Although I don’t agree with everything Henry says here, I do believe that reputational damage is a real risk with these kind of discussions and they definitely have the potential to damage the animal welfare movement if not done in the right way. Almost everyone in my friend circle thinks it batshit crazy to care about shrimps, to so what about soil animals? Few people care much about radical empathy outside of EA. Thoughts being unpopular is not a reason to not have a discussion, but having potentially negative consequences of people being confused and caring less about all animals in general might be a reason.
In saying that, It seems that is not why your comments were banned and i’m surprised @Kevin Xia 🔸 banned these posts for the reasons you described above.
I think these conversations are important but are safer on the EA forum, and even then within dedicated discussions and not on every single animal welfare post.
I’m a bit confused as to why you are asking for concrete examples of people moving away from helping vertebrate animals. My impression is that your current opinion is that by the best of your calculations we should not support factory farming ending interventions because it is negative expected value.
Do you not want people to move away from helping vertebrate animals at the moment?
I agree with ‘within dedicated discussions and not on every single animal welfare post,’ and I think Vasco should probably take note, here.
However, I’m not really sure what you mean by reputational risk—whose reputation is at risk?
Generally speaking, I very much want people to be saying what they honestly believe, both on this forum and elsewhere. Vasco honestly believes that soil animal welfare outweighs farmed animal welfare, and he has considered arguments for why he believes this, and so I think it’s valuable for him to say the things he says (so long as he’s not being spammy about it). If people are constantly self-censoring out of fear of reputational risks, and the like, then it’s ~impossible for us to collectively figure out what’s true, and we will thus fail to rectify moral atrocities.
And, like, the core of Vasco’s argument—that if soil animals are conscious, then, given how numerous they are, their total moral weight must be very high—is really quite straightforward. I’m skeptical that readers will go away feeling confused, or thinking that Vasco (and, by extension, animal welfare folks in general?) is crazy, such that they somehow end up caring less about animals?
I By reputational risk I mean that an organization like Hive who’s stated purpose is to be “Your global online hub for farmed animal advocates.” could be undermined by their platform being spammed with arguments suggesting helping farmed animals is a bad idea.
I don’t think discussions about whether what your entire platfor is doing is even net positive, are best had on an organizational slack forum. It’s could demotivate people who are passionate about helping farmed animals.
Perhaps very uncertain philosophical questions can be discussed on other forums, then when there is some consensus that can move into the mainstream, as I think has mostly been the case with EA ideas in the past.
I strongly disagree with your statement below based on experience. Vascos arguments might be logically straightforward, but most people I know and hang out with would find it bizarre, incomprehensible and even offensive. If I tried to argue this I would probably lose hard fought reputation I have as a sensible guy who advocate for helping humans far away and farmed animals—convincing people chickens matter is hard enough...
“the core of Vasco’s argument—that if soil animals are conscious, then, given how numerous they are, their total moral weight must be very high—is really quite straightforward.
Which is why the EA forum (and maybe others) seems like a good place to anchor these discussions, send perhaps not a farmed animal welfare group slack page. My argument is that we should be wise about where and when we talk about what....
At least until the Daly show cracks open the Overton window again ;)
At least until the Daly show cracks open the Overton window again ;)
Rethink Priorities (RP) conducted a “US national poll of 4,446 Americans, adjusted to match a US nationally representative likely voter electorate”, and found “65% of respondents thought honeybees could feel pain, 56% of respondents thought that ants could feel pain, and 52% of respondents thought termites could feel pain”. I estimate effects on soil ants and termites are much larger than on target beneficiaries for “welfare range as a fraction of that of humans” = “number of neurons as a fraction of that of humans”^0.19, which explains 78.6 % of the variance in the welfare ranges in Bob Fischer’s book about comparing welfare across species.
I estimate effects on soil animals would still be much larger than those on the target beneficiaries for a welfare per animal-year of exactly 0 for animals with fewer neurons than those considered in Bob’s book, and an exponent of the number of neurons of 0.19 which explains very well its estimates []. I calculate soil ants and termites have 2.91 and 1.16 times as many neurons as shrimp, so effects on them would still be relevant. I get the following increase in the welfare of soil ants and termites as a fraction of the increase in the welfare of the target beneficiaries for an exponent of 0.19 (the chicken welfare corporate campaigns would decrease animal welfare):
I definitely agree I should not be commenting about soil animals on every post about animal welfare. I have not been doing this, although I think most people would like me to bring up soil animals less frequently. I have been trying to focus on more prominent posts, and ones from people who I think may be more open to it.
