If no single observer in the universe experiences a âcatastrophe,â can we truly say a catastrophe has occurred?
It depends on how catastrophe is defined. I think most people would consider a catastrophe all life on Earth dying painlessly, even though no one would experience anything in the process.
I donât know about you but I would never take that gamble.
Would you take the gamble if it involved 1 min of excruciating pain? If not, would you want the painless death of people who have a probability of experiencing more than 1 min of excruciating pain in their real future higher than 1 in 1 trillion, 10^-12, to eliminate the risk of them experiencing excruciating pain? I think the probability of a random person experiencing more than 1 min of excruciating pain in their remaining life is much higher than 10^-12. The probability of dying in a road injury in high income countries in 2023 was 8.61*10^-5. So a probablity of 0.1 % of experiencing more than 1 min of excruciating pain in a road injury death would result in an annual probability of a random person in high income countries experiencing more than 1 min of excruciating pain of at least 8.61*10^-8 (= 8.61*10^-5*0.001), 86.1 k (= 8.61*10^-8/â10^-12) times as large as 1 in 1 trillion. âAt leastâ because there are other events besides road injury deaths which could lead to more than 1 min of excruciating pain.
I think most people would consider a catastrophe all life on Earth dying painlessly, even though no one would experience anything in the process.
I believe, the reason people find the idea of a painless extinction so tragic is that they fundamentally confuse non-existence with a vacuum. This is a massive Category Error.
âIn physics, a vacuum is still a âsomethingâ, it has a metric, a coordinate system, and energy fields. It is a physical state. But non-existence isnât a âstateâ you fall into; it is the total deletion of all states. We fail to grasp this because we canât imagine a âtotal shutdownâ without projecting a background stage (like darkness or silence) to hold it.
âAnd that is the reason why people usually argue, âBut think of all the music, the sunsets, and the joy weâd lose!â which is Circular Reasoning. We only value those things because weâre already here and wired to âthirstâ for them. If the world ends painlessly, that thirst vanishes along with the water. No one is left behind to feel âdeprived.â You canât have a âlossâ without a âloserâ to experience it.
âThe trick our mind plays on us is the Phantom Observer effect. When you imagine the world ending, youâre secretly picturing yourself standing in the void, looking at a blank space and feeling sad. But in a total extinction, the observer is deleted too. Youâre not âmissingâ the party; the party, the guests, and the very concept of âmissing outâ are all wiped from the map.
ââTL;DR: People fear ânothingnessâ because they perceive it as a cold, hollow state. But once you grasp that nothingness isnât a state of lack, but rather the âlossâ losing its host, the tragedy evaporates. It is not a âloss of valueâ; it is the deletion of the very coordinate system where value exists.
If not, would you want the painless death of people who have a probability of experiencing more than 1 min of excruciating pain in their real future higher than 1 in 1 trillion, 10^-12, to eliminate the risk of them experiencing excruciating pain?
So, regarding this question, while I realize this is a total non-starter in any public discourse and feels counter-intuitive at first glance, my answer would be yes. I believe it only sounds radical because we are biologically programmed to protect the âcoordinate systemâ at all costs. However, once you see that non-existence isnât âlosing the waterâ but âdeleting the thirst, you weigh the reality of suffering against the âneutralityâ of non-existence and the conclusion becomes unavoidable. It is hard to internalize this reasoning because our minds are designed to value things within the system but once you step outside that âcoordinate system,â you see that.
A. Duration of 1 s, intensity of X, and probability of 10^-100.
B. Duration of 10^100 years, intensity of 99.99999999 % of X, and probability of 1.
Would you prefer averting A over B? In other words, would you prefer A) an infinitesimal chance of decreasing 1 s of very intense pain over B) certainly decreasing 10^100 years of an infinitesimaly less intense pain?
Thank you for the thought experiment! Hereâs my current thinking about it:
The premise of â99.99999999% of Xâ assumes that pain exists on a perfectly smooth, linear scale that can be infinitely divided. However, from a functional perspective, it would be evolutionarily absurd for every infinitesimal change in stimulus to have a unique affective counterpart. If the brain had to run a different neurological âprogramâ for 90âC versus 90.00001âC for example, the computational overhead would be catastrophic.
Instead, it feels more neurobiologically grounded to model pain as operating through discrete phase transitions. This perspective would highlight the fact that the nervous system cares about categorical urgency rather than focusing on the infinite precision of a scalar value.
I think a five-phase discrete model like this could be used (where each jump represents a fundamental shift in the organismâs functional priorities):
Background Noise: A state similar to the âSolidâ phase of homeostasis; data is processed but remains subconscious.
Informative Discomfort: A low-energy awareness that suggests minor behavioral adjustments.
Behavioral Re-prioritization: A phase where the signal energy demands the abandonment of non-essential tasks
Urgent System Override: A high-intensity state that prioritizes immediate survival over higher reasoning.
Systemic Collapse (Agony): A critical point similar to a âPlasmaâ state; a catastrophic failure where the system breaks down, resulting in cognitive fragmentation.
In this model, the ethics of phase transitions are governed by lexical priority, meaning that even an infinite amount of Level 2 discomfort can never add up to a Level 5 phase. However, lexical priority only prevents us from trading a lower level for a higher one; it doesnât forbid arithmetic within the same phase. Therefore, when sensations occupy the same level, quantitative calculations become perfectly permissible.
Coming to your question, I believe that 99.99999999% of X and X are functionally identical, as the infinitesimal difference between them becomes irrelevant to the organismâs affective state. Letâs say X refers to the highest phase of Systemic Collapse. Because the system has already crossed the final âboiling pointâ into the catastrophe phase, it is already operating in a state of maximum functional disruption, making X and 99.99999999% of X biologically indistinguishable. Since these pains occupy the same biological orbital, we can apply a quantitative comparison.
To find the total disutility (U), letâs use the formula U=IĂT, where I is the intensity and T is the duration. In my model, we define the highest level of systemic collapse as Level 5 so letâs assign X a value of 5, and 99.999999% of X becomes 4.999999.
Option A (X for 1 second): UAâ=5Ă1 second=5 units
Option B (99.999999% of X for 10^100 years): UBâ=4.999999Ă(3.15Ă10^107 seconds)â1.57Ă10^108 units
Even without the probability factor, the math is undeniable: UBââ«UAâ. Therefore, averting B is the rational conclusion. By preventing 10^100 years of systemic collapse, we are eliminating an extreme amount of suffering. (Rather than accounting for an intensity difference that remains below the threshold of neural resolution.)
But letâs consider these 2 pains:
A. Duration of 1 s, level 5 intensity, and probability of 10^-100.
B. Duration of 10^100 years, level 4 intensity, and probability of 1.
As long as we treat this as a purely abstract thought experiment where variables are independent, (viewing 10^100 years not as a single continuous experience, but as a series of completely independent events of Level 4 pain) increasing the duration becomes equivalent to increasing the population size. In this framework, my answer would be similar to the âtrillion dust specksâ problem: I would choose to avert Option A as I believe that even an infinitesimal chance of a staggering amount of Level 5 pain outweighs the certainty of a small amount of Level 4 pain due to lexical priority.
However I want to note that in a biological context, duration and intensity are inextricably linked. Pain has a cumulative nature. As duration extends, the collapse of cognitive and emotional resilience removes the brainâs natural filters and causes long-term stimuli to neurologically evolve into a higher-intensity experience (neurons become increasingly reactive or neuroplasticity lowers the pain threshold to turn even minor stimuli into intense suffering etc.).
If my conclusion feels counterintuitive, the discrepancy between our biological intuitions and abstract logical conclusions is likely the reason. In the real world, the variables in the âTotal Pain = Intensity Ă Timeâ equation are interdependent (and we tend to imagine these scenarios by projecting our lived biological experiences onto them) however, in this thought experiment, they are treated as independent factors.
Thanks for elaborating. Imagine pain has N levels of intensity (with N equal to 1 or higher). Consider the following pains:
A. Duration of 1 year, intensity level N (the highest), and probability of 10^-100.
B. Duration of 10^100 years, intensity level N â 1 (the 2nd highest), and probability of 1.
The expected pain of B is 10^100*(N â 1)*1/â(1*N*10^-100) = 10^200*(1 â 1/âN) times that of A. I would prefer averting B for N equal to 2 or higher. Even for N = 2, the expected pain of B is 5*10^199 times that of A.
For which values of N (if any) would you prefer averting B over A? I understand you would prefer averting A at least for N = 5. I suspect you would prefer averting A for any value of N (equal to 1 or higher) in principle, but that you believe N cannot take a high value in practice. If so, why?
Actually, my argument doesnât hinge on N being theoretically finite.
My central claim is this: Level 5 pain is not simply âLevel 4 pain + 1 unit.â They represent fundamentally different categories of experience.
The issue with this example is that it still treats N and Nâ1 as points on the same scalar continuum, which fails to capture the categorical distinction at the core of my proposition.
