Sure, cultured meat is for most intents and purposes not yet available. If you think most of the badness of meat eating is in the killing itself, the exact conditions under which the animal lived probably don’t matter much to your decision making. But it is possible with current technology to eat an animal that has not been tortured, had a rich and pleasant life, etc. If you favor a [certain flavor of] utilitarian perspective, it’s possible to eat meat such that the animal being eaten had a net very good life.
So, suppose I’m vaguely utilitarian but not a super strict consequentialist. How do I think about meat eating given that the marginal consumption causes lots of expected suffering, but the suffering is not a first order or desired consequence of my actions?
It all matters. The conditions they were raised in matter, the killing of an animal who does not want to die matters. Construct for me a hypothetical where I have to pick between an animal that suffered and then was killed, or an animal that had a good life and then was killed, and I will pick the latter. Add a third choice where no animal need die, and I’ll pick that one every time it is available.
You should think about meat eating this way: that whether or not killing an animal or causing lots of unexpected suffering is your conscious objective, you know with a substantial certainty that those results will ensue. Because you act knowing the certainty of the consequences, you are responsible whether or not the consequences are your intended objective. This is a common standard we use to determine intent in the criminal justice system.
Sure, cultured meat is for most intents and purposes not yet available. If you think most of the badness of meat eating is in the killing itself, the exact conditions under which the animal lived probably don’t matter much to your decision making. But it is possible with current technology to eat an animal that has not been tortured, had a rich and pleasant life, etc. If you favor a [certain flavor of] utilitarian perspective, it’s possible to eat meat such that the animal being eaten had a net very good life.
So, suppose I’m vaguely utilitarian but not a super strict consequentialist. How do I think about meat eating given that the marginal consumption causes lots of expected suffering, but the suffering is not a first order or desired consequence of my actions?
It all matters. The conditions they were raised in matter, the killing of an animal who does not want to die matters. Construct for me a hypothetical where I have to pick between an animal that suffered and then was killed, or an animal that had a good life and then was killed, and I will pick the latter. Add a third choice where no animal need die, and I’ll pick that one every time it is available.
You should think about meat eating this way: that whether or not killing an animal or causing lots of unexpected suffering is your conscious objective, you know with a substantial certainty that those results will ensue. Because you act knowing the certainty of the consequences, you are responsible whether or not the consequences are your intended objective. This is a common standard we use to determine intent in the criminal justice system.