Evan Fields

• Evan Fields 15 Jul 2025 11:28 UTC

  9 points

  3 ∶ 0

  on: July ’25 EA Newslet­ter Poll

  It is possible to rationally prioritise between causes without engaging deeply on philosophical issues

  At least on the margin, sometimes. I don’t think “children dying is bad” requires deeply engaging philosophical issues, and once you have the simple goal “fewer children die” you can do some cause prioritization.

  (In contrast, I think a straightforward strategy of figure out the nature of goodness and then pick the causes requires ~solving philosophy.)

Ques­tion: how to form be­liefs about effec­tive­ness in high un­cer­tainty fields?

• Evan Fields 18 Jan 2025 22:07 UTC

  1 point

  0 ∶ 0

  on: Mo­ral mountaineering

  Thanks for sharing!

  Does “aiming for a nearby peak you can see the torch on” risk giving moral license to proximal bad actions? For example, consider (I endorse none of these):

  • I want to live in a world without factory farms, thus I’m justified in proximally reducing factoring farming by doing arson at any factory farm I like.

  • I want to live in the communist utopia where nobody has more private wealth than anybody else, so stealing from sufficiently rich people is good.

  • I want to live in a world with ubiquitous cheap clean energy and think any agenda other than energy abundance is a distraction, so I spend all my altruistic effort lobbying against any kind of demand responsiveness or energy efficiency standard.

  Intuitively, these feel quite different to me than your example about eating tuna:

  “In a world I’d like to live in, cheap alternatives exist to replace the need for animal farming, and people broadly care a notch more about animals suffering. That world involves people not eating tuna. So I should head in that direction.”

  Maybe it’s the “we can agree on features of a world we all want” condition? But the world pointed at isn’t so different than the world in my first example. (Also, are there worlds we all agree we all want?) The core difference seems—to me—to be the nature of the proximal action. Not eating tuna is at least plausibly good; arson is almost surely bad. As you conclude,

  But if the intuitively good thing is a constructive part of a future everyone wants, that’s a reason to do the project, and a way to cut through the paralysis.

  Intuitive to whom? In EA spaces, I find that most people share moral intuitions that are at least familiar and grokkable to me. But in the wider world (even fairly demographically similar worlds, like “people on English speaking reddit”), I regularly find that others’ moral intuitions are just wild to me. Presumably mine are equally bizarre to them.

  So...yeah. In a world of disagreement about what’s good and what’s intuitive, how do you use “head generally in the direction we all want to go” as a decision criterion?

• Evan Fields 14 Jan 2025 2:48 UTC

  1 point

  0 ∶ 0

  in reply to: MichaelDickens’s comment on: Ethics of Whey Protein: Net Nega­tive or Jus­tifi­able for En­vi­ron­men­tal Ve­gans?

  I wish it were easier to buy PerfectDay and similar products, but I guess it makes early business sense to target food manufacturers rather than end consumers. It’s cool you can get it from Myprotein—I tried the caramel flavor but found the flavoring overwhelming. Sad that there’s no unflavored option. Maybe the animal free version still has some off flavors compared to the animal derived version?

• Evan Fields 14 Jan 2025 2:03 UTC

  13 points

  0 ∶ 0

  on: What are we do­ing about the EA Fo­rum? (Jan 2025)

  This was a good read—thanks for sharing. In the spirit of engaging with the invitation to comment below, here are my n = 1 thoughts. Quick background: I’ve been EA-adjacent for ~10 years and Forum-lurking for ?? years, but only recently really identified as an EA and joined the Forum.

  Main point: I would like to use the Forum more! While EA-the-movement isn’t a huge part of my life, EA-the-ideas are close to my core values. I’d like to refine my moral thinking, learn more about doing good in the world, and hang out with people who are somewhat but not excessively like-minded. I stop by the Forum ~daily, but find several barriers to engaging more (whether reading or writing). In no particular order:

  • There’s not as much new content as I’d hope, or at least easily discoverable content on the front page. Sometimes I stop by hoping to find a new thread that grabs me, but the front page threads are either not new or too serious (see below). Maybe Instagram/​Reddit style always-something-new isn’t the right niche for the Forum, but it sure is good for engagement.

