However, the same goes for comparisons among the expected mass of seemingly identical objects with a similar mass if I can only assess their mass using my hands, but this does not mean their mass is incomparable.
I donât exactly understand what argument youâre making here.
My core argument in the post is: Take any intervention X. We want to weigh up its impact for all sentient beings across the cosmos, where this âweighing upâ is aggregation over all hypotheses. Now suppose we want to force ourselves to compare X with inaction, i.e., say either UEV(do X) > UEV(donât do X) or vice versa. We have such an extremely coarse-grained understanding (if any) of these hypotheses[1] that, when we do the weighing-up, whether we say UEV(do X) > UEV(donât do X) or vice versa seems to depend on an arbitrary choice.
Relative to the amount of fine-grained detail necessary to evaluate the hypothesis, when what we value is âwell-being of all sentient beings across the cosmosâ.
My best guess about which of 2 identical objects has a larger mass in expectation will be arbitrary if their mass only differs by 10^-6 kg, and I have no way of assessing this small difference. However, this does not mean the expected mass of the 2 objects is fundamentally incomparable. Likewise, my best guess about which of 2 actions increases welfare more in expectation may be arbitrary without this implying that their expected change in welfare is incomparable.
I am not sure it matters whether one endorses precise expected values (EVs) or not. In practice, I still like to test different EVs when the underlying probability density function (PDF) is very arbitrary and uncertain, as it is the case for PDFs of welfare ranges. In such cases, I suspect decreasing uncertainty to find the best options has higher EV than the supposedly imprecise EVs of going with the current best option.
My best guess about which of 2 identical objects has a larger mass in expectation will be arbitrary is their mass only differs by 10^-6 kg, and I have no way of assessing this small difference. However, this does not mean the expected mass of the 2 objects is fundamentally incomparable
I worry youâre reifying âexpectationsâ as something objective here. The relative actual masses of the objects are clearly comparable. But if you subjectively canât compare them, then theyâre indeed incomparable âin expectationâ in the relevant sense.
I would be able to subjectively compare the mass of the 2 objects with more evidence. Some comparisons may not be feasible with currently available evidence, but the degree of imprecision should be set by what is physically possible?
If you had more evidence, you could make the comparison. But you currently have no clue which direction the comparison would go, in expectation over the evidence you might receive. So how are you supposed to compare them right now?
I would simply say the expected mass is practically (not exactly) the same given the evidence available to me, and consider gathering additional evidence depending on how much I expected this to change future decisions. Likewise for altruistic interventions among which comparisons of the expected change in welfare feel very arbitrary.
I donât know what you mean by âpractically the sameâ, can you say more?
Regardless, the problem is that âgathering evidenceâ vs âdoing something elseâ is itself a decision, whose consequences youâll be clueless about. I discuss this more here.
I meant my future decisions would be the same in reality if I could not gather additional evidence regardless of whether the mass of the 2 identical objects was exactly the same or differed by 10^-6 kg.
Do you think annual human welfare per human-year has increased since 1900? Child mortality decreased 37.3 pp (= 0.41 â 0.037) since then until 2023. If you agree annual human welfare per human-year has increased since 1900, are you confident that similar progress cannot be extented to non-humans? Would you have argued 200 years ago that we are all clueless about how to increase human welfare? I agree research can backfire. However, at least historically, doing research on the sentience of animals, and on how to increase their welfare has mostly been beneficial for the target animals?
I meant my future decisions would be the same in reality if I could not gather additional evidence
Perhaps, but thatâs consistent with incomparability. Given the independent motivations weâve discussed (/âgiven in my post) for calling the two options incomparable, Iâd say you should call them incomparable.
I donât exactly understand what argument youâre making here.
My core argument in the post is: Take any intervention X. We want to weigh up its impact for all sentient beings across the cosmos, where this âweighing upâ is aggregation over all hypotheses. Now suppose we want to force ourselves to compare X with inaction, i.e., say either UEV(do X) > UEV(donât do X) or vice versa. We have such an extremely coarse-grained understanding (if any) of these hypotheses[1] that, when we do the weighing-up, whether we say UEV(do X) > UEV(donât do X) or vice versa seems to depend on an arbitrary choice.
Can you say how your argument relates to mine?
Relative to the amount of fine-grained detail necessary to evaluate the hypothesis, when what we value is âwell-being of all sentient beings across the cosmosâ.
Thanks for following up, Anthony.
My best guess about which of 2 identical objects has a larger mass in expectation will be arbitrary if their mass only differs by 10^-6 kg, and I have no way of assessing this small difference. However, this does not mean the expected mass of the 2 objects is fundamentally incomparable. Likewise, my best guess about which of 2 actions increases welfare more in expectation may be arbitrary without this implying that their expected change in welfare is incomparable.
I am not sure it matters whether one endorses precise expected values (EVs) or not. In practice, I still like to test different EVs when the underlying probability density function (PDF) is very arbitrary and uncertain, as it is the case for PDFs of welfare ranges. In such cases, I suspect decreasing uncertainty to find the best options has higher EV than the supposedly imprecise EVs of going with the current best option.
I worry youâre reifying âexpectationsâ as something objective here. The relative actual masses of the objects are clearly comparable. But if you subjectively canât compare them, then theyâre indeed incomparable âin expectationâ in the relevant sense.
I would be able to subjectively compare the mass of the 2 objects with more evidence. Some comparisons may not be feasible with currently available evidence, but the degree of imprecision should be set by what is physically possible?
If you had more evidence, you could make the comparison. But you currently have no clue which direction the comparison would go, in expectation over the evidence you might receive. So how are you supposed to compare them right now?
I would simply say the expected mass is practically (not exactly) the same given the evidence available to me, and consider gathering additional evidence depending on how much I expected this to change future decisions. Likewise for altruistic interventions among which comparisons of the expected change in welfare feel very arbitrary.
I donât know what you mean by âpractically the sameâ, can you say more?
Regardless, the problem is that âgathering evidenceâ vs âdoing something elseâ is itself a decision, whose consequences youâll be clueless about. I discuss this more here.
I meant my future decisions would be the same in reality if I could not gather additional evidence regardless of whether the mass of the 2 identical objects was exactly the same or differed by 10^-6 kg.
Do you think annual human welfare per human-year has increased since 1900? Child mortality decreased 37.3 pp (= 0.41 â 0.037) since then until 2023. If you agree annual human welfare per human-year has increased since 1900, are you confident that similar progress cannot be extented to non-humans? Would you have argued 200 years ago that we are all clueless about how to increase human welfare? I agree research can backfire. However, at least historically, doing research on the sentience of animals, and on how to increase their welfare has mostly been beneficial for the target animals?
Perhaps, but thatâs consistent with incomparability. Given the independent motivations weâve discussed (/âgiven in my post) for calling the two options incomparable, Iâd say you should call them incomparable.
I think I address your questions in the second paragraph in âWhy weâre especially unaware of large-scale consequencesâ (this post) and âMeta-extrapolationâ (post #4). See also my discussion with Richard here.