Thanks for this. These are uncomfortable things to contemplate but very much worth it.
As is often the case with discussions in the West about Taiwan, I think this post in Part 2.3 does not persuasively argue the risks stemming from a loss of Taiwan are anywhere near worth the existential risks of a US-China conflict outlined thereafter, even though the obliteration of Taiwanese democracy would be unquestionably tragic.
As far as the costs of doing nothing go, they are definitely real, but I think you overstate them, especially in light of the damage the US is currently doing to global liberal democracy under Trump II, which seems to render a lot of costs of nonintervention moot (e.g., Russian being emboldened to shatter NATO rings rather hollow when there is a solid chance that the US precipitates NATO’s functional destruction). The imperial aggression risk from China is also rather tenuous, as you note, which in your telling leaves primarily the risk of encouraging Russian expansionism, which is also really bad, but I’m not sure I see a solid connection to Taiwan. I think far more relevant variables will be Russian assessment of US willingness to intervene in Europe (the best indicator for which is our gradual abandonment of Ukraine, not a good sign) as well as the EU’s ability to operate without US military backing (also not promising right now) along with factors like manpower post-Ukraine and other things Kremlinologists smarter than me could probably list here.
You could easily argue the opposite as well—if the US gets involved in Taiwan, Russia could be encouraged to strike at the e.g. Baltics, because the US would likely be stretched thin.
I still think Taiwan is worth defending, but I think part of this may be because I have lower assessments of risk of nuclear war, etc.—perhaps, admittedly, a coping mechanism to avoid concluding a place I love very dearly is not worth the existential risk. (I used to live in Taipei, which is where I learned Chinese, and still have friends there.)
I think this post in Part 2.3 does not persuasively argue the risks stemming from a loss of Taiwan are anywhere near worth the existential risks of a US-China conflict outlined thereafter, even though the obliteration of Taiwanese democracy would be unquestionably tragic.
I think I’m sympathetic to this, but a part of me wishes I wasn’t.
As far as the costs of doing nothing go, they are definitely real, but I think you overstate them, especially in light of the damage the US is currently doing to global liberal democracy under Trump II, which seems to render a lot of costs of nonintervention moot (e.g., Russian being emboldened to shatter NATO rings rather hollow when there is a solid chance that the US precipitates NATO’s functional destruction).
Good point. I wrote much of this in January and February before it became apparent how much of an incredible own-goal we were going to make by undermining our alliances. Much of the goodness of a future guided by a grand alliance of democracies might have already been lost. As such it’d be consistent for me to say that we should thus consider more seriously the merit of US isolationism with regards to Taiwan. A thought I can see the logic in, but one that leaves me feeling quite sad.
I still think Taiwan is worth defending, but I think part of this may be because I have lower assessments of risk of nuclear war, etc.—perhaps, admittedly, a coping mechanism to avoid concluding a place I love very dearly is not worth the existential risk. (I used to live in Taipei, which is where I learned Chinese, and still have friends there.)
Something I didn’t get into in the piece, is that if we’re 100% rational utiliarians nuclear blackmail is extremely effective at cowing us. It’s literally pascal’s mugging on a geopolitical scale. I’m not sure whether we should bite the bullet and get mugged or if the result of effective nuclear blackmail is so bad (end of independent democracies) maybe there’s some game theory that suggests we roll a d20 for “damn the torpedoes”.
I wrote much of this in January and February before it became apparent how much of an incredible own-goal we were going to make by undermining our alliances.
Personally, not addressing this came through as USA-absorbed; largely lacking self-awareness and making me itch to find a Chinese counterpoint.
As an European living in Australia and interested in China, right now I look worriedly at what will USA-backed Israel preemptively bomb next while everything in Western news seems to be about how Iran’s leader is “vulnerable” but with an “iron grip”[1] and how exactly will he be killed.
So I find it hard to take seriously a post that is all worried about Xi and China vs Taiwan while the USA are just some kind of abstract defender that just “maybe yes, maybe not” will join wars just because somehow it happens to have bases next door to China. And Russia. And Iran. Etc, etc.
The referring to CIA intelligence (just like with Iraq’s WMDs[2]) and seeing that the Plan A video starts with a nuclear strike from Russia (never USA, of course) doesn’t help.
I guess my question is: how much risk reduction would there be if USA stopped messing with the world?
