Maybe a good slogan for the anti-realists would be āreality doesnāt come with labels.ā Thereās a fact of the matter about how atoms (or 1s and 0s) are allocated, but how we draw categories comes down to subjective judgment calls.
But how we draw categories, and what subjective judgement calls we make, directly results from how atoms (or 1s and 0s) are arranged. In other words, we, and our processes for creating labels, are part of reality. (This is at least if we assume certain forms of dualism is false, or something like that; Iām not a philosopher.)
I donāt think that that idea is enough to support moral realismāor at least non-naturalist realismābecause such a realism would want to suggest some labels are right, not just that reality comes with them. (Or something like that; Iām definitely confused here.)
But it makes me feel like this āslogan for the anti-realistā might not quite capture what anti-realists are trying to claim? Or at least that I might not be understanding what the slogan is meant to convey?
Does the following statement of the slogan seem to you to capture the anti-realist position: āReality doesnāt come with objectively correct labels. Humans create labels and draw categories, and how they do this will be determined by physical reality, but thereās no separate criteria determining how humans should do this; thereās nothing more/āother than how they will do this.ā
Does the following statement of the slogan seem to you to capture the anti-realist position: āReality doesnāt come with objectively correct labels. Humans create labels and draw categories, and how they do this will be determined by physical reality, but thereās no separate criteria determining how humans should do this; thereās nothing more/āother than how they will do this.ā
Yeah, that sounds right! It carries more information than my crude proposal.
As you suggest, moral naturalists might agree that reality (obviously) doesnāt carry labels. They might argue that in a way, it kind of screams out at you where you can put the labels. And the anti-realist position is that thereās more ambiguity than āit just screams out at you.ā
While the distinction between anti-realism and non-naturalism seems relatively clearcut, I think the distinction between anti-realism and naturalism is a bit loose. This is also reflected in Luke Muehlhauserās Pluralistic Moral Reductionism post. Luke left it open whether to count PMR as realism or anti-realism. By contrast, my terminological choice has been to count it as anti-realism.
I also feel that ānaturalistic moral realismā doesnāt really ācaptureā what I want from moral realism. So in that sense I think Iād share your view that the distinction between anti-realism and moral naturalism seems loose, and that the latter might be better thought of as anti-realism. (I also think that what I want from ārealismā is probably some sort of weird spooky thing that Iād normally reject a desire for on reductionist grounds, so to that extent Iām inclined to agree with much of what youāre writing.)
But how we draw categories, and what subjective judgement calls we make, directly results from how atoms (or 1s and 0s) are arranged. In other words, we, and our processes for creating labels, are part of reality. (This is at least if we assume certain forms of dualism is false, or something like that; Iām not a philosopher.)
I donāt think that that idea is enough to support moral realismāor at least non-naturalist realismābecause such a realism would want to suggest some labels are right, not just that reality comes with them. (Or something like that; Iām definitely confused here.)
But it makes me feel like this āslogan for the anti-realistā might not quite capture what anti-realists are trying to claim? Or at least that I might not be understanding what the slogan is meant to convey?
Does the following statement of the slogan seem to you to capture the anti-realist position: āReality doesnāt come with objectively correct labels. Humans create labels and draw categories, and how they do this will be determined by physical reality, but thereās no separate criteria determining how humans should do this; thereās nothing more/āother than how they will do this.ā
Yeah, that sounds right! It carries more information than my crude proposal.
As you suggest, moral naturalists might agree that reality (obviously) doesnāt carry labels. They might argue that in a way, it kind of screams out at you where you can put the labels. And the anti-realist position is that thereās more ambiguity than āit just screams out at you.ā
While the distinction between anti-realism and non-naturalism seems relatively clearcut, I think the distinction between anti-realism and naturalism is a bit loose. This is also reflected in Luke Muehlhauserās Pluralistic Moral Reductionism post. Luke left it open whether to count PMR as realism or anti-realism. By contrast, my terminological choice has been to count it as anti-realism.
That makes sense.
I also feel that ānaturalistic moral realismā doesnāt really ācaptureā what I want from moral realism. So in that sense I think Iād share your view that the distinction between anti-realism and moral naturalism seems loose, and that the latter might be better thought of as anti-realism. (I also think that what I want from ārealismā is probably some sort of weird spooky thing that Iād normally reject a desire for on reductionist grounds, so to that extent Iām inclined to agree with much of what youāre writing.)