In my argument, if Level 5 pain is an âapple,â Level 4 pain is an âorange.â And when we are dealing with apples and oranges, numerical superiority alone is insufficient for a value comparison. If we say that apples have lexical priority over oranges, the initial coefficients (duration and probability) become irrelevant.
While mathematical models can theoretically increase N to infinity, the subjective reality of suffering is biologically capped because there is a physiological ceiling of the nervous system.
Sensory receptors and neural circuits have finite firing rates. Once the system reaches âsaturation,â the neural âbandwidthâ is fully occupied. At this point, any further increase in the external stimulus intensity fails to translate into a higher degree of perceived pain because the biological hardware simply cannot transmit signals any faster or more intensely.
Furthermore, the body possesses intrinsic protective mechanisms that act as a natural circuit breaker for the conscious mind. When pain reaches a critical threshold that threatens systemic homeostasis, it often triggers a âshutdownâ mechanism, such as fainting, metabolic shock, or a dissociative state. These responses serve as a natural limit to subjective experience.
I suspect you would prefer averting A for any value of N (equal to 1 or higher) in principle, but that you believe N cannot take a high value in practice.
I understand I got this right. So, if N could be 1 M, I think you would prefer averting i) 1 year of pain of intensity level 1 M with probability 10^-100 over ii) 10^100 years of pain of intensity level 999,999 with probability 1.
While mathematical models can theoretically increase N to infinity, the subjective reality of suffering is biologically capped because there is a physiological ceiling of the nervous system.
N is supposed to be the number of different pain intensities. One cannot determine the maximum pain intensity M based on N alone. In theory, N can be arbitrarily large for any M. The mean difference Delta = M/âN between consecutive pain intensity levels would just tend to 0 as N increases to infinity. For a constant difference between the pain intensity of consecutive intensity levels, the pain intensity of level i would be Delta*i.
The premise of â99.99999999% of Xâ assumes that pain exists on a perfectly smooth, linear scale that can be infinitely divided.
I agree pain intensities cannot be arbitrarily close. However, consider N = 100. Would you prefer averting, for example, i) 0.1 s of pain of intensity level 100 with probability 10^-100 over ii) 10^100 years of pain of intensity level 99 with probability 1. The expected pain of ii) is 3.12*10^208 (= 10^100*99*1/â(0.1/â60^2/â24/â365.25*100*10^-100)) times that of i).
I agree pain intensities cannot be arbitrarily close. However, consider N = 100. Would you prefer averting, for example, i) 0.1 s of pain of intensity level 100 with probability 10^-100 over ii) 10^100 years of pain of intensity level 99 with probability 1. The expected pain of i) is 3.12*10^208(=10^100*99*1/â(0.1/â60^2/â24/â365.25*100*10^-100)) times that of i).
Regarding this question: If we assume a lexical priority between these categories, we should prefer to avert option (i) regardless of the numerical magnitude of duration or probability.
The first reason this conclusion might feel counterintuitive is the potential to overlook our assumption of duration and intensity being independent variables, the importance of which I emphasized in my previous comment.
The second potential reason is that we cannot imagine 100 distinct categories of pain as our cognitive hardware is not built for that level of resolution. Actually, the logic remains identical to our example using levels 4 and 5.
(My choice of a 5-category model was not arbitrary. I believe the number of distinct ânegative states of beingâ an organism can experience is likely capped within this range and is unlikely to exceed 6-8. Beyond a certain point, adding more âprecisionâ to pain provides no survival advantage. So, this limited number of categorical urgency states is more than sufficient for effective decision-making.)
However, if a biological system truly possessed that many categories, this wouldnât conflict with our intuitions, as the transition from 99 to 100 would be perceived as a stark, undeniable shift in experience (which ties back to my definition of a phase transition, where each jump represents a fundamental shift in the organismâs functional priorities.)
Do you think pain A having a higher intensity than B implies that averting an infinitesimal duration of pain A with an infinitesimal probability is better than averting an astronomically long time of pain B with certainty? If not, what is required for you to believe this besides A having a higher pain intensity than B?
Consider someone holding their hand in hot water for 1 min. If you think there are only 5 pain intensities, what would be the range of temperature for each pain intensity? If the ith pain intensity starts at T_(i â 1), and ends at T_i, what would change so much from temperature T_i_before = T_i â 0.001 ÂșC to T_i_after = T_i + 0.001 ÂșC that makes you prioritise averting pain at T_i_after infinitely more than pain at T_i_before? Do you believe empirical studies of peopleâs preferences would find a few temperatures (4 if you believe in 5 pain intensities) with this property, where people would prefer averting any time in pain at temperature T_i_after over an arbitrarily long time in pain at temperature T_i_before?
Thank you, those were thought-provoking questions. They really helped me dive deeper into this topic, as Iâve been wanting to do. Here is my elaboration on this:
Do you think pain A having a higher intensity than B implies that averting an infinitesimal duration of pain A with an infinitesimal probability is better than averting an astronomically long time of pain B with certainty?
I believe this thought experiment fails to test our core question which is âShould moral prioritization be determined by the aggregation of suffering (intensity Ă duration/ânumber of individuals), or does the intensity of pain possess an inherent lexical priority that outweighs duration or population size regardless of their scale?â.
The reason it fails is its reliance on the false assumption that intensity and duration are independent variables. In biological systems, these two variables are deeply coupled. A stimulus that causes moderate discomfort over 3 seconds can escalate into profound agony if sustained for a minute. Conversely, an âextremeâ stimulus experienced for a mere 0.0001 seconds may fail to even trigger a affective state at all.
To truly test the lexical priority of intensity, we must use a thought experiment that isolates the intensity from the âcompounding effectâ of time. To do this I suggest a reincarnation model: Letâs say you must choose between an infinite number of lifetimes where a speck of dust irritates your eye for 1 minute, versus a single 1 minute lifetime of extreme agony. Which one would you prefer? The mathematical disutility of the former is technically infinite. Yet, I would choose that option without a second thought and the calculation would carry no weight.
The claim that mathematical dominance constitutes an inherent âbetterâ or âworseâ is actually an example of begging the question. By assuming that a larger sum of utility automatically translates into a moral obligation, one presupposes the very value judgment they claim to derive. Numerical superiority is the moral victory only within the framework of total utilitarianism and if one operates within a different ethical framework, these mathematical results may carry no moral weight at all. To bridge the gap between the âisâ of mathematical aggregation and the âoughtâ of moral action, a separate, qualitative value judgment is required.
This distinction is clearly illustrated by the analogy of heat capacity versus temperature. A massive iceberg possesses a far greater total heat capacity than a single cup of boiling water due to the sheer volume of its molecules. However, it does not follow that the iceberg is âsuperiorâ unless one has already decided that total heat capacity (aggregate sum) is the metric that matters. If your moral compass is calibrated to temperature (intensity), the icebergâs mass is irrelevant; no amount of ice can ever surpass the boiling waterâs temperature.
But how can I justify thatâtemperatureâ is what matters rather than âheat capacityâ? I believe that to establish a grounded ethical code, we must align our moral framework with the actual preferences of the subjects in whom valence is embodied. I also believe that if we do so, we will find that our moral imperative is not the maximization of a mathematical aggregate, but the maximization of what truly carries weight for the experiencing subjects themselves.
For the subject, while low-level experiences are inherently tradable by their very nature (functioning as manageable costs for a rational agent) high-intensity states arenât just âmoreâ of the same unit of pain; they represent a different kind of reality that demands absolute priority over any trade. (more on this later) This shift marks a morally significant qualitative change that aggregation inherently ignores.
I always felt that the true strength of utilitarianism lies in its commitment to grounding moral value in the most objective reality of the universe: the experienced valence of sentient beings. However, by prioritizing the âmathematical aggregateâ over the nature of the experience, I believe that total utilitarianism drifts into a state of theoretical hallucination, detached from the very subjects it claims to represent.
If the ith pain intensity starts at T_(i â 1), and ends at T_i, what would change so much from temperature T_i_before = T_i â 0.001 ÂșC to T_i_after = T_i + 0.001 ÂșC that makes you prioritise averting pain at T_i_after infinitely more than pain at T_i_before?
Consider the engineering analogues: a bridge rated for exactly 10,000 tons does not merely become âslightly more strainedâ when the 10,001st ton is added; it undergoes a catastrophic structural collapse. Similarly, an electrical circuit rated for 15 amps will heat up intensely at 14.99 amps, but at 15.01 amps, the fuse blows and the circuitry melts.
Biological systems similarly operate through this âall-or-nothingâ dynamic. Take protein denaturation as an example: a protein can withstand thermal stress and keep its function until it hits a specific temperature. However, even a tiny increase as little as 0.001 °C past this tipping point causes its internal bonds to snap at the same time. This results in a sudden, irreversible loss of activity, much like an egg white irreversibly turning solid after a certain point. Likewise, in toxicology, a body can manage a certain amount of poison, but once a specific dose is reached, the bodyâs natural defenses are suddenly defeated. At this stage, the system is no longer just struggling more; it is undergoing a collapse, which is why preventing that final tiny increase is more critical than any increase before it.
