Jordan Arel

Karma: 561

I have been on a mission to do as much good as possible since I was quite young, and I decided to prioritize X-risk and improving the long-term future at around age 13. Toward this end, growing up I studied philosophy, psychology, social entrepreneurship, business, economics, the history of information technology, and futurism.

A few years ago I wrote a book draft I was calling “Ways to Save The World” or “Paths to Utopia” which imagined broad innovative strategies for preventing existential risk and improving the long-term future.

Upon discovering Effective Altruism in January 2022, while preparing to start a Master’s of Social Entrepreneurship degree at the University of Southern California, I did a deep dive into EA and rationality and decided to take a closer look at the possibility of AI caused X-risk and lock-in, and moved to Berkeley to do longtermist research and community building work.

I am now researching “Deep Reflection,” processes for determining how to get to our best achievable future, including interventions such as “The Long Reflection,” “Coherent Extrapolated Volition,” and “Good Reflective Governance.”

Jordan Arel 25 Jan 2026 21:44 UTC
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on: Are Short AI Timelines Really Higher-Leverage?
Really enjoyed this, great work! I get the impression medium and long timelines are significantly under-prioritized by the community, perhaps due to social/systemic biases.
I’m thrilled to see this as currently a leading forum debate week topic Toby Ord has suggested, I think this could be really high value for the community to collectively reckon with, and of course Toby’s work on the surprisingly bad scaling of chain of thought post-training (1 & 2) seems highly relevant here.

Jordan Arel 25 Jan 2026 0:11 UTC
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in reply to: peterbarnett’s comment on: peterbarnett’s Shortform
Hey again, sorry to spam you as I just commented on another piece of yours but am really vibing with your content!
I’m really hoping we can get something like this, I’ve been calling this “existential compromise.”
I worry that it may be difficult to get humanity to agree that we should use even a small fraction of future the resources optimally (see my research on this here), as I agree it seems like it will be a very weird^[1] thing that is optimal.
I think a compromise like this, with things split between optimal use and more (trans-) human friendly world makes a lot of sense and could perhaps be achieved if we can get society onto a good viatopian path, I’ve described what I hope that could look like here.
I would also say that I think Will Macaskill’s “grand bargain” and suggestions that we should try to aim for compromise in order to achieve “the good de dicto” feels to me like he actually is arguing that we need to aim for what is in fact best with significant fraction of future resources.
Nick Bostrom has also argued (page 14) that it should be possible for humans to get almost all of what they want and yet most resources could be optimized for “super-beneficiaries”.
Essentially I think we need to get whatever process^[2] is used to decide what we do with future resources to be extremely careful and thorough. I think we should target that process specifically, but it might also be good to broadly try to differentially accelerate society‘s wisdom (perhaps with AI).
Additionally, it could be really good to delay or slow things down so that we have more time to realize the existential stakes giving us the time that it takes to collectively mature and wisen.
1. ^
  Recently Will Macaskill’s research debated whether or not the best possible use of resources is something very extreme, calling this thesis “extremity of the best” (EOTB). I think this is very likely to be the case.
2. ^
  I think this includes things like AGI/superintelligence governance, global constitutional conventions, and obviously any kind of long reflection or coherent extrapolated volition that we collectively decide to undergo.

Jordan Arel 24 Jan 2026 23:08 UTC
3 points
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in reply to: peterbarnett’s comment on: peterbarnett’s Shortform
Hi Peter, good to meet you! If you are interested in the long reflection you might be interested in my research which I will link here which is on the broader class of interventions that the long reflection belongs, I really appreciate any feedback or comments on it.
Additionally, if this is something you’re interested in, you might be interested in this as a future forum debate topic. I raised it as a potential candidate here, I’m really hoping it gets enough initial upvotes to be a finalist candidate as I really think it’s an important crux for whether or not we achieve a highly valuable future!

