I am a generalist quantitative researcher. I am open to volunteering and paid work. I welcome suggestions for posts. You can give me feedback here (anonymously or not).
Vasco Grilođž
Karma: 11,262
Hi David. Are you implying this post is neglecting non-empirical evidence? If so, which type of evidence do you have in mind?
Actually, this comes down to how we define the boundaries. If the difference is truly imperceptible, it remains within the same region where numerical comparisons are perfectly valid.
Do you think there is a temperature T, and duration t for which the pain of T for t + 0.1 s is infinitely (lexically) worse than pain of T for t â 0.1 s?
However, my claim is based on a discontinuous graph. Just as water undergoes a qualitative jump at 100 °C and turns into steam, I believe consciousness undergoes a phase transition at specific thresholds which creates a qualitative leap in the nature of pain.
What do you mean by âqualitative leapâ? A large, but finite increase in pain intensity for a small increase in temperature or duration? If so, it would still be the case that a sufficiently long time in pain of level i would be worse than any given time in pain of level i + 1, as argued in Benthamâs Bulldogâs post.
I am not entirely certain, but maybe we might also consider the following hypothesis: This qualitative shift in experience morally corresponds to the tradability status of the experience itself.
This is how I would think about it. I do not know if there are large increases in pain intensity for small increases in temperature or duration. However, I agree pain intensity increases superlinearly with temperature for some ranges of temperature. Note the above goes very much against prioritising higher levels of pain infinitely (lexically) more.
But at a certain critical threshold (the point of systemic collapse where the subject entirely loses its rationality) this tradability factor effectively hits zero. In such a model, while Level 3 and Level 4 pain might possess vastly different coefficients due to the hidden tradability factor, they remain theoretically comparable. However, once we reach Level 5, we encounter a state of incomparability.
Imagine 53 ÂșC for 1 min separates the levels of pain 4 and 5, as it is roughly the case in the graph above (which assumes the temperature ranges you mentioned apply to a duration of 1 min). Would you prever averting i) 53 ÂșC for 60.1 s (maximum pain level of 5) for 1 person with probability 10^-100 over ii) 53 ÂșC for 59.9 s (maximum pain level of 4) for the 8 billion people on Earth with certainty? i) corresponds to 6.01*10^-99 s (= 60.1*1*10^-100) of level 4 pain in expectation, and ii) to 4.79*10^11 s (= 59.9*8*10^9*1) of level 5 pain in expectation. I understand you would prefer averting i) because you prioritise averting level 5 pain infinitely (lexically) more than averting level 4 pain. I do not understand this. People would not distinguish between 53 ÂșC for 60.1 s (maximum pain level of 5), and 53 ÂșC for 59.9 s (maximum pain level of 4).
Thanks for the great post, Rory. In reality, I think the intended output often increases as any of the input factors increases. However, your point remains that increasing the most limiting input factor may increase the output much more than increasing other input factors.
Level 1: Ignorable (40°C â 43°C)
I think you meant 44 ÂșC instead of 43 ÂșC. Level 2 starts at 44 ÂșC.
1-) As I stated earlier, duration is not just a multiplier; it is a catalyst for a qualitative shift. ( In the context of my Five-Phase Model, after a certain threshold, a prolonged Level 3 experience does not simply âadd upâ to a large Level 3 sum, it undergoes a functional priority shift, effectively transforming into a Level 4 state for example.)
It makes sense the maximum level of pain increases with duration, but I do not think this solves the core issue. There will still be very small changes in temperature or duration leading to a change in the level of pain. Consider the function f(T = âtemperature of the waterâ, t = âtime with a hand under waterâ) which outputs the highest level of pain (1 to 5). Below is an illustration from Gemini. It assumes the temperature ranges you provided apply to a duration of 1 min, and the level of pain increases with duration as you mentioned. The specific shape of the boundaries between pain level is not important. What matters is that boundaries exist. Imagine 45 ÂșC for 3 min separates the levels of pain 2 and 3, as it is roughly the case below. Would you prever averting i) 45 ÂșC for 3 min 0.1 s (maximum pain level of 3) for 1 person with probability 10^-100 over ii) 45 ÂșC for 2 min 59.9 s (maximum pain level of 2) for the 8 billion people on Earth with certainty? i) corresponds to 1.80*10^-98 s (= (3*60 + 0.1)*1*10^-100) of level 3 pain in expectation, and ii) to 1.44*10^12 s (= (2*60 + 59.9)*8*10^9*1) of level 2 pain in expectation. I understand you would prefer averting i) because you prioritise averting level 3 pain infinitely (lexically) more than averting level 2 pain. I do not understand this. People would not distinguish between 45 ÂșC for 3 min 0.1 s (maximum pain level of 3), and 45 ÂșC for 2 min 59.9 s (maximum pain level of 2).