Coming back to your question: on a physiological level, we can ground the radical shift between Ti_beforeâ and Ti_afterâ at the 44 °C threshold (the scientifically proven point where the activation energy peak for TRPV1 receptors is reached). At Ti_beforeâ, the thermal energy is high but remains below the critical barrier; the nociceptors are under severe stress, yet the ion channels stay closed.
At Ti_afterâ, however, the system crosses the precise energetic tipping point where these receptors snap open simultaneously. This causes a sudden, massive influx of ions and the signal sent to the brain changes completely. It stops being a manageable warning that says, âIt is getting very hot,â and becomes a definitive alarm screaming, âTissue is being destroyed.â
So, the microscopic gap between these two temperatures represents the exact moment heat alarm receptors are triggered, causing the system to send not just a signal of a small increase in warmth, but an emergency alarm of actual tissue damage.
From an evolutionary perspective, it would be counter-intuitive for the nervous system to function as a linear thermometer. Instead, it is optimized to prioritize a hierarchy of survival-critical thresholds. Consequently, it is much more biologically grounded to suggest that conscious experience operates through discrete qualitative phases, where each phase represents a distinct functional mode with corresponding affective experiences hardwired to trigger specific behavioral responses.
Consider someone holding their hand in hot water for 1 min. If you think there are only 5 pain intensities, what would be the range of temperature for each pain intensity?
By modelling pain as a hierarchical control system designed by evolution to force a specific behavioral response (specifically to signal how much agency, mental energy, and priority the brain must allocate to a threat), I would propose a taxonomy along these lines:
Level 1: Ignorable (40°C â 43°C)
Biological Response: Low-level nociception filtered by the thalamus; does not interrupt primary behavioral goals or internal maintenance.
Affective Experience: The mind acknowledges it but grants no priority; attention might remain elsewhere.
Tradability Status: Easily traded for even the smallest reward (e.g., âIâll keep my hand here just to see what happensâ).
Level 2: Manageable (44°C â 47°C)
Biological Response: The brain uses adrenaline to handle the heat, managing the situation while calculating the cost.
Affective Experience: Annoying and sharp. It takes effort to keep the hand submerged, but it does not hijack your thoughts. The âSelfâ remains an active agent.
Tradability Status: If you expect a reward you would be okay to endure this.
Level 3: Dominant (47°C â 50°C)
Biological Response: Inflammatory response begins. Forced reprioritization occurs as the organism is signaled to stop to prevent permanent tissue loss.
Affective Experience: Significant distress. You are likely sweating. Your brain is screaming that this is a âcrisisâ and the world is split between the task and the pain.
Tradability Status: A heavy burden. You would only keep your hand in only if the incentive is exceptionally valuable or the objective is critical for survival.
Level 4: Invasive (50°C â 53°C)
Biological Response: This temperature causes second-degree burns quickly. Total limbic system hijack occurs, and the body will likely trigger an involuntary withdrawal reflex.
Affective Experience: Extreme desperation. Future and past vanish; there is only the agonizing âNow.â The âSelfâ is a prisoner fighting the pain.
Tradability Status: Agency is barely holding on; rational calculations become nearly impossible due to the systemic emergency.
Level 5: Annihilating (>53°C)
Biological Response: Hardware failure. Cognitive fragmentation occur as biological limits are exceeded (e.g., rapid protein denaturation).
Affective Experience: The subject is erased. No âdecisionâ can be made because the âSelfâ that makes decisions has been replaced by raw, overwhelming signals.
Tradability Status: As the intensity has achieved absolute priority, any other consideration is impossible.
I believe, the most morally significant element of this taxonomy lies in the âTradability Statusâ assigned to each phase as it tracks the gradual dissolution of an agentâs capacity to engage in value exchange. At lower levels, pain is merely a âcostâ that a rational subject might willingly pay to secure a greater âutility.â However, as we move through the phases, we witness a profound shift: pain ceases to be a negotiable variable and instead becomes a priority that overrides all other possible values.
Do you believe empirical studies of peopleâs preferences would find a few temperatures (4 if you believe in 5 pain intensities) with this property, where people would prefer averting any time in pain at temperature T_i_after over an arbitrarily long time in pain at temperature T_i_before?
Like I mentioned, while individuals demonstrate a willingness to trade intensity for duration at lower levels of pain, for instance, accepting 43âC water for a longer duration over 44âC for a shorter one, this linear trade-off curve fractures sharply as it approaches the threshold of systemic breakdown. As intensity increases, our willingness to trade it for duration diminishes.
However, I want to take a step further than suggesting a logarithmic preference curve. I contend that if we strip away all confounding factors, intensity possesses a lexical superiority over duration in our preferences. Hereâs what I mean:
Letâs analyze why someone might prioritize ending a long-duration mild pain (like mild chronic pain) by undergoing a short-duration intense pain (like a painful invasive surgery). I claim that this choice is not driven by the total number of seconds endured. Instead, the persistent nature of chronic pain degrades the systemâs integrity in a way that fundamentally alters the intensity of the total experience.
Consider these factors;
1-) As I stated earlier, duration is not just a multiplier; it is a catalyst for a qualitative shift. ( In the context of my Five-Phase Model, after a certain threshold, a prolonged Level 3 experience does not simply âadd upâ to a large Level 3 sum, it undergoes a functional priority shift, effectively transforming into a Level 4 state for example.)
2-) There is a profound opportunity cost of utility. Persistence of pain acts as a âutility block,â preventing the subject from accessing or enjoying positive states throughout the entire duration. (Furthermore, the realization that this obstacle is enduring creates a secondary layer of profound psychological disutility, distinct from the sensory pain itself.)
Therefore, I believe that the âvalueâ we assign to duration is actually a value judgment about the quality of the state the subject is forced to inhabit, rather than a preference for a smaller numerical sum.
This perspective suggests that in a perfectly isolated system (where the âselfâ is reset and no systemic degradation carries over) the accumulation of duration might never alter the preference for intensity. If we strip away the biological âwear and tearâ and the psychological erosion that typically accompanies time, we are left with a pure hierarchy of states. To test this claim, consider the reincarnation thought experiment I provided at the beginning of this comment.
I think you meant 44 ÂșC instead of 43 ÂșC. Level 2 starts at 44 ÂșC.
1-) As I stated earlier, duration is not just a multiplier; it is a catalyst for a qualitative shift. ( In the context of my Five-Phase Model, after a certain threshold, a prolonged Level 3 experience does not simply âadd upâ to a large Level 3 sum, it undergoes a functional priority shift, effectively transforming into a Level 4 state for example.)
It makes sense the maximum level of pain increases with duration, but I do not think this solves the core issue. There will still be very small changes in temperature or duration leading to a change in the level of pain. Consider the function f(T = âtemperature of the waterâ, t = âtime with a hand under waterâ) which outputs the highest level of pain (1 to 5). Below is an illustration from Gemini. It assumes the temperature ranges you provided apply to a duration of 1 min, and the level of pain increases with duration as you mentioned. The specific shape of the boundaries between pain level is not important. What matters is that boundaries exist. Imagine 45 ÂșC for 3 min separates the levels of pain 2 and 3, as it is roughly the case below. Would you prever averting i) 45 ÂșC for 3 min 0.1 s (maximum pain level of 3) for 1 person with probability 10^-100 over ii) 45 ÂșC for 2 min 59.9 s (maximum pain level of 2) for the 8 billion people on Earth with certainty? i) corresponds to 1.80*10^-98 s (= (3*60 + 0.1)*1*10^-100) of level 3 pain in expectation, and ii) to 1.44*10^12 s (= (2*60 + 59.9)*8*10^9*1) of level 2 pain in expectation. I understand you would prefer averting i) because you prioritise averting level 3 pain infinitely (lexically) more than averting level 2 pain. I do not understand this. People would not distinguish between 45 ÂșC for 3 min 0.1 s (maximum pain level of 3), and 45 ÂșC for 2 min 59.9 s (maximum pain level of 2).
I think you meant 44 ÂșC instead of 43 ÂșC. Level 2 starts at 44 ÂșC.
Yes, thank you!
People would not distinguish between 45 ÂșC for 3 min 0.1 s (maximum pain level of 3), and 45 ÂșC for 2 min 59.9 s (maximum pain level of 2).
Actually, this comes down to how we define the boundaries. If the difference is truly imperceptible, it remains within the same region where numerical comparisons are perfectly valid. However, my claim is based on a discontinuous graph. Just as water undergoes a qualitative jump at 100 °C and turns into steam, I believe consciousness undergoes a phase transition at specific thresholds which creates a qualitative leap in the nature of pain.