Jordan Arel 24 Jan 2026 18:27 UTC
14 points
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on: Propose a debate topic—I’ll run one
“Conditional on avoiding existential catastrophes, the vast majority of future value depends on whether humanity implements a comprehensive reflection process (e.g., long reflection or coherent extrapolated volition)”
I made a more extensive argument of why I think this may be the case here.
Essentially, we cannot expect to ‘stumble’ into a great future. Without a comprehensive reflection process to navigate complex strategic uncertainties (e.g. here and here), we risk surviving but failing to realize the vast majority of our potential.
Crucially, humanity might not naturally converge on a patient process for determining the optimal use of future resources (e.g. here and here).
This strategic area is severely neglected; if a comprehensive reflection process is essential for high value futures, this may have significant implications for strategy and cause prioritization that the community hasn’t explicitly addressed.
What links here?
- Jordan Arel's comment on peterbarnett’s Quick takes by peterbarnett (24 Jan 2026 23:08 UTC; 3 points)

Jordan Arel 24 Jan 2026 6:07 UTC
10 points
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on: Against Maxipok: existential risk isn’t everything
Thanks for putting this out!
I agree with quite a lot of this, however I think one of the most important points for whether or not we get something close to a near-best future is whether or not we have some kind of relatively comprehensive process for determining what humanity does with our future; what I’ve been calling “deep reflection,” which could be something like a long reflection or coherent extrapolated volition.
I think if such a process is used to determine how to use at least some percentage of future resources, then at least that percentage could be close to optimal value; if for some reason there is not a comprehensive process that determines any significant percentage of future resources, then I am quite pessimistic that we would get very far above 0% possible value, as getting high value seems quite difficult because it seems like there are many factors or crucial considerations (e.g. here and here) which could decrease future value, and like getting even a few of these factors wrong may mean we get close to zero value.
I am also quite sympathetic to extremity of the best. My intuition is that it is very likely that optimal use of resources is far, far better than most other likely uses. Would be happy to expand more on this if there is interest.
That said, I think it’s important to recognize the importance of such a comprehensive process as an essential unifying strategic element; conditional on avoiding any existential catastrophes, it seems to me the vast majority of future value^[1] will be determined by two factors:
1. Whether or not we get a comprehensive reflection process at all
2. What percentage of future resources are used optimally according to the outcome of such a process
I think all of the other factors you mentioned are quite important, but I believe that they gain the vast majority of their value through how they influence the above two factors. Again, this is simply because (i) I believe we need such a process to determine how to get much above zero value with any degree of confidence, and (ii) it seems quite possible there will not be widespread agreement that we should use resources optimally according to the outcome of this process, but hopefully some grand bargain/existential compromise can be reached, or more optimistically perhaps we could try to get on a path where more convergence happens.
Would be curious to hear if you disagree with the previous paragraph, it feels like a pretty big crux for me.
1. ^
  Rather than “the vast majority of future value,” perhaps it would be slightly more accurate to say “the vast majority of positive impact we will have in expectation”; perhaps we are already predestined to achieve very high value or very low value, or more importantly, perhaps there are things we could do that seem like they will have a large impact (positive or negative); but unless our actions are leading to comprehensive strategic clarity (comprehensive reflection), and the likelihood of acting on this clarity (deep reflection), if seems hard to be confident ex ante our actions are highly likely to have highly positive impact in the final analysis.
What links here?
- Propose a debate topic—I’ll run one by Toby Tremlett🔹 (13 Jan 2026 9:20 UTC; 53 points)

Jordan Arel 23 Jan 2026 4:31 UTC
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in reply to: Jordan Arel’s comment on: How (and why) to read Drexler on AI
And I might add – not just a deep understanding of how the world is, but of how the world could be:
- Large knowledge models for grounded, efficient information retrieval
- Decomposable tasks for superintelligent systems without superintelligent agents
- The potential for coordinated small models to outcompete large models on narrow tasks, making superintelligence potentially nearer but also safer
- Structured transparency enabling verifiable commitments and de-escalation of races
- Massively positive sum possibilities making coordination much more desirable
That is to say, I think Eric is a futurist in the best sense; he is someone who sees how the future could be and strives to paint a highly legible and compelling vision of this that at times can make it feel like it might just be inevitable, but at the very least, and perhaps more importantly, shows that it’s both possible and desirable.