You are welcome. Feel free to get in touch in the future if you want me to have a look at other CEAs of animal welfare interventions.
Hi Alfredo. Thanks for the great post.
I think your question was relevant. I did not feel like you were derailing the post. Thanks for the support.
Hi Cynthia. Thanks for the helpful clarification. Are there any medical conditions that make people regularly experience excruciating pain (for example, for a few minutes per week)? Maybe people suffering from cluster headaches?
Thank you too for making me understand your perspective better. I think it is shared by many people.
Could you recommend any charity directly concerned with soil animals and arthropods that you think is good and that you yourself donate to? Iâd like to know, perhaps I could donate some.
Also Iâm wondering if they do just research at this phase, or are they already actively helping?
I am glad you are open to supporting work targeting invertebrates. My top recommendation for this is funding the Arthropoda Foundation. I donated a few k$ to them last year. Here is the post announcing their launch, and here is their post during the last Marginal Funding Week. They have been funding research informing how to increase the welfare of farmed arthropods, and âare particularly interested in research with a clear path to impact, whether by shaping future science or informing real-world decision-makingâ.
Hi.
âI speculate birds cause 1 s of excruciating pain to each arthropod they eat. So I estimate the decrease in the welfare of each arthropod is equal to that from them losing 24 h of fully healthy lifeâ
Did you just equal 1 second of suffering to a whole day of good life?
The sentence before the one you quoted above has the additional context.
I guess I am roughly indifferent between 1 s of excruciating pain, like âsevere burning in large areas of the body, dismemberment, or extreme tortureâ, and losing 24 h of fully healthy life. I speculate birds cause 1 s of excruciating pain to each arthropod they eat. So I estimate the decrease in the welfare of each arthropod is equal to that from them losing 24 h of fully healthy life (= 24*60/â22.4).
I assume that 1 s of excruciating pain (very extreme suffering) is as bad as losing 24 h of fully healthy life.
I like Peter Godfrey-Smiths concept of a life worth living and the thought experiments that come with it. So basically you get to decide if you want to be reborn and live the life of certain animal or not. If you say you would take the chance to live a certain life, you consider this to be a life worth living.
I like this thought experiment too.
If some people feel that 1 second of excruciating pain is worth 24 hours of living while others think itâs not a big deal you can just type in any numbers in your calculations in order to get the result you want.
My conclusions do not depend on whether arthropods have positive or negative lives. âFor simplicity, I ignore changes in the population of arthropodsâ, and I still conclude bird-sage glass may impact arthropods much more than birds.
But we should probably take care about ourselves first and make the world robustly good for humans. I wouldnât feel particularly good about myself letting kids die due to concerns for insects or even chicken.
Do you think there should still be some spending on animal welfare? Each 4 k$ or so spent on animal welfare could have saved one child if donated to GiveWellâs top charities.
The ill dog can even have some real fun in last days with morphine or other drugs (Iâm not joking⊠opioids cause euphoria and pleasure to everyone)
Interesting perspective.
Maybe youâre right if weâre strictly thinking on margin. In this case you can say, on margin, for me itâs best to help arthropods. And it might indeed be the case. In your particular case you have this kind of luck that your visceral care is so well aligned with utilitarian calculus. So you can help arthropods and feel great about it.