I am not entirely certain, but maybe we might also consider the following hypothesis: This qualitative shift in experience morally corresponds to the tradability status of the experience itself. At lower levels of intensity, the exchange value remains high; however, as we ascend the levels, this value drops logarithmically (an approach that would also align closely with my model). This means that averting even a minute amount of a higher-level pain requires sacrificing an exponentially larger quantity of a lower-level one. But at a certain critical threshold (the point of systemic collapse where the subject entirely loses its rationality) this tradability factor effectively hits zero. In such a model, while Level 3 and Level 4 pain might possess vastly different coefficients due to the hidden tradability factor, they remain theoretically comparable. However, once we reach Level 5, we encounter a state of incomparability.
Actually, this comes down to how we define the boundaries. If the difference is truly imperceptible, it remains within the same region where numerical comparisons are perfectly valid.
Do you think there is a temperature T, and duration t for which the pain of T for t + 0.1 s is infinitely (lexically) worse than pain of T for t â 0.1 s?
However, my claim is based on a discontinuous graph. Just as water undergoes a qualitative jump at 100 °C and turns into steam, I believe consciousness undergoes a phase transition at specific thresholds which creates a qualitative leap in the nature of pain.
What do you mean by âqualitative leapâ? A large, but finite increase in pain intensity for a small increase in temperature or duration? If so, it would still be the case that a sufficiently long time in pain of level i would be worse than any given time in pain of level i + 1, as argued in Benthamâs Bulldogâs post.
I am not entirely certain, but maybe we might also consider the following hypothesis: This qualitative shift in experience morally corresponds to the tradability status of the experience itself.
This is how I would think about it. I do not know if there are large increases in pain intensity for small increases in temperature or duration. However, I agree pain intensity increases superlinearly with temperature for some ranges of temperature. Note the above goes very much against prioritising higher levels of pain infinitely (lexically) more.
But at a certain critical threshold (the point of systemic collapse where the subject entirely loses its rationality) this tradability factor effectively hits zero. In such a model, while Level 3 and Level 4 pain might possess vastly different coefficients due to the hidden tradability factor, they remain theoretically comparable. However, once we reach Level 5, we encounter a state of incomparability.
Imagine 53 ÂșC for 1 min separates the levels of pain 4 and 5, as it is roughly the case in the graph above (which assumes the temperature ranges you mentioned apply to a duration of 1 min). Would you prever averting i) 53 ÂșC for 60.1 s (maximum pain level of 5) for 1 person with probability 10^-100 over ii) 53 ÂșC for 59.9 s (maximum pain level of 4) for the 8 billion people on Earth with certainty? i) corresponds to 6.01*10^-99 s (= 60.1*1*10^-100) of level 4 pain in expectation, and ii) to 4.79*10^11 s (= 59.9*8*10^9*1) of level 5 pain in expectation. I understand you would prefer averting i) because you prioritise averting level 5 pain infinitely (lexically) more than averting level 4 pain. I do not understand this. People would not distinguish between 53 ÂșC for 60.1 s (maximum pain level of 5), and 53 ÂșC for 59.9 s (maximum pain level of 4).
People would not distinguish between 53 ÂșC for 60.1 s (maximum pain level of 5), and 53 ÂșC for 59.9 s (maximum pain level of 4).
If the pain is imperceptible, how can we call it âMOREâ pain? Pain is a subjective experience; if the subject cannot feel the difference, then in what sense is it more?
What do you mean by âqualitative leapâ? A large, but finite increase in pain intensity for a small increase in temperature or duration?
If there is a qualitative leap, it means there is a fundamental difference in the experience. Different brain circuits are fired; the brain classifies the situation with a different prioritization.
With a little annoyance, you might be so tired that you donât even bother to scratch your nose to get rid of it. With manageable pain, you can still enjoy other things, like enjoying music even with a headache. If the pain is dominant, you are truly occupied by it, but you wouldnât want to kill yourself. But with invasive pain, you would give everything, even your life, just to make it stop.
This isnât just a higher magnitude of the âIâm too tired to scratch my noseâ response. It is completely something else. In none of these examples is it a case of the same neurons simply firing more; completely different circuits are fired in entirely different ways.
If so, it would still be the case that a sufficiently long time in pain of level i would be worse than any given time in pain of level i + 1, as argued in Benthamâs Bulldogâs post.
In that case, it becomes a qualitatively different experience.
Would you prever averting i) 53 ÂșC for 60.1 s (maximum pain level of 5) for 1 person with probability 10^-100 over ii) 53 ÂșC for 59.9 s (maximum pain level of 4) for the 8 billion people on Earth with certainty?
Pain perception doesnât work like a slider. We are not thermometers :)) Think about your experiences, do you experience pain like, âYeah it became 2 iotas higher, yeah now it became 6 iotas higherâ? No⊠It is distinct different codes to inform different responses.
You feel it like: âHmm itâs a bit annoying, but anyway.â âHmm itâs bad, it would be good to get rid of this.â âOh it is serious, I REALLY WANT TO stop this.â âOh itâs absolute hell, I canât think of anything else than stopping this exactly this moment.â
I would prefer infinite people to experience the âHmm itâs a bit annoyingâ response rather than one person to feel âOh itâs absolute hell.â There are different considerations when making real-world decisions, but in a vacuum, I would even prefer the âOh itâs seriousâ response infinite times than the âOh itâs absolute hell, I canât think of anything elseâ response. (As I would choose infinite reincarnations with a broken leg for 3 months rather than one reincarnation of 30 min of being eaten alive).
Between 10x absolute hell and 11x absolute hell, I would choose the second because itâs comparing apples to apples, but otherwise, itâs comparing oranges to apples. If the difference is imperceptible, it is still an apple or an orange. Actually, in my model, level 5 is unnecessary as it is evolutionarily the same response as level 4, so Iâll probably remove it from my updated model.
If reincarnation were real, would you prefer infinite lifetimes with dust specks irritating you for 10 minutes, or just one lifetime of 10 min extreme unbearable hell? The former is infinity times larger than the second.
People would not distinguish between 53 ÂșC for 60.1 s (maximum pain level of 5), and 53 ÂșC for 59.9 s (maximum pain level of 4).
I should have been clearer. I meant âpeople would barely distinguishâ. In any case, my point is that you seem to believe pain of level 5 is infinitely worse than pain of level 4 despite people barely or not distinguishing between experiences with pain of level 4 and 5 if they are sufficiently close to the temperature-duration curve separating a highest level of pain of 4 and 5.
Would you prever averting i) 53 ÂșC for 60.1 s (maximum pain level of 5) for 1 person with probability 10^-100 over ii) 53 ÂșC for 59.9 s (maximum pain level of 4) for the 8 billion people on Earth with certainty?
You did not answer this? If it helps, you could imagine that it was a real situation, and that by default ii) all people on Earth would have one hand under water at 53 ÂșC with certainty for 59.9 s, but that you could prevent this, and instead have i) just one person have their hand under water at 53 ÂșC with probablity 10^-100 for 60.1 s. It seems obvious to me i) is way better. However, if you think level 5 pain is infinitely worse than level 4 pain, you would pick ii).
Actually, in my model, level 5 is unnecessary as it is evolutionarily the same response as level 4, so Iâll probably remove it from my updated model.
The number of levels of pain, and temperture is not important to the situation I described above. As long as you believe some pains are infinitely worse than others, it is possible to come up with a situation like the above where you would pick ii) all people on Earth having one hand under water at temperature T with certainty for 59.9 s (maximum level of pain of k) over i) just one person having their hand under water at temperature T with probablity 10^-100 for 60.1 s (maximum level of pain of k + 1).
I am only discussing temperature and duration, but my argument generalises to any number of dimensions affecting the maximum level of pain. If this depends on N variables, there will be a N-dimensional space with boundaries separating experiences with maximum level of pain k and k + 1. So, for a boundary which contains experiences with duration 60 s, people prioritising pains of level k + 1 infinitely more than pains of level k would pick ii) all people on Earth being subject to a painful stimulus with certainty for 59.9 s (maximum level of pain of k) over i) just one person being subject to the same painful stimulus with probablity 10^-100 for 60.1 s (maximum level of pain of k + 1).
If reincarnation were real, would you prefer infinite lifetimes with dust specks irritating you for 10 minutes, or just one lifetime of 10 min extreme unbearable hell? The former is infinity times larger than the second.
I do not know whether literal dust specks would be sufficiently bad to make my welfare negative. However, I would prefer 10 min of extreme unbearable hell over an infinite time with slighly negative welfare.
You did not answer this? If it helps, you could imagine that it was a real situation, and that by default ii) all people on Earth would have one hand under water at 53 ÂșC with certainty for 59.9 s, but that you could prevent this, and instead have i) just one person have their hand under water at 53 ÂșC with probablity 10^-100 for 60.1 s. It seems obvious to me i) is way better. However, if you think level 5 pain is infinitely worse than level 4 pain, you would pick ii).
Still thinking about it.
