This is circular. The principle is only compromised if (OP believes) the change decreases EV — but obviously OP doesn’t believe that; OP is acting in accordance with the do-what-you-believe-maximizes-EV-after-accounting-for-second-order-effects principle.
Maybe you think people should put zero weight on avoiding looking weird/slimy (beyond what you actually are) to low-context observers (e.g. college students learning about the EA club). You haven’t argued that here. (And if that’s true then OP made a normal mistake; it’s not compromising principles.)
I agree that things tend to get tricky and loopy around these kinds of reputation-considerations, but I think at least the approach I see you arguing for here is proving too much, and has a risk of collapsing into meaninglessness.
I think in the limit, if you treat all speech acts this way, you just end up having no grounding for communication. “Yes, it might be the case that the real principles of EA are X, but if I tell you instead they are X’, then you will take better actions, so I am just going to claim they are X’”.
In this case, it seems like the very people that the club is trying to explain the concepts of EA to, are also the people that OP is worried about alienating by paying the organizers. In this case what is going on is that the goodness of the reputation-protecting choice is directly premised on the irrationality and ignorance of the very people you are trying to attract/inform/help. Explaining that isn’t impossible but it does seem like a particularly bad way to start of a relationship, and so I expect consequences-wise to be bad.
“Yes, we would actually be paying people, but we expected you wouldn’t understand the principles of cost-effectiveness and so be alienated if you heard about it, despite us getting you to understand them being the very thing this club is trying to do”, is IMO a bad way to start off a relationship.
I also separately think that optimizing heavily for the perception of low-context observers in a way that does not reveal a set of underlying robust principles, is bad. I don’t think you should put “zero” weight on that (and nothing in my comment implied that), but I do think it’s something that many people put far too much weight on (going into detail of which wasn’t the point of my comment, but on which I have written plenty about in many other comments).
There is also another related point in my comment, which is that “cost-effectiveness” is of course a very close sister concept to “wasting money”. I think in many ways, thinking about cost-effectiveness is where you end up if you think carefully about how you can avoid wasting money, and is in some ways a more grown-up version of various frugality concerns.
When you increase the total cost of your operations (by, for example, reducing the cost-effectiveness of your university organizers, forcing you to spend more money somewhere else to do the same amount of good) in order to appear more frugal, I think you are almost always engaging in something that has at least the hint of deception.
Yes, you might ultimately be more cost-effective by getting people to not quite realize what happened, but when people are angry at me or others for not being frugal enough, I think it’s rarely appropriate to ultimately spend more to appease them, even if doing so would ultimately then save me enough money to make it worth it. While this isn’t happening as directly here as it was with other similar situations, like whether the Wytham Abbey purchase was not frugal enough, I think the same dynamics and arguments apply.
I think if someone tries to think seriously and carefully through what it would mean to be properly frugal, I don’t think they would endorse you sacrificing the effectiveness of your operations causing you to ultimately spend more to achieve the same amount of good. And if they learned that you did, and they think carefully about what this implies about your frugality, they would end up more angry, not less. That, I think, is a dynamic worth avoiding.
This is circular. The principle is only compromised if (OP believes) the change decreases EV — but obviously OP doesn’t believe that; OP is acting in accordance with the do-what-you-believe-maximizes-EV-after-accounting-for-second-order-effects principle.
Maybe you think people should put zero weight on avoiding looking weird/slimy (beyond what you actually are) to low-context observers (e.g. college students learning about the EA club). You haven’t argued that here. (And if that’s true then OP made a normal mistake; it’s not compromising principles.)
I agree that things tend to get tricky and loopy around these kinds of reputation-considerations, but I think at least the approach I see you arguing for here is proving too much, and has a risk of collapsing into meaninglessness.
I think in the limit, if you treat all speech acts this way, you just end up having no grounding for communication. “Yes, it might be the case that the real principles of EA are X, but if I tell you instead they are X’, then you will take better actions, so I am just going to claim they are X’”.
In this case, it seems like the very people that the club is trying to explain the concepts of EA to, are also the people that OP is worried about alienating by paying the organizers. In this case what is going on is that the goodness of the reputation-protecting choice is directly premised on the irrationality and ignorance of the very people you are trying to attract/inform/help. Explaining that isn’t impossible but it does seem like a particularly bad way to start of a relationship, and so I expect consequences-wise to be bad.
“Yes, we would actually be paying people, but we expected you wouldn’t understand the principles of cost-effectiveness and so be alienated if you heard about it, despite us getting you to understand them being the very thing this club is trying to do”, is IMO a bad way to start off a relationship.
I also separately think that optimizing heavily for the perception of low-context observers in a way that does not reveal a set of underlying robust principles, is bad. I don’t think you should put “zero” weight on that (and nothing in my comment implied that), but I do think it’s something that many people put far too much weight on (going into detail of which wasn’t the point of my comment, but on which I have written plenty about in many other comments).
There is also another related point in my comment, which is that “cost-effectiveness” is of course a very close sister concept to “wasting money”. I think in many ways, thinking about cost-effectiveness is where you end up if you think carefully about how you can avoid wasting money, and is in some ways a more grown-up version of various frugality concerns.
When you increase the total cost of your operations (by, for example, reducing the cost-effectiveness of your university organizers, forcing you to spend more money somewhere else to do the same amount of good) in order to appear more frugal, I think you are almost always engaging in something that has at least the hint of deception.
Yes, you might ultimately be more cost-effective by getting people to not quite realize what happened, but when people are angry at me or others for not being frugal enough, I think it’s rarely appropriate to ultimately spend more to appease them, even if doing so would ultimately then save me enough money to make it worth it. While this isn’t happening as directly here as it was with other similar situations, like whether the Wytham Abbey purchase was not frugal enough, I think the same dynamics and arguments apply.
I think if someone tries to think seriously and carefully through what it would mean to be properly frugal, I don’t think they would endorse you sacrificing the effectiveness of your operations causing you to ultimately spend more to achieve the same amount of good. And if they learned that you did, and they think carefully about what this implies about your frugality, they would end up more angry, not less. That, I think, is a dynamic worth avoiding.