However, I think this is compatible with my conception of hedonism, because personal meaning involves conscious experiences.
The thing to do in situations where youāre unsure whatās a terminal value vs. an instrumental value is to design choice situations where the two things come apart. I do this in my post (e.g., the āauthenticityā experience machine thought experiment).
Hedonism is true if and only if conscious experiences are terminally valuable. So, since personal meaning, knowledge, autenticity, and reunion each imply conscious experiences, all of those are terminally valuable according to hedonism. A valid counterexample would have to be terminally valuable while not involving conscious experiences.
Hedonism is true if and only if conscious experiences are terminally valuable.
Seems like weāre using words differently. But itās confusing because you seem to be going against the SEP definition that you gave above in your post:
At its simplest, ethical hedonism is the claim that all and only pleasure has positive importance and all and only pain or displeasure has negative importance. This importance is to be understood non-instrumentally, that is, independently of the importance of anything that pleasure or displeasure might cause or prevent.
This definition is about pleasure. Hedonists sometimes point out that we shouldnāt interpret āpleasureā too narrowly, i.e., that itās not just about things like eating great food or orgasm, but also includes āpositive experiencesā very generally. Even so, the point behind hedonism (as I understand it, and as seems compatible with the SEP definition you gave) is something like āthe better it feels, the more ethical value ā and nothing else matters.ā Thatās clearly different from the view Iām advocating in the linked post. Iām saying that no experiences are valuable in themselves and people can ā depending on their life goals ā decide to forego eons of optimized fun in exchange for something that provides them with deeper meaning. Even if their choice (e.g.) means theyāll have a much shorter life that also includes hardships.
At its simplest, ethical hedonism is the claim that all and only pleasure has positive importance and all and only pain or displeasure has negative importance.
I understand this as meaning that all and only conscious experiences have moral importance. However, I think there is a difference between:
āEthical value is about how it feelsāand nothing else mattersā (the way I interpret SEPās definition).
āThe better it feels, the more ethical value ā and nothing else mattersā (your suggested interpretation).
The 2nd of these seems to be about hedonic utilitarianism, not just hedonism as the 1st.
Iām saying that no experiences are valuable in themselves and people can ā depending on their life goals ā decide to forego eons of optimized fun in exchange for something that provides them with deeper meaning.
It looks like such choices would be compatible with desire and objective list theories, but I realise now that these are encompassed by my (probably unusual) interpretation of hedonism, as conscious experiences are still central to both of them.
Thanks for sharing.
Could you give an example of something you value which does not involve conscious experiences? In your post, you say:
However, I think this is compatible with my conception of hedonism, because personal meaning involves conscious experiences.
The thing to do in situations where youāre unsure whatās a terminal value vs. an instrumental value is to design choice situations where the two things come apart. I do this in my post (e.g., the āauthenticityā experience machine thought experiment).
Hedonism is true if and only if conscious experiences are terminally valuable. So, since personal meaning, knowledge, autenticity, and reunion each imply conscious experiences, all of those are terminally valuable according to hedonism. A valid counterexample would have to be terminally valuable while not involving conscious experiences.
Seems like weāre using words differently. But itās confusing because you seem to be going against the SEP definition that you gave above in your post:
This definition is about pleasure. Hedonists sometimes point out that we shouldnāt interpret āpleasureā too narrowly, i.e., that itās not just about things like eating great food or orgasm, but also includes āpositive experiencesā very generally. Even so, the point behind hedonism (as I understand it, and as seems compatible with the SEP definition you gave) is something like āthe better it feels, the more ethical value ā and nothing else matters.ā Thatās clearly different from the view Iām advocating in the linked post. Iām saying that no experiences are valuable in themselves and people can ā depending on their life goals ā decide to forego eons of optimized fun in exchange for something that provides them with deeper meaning. Even if their choice (e.g.) means theyāll have a much shorter life that also includes hardships.
Thanks for clarifying.
I understand this as meaning that all and only conscious experiences have moral importance. However, I think there is a difference between:
āEthical value is about how it feelsāand nothing else mattersā (the way I interpret SEPās definition).
āThe better it feels, the more ethical value ā and nothing else mattersā (your suggested interpretation).
The 2nd of these seems to be about hedonic utilitarianism, not just hedonism as the 1st.
It looks like such choices would be compatible with desire and objective list theories, but I realise now that these are encompassed by my (probably unusual) interpretation of hedonism, as conscious experiences are still central to both of them.