I do not know whether literal dust specks would be sufficiently bad to make my welfare negative. However, I would prefer 10 min of extreme unbearable hell over an infinite time with slighly negative welfare.
Okay, letâs change it then. What would be bad enough, a mild headache? Letâs go with that. Would you prefer infinite lifetimes with a mild headache for 10 minutes, or just one lifetime of 10 min extreme unbearable hell? The disutility of the former is infinitely greater than that of the latter. Actually, even if you replace those 10 minutes with 10^10000000000 years of uninterrupted extreme torture, the disutility of the former is still infinitely greater. Which one would you choose in that case?
Or letsâsay you have to choose between these two worlds:
World A: a Rayoâs number of people experience extreme suffering but also an infinite number of people live barely above neutral (defined as 1/âRayoâs number above neutral) World B: a world where a Rayoâs number of people experience extreme hedonia without any suffering whatsoever.
The utility of the former is infinitely greater than that of the latter. Which one would you go for?
I would go with world A. I think world B is worse than, for example, a world with 1 M times as many people as B, and welfare per person just 0.0001 % lower. Repeating a similar comparison sufficiently many times, I conclude that world B is worse than a world C with way way more people than B, and welfare per person just above 0. I also believe world C is worse than a world D with 10 billion more people than C, all of whom experiencing super high welfare except for 1 person with welfare just below 0 (for example, â10^-100 times the welfare of a random human). So I conclude world B is worse than a world D with lots and lots of people with barely positive lives, 10^10 â 1 people with super high welfare w, and 1 person with welfare just below 0. I think 10^10 â 1 people with welfare w is worse than 10^11 people with welfare 0.0001 % lower than w. Repeating this, I determine that 10^10 â 1 people with welfare w is worse than lots and lots of people with barely positive welfare. So I conclude that world B is worse than a world E with lots and lots of people with barely positive lives, and 1 person with welfare just below 0. Based on a similar reasoning, world B is worse than a world F with lots and lots of people with welfare just above 0, and lots of people with welfare just below 0. For the reasons I have mentioned in the thread, I think sufficiently many people with welfare just below 0 is worse than a given number of people with very negative welfare. So I conclude world B is worse than world A with infinitely many people with welfare just above 0, and a large number of people with very negative welfare.
My conclusion that A is better than B may seem counterintuitive. However, I strongly endorse all the steps that lead me to conclude A is better than B. So I also endorse this conclusion. It is also counterintuitive that the mass of sufficiently many grains of sand could be larger than the mass of a mountain. However, I strongly endorse that grains of sand have mass, and therefore I am forced to endorse the conclusion that sufficiently many grains could have a greater mass than a mountain.
Hi Elif. Thanks for the comment.
Aggregation across existing individuals still matters in person-affecting views.
It depends on how catastrophe is defined. I think most people would consider a catastrophe all life on Earth dying painlessly, even though no one would experience anything in the process.
Would you take the gamble if it involved 1 min of excruciating pain? If not, would you want the painless death of people who have a probability of experiencing more than 1 min of excruciating pain in their real future higher than 1 in 1 trillion, 10^-12, to eliminate the risk of them experiencing excruciating pain? I think the probability of a random person experiencing more than 1 min of excruciating pain in their remaining life is much higher than 10^-12. The probability of dying in a road injury in high income countries in 2023 was 8.61*10^-5. So a probablity of 0.1 % of experiencing more than 1 min of excruciating pain in a road injury death would result in an annual probability of a random person in high income countries experiencing more than 1 min of excruciating pain of at least 8.61*10^-8 (= 8.61*10^-5*0.001), 86.1 k (= 8.61*10^-8/â10^-12) times as large as 1 in 1 trillion. âAt leastâ because there are other events besides road injury deaths which could lead to more than 1 min of excruciating pain.
Good questions, thank you!
I believe, the reason people find the idea of a painless extinction so tragic is that they fundamentally confuse non-existence with a vacuum. This is a massive Category Error.
âIn physics, a vacuum is still a âsomethingâ, it has a metric, a coordinate system, and energy fields. It is a physical state. But non-existence isnât a âstateâ you fall into; it is the total deletion of all states. We fail to grasp this because we canât imagine a âtotal shutdownâ without projecting a background stage (like darkness or silence) to hold it.
âAnd that is the reason why people usually argue, âBut think of all the music, the sunsets, and the joy weâd lose!â which is Circular Reasoning. We only value those things because weâre already here and wired to âthirstâ for them. If the world ends painlessly, that thirst vanishes along with the water. No one is left behind to feel âdeprived.â You canât have a âlossâ without a âloserâ to experience it.
âThe trick our mind plays on us is the Phantom Observer effect. When you imagine the world ending, youâre secretly picturing yourself standing in the void, looking at a blank space and feeling sad. But in a total extinction, the observer is deleted too. Youâre not âmissingâ the party; the party, the guests, and the very concept of âmissing outâ are all wiped from the map.
ââTL;DR: People fear ânothingnessâ because they perceive it as a cold, hollow state. But once you grasp that nothingness isnât a state of lack, but rather the âlossâ losing its host, the tragedy evaporates. It is not a âloss of valueâ; it is the deletion of the very coordinate system where value exists.
So, regarding this question, while I realize this is a total non-starter in any public discourse and feels counter-intuitive at first glance, my answer would be yes. I believe it only sounds radical because we are biologically programmed to protect the âcoordinate systemâ at all costs. However, once you see that non-existence isnât âlosing the waterâ but âdeleting the thirst, you weigh the reality of suffering against the âneutralityâ of non-existence and the conclusion becomes unavoidable. It is hard to internalize this reasoning because our minds are designed to value things within the system but once you step outside that âcoordinate system,â you see that.
Got it. Consider these 2 pains:
A. Duration of 1 s, intensity of X, and probability of 10^-100.
B. Duration of 10^100 years, intensity of 99.99999999 % of X, and probability of 1.
Would you prefer averting A over B? In other words, would you prefer A) an infinitesimal chance of decreasing 1 s of very intense pain over B) certainly decreasing 10^100 years of an infinitesimaly less intense pain?
Thank you for the thought experiment! Hereâs my current thinking about it:
The premise of â99.99999999% of Xâ assumes that pain exists on a perfectly smooth, linear scale that can be infinitely divided. However, from a functional perspective, it would be evolutionarily absurd for every infinitesimal change in stimulus to have a unique affective counterpart. If the brain had to run a different neurological âprogramâ for 90âC versus 90.00001âC for example, the computational overhead would be catastrophic.
Instead, it feels more neurobiologically grounded to model pain as operating through discrete phase transitions. This perspective would highlight the fact that the nervous system cares about categorical urgency rather than focusing on the infinite precision of a scalar value.
I think a five-phase discrete model like this could be used (where each jump represents a fundamental shift in the organismâs functional priorities):
Background Noise: A state similar to the âSolidâ phase of homeostasis; data is processed but remains subconscious.
Informative Discomfort: A low-energy awareness that suggests minor behavioral adjustments.
Behavioral Re-prioritization: A phase where the signal energy demands the abandonment of non-essential tasks
Urgent System Override: A high-intensity state that prioritizes immediate survival over higher reasoning.
Systemic Collapse (Agony): A critical point similar to a âPlasmaâ state; a catastrophic failure where the system breaks down, resulting in cognitive fragmentation.
In this model, the ethics of phase transitions are governed by lexical priority, meaning that even an infinite amount of Level 2 discomfort can never add up to a Level 5 phase. However, lexical priority only prevents us from trading a lower level for a higher one; it doesnât forbid arithmetic within the same phase. Therefore, when sensations occupy the same level, quantitative calculations become perfectly permissible.
Coming to your question, I believe that 99.99999999% of X and X are functionally identical, as the infinitesimal difference between them becomes irrelevant to the organismâs affective state. Letâs say X refers to the highest phase of Systemic Collapse. Because the system has already crossed the final âboiling pointâ into the catastrophe phase, it is already operating in a state of maximum functional disruption, making X and 99.99999999% of X biologically indistinguishable. Since these pains occupy the same biological orbital, we can apply a quantitative comparison.
To find the total disutility (U), letâs use the formula U=IĂT, where I is the intensity and T is the duration. In my model, we define the highest level of systemic collapse as Level 5 so letâs assign X a value of 5, and 99.999999% of X becomes 4.999999.
Option A (X for 1 second):
UAâ=5Ă1 second=5 units
Option B (99.999999% of X for 10^100 years):
UBâ=4.999999Ă(3.15Ă10^107 seconds)â1.57Ă10^108 units
Even without the probability factor, the math is undeniable: UBââ«UAâ. Therefore, averting B is the rational conclusion. By preventing 10^100 years of systemic collapse, we are eliminating an extreme amount of suffering. (Rather than accounting for an intensity difference that remains below the threshold of neural resolution.)