Yes, I am thinking at the margin. I believe soil animals are very neglected in the current portfolio of animal welfare interventions. The animal advocacy movement spent around 259 M$ in 2024. The vast majority was spent on farmed animals, and almost nothing on soil animals. I am only aware of 2 projects on soil invertebrates funded by WAI on spiders totalling 56.9 k$ (= (29.9 + 27.0)*10^3). If one of these happened in 2024, spending on research on soil invertebrates was 0.0110 % (= 56.9*10^3/â2/â(259*10^6)) of that targeting farmed animals. In contrast, I estimate there are 959 M times as many soil animals as farmed animals, and that soil animals have 13.6 k times as many neurons in total as farmed animals. The ratio between total number of neurons and spending is 124 M (= 13.6*10^3/â(1.10*10^-4)) times as large for soil animals as for farmed animals. I am very uncertain about whether the total number of neurons is a good proxy for potential benefits, but I see it as a reasonable option.
everyone mattersâso if we can help birds in ways that seem cheap and straightforward we should do it
Imagine an intervention can help a group of people âin ways that seem cheap and straightforwardâ, but this may decrease human welfare due harming a much larger group of people, and that overall you are very uncertain about whether the intervention increases or decreases human welfare (in expectation). To increase human welfare, it would be reasonable to invest less in that intervention, and instead pursue ones which decrease the uncertainty about its effects, or ones which robustly increase human welfare? I agree that everyone matters, but this is precisely what makes me more pessimistic about bird-safe glass. I think one should account for effects on all potential beings.
Now even more importantly, I think we shouldnât even think in this way. If we conclude that extra years of life are net negative for birds, what should we do? Should we go and kill all birds?
The welfare of birds can be increased by decreasing the number of birds with negative lives, but also by improving their lives (making them less negative or positive), and this may increase the welfare of birds more cost-effectively. Would you oppose killing a bird if this was the most cost-effective way of increasing its welfare? If yes, do you oppose euthanising pets even when this is the most cost-effective way of increasing their welfare?
I know this, but I think offsets can help us escape it.
Money used for offsets can be used for other altruistic purposes. For example, according to Animal Charity Evaluators (ACE), The Humane League (THL) helped 11 chickens per $ in 2024, and the Shrimp Welfare Projectâs (SWPâs) Humane Slaughter Initiative (HSI) helped 10.4 k shrimps per $ in 2024. So one has to decide between helping 1 chicken or 945 shrimps (= 10.4*10^3/â11).
eating bugs might even be useful⊠Maybe it is way to keep insect population from exploding
I do not understand. Catching wild insects for human consumption would be more expensive than increasing the production of farmed insects, and this would require a greater population of farmed insects.
First of all, all people are in the same category according to most moral theories.
Which moral theories put birds and insects in different categories?
Second interventions that help one group of people and harm other group even more donât seem like they could look good on any intuitive measure. It would seem like some form of exploitation, slavery, war, genocide, or something like this, which doesnât look good.
The actions you have in mind described by the above have looked intuitive to lots of people at certain points in history, even if they were described differently when they were performed?
Third, windows are not a natural part of environment, itâs something introduced by us, that directly harms birds. Predation of worms and bugs by birds has always been there and it might have benefits for the birds, for the ecosystem, and perhaps even for the bugs, if it keeps their number in check and avoids overpopulation, which could result in much worse life conditions, hunger, etc⊠Of course it wonât help the insect thatâs eaten, but it might help the population of insects as whole by controlling their population.
Vaccines are not naturally part of the human environment, and the diseases they mitigate could be a good way of keeping human population in check, even though they harm the people who suffer from them?
Thank you for the comment, Zlatko.
I agree with your logic, but Iâm wondering how you psychologically deal with this?
I sometimes feel a bit demotivated that increasing welfare seems very hard. However, I try to focus on what I can do to improve the situation. I also find comfort in determinism. I already thought I could not contribute to a better or worse world even before learning about effects on soil animals. I believe what I do (or, more precisely, the probabilities of my potential actions) is fully determined by the laws of physics.
Hereâs the most uncomfortable part and what Iâm genuinely afraid of: it is the possibility to arrive at negative conclusion about an intervention that is by our very strong intuitions very positive, benevolent and altruistic, and that probably does, indeed help birds.