“if soil animals are conscious”. Nitpick. Certainty of consciousness is not needed. An (expected) welfare per animal-year which is not very low is enough, and I suppose this follows from a probability of sentience which is not very low. By sentience, I mean experiencing positive or negative experiences. Consciousness includes neutral experiences, so it does not necessarily imply sentience.
I am confident effects on soil animals matter for people endorsing something like the welfare ranges presented in Table 8.6 of Bob Fischer’s book about comparing animal welfare across species. I estimate effects on soil animals would still be much larger than those on the target beneficiaries for a welfare per animal-year of exactly 0 for animals with fewer neurons than those considered in Bob’s book, and welfare per animal-year for animals with at least as many neurons as shrimp (the animal with the least neurons for which the welfare range is estimated in the book) proportional to “number of neurons as a fraction of that of humans”^0.19, which explains explains78.6 % of the variance in the estimates for the welfare range presented in the book. I calculate soil ants and termites have 2.91 and 1.16 times as many neurons as shrimp, so effects on them would still be relevant. I get the following increase in the welfare of soil ants and termites as a fraction of the increase in the welfare of the target beneficiaries for an exponent of 0.19 (the chicken welfare corporate campaigns would decrease animal welfare):
For cage-free corporate campaigns, −20.4.
For buying beef, 3.31 M.
For broiler welfare corporate campaigns, −321.
For GiveWell’s top charities, 83.6 k.
For HIPF, 65.5 k.
It is the welfare per animal-year which has to be sufficiently high, but I also think nematodes, the animals with the least neurons, are more than 1 % likely to be sentient. From Andrews (2024):
Given the determinate development of their nervous systems, 30-some years ago it was taken as given that C. elegans are too simple to learn. However, once researchers turned to examine learning and memory in these tiny animals, they found an incredible amount of flexible behavior and sensitivity to experience. C. elegans have short-term and long-term memory, they can learn through habituation (Rankin et al., 1990), association (Wen et al., 1997), and imprinting (Remy & Hobert, 2005). They pass associative learning tasks using a variety of sensory modalities, including taste, smell, sensitivity to temperature, and sensitivity to oxygen (Ardiel & Rankin, 2010). They also integrate information from different sensory modalities, and respond differently to different levels of intoxicating substances, “support[ing] the view that worms can associate a physiological state with a specific experience” (Rankin, 2004, p. R618). There is also behavioral evidence that C. elegans engage in motivational trade-offs. These worms will flexibly choose to head through a noxious environment to gain access to a nutritious substance when hungry enough (Ghosh et al., 2016)—though Birch and colleagues are not convinced this behavior satisfies the marker of motivational trade-offs because it appears that one reflex is merely inhibiting another (Birch et al., 2021, p. 31).
C. elegans are a model organism for the study of nociceptors, and much of what we now know about the mechanisms of nociception comes from studies on this species (Smith & Lewin, 2009). Behavioral responses to noxious stimuli are modulated by opiates, as demonstrated by a study finding that administration of morphine has a dose-dependent effect on the latency of response to heat (Pryor et al., 2007). And, perhaps surprisingly, when the nerve ring that comprises the C. elegans brain was recently mapped, researchers found that different regions of the brain support different circuits that route sensory information to another location where they are integrated, leading to action (Brittin et al., 2021).
Even if we grant the author’s low confidence in nematodes’ having marker five (motivational trade-offs), current science provides ample confidence that nematodes have markers one (nociceptors), two (integrated brain regions), four (responsiveness to analgesics), and seven (sophisticated associative learning). Given high confidence that nematodes have even three of these markers, the report’s methodology [Birch et al. (2021)] would have us conclude that there is “substantial evidence” of sentience in nematodes.
Thanks, @NickLaing. I am tagging you because my initial reply did not include the paragraph just below.
Kevin did not ban posts about soil animals. “Kevin explained posts about soil animals are not restricted as long as they are sufficiently different from the above, and is open to discussing what this means on a case by case basis”.
Do you think people who consider caring about shrimp crazy, and are interested in helping vertebrate animals may lose this interest as a result of other people caring about shrimp? Do you think people who consider caring about soil animals crazy, and are interested in helping farmed animals may lose this interest as a result of other people caring about soil animals?
As a rule of thumb, I think interventions increasing agricultural land are beneficial, and ones decreasing it are harmful. I estimate cage-free and broiler welfare corporate campaigns increase agricultural land (although I am very uncertain about whether cage-free campaigns increase or decrease agricultural land), thus being beneficial. However, I think broadly advocating for replacing animal- with plant-based foods tends to decrease agricultural land, thus being harmful.
I certainly do not think people caring about shrimp or soil animals crazy. Although most people basically do.
My point was that your comment
“Do you have concrete examples of people moving away from supporting vertebrate animals as a result of discussions about soil animals?”