But letâs consider these 2 pains:
A. Duration of 1 s, level 5 intensity, and probability of 10^-100.
B. Duration of 10^100 years, level 4 intensity, and probability of 1.
As long as we treat this as a purely abstract thought experiment where variables are independent, (viewing 10^100 years not as a single continuous experience, but as a series of completely independent events of Level 4 pain) increasing the duration becomes equivalent to increasing the population size. In this framework, my answer would be similar to the âtrillion dust specksâ problem: I would choose to avert Option A as I believe that even an infinitesimal chance of a staggering amount of Level 5 pain outweighs the certainty of a small amount of Level 4 pain due to lexical priority.
However I want to note that in a biological context, duration and intensity are inextricably linked. Pain has a cumulative nature. As duration extends, the collapse of cognitive and emotional resilience removes the brainâs natural filters and causes long-term stimuli to neurologically evolve into a higher-intensity experience (neurons become increasingly reactive or neuroplasticity lowers the pain threshold to turn even minor stimuli into intense suffering etc.).
If my conclusion feels counterintuitive, the discrepancy between our biological intuitions and abstract logical conclusions is likely the reason. In the real world, the variables in the âTotal Pain = Intensity Ă Timeâ equation are interdependent (and we tend to imagine these scenarios by projecting our lived biological experiences onto them) however, in this thought experiment, they are treated as independent factors.
Thanks for elaborating. Imagine pain has N levels of intensity (with N equal to 1 or higher). Consider the following pains:
A. Duration of 1 year, intensity level N (the highest), and probability of 10^-100.
B. Duration of 10^100 years, intensity level N â 1 (the 2nd highest), and probability of 1.
The expected pain of B is 10^100*(N â 1)*1/â(1*N*10^-100) = 10^200*(1 â 1/âN) times that of A. I would prefer averting B for N equal to 2 or higher. Even for N = 2, the expected pain of B is 5*10^199 times that of A.
For which values of N (if any) would you prefer averting B over A? I understand you would prefer averting A at least for N = 5. I suspect you would prefer averting A for any value of N (equal to 1 or higher) in principle, but that you believe N cannot take a high value in practice. If so, why?
Actually, my argument doesnât hinge on N being theoretically finite.
My central claim is this: Level 5 pain is not simply âLevel 4 pain + 1 unit.â They represent fundamentally different categories of experience.
The issue with this example is that it still treats N and Nâ1 as points on the same scalar continuum, which fails to capture the categorical distinction at the core of my proposition.
In my argument, if Level 5 pain is an âapple,â Level 4 pain is an âorange.â And when we are dealing with apples and oranges, numerical superiority alone is insufficient for a value comparison. If we say that apples have lexical priority over oranges, the initial coefficients (duration and probability) become irrelevant.
I replied here.
While mathematical models can theoretically increase N to infinity, the subjective reality of suffering is biologically capped because there is a physiological ceiling of the nervous system.
Sensory receptors and neural circuits have finite firing rates. Once the system reaches âsaturation,â the neural âbandwidthâ is fully occupied. At this point, any further increase in the external stimulus intensity fails to translate into a higher degree of perceived pain because the biological hardware simply cannot transmit signals any faster or more intensely.
Furthermore, the body possesses intrinsic protective mechanisms that act as a natural circuit breaker for the conscious mind. When pain reaches a critical threshold that threatens systemic homeostasis, it often triggers a âshutdownâ mechanism, such as fainting, metabolic shock, or a dissociative state. These responses serve as a natural limit to subjective experience.
I understand I got this right. So, if N could be 1 M, I think you would prefer averting i) 1 year of pain of intensity level 1 M with probability 10^-100 over ii) 10^100 years of pain of intensity level 999,999 with probability 1.
N is supposed to be the number of different pain intensities. One cannot determine the maximum pain intensity M based on N alone. In theory, N can be arbitrarily large for any M. The mean difference Delta = M/âN between consecutive pain intensity levels would just tend to 0 as N increases to infinity. For a constant difference between the pain intensity of consecutive intensity levels, the pain intensity of level i would be Delta*i.
I agree pain intensities cannot be arbitrarily close. However, consider N = 100. Would you prefer averting, for example, i) 0.1 s of pain of intensity level 100 with probability 10^-100 over ii) 10^100 years of pain of intensity level 99 with probability 1. The expected pain of ii) is 3.12*10^208 (= 10^100*99*1/â(0.1/â60^2/â24/â365.25*100*10^-100)) times that of i).
Regarding this question: If we assume a lexical priority between these categories, we should prefer to avert option (i) regardless of the numerical magnitude of duration or probability.
The first reason this conclusion might feel counterintuitive is the potential to overlook our assumption of duration and intensity being independent variables, the importance of which I emphasized in my previous comment.
The second potential reason is that we cannot imagine 100 distinct categories of pain as our cognitive hardware is not built for that level of resolution. Actually, the logic remains identical to our example using levels 4 and 5.
(My choice of a 5-category model was not arbitrary. I believe the number of distinct ânegative states of beingâ an organism can experience is likely capped within this range and is unlikely to exceed 6-8. Beyond a certain point, adding more âprecisionâ to pain provides no survival advantage. So, this limited number of categorical urgency states is more than sufficient for effective decision-making.)
However, if a biological system truly possessed that many categories, this wouldnât conflict with our intuitions, as the transition from 99 to 100 would be perceived as a stark, undeniable shift in experience (which ties back to my definition of a phase transition, where each jump represents a fundamental shift in the organismâs functional priorities.)
Do you think pain A having a higher intensity than B implies that averting an infinitesimal duration of pain A with an infinitesimal probability is better than averting an astronomically long time of pain B with certainty? If not, what is required for you to believe this besides A having a higher pain intensity than B?
Consider someone holding their hand in hot water for 1 min. If you think there are only 5 pain intensities, what would be the range of temperature for each pain intensity? If the ith pain intensity starts at T_(i â 1), and ends at T_i, what would change so much from temperature T_i_before = T_i â 0.001 ÂșC to T_i_after = T_i + 0.001 ÂșC that makes you prioritise averting pain at T_i_after infinitely more than pain at T_i_before? Do you believe empirical studies of peopleâs preferences would find a few temperatures (4 if you believe in 5 pain intensities) with this property, where people would prefer averting any time in pain at temperature T_i_after over an arbitrarily long time in pain at temperature T_i_before?
Thank you, those were thought-provoking questions. They really helped me dive deeper into this topic, as Iâve been wanting to do. Here is my elaboration on this:
I believe this thought experiment fails to test our core question which is âShould moral prioritization be determined by the aggregation of suffering (intensity Ă duration/ânumber of individuals), or does the intensity of pain possess an inherent lexical priority that outweighs duration or population size regardless of their scale?â.
The reason it fails is its reliance on the false assumption that intensity and duration are independent variables. In biological systems, these two variables are deeply coupled. A stimulus that causes moderate discomfort over 3 seconds can escalate into profound agony if sustained for a minute. Conversely, an âextremeâ stimulus experienced for a mere 0.0001 seconds may fail to even trigger a affective state at all.
To truly test the lexical priority of intensity, we must use a thought experiment that isolates the intensity from the âcompounding effectâ of time. To do this I suggest a reincarnation model: Letâs say you must choose between an infinite number of lifetimes where a speck of dust irritates your eye for 1 minute, versus a single 1 minute lifetime of extreme agony. Which one would you prefer? The mathematical disutility of the former is technically infinite. Yet, I would choose that option without a second thought and the calculation would carry no weight.
The claim that mathematical dominance constitutes an inherent âbetterâ or âworseâ is actually an example of begging the question. By assuming that a larger sum of utility automatically translates into a moral obligation, one presupposes the very value judgment they claim to derive. Numerical superiority is the moral victory only within the framework of total utilitarianism and if one operates within a different ethical framework, these mathematical results may carry no moral weight at all. To bridge the gap between the âisâ of mathematical aggregation and the âoughtâ of moral action, a separate, qualitative value judgment is required.
This distinction is clearly illustrated by the analogy of heat capacity versus temperature. A massive iceberg possesses a far greater total heat capacity than a single cup of boiling water due to the sheer volume of its molecules. However, it does not follow that the iceberg is âsuperiorâ unless one has already decided that total heat capacity (aggregate sum) is the metric that matters. If your moral compass is calibrated to temperature (intensity), the icebergâs mass is irrelevant; no amount of ice can ever surpass the boiling waterâs temperature.
But how can I justify thatâtemperatureâ is what matters rather than âheat capacityâ? I believe that to establish a grounded ethical code, we must align our moral framework with the actual preferences of the subjects in whom valence is embodied. I also believe that if we do so, we will find that our moral imperative is not the maximization of a mathematical aggregate, but the maximization of what truly carries weight for the experiencing subjects themselves.
For the subject, while low-level experiences are inherently tradable by their very nature (functioning as manageable costs for a rational agent) high-intensity states arenât just âmoreâ of the same unit of pain; they represent a different kind of reality that demands absolute priority over any trade. (more on this later) This shift marks a morally significant qualitative change that aggregation inherently ignores.
