Nice question, Sammy! I worry the meat-eater problem is mostly a distraction. If one values 1 unit of welfare in animals as much as 1 unit of welfare in humans, and does not think Rethink Prioritiesā welfare ranges are wildly off, the best animal welfare interventions will be much more cost-effective than the best interventions to save human lives. I estimatedcorporate campaigns for chicken welfare, such as the ones supported by The Humane League (THL), are 1.51 k times as cost-effective as GiveWellās top charities.
Its not only the welfare ranges, but also assuming we are hedonistic utilitarians which is pretty important and I would be interested to know how man EAs are in that boat. In general though your point stands!
If one values 1 unit of welfare in animals as much as 1 unit of welfare in humans
Rejecting this implies rejecting hedonistic utilitarianism if welfare above is interpreted as hedonic welfare. I have now changed āwelfareā to āhedonic welfareā above.
assuming we are hedonistic utilitarians
Holding everything else constant in my calculations, one would have to be less than 0.0662 % (= 1/ā(1.51*10^3)) hedonistic utilitarian to prioritise GiveWellās top charities over corporate campaigns for chicken welfare. Weighting hedonistic utilitarianism so lightly, I think:
Current factory-farming could easily be justified. In essence, because one would be able to value eating factory-farmed animals up to 1.51 k times as much as today.
There would also be no obvious reason to support global health and development interventions. Such support makes sense assuming an additional year of healthy life or a given relative increase in income are worth roughly the same regardless of the person, but this is only obviously the case if one values hedonic welfare the same regardless of who experiences it.
I suspect people who prioritise global health and development over animal welfare implicitly endorse hedonistic utilitarianism for comparisons between interventions targeting people, but reject it for comparisons across species.
Nice question, Sammy! I worry the meat-eater problem is mostly a distraction. If one values 1 unit of welfare in animals as much as 1 unit of welfare in humans, and does not think Rethink Prioritiesā welfare ranges are wildly off, the best animal welfare interventions will be much more cost-effective than the best interventions to save human lives. I estimated corporate campaigns for chicken welfare, such as the ones supported by The Humane League (THL), are 1.51 k times as cost-effective as GiveWellās top charities.
Its not only the welfare ranges, but also assuming we are hedonistic utilitarians which is pretty important and I would be interested to know how man EAs are in that boat. In general though your point stands!
Thanks, Nick.
Rejecting this implies rejecting hedonistic utilitarianism if welfare above is interpreted as hedonic welfare. I have now changed āwelfareā to āhedonic welfareā above.
Holding everything else constant in my calculations, one would have to be less than 0.0662 % (= 1/ā(1.51*10^3)) hedonistic utilitarian to prioritise GiveWellās top charities over corporate campaigns for chicken welfare. Weighting hedonistic utilitarianism so lightly, I think:
Current factory-farming could easily be justified. In essence, because one would be able to value eating factory-farmed animals up to 1.51 k times as much as today.
There would also be no obvious reason to support global health and development interventions. Such support makes sense assuming an additional year of healthy life or a given relative increase in income are worth roughly the same regardless of the person, but this is only obviously the case if one values hedonic welfare the same regardless of who experiences it.
I suspect people who prioritise global health and development over animal welfare implicitly endorse hedonistic utilitarianism for comparisons between interventions targeting people, but reject it for comparisons across species.
Hi Vasco, I first learned about the meat eater problem from your post. Thank you for your insight.