Jordan Arel 23 Jan 2026 3:56 UTC
5 points
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on: How (and why) to read Drexler on AI
Thanks for posting this Owen, couldn’t agree more!
I often find myself referencing Eric’s work in specific contexts, in fact I just recommended it last night to someone working on AI control via task decomposition. I have been meaning to do a link-post on Why AI Systems Don’t Want Anything as soon as I get some free time, as it’s the biggest update I have had on AI existential risk since ChatGPT was released.
Eric has the keen ability to develop a unique, nuanced, first principles perspective. I agree his work is dense and I think this is one of its greatest virtues; when I recommend his blog I always have to comment in amazement that you can read the whole thing in an afternoon and come away with an entirely novel viewpoint on the world of AI.
This is a great overview of the virtues of his work, and the things his work leaves out. I especially like how you talk about deep study and the five steps you describe in order to internalize and reinvent. I think this also hints that what I see as Eric’s greatest strength; he looks at things very deeply in order to understand from first principles. I hope studying his work deeply in this way might help inspire others to develop similar first principles insight.

Jordan Arel 19 Jan 2026 20:06 UTC
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in reply to: Linch’s comment on: Linch’s Shortform
Max Tegmark explains it best I think. Very clear and compelling and you don’t need any technical background to understand what he’s saying.
I believe his third or maybe it was second appearance on Lex Fridman’s podcast where I first heard his strongest arguments, although those are quite long with extraneous content, here is a version that is just the arguments. His solutions are somewhat specific, but overall his explanation is very good I think:

Jordan Arel 19 Jan 2026 19:26 UTC
3 points
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on: Jordan Arel’s Shortform
Quick link-post highlighting Toner quoting Postrel’s dynamist rules + her commentary. I really like the dynamist rules as a part of the vision of the AGI future we should aim for:
“Postrel does describe five characteristics of ‘dynamist rules’:
As an overview, dynamist rules:
1. Allow individuals (including groups of individuals) to act on their own knowledge.
2. Apply to simple, generic units and allow them to combine in many different ways.
3. Permit credible, understandable, enduring, and enforceable commitments.
4. Protect criticism, competition, and feedback.
5. Establish a framework within which people can create nested, competing frameworks of more specific rules.
I see some overlap with existing ideas in AI policy:
- Transparency, everyone’s favorite consensus recommendation, fits well into a dynamist worldview. It helps with Postrel’s #1 (giving individuals access to better information that they can act on as they choose), #3 (facilitating commitments), and #4 (facilitating criticism and feedback). Ditto whistleblower protections.
- Supporting the development of a third-party audit ecosystem also fits—it helps create and enforce credible commitments, per #3, and could be considered a kind of nestable framework, per #5.
- The value of open models in driving decentralized use, testing, and research is obvious through a dynamist lens, and jibes with #1 and #4. (I do think there should be some precautionary friction before releasing frontier models openly, but that’s a narrow exception to the broader value of open source AI resources.)
Another good bet is differential technological development, aka defensive accelerationism—proactively building technologies that help manage challenges posed by other technologies—though I can’t easily map it onto Postrel’s five characteristics. I’d be glad to hear readers’ ideas for other productive directions to push in.”

