent with my narrower answer. My narrower answer would also predict that protecting civilians is important but not very important, which is consistent with the historical record. On the other hand it does not have a explanation for weapons bans; my defense is that a decent enough simple theory in social science doesn’t need to explain everything).
I agree that the model I proposed is imprecise; I think this counts against its usefulness but not its validity.
I’m not suggesting this as a thing to advocate for; merely as a descriptive pattern of what the category of war crimes is doing. I think the things which make ending war harder are an important class of really destructive thing, but it seems clarity-obscuring to me to claim that this is definitionally what war crimes are? Rather than giving your thing a new label and then getting to discuss what fraction of war crimes are in that category, and whether there are things in that category which aren’t war crimes (e.g. if torturing POWs counts under your categorization, then why doesn’t conscription count—after all, it damages the “one side runs out of soldiers” mechanism for ending war).
merely as a descriptive pattern of what the category of war crimes is doing. I think the things which make ending war harder are an important class of really destructive thing, but it seems clarity-obscuring to me to claim that this is definitionally what war crimes are? Rather than giving your thing a new label
Fair, I guess the thing I’m interested in is something like “widely shared and independently recurring norms of war.” Though I’d want to be narrow enough to exclude stuff like “norms of war include paying your soldiers and have okay logistics planning” or “norms of war descriptively include being total morons sometimes in XYZ ways”
e.g. if torturing POWs counts under your categorization, then why doesn’t conscription count—after all, it damages the “one side runs out of soldiers” mechanism for ending war
right sorry I do think the costs/benefits ratio matter significantly here.
Ok, so one place the predictions of these theories might come apart is that my theory suggests a norm against impersonating medics, whereas I think yours doesn’t (although maybe I’m just not seeing it; I don’t think I would have said that avoiding torture of prisoners was part of protecting the mechanisms of ending war, although I do kind of see what you mean). I haven’t looked into it at all, but if that norm has emerged independently multiple times that would be suggestive in favour of the broader theory; whereas if it has just emerged once it looks perhaps more potentially-idiosyncratic, which would be suggestive in favour of the narrower theory.
I like the puzzle. But I wonder if you can make your answer even simpler:
Actions taken in war have some benefit to the perpetrator, and some costs to the larger system of permitting them
When the ratio between these things gets too extreme, it’s regarded as a war crime
I think this explains the category that you outline (undermining trust in the kind of institutions that could stop the war is super destructive!), but also explains some other cases, e.g. abuse of prisoners, not impersonating medical staff, etc.
Yeah this is fair. I outlined something like that here.
I think there’s a few tricky things with this model. One is lack of precision, eg by whose lights are you interpreting “costs to the larger system of permitting them.” Relatedly, an advantage of advocating “war crimes are crimes against the end of war” is that it creates a clear core (even if it doesn’t describe everything) of norms that I think are a good description of commonly shared norms in history, and I think are good to uphold morally[1]. In contrast, many other norms of war tend to be more sporadic, like protecting civilians, chivalry, or diplomatic precedence.
Another tricky thing is Schelling’s point that almost all conflict is non-zero-sum, you can’t treat the zero-sum parts of war and the non-zero-sum parts as cleanly separable.
(I’d also note that torturing POWs makes surrender less appealing, so it’s consistent with my narrower answer. My narrower answer would also predict that protecting civilians is important but not very important, which is consistent with the historical record. On the other hand it does not have a explanation for weapons bans; my defense is that a decent enough simple theory in social science doesn’t need to explain everything).
With the important caveat of course that it reduces the cost of war, which is probably bad.
I agree that the model I proposed is imprecise; I think this counts against its usefulness but not its validity.
I’m not suggesting this as a thing to advocate for; merely as a descriptive pattern of what the category of war crimes is doing. I think the things which make ending war harder are an important class of really destructive thing, but it seems clarity-obscuring to me to claim that this is definitionally what war crimes are? Rather than giving your thing a new label and then getting to discuss what fraction of war crimes are in that category, and whether there are things in that category which aren’t war crimes (e.g. if torturing POWs counts under your categorization, then why doesn’t conscription count—after all, it damages the “one side runs out of soldiers” mechanism for ending war).
Poor choice of words on my part!
Fair, I guess the thing I’m interested in is something like “widely shared and independently recurring norms of war.” Though I’d want to be narrow enough to exclude stuff like “norms of war include paying your soldiers and have okay logistics planning” or “norms of war descriptively include being total morons sometimes in XYZ ways”
right sorry I do think the costs/benefits ratio matter significantly here.
Ok, so one place the predictions of these theories might come apart is that my theory suggests a norm against impersonating medics, whereas I think yours doesn’t (although maybe I’m just not seeing it; I don’t think I would have said that avoiding torture of prisoners was part of protecting the mechanisms of ending war, although I do kind of see what you mean). I haven’t looked into it at all, but if that norm has emerged independently multiple times that would be suggestive in favour of the broader theory; whereas if it has just emerged once it looks perhaps more potentially-idiosyncratic, which would be suggestive in favour of the narrower theory.
Thanks, I like this crux/operationalization!