PhD in physics (thermodynamics of ecosystems) and in moral philosophy (animal rights), master in economics, researcher in health and welfare economics at KULeuven, president of EABelgium, environmental footprint analyst at Ecolife
Stijn
Karma: 578
Some solutions to utilitarian problems
Thanks, I corrected the link
Now that’s a suggestion :-) My intention is to do academic economic research about the implications of such population ethical theories for cost-benefit analysis. My preliminary, highly uncertain guess is that a variable critical level utilitarianism results in a higher priority for avoiding current suffering (e.g. livestock farming, wild animal suffering), because it is closer to a negative utilitarianism or person affecting views, compared to e.g. total utilitarianism which prioritizes the far future (existential risk reduction). And my even more uncertain guess is that variable critical level utilitarianism is less vulnerable than total utilitarianism to counterintuitive sadistic repugnant conclusions. This means that also future generations can be inclined to be variable critical levellers instead of totalists, and that means we should discount future generations more (i.e. prioritize current generations more and focus less on existential risk reduction). But this conclusion will be very senstitive on the critical levels chosen by current and future generations.
It seems that with the formulation of the Comparative Interest principle, you already assume an asymmetry. Consider the symmetric (equally reasonable) formulation, by writing ‘better’ instead of ‘worse’ and switching X and Y: An outcome X is in one way better than an outcome Y if, conditional on X, the individuals in X would have a stronger overall interest in outcome X than in Y and, conditional on Y, the individuals in Y would not have an even stronger overall interest in Y than in X.
With this formulation, the procreation asymmetry illustriation looks different: there is an arrow from non-existence to positive existence (top arrow from right to left), but no arrow from negative existence to non-existence.
Your formulation of the comparative interest principle, means that you focus on the tails of the arrows in the figure: an arrow can only be drawn if someone exists (and has interests) at the position of the tail of the arrow. My formulation focuses on the arrowheads: an arrow can only be drawn if someone exists (and has interests) at the position of the head of the arrow. There is a symmetry in choosing heads or tails, so your comparative interest principle is not suitable for a good defense of the procreation asymmetry.
I have another defense, based on my theory of variable critical level utilitarianism (https://stijnbruers.wordpress.com/2018/02/24/variable-critical-level-utilitarianism-as-the-solution-to-population-ethics/). This is a critical level utilitarianism, where now everyone is free to choose their own critical level. The condition is: everyone should be willing to accept a life at the chosen critical level. This means that no-one will choose a negative critical level. Critical levels always have to be positive. That introduces an asymmetry between the positive and the negative, and this asymmetry is at the root of the procreation asymmetry.
I’m still not perfectly convinced: there still seems to be a symmetric formulation. You describe it in terms of pushing instead of pulling. But what about the symmetry between expressions “an existing individual in X pushes the situation from X to Y”, versus “an existing individual in Y pulls the situation from X to Y”? Why would there be no money pump in pulling cases if there could be a money pump in a pushing case?
That being said, my gut feeling tells me that your reference to game theoretic instability or money pumps is similar (analogous or perhaps exactly the same?) as my reference to dynamic inconsistency (subgame imperfect situations) that I described in my variable critical level utilitarianism draft paper https://stijnbruers.files.wordpress.com/2018/02/variable-critical-level-utilitarianism-1.pdf. So in the end you could be pointing at a valid argument indeed.
got it! :-)
Probability estimate for wild animal welfare prioritization
Perhaps I’m too sloppy with the terminology. I’ve rewritten the part about suffering focused ethics in the main text. What I meant is that these theories are characterized by a (procreation) asymmetry. That allows the avoidance of the repugnant sadistic conclusion (which is indeed called the very repugnant conclusion by Arrhenius).
So the suffering focused ethic that I am proposing, does not imply that sadistic conclusion that you mentioned (where the state with everyone experiencing extreme suffering is considered better). My personal favorite suffering focused ethic is variable critical level utilitarianism: a flexible version of critical level utilitarianism where everyone can freely choose their own non-negative critical level, which can be different for different persons, different situations and even different choice sets. This flexibility allows to steer away from the most counterintuitive conclusions.
Suppose we can choose between A: adding one person with negative utility −100, versus B: adding thousand people, each with small positive utility +1. If the critical level was fixed at say +10, then situation A decreases social welfare with 100, whereas B decreases it with 900, so traditional critical level theory indeed implies a sadistic conclusion to choose A. However, variable critical level utilitarianism can avoid this: the one person in A can choose a very high critical level for him in A, the thousand people in B can set their critical levels in B at say +1. Then B gets chosen. In general, people can choose their critical levels such that they can steer away from the most counterintuitive conclusions. The critical levels can depend on the situation and the choice set, which gives the flexibility. You can also model this with game theory, as in my draft article: https://stijnbruers.files.wordpress.com/2018/02/variable-critical-level-utilitarianism-1.pdf
the personal probability estimates are pulled out of my ‘air’ of intuitive judgments. You are allowed to play with the numbers according to your intuitive judgments. Breaking down the total estimate into factors allows you to make more accurate estimates, because you better reflect on all your beliefs that are relevant for the estimate
As mentioned, those percentages wher my own subjective estimates, and they were determined based on the considerations that I mentioned (“This estimate is based on”). When I clearly state that these are my personal, subjective estimates, I don’t think it is misleading: it does not give a veneer of objectivity.
The clarifying part is that you can now decide whether you agree or disagree with the probability estimates. Breaking the estimate into factors helps you to clarify the relevant considerations and improves your accuracy. It is better than simply guessing the overall estimate of the probability that wild animal suffering is the priority.