I always felt that the true strength of utilitarianism lies in its commitment to grounding moral value in the most objective reality of the universe: the experienced valence of sentient beings. However, by prioritizing the âmathematical aggregateâ over the nature of the experience, I believe that total utilitarianism drifts into a state of theoretical hallucination, detached from the very subjects it claims to represent.
Consider the engineering analogues: a bridge rated for exactly 10,000 tons does not merely become âslightly more strainedâ when the 10,001st ton is added; it undergoes a catastrophic structural collapse. Similarly, an electrical circuit rated for 15 amps will heat up intensely at 14.99 amps, but at 15.01 amps, the fuse blows and the circuitry melts.
Biological systems similarly operate through this âall-or-nothingâ dynamic. Take protein denaturation as an example: a protein can withstand thermal stress and keep its function until it hits a specific temperature. However, even a tiny increase as little as 0.001 °C past this tipping point causes its internal bonds to snap at the same time. This results in a sudden, irreversible loss of activity, much like an egg white irreversibly turning solid after a certain point. Likewise, in toxicology, a body can manage a certain amount of poison, but once a specific dose is reached, the bodyâs natural defenses are suddenly defeated. At this stage, the system is no longer just struggling more; it is undergoing a collapse, which is why preventing that final tiny increase is more critical than any increase before it.
Coming back to your question: on a physiological level, we can ground the radical shift between Ti_beforeâ and Ti_afterâ at the 44 °C threshold (the scientifically proven point where the activation energy peak for TRPV1 receptors is reached). At Ti_beforeâ, the thermal energy is high but remains below the critical barrier; the nociceptors are under severe stress, yet the ion channels stay closed.
At Ti_afterâ, however, the system crosses the precise energetic tipping point where these receptors snap open simultaneously. This causes a sudden, massive influx of ions and the signal sent to the brain changes completely. It stops being a manageable warning that says, âIt is getting very hot,â and becomes a definitive alarm screaming, âTissue is being destroyed.â
So, the microscopic gap between these two temperatures represents the exact moment heat alarm receptors are triggered, causing the system to send not just a signal of a small increase in warmth, but an emergency alarm of actual tissue damage.
From an evolutionary perspective, it would be counter-intuitive for the nervous system to function as a linear thermometer. Instead, it is optimized to prioritize a hierarchy of survival-critical thresholds. Consequently, it is much more biologically grounded to suggest that conscious experience operates through discrete qualitative phases, where each phase represents a distinct functional mode with corresponding affective experiences hardwired to trigger specific behavioral responses.
By modelling pain as a hierarchical control system designed by evolution to force a specific behavioral response (specifically to signal how much agency, mental energy, and priority the brain must allocate to a threat), I would propose a taxonomy along these lines:
Level 1: Ignorable (40°C â 43°C)
Biological Response: Low-level nociception filtered by the thalamus; does not interrupt primary behavioral goals or internal maintenance.
Affective Experience: The mind acknowledges it but grants no priority; attention might remain elsewhere.
Tradability Status: Easily traded for even the smallest reward (e.g., âIâll keep my hand here just to see what happensâ).
Level 2: Manageable (44°C â 47°C)
Biological Response: The brain uses adrenaline to handle the heat, managing the situation while calculating the cost.
Affective Experience: Annoying and sharp. It takes effort to keep the hand submerged, but it does not hijack your thoughts. The âSelfâ remains an active agent.
Tradability Status: If you expect a reward you would be okay to endure this.
Level 3: Dominant (47°C â 50°C)
Biological Response: Inflammatory response begins. Forced reprioritization occurs as the organism is signaled to stop to prevent permanent tissue loss.
Affective Experience: Significant distress. You are likely sweating. Your brain is screaming that this is a âcrisisâ and the world is split between the task and the pain.
Tradability Status: A heavy burden. You would only keep your hand in only if the incentive is exceptionally valuable or the objective is critical for survival.
Level 4: Invasive (50°C â 53°C)
Biological Response: This temperature causes second-degree burns quickly. Total limbic system hijack occurs, and the body will likely trigger an involuntary withdrawal reflex.
Affective Experience: Extreme desperation. Future and past vanish; there is only the agonizing âNow.â The âSelfâ is a prisoner fighting the pain.
Tradability Status: Agency is barely holding on; rational calculations become nearly impossible due to the systemic emergency.
Level 5: Annihilating (>53°C)
Biological Response: Hardware failure. Cognitive fragmentation occur as biological limits are exceeded (e.g., rapid protein denaturation).
Affective Experience: The subject is erased. No âdecisionâ can be made because the âSelfâ that makes decisions has been replaced by raw, overwhelming signals.
Tradability Status: As the intensity has achieved absolute priority, any other consideration is impossible.
I believe, the most morally significant element of this taxonomy lies in the âTradability Statusâ assigned to each phase as it tracks the gradual dissolution of an agentâs capacity to engage in value exchange. At lower levels, pain is merely a âcostâ that a rational subject might willingly pay to secure a greater âutility.â However, as we move through the phases, we witness a profound shift: pain ceases to be a negotiable variable and instead becomes a priority that overrides all other possible values.
Like I mentioned, while individuals demonstrate a willingness to trade intensity for duration at lower levels of pain, for instance, accepting 43âC water for a longer duration over 44âC for a shorter one, this linear trade-off curve fractures sharply as it approaches the threshold of systemic breakdown. As intensity increases, our willingness to trade it for duration diminishes.
However, I want to take a step further than suggesting a logarithmic preference curve. I contend that if we strip away all confounding factors, intensity possesses a lexical superiority over duration in our preferences. Hereâs what I mean:
Letâs analyze why someone might prioritize ending a long-duration mild pain (like mild chronic pain) by undergoing a short-duration intense pain (like a painful invasive surgery). I claim that this choice is not driven by the total number of seconds endured. Instead, the persistent nature of chronic pain degrades the systemâs integrity in a way that fundamentally alters the intensity of the total experience.
Consider these factors;
1-) As I stated earlier, duration is not just a multiplier; it is a catalyst for a qualitative shift. ( In the context of my Five-Phase Model, after a certain threshold, a prolonged Level 3 experience does not simply âadd upâ to a large Level 3 sum, it undergoes a functional priority shift, effectively transforming into a Level 4 state for example.)
2-) There is a profound opportunity cost of utility. Persistence of pain acts as a âutility block,â preventing the subject from accessing or enjoying positive states throughout the entire duration. (Furthermore, the realization that this obstacle is enduring creates a secondary layer of profound psychological disutility, distinct from the sensory pain itself.)
Therefore, I believe that the âvalueâ we assign to duration is actually a value judgment about the quality of the state the subject is forced to inhabit, rather than a preference for a smaller numerical sum.
This perspective suggests that in a perfectly isolated system (where the âselfâ is reset and no systemic degradation carries over) the accumulation of duration might never alter the preference for intensity. If we strip away the biological âwear and tearâ and the psychological erosion that typically accompanies time, we are left with a pure hierarchy of states. To test this claim, consider the reincarnation thought experiment I provided at the beginning of this comment.
I think you meant 44 ÂșC instead of 43 ÂșC. Level 2 starts at 44 ÂșC.
It makes sense the maximum level of pain increases with duration, but I do not think this solves the core issue. There will still be very small changes in temperature or duration leading to a change in the level of pain. Consider the function f(T = âtemperature of the waterâ, t = âtime with a hand under waterâ) which outputs the highest level of pain (1 to 5). Below is an illustration from Gemini. It assumes the temperature ranges you provided apply to a duration of 1 min, and the level of pain increases with duration as you mentioned. The specific shape of the boundaries between pain level is not important. What matters is that boundaries exist. Imagine 45 ÂșC for 3 min separates the levels of pain 2 and 3, as it is roughly the case below. Would you prever averting i) 45 ÂșC for 3 min 0.1 s (maximum pain level of 3) for 1 person with probability 10^-100 over ii) 45 ÂșC for 2 min 59.9 s (maximum pain level of 2) for the 8 billion people on Earth with certainty? i) corresponds to 1.80*10^-98 s (= (3*60 + 0.1)*1*10^-100) of level 3 pain in expectation, and ii) to 1.44*10^12 s (= (2*60 + 59.9)*8*10^9*1) of level 2 pain in expectation. I understand you would prefer averting i) because you prioritise averting level 3 pain infinitely (lexically) more than averting level 2 pain. I do not understand this. People would not distinguish between 45 ÂșC for 3 min 0.1 s (maximum pain level of 3), and 45 ÂșC for 2 min 59.9 s (maximum pain level of 2).
Yes, thank you!
Actually, this comes down to how we define the boundaries. If the difference is truly imperceptible, it remains within the same region where numerical comparisons are perfectly valid. However, my claim is based on a discontinuous graph. Just as water undergoes a qualitative jump at 100 °C and turns into steam, I believe consciousness undergoes a phase transition at specific thresholds which creates a qualitative leap in the nature of pain.