Seems incongruous with “I am very uncertain about whether cage-free campaigns increase or decrease agricultural land), thus being beneficial.
Do you currently support Cage free campaigns or not? This seems like an important question when the topic is your comments being banned from a forum largely dedicated to this goal.
My best guess is that a random cage-free corporate campaign increases animal welfare due to increasing the amount of feed needed to produce 1 kg of eggs, and therefore increasing agricultural-land-years. It makes sense hens in barns need more feed because they can move around, and therefore spend more energy. However, chickens may have higher mortality in barns in some cases, and this pushes the amount of feed needed to produce 1 kg of eggs up. I have not investigated this much, but asked Gemini 2.5 about it on 11 April 2025, and it suggested there is lots of overlap between the feed needed to produce 1 kg of eggs with chickens in barns and cages. It provided a range of 1.9 to 2.1 feed-kg/egg-kg for cages, and 2.0 to 2.2 feed-kg/egg-kg for barns.
In any case, I estimate cage-free and broiler welfare corporate campains increase the welfare of target beneficiaries, and soil ants, termites, springtails, mites, and nematodes 1.14 % and 6.51 % as cost-effectively as funding Centre for Exploratory Altruism Research’s (CEARCH’s) High Impact Philanthropy Fund (HIPF). So I recommend this instead.
Although I don’t agree with everything Henry says here, I do believe that reputational damage is a real risk with these kind of discussions and they definitely have the potential to damage the animal welfare movement if not done in the right way. Almost everyone in my friend circle thinks it batshit crazy to care about shrimps, to so what about soil animals? Few people care much about radical empathy outside of EA. Thoughts being unpopular is not a reason to not have a discussion, but having potentially negative consequences of people being confused and caring less about all animals in general might be a reason.
In saying that, It seems that is not why your comments were banned and i’m surprised @Kevin Xia 🔸 banned these posts for the reasons you described above.
I think these conversations are important but are safer on the EA forum, and even then within dedicated discussions and not on every single animal welfare post.
I’m a bit confused as to why you are asking for concrete examples of people moving away from helping vertebrate animals. My impression is that your current opinion is that by the best of your calculations we should not support factory farming ending interventions because it is negative expected value.
Do you not want people to move away from helping vertebrate animals at the moment?
I agree with ‘within dedicated discussions and not on every single animal welfare post,’ and I think Vasco should probably take note, here.
However, I’m not really sure what you mean by reputational risk—whose reputation is at risk?
Generally speaking, I very much want people to be saying what they honestly believe, both on this forum and elsewhere. Vasco honestly believes that soil animal welfare outweighs farmed animal welfare, and he has considered arguments for why he believes this, and so I think it’s valuable for him to say the things he says (so long as he’s not being spammy about it). If people are constantly self-censoring out of fear of reputational risks, and the like, then it’s ~impossible for us to collectively figure out what’s true, and we will thus fail to rectify moral atrocities.
And, like, the core of Vasco’s argument—that if soil animals are conscious, then, given how numerous they are, their total moral weight must be very high—is really quite straightforward. I’m skeptical that readers will go away feeling confused, or thinking that Vasco (and, by extension, animal welfare folks in general?) is crazy, such that they somehow end up caring less about animals?
I By reputational risk I mean that an organization like Hive who’s stated purpose is to be “Your global online hub for farmed animal advocates.” could be undermined by their platform being spammed with arguments suggesting helping farmed animals is a bad idea.
I don’t think discussions about whether what your entire platfor is doing is even net positive, are best had on an organizational slack forum. It’s could demotivate people who are passionate about helping farmed animals.
Perhaps very uncertain philosophical questions can be discussed on other forums, then when there is some consensus that can move into the mainstream, as I think has mostly been the case with EA ideas in the past.
I strongly disagree with your statement below based on experience. Vascos arguments might be logically straightforward, but most people I know and hang out with would find it bizarre, incomprehensible and even offensive. If I tried to argue this I would probably lose hard fought reputation I have as a sensible guy who advocate for helping humans far away and farmed animals—convincing people chickens matter is hard enough...
“the core of Vasco’s argument—that if soil animals are conscious, then, given how numerous they are, their total moral weight must be very high—is really quite straightforward.
Which is why the EA forum (and maybe others) seems like a good place to anchor these discussions, send perhaps not a farmed animal welfare group slack page. My argument is that we should be wise about where and when we talk about what....