If you don’t like the wide margins, perhaps you can improve the estimates? But knowing we often have an overconfidence bias (our error estimates are often too narrow), we should a priori not expect narrow error margins and we should correct this bias by taking wider margins.
A small addendum: a simplified expected value estimate of reducing X-risks versus wild animal suffering: https://stijnbruers.wordpress.com/2019/10/29/reducing-existential-risks-or-wild-animal-suffering-part-ii-expected-value-estimate/
Asymmetric altruism
The intransitivity problem that you address is very similar to the problem of simultaneity or synchronicity in special relativity. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relativity_of_simultaneity Consider three space-time points (events) P1, P2 and P3. The point P1 has a future and a past light cone. Points in the future light cone are in the future of P1 (i.e. a later time according to all observers). Suppose P2 and P3 are outside of the future and past light cones of P1. Then it is possible to choose a reference frame (e.g. a non-accelerating rocket) such that P1 and P2 have the same time coordinate and hence are simultaneous space-time events: the person in the rocket sees the two events happening at the same time according to his personal clock. It is also possible to perform a Lorentz transformation towards another reference frame, e.g. a second rocket moving at constant speed relative to the first rocket, such that P1 and P3 are simultaneous (i.e. the person in the second rocket sees P1 and P3 at the same time according to her personal clock). But… it is possible that P3 is in the future light cone of P2, which means that all observers agree that event P3 happens after P2 (at a later time according to all clocks). So, special relativity involves a special kind of intransitivity: P2 is simultaneous to P1, P1 is simultaneous to P3, and P3 happens later than P2. This does not make space-time inconsistent or irrational, neither does it make the notion of time incomprehensible. The same goes for person-affecting views. In the analogy: the time coordinate corresponds to a person’s utility level. A later time means a higher utility. You can formulate a person-affecting axiology that is ‘Lorentz invariant’ just like in special relativity.
My favorite population ethical theory is variable critical level utilitarianism
https://stijnbruers.files.wordpress.com/2018/02/variable-critical-level-utilitarianism-2.pdf
This theory is in many EA-relevant cases (e.g. dealing with X-risks) equal to total utilitarianism, except that it avoids the very repugnant conclusion: situation A involves N extremely happy people, situation B involves the same N people, now extremely miserable (very negative utility), plus a huge number M of extra people with lives barely worth living (small positive utility). According to total utilitarianism, situation B would be better if M is large enough. I’m willing to bite the bullet of the repugnant conclusion, but this very repugnant conclusion is for me one of the most counterintuitive conclusions in population ethics. VCLU can easily avoid this.
The extreme cost-effectiveness of cell-based meat R&D
I partially agree. In my second, high estimate model, cell-based meat arrives in 100 years. However, it more likely arrives sooner, e.g. in 2030. From then on, carbon offsetting starts to count. I agree that we should discount future emission reductions, due to the urgency of the climate problem and the possibility of early threshold values in the climate system being passed. But 10 years is not so long.
I’m surprised by the level of agreement between our assumptions. In your model, 200 M$ funding is required to advance clean meat with 0,7 years, whereas I assumed 100M$ and 1 year. You assume a lower greenhouse gas saving: 50% of the current 7,8 Gton CO2 emissions, whereas I assumed an increase in meat consumption in businass as usual scenario, and a reduction of 1 ton CO2 per vegan year, that means a reduction of around 10 Gton (assuming 10B people), but you assumed a 25% probability of success, whereas I assumed 10%. But with more lognormal error distributions, you arrive at higher $/ton estimates. Here’s my guesstimate
I quickly made a guesstimate: https://www.getguesstimate.com/models/16723 (you can also compare it with shaybenmoshe’s guesstimate below)
The basic (in my opinion realisitic) assumption is that other people invest in cell-based meat R&D anyway, and that in the business-as-usual scenario (where you do not fund anything) no other strategy (technology, intervention, vegan outreach campaign,...) will be able (even with more funding) to abolish animal farming before cell-based meat enters the market at competitive prices. Suppose cell-based meat arrives within a few decades and eliminates animal farming in say 50 years, whereas another, next best strategy would eliminate animal farming in 100 years. Suppose that this other strategy was less costly, for example requiring only 10 million euro funding per year over a period of 100 years to abolish animal farming, whereas cell-based meat would require 100 million euro funding over 50 years. And suppose that other strategy was more neglected, for example receiving only 10 million euro funding per year, compared to 100 million for cell-based meat. Even then, extra funding for that other strategy would not be effective when it is impossible to speed it up such that it will eliminate animal farming within 50 years. When that other strategy takes more than 50 years anyway, it will become obsolete anyway in the business-as-usual scenario where cell-based meat arrives earlier and eliminates animal farming earlier. A global coordination such that all cell-based meat funding goes to that other, less costly strategy, is not effective (not so feasible). Hence, the most effective thing to do for us, is to accelerate that cell-based meat research, such that it enters the market one year earlier. That saves an extra year of animal suffering and greenhouse gas emissions. If other strategies received more funding, there is a likelihood that they make cell-based meat obsolete, and this consideration is included in the 10% probability of cell-based meat eliminating animal farming.
I don’t follow the logic of the argument, but at first sight it seems scary. Suppose a really hate my ex-girlfriend. In fact, I hate her so much that I want to kill her. I am even willing to pay $6000 to an assassin to do the job. But instead I kill her myself and give the 6000 dollars to SCI to save a life. (I can even steal all her money after I killed her and give it away to effective charities) “If you would happily pay this much (in my case, $6000) to kill someone, you probably shouldn’t abstain from killing that person.” If this is how effective altruists would defend their meat consumption, it will discredit the whole idea of effective altruism.