Jordan Arel 7 Jan 2026 17:36 UTC
3 points
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on: What sort of post-superintelligence society should we aim for?
Hey Will, very excited to see you posting more on viatopia, couldn’t agree more that some conception of viatopia might be an ideal north star for navigating the intelligence explosion.
As crazy as this seems, I just last night wrote a draft of a piece on what I have been calling primary and secondary cruxes/crucial considerations, (in previous work I also used a perhaps even more closely related concept of “robust viatopia proxy targets”) which seems closely related to your “societal version of Rawls’ primary goods,” though I had not been previously aware of this work by Rawls. I continue to be quite literally shocked at the convergence of our research, in this case profoundly (if you happen to be as incredulous as I am, I do by chance have my work on this time-stamped through a few separate modalities I’d be happy to share.)
I believe figuring out primary goods and primary cruxes should be a key priority of macrostrategy research, we don’t need to figure out everything, we just need to get the right processes and intermediate conditions in order to move us progressively in the right direction.
I think what is ultimately most important is that we reach a state of what I have been calling “deep reflection”; a state in which we have both comprehensively reflected to determine how to achieve a high value future, and simultaneously are in such a state in which society is likely to act on that knowledge. This is not quite the same as viatopia, as it’s more of an end state that would occur right before we actualize our potential, hence I think it can act as another useful handle as the kind of thing we should hope viatopia is ultimately moving us toward.
I’m really looking forward to seeing more essays in your series!

Jordan Arel 29 Dec 2025 17:31 UTC
5 points
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on: The x-risk case for exercise: to have the most impact, the world needs you at your best
Thanks Kat! Couldn’t agree more, I think self-care is essential, I wish there were more posts, or better yet more high quality comprehensive systematic health and mental health support for high-impact x-risk workers and a culture where this is acknowledged as important, I think this is an underrated crux for x-risk work.

It may seem like ‘fluff,’ but really I think the research is on our side! Would love to see what a quantitative case for exercise or other forms of self-care might look like.

I agree one way for supporting this is that you can read wok stuff while exercising. I actually like the “Milo” voice on Eleven Labs for reading work stuff even more than most audiobook narrators, it’s crazy how good text-to-speech has gotten, I get a lot of extra reading in through this and would highly recommend Eleven Labs.

Jordan Arel 17 Nov 2025 15:11 UTC
1 point
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on: HARM: a financial liability
I really like this. I’ve been thinking it would be good to have a market that measures positive and negative externalities and includes those in prices of goods, but I noticed that a shortcoming of this was that it didn’t really directly address existential risk and I think tour suggestion is a really interesting way of trying to have that included. After all, x-risk seems like the most impact of all and just incentivizing the positive externalities from, say, AI, could actually have negative impact if it doesn’t account for this.

Jordan Arel 10 Nov 2025 15:51 UTC
5 points
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on: Problems I’ve Tried to Legibilize
I very much agree with this and have been struggling with a similar problem in terms of achieving high value futures, versus mediocre ones.

I think there may be some sort of a “Fragile Future Value Hypothesis,” somewhat related to Will MacAskill’s “No Easy Eutopia,” (and the essay which follows this one in the series) and somewhat isomorphic to “The Vulnerable World Hypothesis,” in which there may be many path dependencies, potentially leading to many low and medium value futures attractor states we could end up in, because, in expectation, we are somewhat clueless as to which crucial considerations matter, and if we act wrongly on any of those crucial considerations, we could potentially lose most or even nearly all future value.

I also agree that making the decisionmakers working on AI highly aware of this could be an important solution, I’ve been thinking that the problem isn’t so much that people at the labs don’t care about future value, they are often quite explicitly utopian, it just seems to me that they don’t have much awareness of the fact that near-best futures might actually be highly contingent and very difficult to achieve, and the illegibility of this fact means that they are not really trying to be careful about which path they set us on.

I also agree that trying to get advanced AI working on these types of issues as soon it is able to meaningfully assist could be an important solution and intend to start working on this as one of my main objectives— although I’ve been a bit more focused on macrostrategy than philosophy because I think this might be a bit more feasible for current or near-future AI, and if we get in the right strategic position then maybe that could position us to figure out the philosophy stuff which I think is going to be a lot harder for AI.