At least until the Daly show cracks open the Overton window again ;)
Rethink Priorities (RP) conducted a “US national poll of 4,446 Americans, adjusted to match a US nationally representative likely voter electorate”, and found “65% of respondents thought honeybees could feel pain, 56% of respondents thought that ants could feel pain, and 52% of respondents thought termites could feel pain”. I estimate effects on soil ants and termites are much larger than on target beneficiaries for “welfare range as a fraction of that of humans” = “number of neurons as a fraction of that of humans”^0.19, which explains 78.6 % of the variance in the welfare ranges in Bob Fischer’s book about comparing welfare across species.
Thanks, Will.
I definitely agree I should not be commenting about soil animals on every post about animal welfare. I have not been doing this, although I think most people would like me to bring up soil animals less frequently. I have been trying to focus on more prominent posts, and ones from people who I think may be more open to it.
“if soil animals are conscious”. Nitpick. Certainty of consciousness is not needed. An (expected) welfare per animal-year which is not very low is enough, and I suppose this follows from a probability of sentience which is not very low. By sentience, I mean experiencing positive or negative experiences. Consciousness includes neutral experiences, so it does not necessarily imply sentience.
I am confident effects on soil animals matter for people endorsing something like the welfare ranges presented in Table 8.6 of Bob Fischer’s book about comparing animal welfare across species. I estimate effects on soil animals would still be much larger than those on the target beneficiaries for a welfare per animal-year of exactly 0 for animals with fewer neurons than those considered in Bob’s book, and welfare per animal-year for animals with at least as many neurons as shrimp (the animal with the least neurons for which the welfare range is estimated in the book) proportional to “number of neurons as a fraction of that of humans”^0.19, which explains explains 78.6 % of the variance in the estimates for the welfare range presented in the book. I calculate soil ants and termites have 2.91 and 1.16 times as many neurons as shrimp, so effects on them would still be relevant. I get the following increase in the welfare of soil ants and termites as a fraction of the increase in the welfare of the target beneficiaries for an exponent of 0.19 (the chicken welfare corporate campaigns would decrease animal welfare):
For cage-free corporate campaigns, −20.4.
For buying beef, 3.31 M.
For broiler welfare corporate campaigns, −321.
For GiveWell’s top charities, 83.6 k.
For HIPF, 65.5 k.
It is the welfare per animal-year which has to be sufficiently high, but I also think nematodes, the animals with the least neurons, are more than 1 % likely to be sentient. From Andrews (2024):
Thanks, @NickLaing. I am tagging you because my initial reply did not include the paragraph just below.
Kevin did not ban posts about soil animals. “Kevin explained posts about soil animals are not restricted as long as they are sufficiently different from the above, and is open to discussing what this means on a case by case basis”.
Do you think people who consider caring about shrimp crazy, and are interested in helping vertebrate animals may lose this interest as a result of other people caring about shrimp? Do you think people who consider caring about soil animals crazy, and are interested in helping farmed animals may lose this interest as a result of other people caring about soil animals?
As a rule of thumb, I think interventions increasing agricultural land are beneficial, and ones decreasing it are harmful. I estimate cage-free and broiler welfare corporate campaigns increase agricultural land (although I am very uncertain about whether cage-free campaigns increase or decrease agricultural land), thus being beneficial. However, I think broadly advocating for replacing animal- with plant-based foods tends to decrease agricultural land, thus being harmful.
I certainly do not think people caring about shrimp or soil animals crazy. Although most people basically do.
My point was that your comment
“Do you have concrete examples of people moving away from supporting vertebrate animals as a result of discussions about soil animals?”
Seems incongruous with “I am very uncertain about whether cage-free campaigns increase or decrease agricultural land), thus being beneficial.
Do you currently support Cage free campaigns or not? This seems like an important question when the topic is your comments being banned from a forum largely dedicated to this goal.
My best guess is that a random cage-free corporate campaign increases animal welfare due to increasing the amount of feed needed to produce 1 kg of eggs, and therefore increasing agricultural-land-years. It makes sense hens in barns need more feed because they can move around, and therefore spend more energy. However, chickens may have higher mortality in barns in some cases, and this pushes the amount of feed needed to produce 1 kg of eggs up. I have not investigated this much, but asked Gemini 2.5 about it on 11 April 2025, and it suggested there is lots of overlap between the feed needed to produce 1 kg of eggs with chickens in barns and cages. It provided a range of 1.9 to 2.1 feed-kg/egg-kg for cages, and 2.0 to 2.2 feed-kg/egg-kg for barns.
In any case, I estimate cage-free and broiler welfare corporate campains increase the welfare of target beneficiaries, and soil ants, termites, springtails, mites, and nematodes 1.14 % and 6.51 % as cost-effectively as funding Centre for Exploratory Altruism Research’s (CEARCH’s) High Impact Philanthropy Fund (HIPF). So I recommend this instead.