I am not entirely certain, but maybe we might also consider the following hypothesis: This qualitative shift in experience morally corresponds to the tradability status of the experience itself. At lower levels of intensity, the exchange value remains high; however, as we ascend the levels, this value drops logarithmically (an approach that would also align closely with my model). This means that averting even a minute amount of a higher-level pain requires sacrificing an exponentially larger quantity of a lower-level one. But at a certain critical threshold (the point of systemic collapse where the subject entirely loses its rationality) this tradability factor effectively hits zero. In such a model, while Level 3 and Level 4 pain might possess vastly different coefficients due to the hidden tradability factor, they remain theoretically comparable. However, once we reach Level 5, we encounter a state of incomparability.
Do you think there is a temperature T, and duration t for which the pain of T for t + 0.1 s is infinitely (lexically) worse than pain of T for t â 0.1 s?
What do you mean by âqualitative leapâ? A large, but finite increase in pain intensity for a small increase in temperature or duration? If so, it would still be the case that a sufficiently long time in pain of level i would be worse than any given time in pain of level i + 1, as argued in Benthamâs Bulldogâs post.
This is how I would think about it. I do not know if there are large increases in pain intensity for small increases in temperature or duration. However, I agree pain intensity increases superlinearly with temperature for some ranges of temperature. Note the above goes very much against prioritising higher levels of pain infinitely (lexically) more.
Imagine 53 ÂșC for 1 min separates the levels of pain 4 and 5, as it is roughly the case in the graph above (which assumes the temperature ranges you mentioned apply to a duration of 1 min). Would you prever averting i) 53 ÂșC for 60.1 s (maximum pain level of 5) for 1 person with probability 10^-100 over ii) 53 ÂșC for 59.9 s (maximum pain level of 4) for the 8 billion people on Earth with certainty? i) corresponds to 6.01*10^-99 s (= 60.1*1*10^-100) of level 4 pain in expectation, and ii) to 4.79*10^11 s (= 59.9*8*10^9*1) of level 5 pain in expectation. I understand you would prefer averting i) because you prioritise averting level 5 pain infinitely (lexically) more than averting level 4 pain. I do not understand this. People would not distinguish between 53 ÂșC for 60.1 s (maximum pain level of 5), and 53 ÂșC for 59.9 s (maximum pain level of 4).
If the pain is imperceptible, how can we call it âMOREâ pain? Pain is a subjective experience; if the subject cannot feel the difference, then in what sense is it more?
If there is a qualitative leap, it means there is a fundamental difference in the experience. Different brain circuits are fired; the brain classifies the situation with a different prioritization.
With a little annoyance, you might be so tired that you donât even bother to scratch your nose to get rid of it. With manageable pain, you can still enjoy other things, like enjoying music even with a headache. If the pain is dominant, you are truly occupied by it, but you wouldnât want to kill yourself. But with invasive pain, you would give everything, even your life, just to make it stop.
This isnât just a higher magnitude of the âIâm too tired to scratch my noseâ response. It is completely something else. In none of these examples is it a case of the same neurons simply firing more; completely different circuits are fired in entirely different ways.
In that case, it becomes a qualitatively different experience.
Pain perception doesnât work like a slider. We are not thermometers :)) Think about your experiences, do you experience pain like, âYeah it became 2 iotas higher, yeah now it became 6 iotas higherâ? No⊠It is distinct different codes to inform different responses.
You feel it like: âHmm itâs a bit annoying, but anyway.â âHmm itâs bad, it would be good to get rid of this.â âOh it is serious, I REALLY WANT TO stop this.â âOh itâs absolute hell, I canât think of anything else than stopping this exactly this moment.â
I would prefer infinite people to experience the âHmm itâs a bit annoyingâ response rather than one person to feel âOh itâs absolute hell.â There are different considerations when making real-world decisions, but in a vacuum, I would even prefer the âOh itâs seriousâ response infinite times than the âOh itâs absolute hell, I canât think of anything elseâ response. (As I would choose infinite reincarnations with a broken leg for 3 months rather than one reincarnation of 30 min of being eaten alive).
Between 10x absolute hell and 11x absolute hell, I would choose the second because itâs comparing apples to apples, but otherwise, itâs comparing oranges to apples. If the difference is imperceptible, it is still an apple or an orange. Actually, in my model, level 5 is unnecessary as it is evolutionarily the same response as level 4, so Iâll probably remove it from my updated model.
If reincarnation were real, would you prefer infinite lifetimes with dust specks irritating you for 10 minutes, or just one lifetime of 10 min extreme unbearable hell? The former is infinity times larger than the second.
I should have been clearer. I meant âpeople would barely distinguishâ. In any case, my point is that you seem to believe pain of level 5 is infinitely worse than pain of level 4 despite people barely or not distinguishing between experiences with pain of level 4 and 5 if they are sufficiently close to the temperature-duration curve separating a highest level of pain of 4 and 5.
You did not answer this? If it helps, you could imagine that it was a real situation, and that by default ii) all people on Earth would have one hand under water at 53 ÂșC with certainty for 59.9 s, but that you could prevent this, and instead have i) just one person have their hand under water at 53 ÂșC with probablity 10^-100 for 60.1 s. It seems obvious to me i) is way better. However, if you think level 5 pain is infinitely worse than level 4 pain, you would pick ii).
The number of levels of pain, and temperture is not important to the situation I described above. As long as you believe some pains are infinitely worse than others, it is possible to come up with a situation like the above where you would pick ii) all people on Earth having one hand under water at temperature T with certainty for 59.9 s (maximum level of pain of k) over i) just one person having their hand under water at temperature T with probablity 10^-100 for 60.1 s (maximum level of pain of k + 1).
I am only discussing temperature and duration, but my argument generalises to any number of dimensions affecting the maximum level of pain. If this depends on N variables, there will be a N-dimensional space with boundaries separating experiences with maximum level of pain k and k + 1. So, for a boundary which contains experiences with duration 60 s, people prioritising pains of level k + 1 infinitely more than pains of level k would pick ii) all people on Earth being subject to a painful stimulus with certainty for 59.9 s (maximum level of pain of k) over i) just one person being subject to the same painful stimulus with probablity 10^-100 for 60.1 s (maximum level of pain of k + 1).
I do not know whether literal dust specks would be sufficiently bad to make my welfare negative. However, I would prefer 10 min of extreme unbearable hell over an infinite time with slighly negative welfare.
Still thinking about it.
Okay, letâs change it then. What would be bad enough, a mild headache? Letâs go with that. Would you prefer infinite lifetimes with a mild headache for 10 minutes, or just one lifetime of 10 min extreme unbearable hell? The disutility of the former is infinitely greater than that of the latter. Actually, even if you replace those 10 minutes with 10^10000000000 years of uninterrupted extreme torture, the disutility of the former is still infinitely greater. Which one would you choose in that case?
Or letsâsay you have to choose between these two worlds:
World A: a Rayoâs number of people experience extreme suffering but also an infinite number of people live barely above neutral (defined as 1/âRayoâs number above neutral)
World B: a world where a Rayoâs number of people experience extreme hedonia without any suffering whatsoever.
The utility of the former is infinitely greater than that of the latter. Which one would you go for?
I would go with world A. I think world B is worse than, for example, a world with 1 M times as many people as B, and welfare per person just 0.0001 % lower. Repeating a similar comparison sufficiently many times, I conclude that world B is worse than a world C with way way more people than B, and welfare per person just above 0. I also believe world C is worse than a world D with 10 billion more people than C, all of whom experiencing super high welfare except for 1 person with welfare just below 0 (for example, â10^-100 times the welfare of a random human). So I conclude world B is worse than a world D with lots and lots of people with barely positive lives, 10^10 â 1 people with super high welfare w, and 1 person with welfare just below 0. I think 10^10 â 1 people with welfare w is worse than 10^11 people with welfare 0.0001 % lower than w. Repeating this, I determine that 10^10 â 1 people with welfare w is worse than lots and lots of people with barely positive welfare. So I conclude that world B is worse than a world E with lots and lots of people with barely positive lives, and 1 person with welfare just below 0. Based on a similar reasoning, world B is worse than a world F with lots and lots of people with welfare just above 0, and lots of people with welfare just below 0. For the reasons I have mentioned in the thread, I think sufficiently many people with welfare just below 0 is worse than a given number of people with very negative welfare. So I conclude world B is worse than world A with infinitely many people with welfare just above 0, and a large number of people with very negative welfare.
My conclusion that A is better than B may seem counterintuitive. However, I strongly endorse all the steps that lead me to conclude A is better than B. So I also endorse this conclusion. It is also counterintuitive that the mass of sufficiently many grains of sand could be larger than the mass of a mountain. However, I strongly endorse that grains of sand have mass, and therefore I am forced to endorse the conclusion that sufficiently many grains could have a greater mass than a mountain.