Jordan Arel 10 Nov 2025 15:22 UTC
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on: Why I think building EA is important for making AI go well
Thank you for sharing Arden! I similarly have been thinking longtermism is an important crux for making AI go well, I think it’s very possible that we could avoid x-risk and have really good outcomes in the short-term, but put ourselves on a path where we predictably miss out on nearly all value in the long-term.

Jordan Arel 6 Nov 2025 17:28 UTC
4 points
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on: Will Welfareans Get to Experience the Future?
I really enjoyed this! Very important crux for how well the future goes. You may be interested to know that Nick Bostrom talks about this, he calls them super-beneficiaries.

Jordan Arel 15 Oct 2025 22:10 UTC
2 points
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in reply to: SiebeRozendal’s comment on: SiebeRozendal’s Shortform
I think this is great. I designed an entire market structure/operating system for society, which tries to generalize this principle to all externalities, positive and negative. Happy to share it if you’re interested.

Jordan Arel 30 Sep 2025 19:57 UTC
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on: Announcing: On Underutilization
I have been thinking that one solution to this could be people self-organizing and spending more of their off-time and casual hours working on these issues in self-organizing or crowd-sourced ways. Would be really curious to hear what your thoughts are on such an approach. I feel like there is enough funding that if people were able to collectively produce something promising, then this could really go somewhere. I have thought a lot about what kind of organizational structures would allow this;

Something like a weekly group meeting where people bring their best ideas and then discuss them and iteratively work on developing project ideas, media, research, and anything that could be high impact. Kind of like the EA Fellowship or other fellowships like Blue Dot and the Astra Fellowship, except for more decentralized and project-focused, and then having a coordination mechanism coordinating between the different groups in order to funnel the best projects from all of the groups to the top.

I have a pretty elaborate mechanism I designed in the past related to this for something else. But seems like it could work well here too. Don’t really have time to work on this myself that much right now. Perhaps unless I could get funding myself, which is ironically my own bottleneck I am primarily focused on right now.

But again, would be very curious to hear your thoughts on this kind of approach.

Jordan Arel 22 Sep 2025 4:13 UTC
1 point
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on: September ’25 EA Newsletter poll: Strong Longtermism
Far-future effects are the most important determinant of what we ought to do
The future is extremely big, and if we work hard, we are in an unusually high leverage position to influence it.

Jordan Arel 6 Aug 2025 20:26 UTC
3 points
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in reply to: Chris Leong’s comment on: On Artificial Wisdom
Interesting! I think I didn’t fully distinguish between two possibilities:
1. AW just has an understanding of wisdom
2. AW whose values are aligned to wisdom, or at least aligned to pursuing and acting on wisdom
I think both types of AW are worth pursuing, but the second may be even more valuable, and I think this is the type I had in mind at least in scenario 3.

Jordan Arel 25 Jun 2025 18:32 UTC
3 points
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on: Debate: Morality is Objective
While there are different value functions, I believe there is a best possible value function.

This may exist at the level of physics, something to do with qualia that we don’t understand perhaps, and I think it would be useful to have an information theory of consciousness which I have been thinking about.

But ultimately, I believe that in theory, even if it’s not at the level of physics, I think you can postulate a meta-social choice theory which evaluates every possible social choice theory under all possible circumstance for every possible mind or value function, and find some sort of game theoretic equilibrium which all value functions and social choice theories for evaluating those functions and meta-social choice theories for deciding between choice theories converge on as the universal best possible set of moral principles—which I think is fundamentally about axiology; what moral choice in any given situation creates the most value across the greatest number of minds/entities/value functions/moral theories? I believe this question has an objective answer, there is actually a best thing to do, good things to do, and bad things to do, even if we don’t know what these are. Moral progress is possible, real, not a meaningless concept.