ADDED 2 days later: USA “spy chief” repeats there’s no evidence Iran is building nuclear weapons. Trump disavows her. 12 hours later, there’s news about USA bombing Iran. Why should I be worried about Xi again?
I guess my question is: how much risk reduction would there be if USA stopped messing with the world?
If the messing around pertains to Taiwan -- a naive implication of my model is if the USA had a 0% chance of intervening in Taiwan this would decrease the risk of catastrophe by around 1% (percentage point). This seems difficult to influence though.
Thanks for this. These are uncomfortable things to contemplate but very much worth it.
As is often the case with discussions in the West about Taiwan, I think this post in Part 2.3 does not persuasively argue the risks stemming from a loss of Taiwan are anywhere near worth the existential risks of a US-China conflict outlined thereafter, even though the obliteration of Taiwanese democracy would be unquestionably tragic.
As far as the costs of doing nothing go, they are definitely real, but I think you overstate them, especially in light of the damage the US is currently doing to global liberal democracy under Trump II, which seems to render a lot of costs of nonintervention moot (e.g., Russian being emboldened to shatter NATO rings rather hollow when there is a solid chance that the US precipitates NATO’s functional destruction). The imperial aggression risk from China is also rather tenuous, as you note, which in your telling leaves primarily the risk of encouraging Russian expansionism, which is also really bad, but I’m not sure I see a solid connection to Taiwan. I think far more relevant variables will be Russian assessment of US willingness to intervene in Europe (the best indicator for which is our gradual abandonment of Ukraine, not a good sign) as well as the EU’s ability to operate without US military backing (also not promising right now) along with factors like manpower post-Ukraine and other things Kremlinologists smarter than me could probably list here.
You could easily argue the opposite as well—if the US gets involved in Taiwan, Russia could be encouraged to strike at the e.g. Baltics, because the US would likely be stretched thin.
I still think Taiwan is worth defending, but I think part of this may be because I have lower assessments of risk of nuclear war, etc.—perhaps, admittedly, a coping mechanism to avoid concluding a place I love very dearly is not worth the existential risk. (I used to live in Taipei, which is where I learned Chinese, and still have friends there.)
I think I’m sympathetic to this, but a part of me wishes I wasn’t.
Good point. I wrote much of this in January and February before it became apparent how much of an incredible own-goal we were going to make by undermining our alliances. Much of the goodness of a future guided by a grand alliance of democracies might have already been lost. As such it’d be consistent for me to say that we should thus consider more seriously the merit of US isolationism with regards to Taiwan. A thought I can see the logic in, but one that leaves me feeling quite sad.
Something I didn’t get into in the piece, is that if we’re 100% rational utiliarians nuclear blackmail is extremely effective at cowing us. It’s literally pascal’s mugging on a geopolitical scale. I’m not sure whether we should bite the bullet and get mugged or if the result of effective nuclear blackmail is so bad (end of independent democracies) maybe there’s some game theory that suggests we roll a d20 for “damn the torpedoes”.
Personally, not addressing this came through as USA-absorbed; largely lacking self-awareness and making me itch to find a Chinese counterpoint.
As an European living in Australia and interested in China, right now I look worriedly at what will USA-backed Israel preemptively bomb next while everything in Western news seems to be about how Iran’s leader is “vulnerable” but with an “iron grip”[1] and how exactly will he be killed.
So I find it hard to take seriously a post that is all worried about Xi and China vs Taiwan while the USA are just some kind of abstract defender that just “maybe yes, maybe not” will join wars just because somehow it happens to have bases next door to China. And Russia. And Iran. Etc, etc.
The referring to CIA intelligence (just like with Iraq’s WMDs[2]) and seeing that the Plan A video starts with a nuclear strike from Russia (never USA, of course) doesn’t help.
I guess my question is: how much risk reduction would there be if USA stopped messing with the world?
The enemy is weak and strong at the same time—just like Umberto Eco warned about fascist movements. Who are the baddies again?
ADDED 2 days later: USA “spy chief” repeats there’s no evidence Iran is building nuclear weapons. Trump disavows her. 12 hours later, there’s news about USA bombing Iran. Why should I be worried about Xi again?
If the messing around pertains to Taiwan -- a naive implication of my model is if the USA had a 0% chance of intervening in Taiwan this would decrease the risk of catastrophe by around 1% (percentage point). This seems difficult to influence though.