I am not confident that bird-safe glass increases the welfare of birds. From Malâs post:
Birds saved from window collisions donât become immortal â they die later from other causes, most commonly predation, as far as we can tell (Hill et al., 2019). Based on age-structured mortality models for affected species like song sparrows, collision victims who survive gain approximately 1â2 additional years of life[1]. Whether this is net positive depends on comparing the suffering of window collision deaths versus alternative deaths (predominantly predation), plus the value of those additional life-years. Critically, if the difference in the amount of suffering caused by the new death outweighs the joy gained from an additional 1â2 years of life, the intervention could be net negative for birds themselves. Whether you think this is possible or likely depends both on empirical facts we donât currently have access to, as well as philosophical beliefs about what makes a life worth living.
I personally think this is not a good approach. I think this constant triage is very cruel and cold as it directly puts interests of one group directly against the interest of other group.
We are always in triage?
My approach would be to let interventions benefiting birds be about birds without worrying about effects on arthropods, while at the same time trying to directly help arthropods as well, by some other interventions directly aimed at arthropod welfare.
Would you advocate for bird-safe glass if it increased the welfare of birds, but robustly increased suffering, and robustly decreased happiness accounting for effects on soil animals and microorganisms?
Since you care a lot about arthropods and soil animals and think that their welfare should dominate our moral concerns
I can see the total welfare of soil animals being practically negligible or all that matter. For individual welfare per fully-healthy-animal-year proportional to âindividual number of neuronsâ^âexponentâ, and âexponentâ from 0 to 2, which covers the best guesses that I consider reasonable, I estimate that the absolute value of the total welfare of soil ants, termites, springtails, mites, and nematodes is 2.04*10^-5 to 17.9 billion times the total welfare of humans.
maybe it would be valuable to try to think of interventions that could directly help them without hurting other animals or damaging the whole ecosystems
I agree. I do not recommend pursuing interventions aiming to change land use, or decrease the welfare of non-soil animals.
I recommend research on i) the welfare of soil animals and microorganisms, and ii) comparisons of welfare across species.
So my take is that concern for arthropods and concern for other beneficiaries should not be mixed. It should be two separate things. Both are worthy and valuable, but one should not be judged in terms of other.
Would you advocate for an intervention which harms a group of people A much more than it benefits another group of people B? If not, one should also consider not advocating for an interventions which may harm a group of animals C much more than it benefits another group of animals D?
Also, interventions that directly help arthropods and soil animals could plausibly have more effects on their welfare than interventions where effects on arthropods and soil animals are just a side effect.
I agree.
Or maybe you think âhereâs another example showing how indirect effects on tiny animals may dominateâ and that this will convince some people to also prioritize (i) and (ii)? (people who were not convinced by your previous largely-overlapping posts but might by this one?)
I was mostly motivated by this, but I would not be surprised if my post ends up having a very minor effect.
Hi Jim. No. For all the non-research interventions I am aware of, including all on Rethink Prioritiesâ (RPâs) Wild Animal Welfare Intervention Database (WAWID), I think the effects on soil animals or microorganisms may be much larger than those on the target beneficiaries. So I recommend decreasing the uncertainty about the effects on soil animals and microorganisms via research on i) their welfare, and ii) comparisons of welfare across species.
Hi Mal.
We donât know if bird-window collisions affect bird population sizes. If populations are resource limited, preventing collision deaths might not increase population size â it might just shift which individuals die and how they die. If populations do increase, though, this creates cascading effects on prey species (primarily insects); scavengers who feed on collision victims; other animals who compete with birds for space, food, or other resources; and broader ecosystem dynamics.
I think replacing standard with bird-safe glass may impact arthropods much more than birds.
Hi Ben and Richard.
Weâve already started engaging policymakers on wild animal-friendly urban infrastructure (e.g. bird-safe glass). [...]
[...]
Supporting an existing amendment which would mandate bird-safe glass in new buildings. We provided advice and research on European bird-safe glass legislation and regulation, and generated positively-framed media coverage (e.g. in The Guardian).
I think replacing standard with bird-safe glass may impact arthropods much more than birds.
That makes sense. I was imagining inputs which are broader than car pieces, but narrower than just people (labour) and money (capita), like people in specific roles, or certain production equipment.