  • It’s very serious! We have lots of posts about “did you know about this new moral catastrophe,” “why you should definitely rearrange your life around doing good,” “10,000 words on the nature of moral epistemics.” These posts are often well written, thoughtful, and topical—but they’re also heavy. This means the Forum doesn’t fit into my life as a quick break from work or a relaxing nights-and-weekends read, nor do I form the semiconscious association that Forum = fun.

  • The standards are very high. Sometimes I write something EA-adjacent[-adjacent] on my blog, but it seems below the implicit quality threshold of the Forum where typical posts are long, thoughtful, and brimming with citations. I’m intimidated away from posting, especially while I’m poor in karma and general non-numerical community credibility.

    • Of course standards being high also has numerous benefits.

    • Maybe this is what quick takes is for? Do I have quick takes? Should I be writing them here? Would anybody read them given that most of my takes are variants on “yeah that seems complicated I’m unsure of the nature of morality and truth here?”

    • Even when I think I have something reasonable to say, it feels like it’s probably been said better elsewhere on the forum and broadly understood by the community, because...

  • There’s not a lot of disagreement. The Forum community seems broadly roughly aligned on both values and what kinds of evidence are compelling, so the posts that do well tend to stand out in the strength of their claims or the depth of their evidence (both reasonable) -- not their novelty. I would be delighted to see more polite, thoughtful, good-faith disagreement. Encountering EA in the mid 2010s vaguely felt like meeting someone who always had a fresh piece of data or thought experiment for you; less so these days.

  I don’t really know that I have a suggestion here. Of all the online spaces I visit, the Forum has by far the most thoughtful comments, well researched posts, and mutual presumption of good faith. I cherish this! But I suspect it’s not free.

• Evan Fields 4 Jan 2025 20:33 UTC

  3 points

  0 ∶ 0

  in reply to: akberkhan’s comment on: Not a Meat Eater FAQ

  Sure, cultured meat is for most intents and purposes not yet available. If you think most of the badness of meat eating is in the killing itself, the exact conditions under which the animal lived probably don’t matter much to your decision making. But it is possible with current technology to eat an animal that has not been tortured, had a rich and pleasant life, etc. If you favor a [certain flavor of] utilitarian perspective, it’s possible to eat meat such that the animal being eaten had a net very good life.

  So, suppose I’m vaguely utilitarian but not a super strict consequentialist. How do I think about meat eating given that the marginal consumption causes lots of expected suffering, but the suffering is not a first order or desired consequence of my actions?

• Evan Fields 1 Jan 2025 16:25 UTC

  4 points

  0 ∶ 0

  on: Not a Meat Eater FAQ

  Thanks for writing this up—it’s very comprehensive! (Also, broadly similar to my current thoughts.) There’s one argument meat eating might be okay (not an argument for “good”) that I rarely see discussed explicitly, and I’m wondering if you have thoughts on:

  What’s the nature of moral responsibility vis a vis indirect consequences of your actions? You have the quote about being to blame for murder even if you hired an assassin rather than pulling the trigger yourself—and this seems reasonable to me. But how about this intuition pump: it just so happens that, whenever my mailman comes by to deliver mail, he kicks the neighbors dog a few times. I am aware of this. I now order something delivered by mail. Am I responsible for the dog getting kicked?

  Intuitively (not a moral philosopher, disclaimers apply, etc.), I want to say that I’m not responsible. Even though the dog-kicking is a known consequence of my mail-getting,

  • I didn’t kick the dog

  • I didn’t want the dog to be kicked

  • The dog doesn’t have to get kicked as a core part of getting mail delivered

  • I would be willing to pay more for my mail delivery if the dog were not kicked (to really torture the hypothetical, e.g. if the marginal non-sadistic mail carrier demanded slightly higher wages)

  The correct “moral fix” isn’t “don’t get mail,” it’s “don’t kick dogs.” Do you share this intuition of non-responsibility? Is meat eating somewhere between hiring an assassin (bad consequences are inherent in the act; actor to blame) and getting mail in this hypothetical (bad consequences not inherent in the act of getting mail; actor not to blame)? How do you think about “blame” differently from “consequentialist obligation”?